




Hegel’s Logic of Essence and the Ontology of 















A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the 













In this dissertation, I develop a critical theory of society in capitalism on the basis of 
Hegel’s Science of Logic. I pursue two parallel aims: Firstly, I demonstrate that the 
ontology that Hegel develops in the logic of essence is the ontology of power. This means 
that power is not external to the structure of individuals, but constitutes them. Secondly, I 
demonstrate that Hegel’s ontology of power is historically specific; namely, it captures 
the structure of social domination in capitalism. In order to do this, I substantially use 
Marx’s mature critique of political economy in Capital and the Grundrisse, as well as 
Adorno’s later social theory. 
I reconstruct the logic of essence on the basis of three major concepts:  “illusion” 
[Schein], “opposition” [Gegensatz], and  “totality” [Totalität]. These three concepts 
cohere with each other, and together, constitute a system of domination. In this system of 
domination, which is specific to capitalism, individuals seem to be equal with each other. 
Yet, the seeming equality is an illusion that conceals the essential relations of domination. 
However, the illusion of equality is not simply a cognitive failure that can be rooted out 
through enlightened reasoning. Rather, the illusion of equality is constitutive of the 
structure of domination. Furthermore, I argue that individuals are essentially the product 
of the relation of opposition that obtains between them, and that opposition is a relation 
of domination.  
I demonstrate that essence for Hegel is tantamount to totality, and that opposition 
and illusion function as necessary moments of it. The totality of essence is solely 
constituted through the interrelation of individuals, yet it has contradictorily a life of its 
 iii 
own that obtains independently of individuals. I argue that the totality exerts absolute 
power over individuals, and forces them, on pain of perishing, to follow its logic. 
Individuals have an illusion that they have power over each other, yet it is the power of 
totality that works through them, renders one powerful and the other powerless. I argue 
that the power of totality over individuals has a non-volitional, and impersonal character, 
and thus functions as a blind spell from which nobody can flee. Under the spell of total 
domination, individuals have the illusion that they are self-determining. What seems to 
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We had all the words of the world  
And did not say 
That which mattered 
Since, there was only one word, one word that was missing: 
Freedom! 








Introduction: Hegel’s Political Logic 
 
 
Even Hegel’s most abstract and metaphysical concepts are saturated with 
experience – experience of a world in which the unreasonable becomes 
reasonable. (Marcuse 1960: vii) 
 
There is no single element or relation in Logic that cannot be ultimately 
referred back to elements and relations of the actual world, and does not 
ultimately have to be so referred. (Lukács GLW 13:504) 
 
 
1- The Logic as Politics 
My general aim in this dissertation is to demonstrate that Hegel’s ontology in the Science 
of Logic – specifically in the second part of the Science of Logic, the logic of essence – 
expresses the general structure of social domination in capitalism. At first sight, the 
project of relating the logic1 to capitalist society seems to be fundamentally misguided. 
The logic, says Hegel, is the realm of “metaphysics proper or purely speculative 
philosophy” (WdL I:16, SL 27). What does a text in metaphysics or purely speculative 
philosophy have to do with politics? The proof that Hegel’s logic is already social and 
political, and for that reason, can be fruitfully appropriated for developing social and 
                                                        
1 Throughout the dissertation, the term “logic” refers to Hegel’s conception of logic, as 
expounded mainly in the Science of Logic, but also in the Encyclopedia Logic. 
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political philosophy cannot be made in the beginning. It is only through executing the 
project of relating logic to politics, that is, in the end of the dissertation, that the success 
or failure of the project can be judged. My aim in these brief introductory remarks is to 
indicate why this project is plausible and worthy to pursue, and to explain my motivation 
for undertaking it.  
The first question that needs to be answered is, why in developing a Hegelian 
politics, I do not rely on the Philosophy of Right.  Is not it the case that the Philosophy of 
Right is the locus of Hegel’s social and political philosophy? To answer this question, we 
need to take into account the nature of Hegel’s enterprise in the Philosophy of Right. The 
Philosophy of Right is arguably a text for legitimation and justification of bourgeois-
capitalist social order, what Hegel (euphemistically) calls “modernity” [die Neuzeit].  In 
the Preface to the book, Hegel explicitly states that his aim is not to offer a critical theory, 
but rather an affirmative theory, which provides a rational ground for “reconciliation” of 
individuals with the modern social and political order2. As the idea that Hegel’s 
philosophy of right has an affirmative character is crucial for me in turning away from it, 
to preempt misunderstanding, I need to qualify my claim with two points: (1) In light of 
the recent scholarship on Hegel, it is evident that Hegel’s motivation was not to give 
legitimacy to his contemporary Prussian state. Hegel was not primarily concerned with 
everyday politics; his aim was much broader. Namely, he attempted to give legitimacy to 
the basic structure of society in modernity, regardless of its immediate empirical 
                                                        
2 “To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present, and thereby to delight in the present 
– this rational insight is the reconciliation with actuality which philosophy grants to those who 
have received the inner call to comprehend, to preserve their subjective freedom in the realm of 
the substantial, and at the same time to stand with their subjective freedom not in a particular and 
contingent situation, but in what has being in and for itself” (GPR, Vorrede S. 26-7, PR p.22). 
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manifestations. (2) That Hegel’s social and political philosophy is affirmative does not at 
any rate imply that it does not have any critical potential. Hegel clearly thought that the 
basic structure of society in modernity was right and rational. This basic structure, which 
Hegel calls “the system of ethical world”  [System der sittlichen Welt] (GPR §270) 
consists of the fundamental social and political institutions of modernity, which cohere 
with each other, and mutually support each other. While Hegel’s stance towards the basic 
structure of society in modernity is affirmative, at the same time, he regards any 
significant perturbation of the normal status of the basic structure, or any excessive 
growth of one institution at the expense of others, as irrational and wrong, which, 
therefore, to that extent, would necessarily warrant criticism. To illustrate this point, let 
us consider a modern society, the contemporary society of the USA.  Hegel’s philosophy 
of right would certainly criticize the excessive atomization of bourgeois nuclear family 
(due to, say, the suburbanization of the social space); it would certainly criticize the 
excessive influence of financial corporations over the political process, as well as the 
excessive police brutality or the unjust penal code. Despite all these, Hegel’s stance 
towards the basic structure of American society is undeniably affirmative. That is, within 
the framework of Hegel’s philosophy of right, while it is necessary to criticize the 
excessive atomization of the bourgeois nuclear family, it is not possible to criticize the 
institution of bourgeois nuclear family as such. Likewise, it is not possible to criticize the 
capitalist economy as such, nor is it possible to criticize the institution of capitalist state 
as such.  
Hegel lived in an era that was still infused with enthusiasm about the prospect of 
the bourgeois-capitalist social order. This enthusiasm, although tamed and not at any rate 
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romantic, entirely colors his social and political philosophy. However, the turn of the 
events since Hegel’s death showed, I believe, that he was wrong.3 Most crucially, he 
significantly underestimated the scope of influence of economy in capitalism. To give 
only some examples out of the many, Hegel did not foresee the rapid proliferation of 
gated communities on the one hand, and of urban ghettos on the other. He did not foresee 
how the Earth under the rule of capital, to use the title of Mike Davis’ book, would turn 
into a “planet of slums.” He did not foresee how the loss of community through 
expansion of market economy could only be compensated either through virulent 
nationalism or religious fundamentalism. It is true that Hegel, having a great sense of 
reality, clearly diagnosed some major problems arising from the function of market 
economy. Yet, he thought these problems are marginal, and do not significantly affect the 
rationality of the basic structure of society, or else, he thought that these problems, 
although important, can be successfully tamed and contained through the intervention of 
the modern state. Contrary to Hegel, it is almost self-evident now that the rule of capital 
is not only restricted to economy. Rather, in capitalism, capital, to use Marx’s, is “a 
general illumination, which bathes all the other colors and modifies their particularity; it 
is a particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being.”  (MEW 42:40, 
G 107) It must be conceded that in light of the all-pervasiveness of the power of capital 
over virtually all aspects of life in capitalism, the project of the Philosophy of Right, 
which aims at proving the rationality of the bourgeois-capitalist system, essentially fails.   
                                                        
3 Towards the end of his life in 1831 Hegel himself takes a more sober position on the basic 
structure of society in modernity, and regards the issue of realization of freedom of individuals in 
the modern state to be “the knot, the problem…with which history is now occupied, and whose 
solution it has to yet work out in the future." (WW 12:536, S, LPH: 472) 
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Thus, one cannot ground a genuinely critical theory of society in capitalism – a 
critical theory that does not, self-complacently, aim at some piecemeal marginal reforms 
such that the status quo be preserved, but aims at a real change of the status quo – on the 
basis of the Philosophy of Right.4 This, however, does not mean that Hegel cannot offer a 
genuinely critical theory of capitalism. He does have such a theory; yet its locus is not in 
his official social and political philosophy. Rather, as I will show in this dissertation, the 
locus of Hegel’s critical theory of capitalism is his Science of Logic. As I hope this 
dissertation will demonstrate, the logic has a great critical potential that far transcends 
Hegel’s own official appraisal of the modern social order, a great critical potential that is 
as yet not fully explored, let alone exploited. Once Antonio Negri wrote, “Spinoza’s true 
politics is his metaphysics” (1991:114). Similarly, my aim is to show, Hegel’s true 
politics is his logic.  
 In undertaking a project of developing critical theory of society on the basis of the 
logic, I deliberately depart from the general trend of scholarship on Hegel’s social and 
political philosophy, especially the scholarship that is done in the Anglophone world. 
Perhaps under the wide influence of John Rawls, who thought the question of 
metaphysics is totally irrelevant to the question of politics, the recent scholarship on 
Hegel has tried to disentangle Hegel’s social and political philosophy from its support in 
the logic. To give some prominent examples: Axel Honneth, who bases his “normative 
reconstruction” of Hegel’s social thought on the Philosophy of Right, explicitly states that 
in “our post metaphysical standards of rationality” appealing to the logic in the context of 
                                                        
4 Or if a genuinely critical theory of society in capitalism on the basis of the Philosophy of Right 
is possible, it can only be achieved through great interpretive violence. See, for example, (Ruda: 
2011) 
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practical philosophy is not allowed (2010:5). Honneth’s reading of Hegel, as he himself 
avers, “does not depend on any argumentative backing by his logic” (ibid:48, my 
emphasis). Similarly, Allen Wood in the introduction of his now classic book on Hegel’s 
philosophy of right programmatically announces, “speculative logic is dead; but Hegel’s 
thought is not” (1990:4-8). More modestly, Frederick Neuhouser in his acclaimed book 
on Hegel’s social and political philosophy intentionally ignores the logic through and 
through (2000). Similar positions are taken by Allen Patten (2002) and Michael 
Hardimon (2004). 
However, despite the current academic interpretation of Hegel, there is a long 
tradition of using the logic for developing critical social theory, a tradition that goes back 
to Marx. In his youth, Marx offered a devastating critique of the affirmative character of 
Hegel’s philosophy of right, yet he remained fascinated with Hegel’s dialectical logic 
throughout his life. It is worthwhile to emphasize that the view that Marx was grappling 
with Hegel in his “philosophical” youth, and then abandoned Hegel in his later “scientific” 
or “economic” phase is simply mistaken. While working on his economic theory in 1858, 
Marx wrote to Engels that the logic had greatly helped him to solve a seemingly technical 
problem in economics:  
I am, by the way, discovering some nice arguments. e.g. I have completely 
demolished the theory of profit as hitherto propounded. What was of great use to 
me as regards method of treatment was Hegel's Logic at which I had taken 
another look by mere accident…. If ever the time comes when such work is again 
possible, I should very much like to write 2 or 3 sheets making accessible to the 
common reader the rational aspect of the method which Hegel not only 
discovered but also mystified. (MEW 29:260, MECW 40:249) 
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Similarly, in his 1873 postface to Capital, despite the fact that Hegel was not fashionable 
at the time, Marx does not hesitate to “openly avow [him]self as the pupil of that mighty 
thinker [i.e. Hegel]”. Then, he continues:  
The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands by no means 
prevents him from being the first to present its general forms of motion in a 
comprehensive and conscious manner….In its mystified form, the dialectic 
became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and glorify what 
exists. In its rational form it is a scandal and an abomination to the bourgeoisie 
and its doctrinaire spokesmen, because it includes in its positive understanding of 
what exists a simultaneous recognition of its negation, its inevitable destruction; 
because it regards every historically developed form as being in a fluid state, in 
motion, and therefore grasps its transient aspect as well; and because it does not 
let itself be impressed by anything, being in its very essence critical and 
revolutionary. (MEW 23: C I:103, my emphasis) 
The attention to Hegel’s logic continued in the Marxist tradition after Marx. In the 
immediate succession to Marx, Engels wrote a book, Anti-Dühring, which was greatly 
influenced by the logic. (Although, unfortunately, as Engels’ aim was to popularize the 
dialectical logic, he oversimplified Hegel, an over-simplification that proved later to be 
more harmful, rather than helpful, to the reception of Hegel). We can also refer to the 
case of Lenin.  With the emergence of the First World War, he was encountered with a 
political impasse: instead of supporting a class-based cause, the members of the Second 
International overtly took nationalist positions. In what now in the era of 
professionalization of politics seems to be absolutely crazy, Lenin’s strategy to encounter 
this political impasse was to seclude himself in the library of Bern for eight months to do 
a close study of Hegel’s Science of Logic. Similarly, it was arguably Hegel’s logic that 
helped Lukács to develop his revolutionary theory in the History and Class 
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Consciousness. The logic, although with a different interpretation, remained pivotal to 
Lukács’ later project of developing an elaborate Ontology of Social Being.  In case of 
Adorno, multiple courses of lectures on sociology and sociological philosophy as well as 
the Negative Dialectics clearly demonstrate the centrality of discussion with Hegel’s 
logic to his critical theory of society in capitalism. 
 The Hegelian-Marxist tradition amply used the logic to explain society and 
politics in capitalism. The question is now, whether Hegel himself would endorse 
developing a social and political philosophy on the basis of the logic. We learned above 
that the current academic scholarship on Hegel, for the most part, endeavors to dissociate 
the question of the logic from the question of politics5. However, there is textually no 
doubt that Hegel himself regarded his social and political philosophy to presuppose the 
logic. Not only in the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right, he explicitly states that the 
philosophical foundation of the book must be found in the logic (GPR §2, §6, §31), but 
also at some crucial stages of the book, he makes his argument mainly through appealing 
to the logic (GPR §141, §272, §280).6 In this dissertation, I will not explore how logic is 
being used in the Philosophy of Right. My aim is rather to develop a radical critical social 
theory on the basis of the logic of essence, a critical theory that will far surpasses Hegel’s 
own understanding of society in modernity, as explicated in the Philosophy of Right. 
 Hegel, thus, openly accepts that the logic is the foundation of politics, but what 
about the reverse claim? Namely, can one say that, for Hegel, logic is also influenced by 
                                                        
5 There are, however, a few recent attempts to revive the interpretation of the Philosophy of Right 
on the basis of the logic. See especially (Goodfield: 2014). 
6 The issues that Hegel directly appeals to the logic to argue for his political conception include, 
among others, the transition from morality to the ethical life (§141), the critique of liberal 
conception of division of powers in the modern state (§272), and the nature of sovereignty in the 
modern state (§280).  
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politics? In this dissertation, I will elaborately argue that Hegel’s logic reflects the 
structure of society in capitalism. This implies that Hegel’s logic is already political. That 
is to say, Hegel in the logic does not offer a transhistorical ontology, which applies to all 
periods of history, but a historically specific ontology, an ontology that captures the 
structure of society in capitalism. The claim that the logic is historical and political might 
seem at first sight to be at odds with Hegel’s own self-understanding of the logic.7 Yet, I 
would suggest that this claim could be defended even textually. In the Introduction to the 
book, Hegel compares logic to the grammar of a language. The grammar, of course, 
cannot exist independently of the language whose grammar it is, yet it is possible to 
extract the rules of grammar, and express them in an abstract and systematic manner. 
Hegel compares one who begins to learn a language, and one who knows the language 
well as follows: 
He who begins the study of grammar finds in its forms and laws dry abstractions, 
arbitrary rules, in general an isolated collection of definitions and terms which 
exhibit only the value and significance of what is implied in their immediate 
                                                        
7 Especially, the following passage has been usually read as if Hegel were offering a purely 
apriori logic, one that can be dissociated from history, and from the empirical world in general: 
“Logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm 
is truth as it is without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this content 
is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence, before the creation of nature and a finite 
mind” (WdL I: 44, SL 50). However, even this passage can be read in such a way that 
accommodates the historicity of the logic. Arguably, for Hegel, eternity does not exclude 
historicity.  The logic is historical, insofar as it grasps the categories, which express the essential 
structure of society in a specific historical period, namely, modernity. The logic is at the same 
time eternal, insofar it develops those categories immanently, and without any reference to the 
social and historical world. This simultaneous historicity and eternity is not peculiar to Hegel’s 
logic; it is characteristic of all great philosophical (and for that matter, artistic) works. Take the 
example of the Critique of Pure Reason. We can say that the Critique is historical, insofar as it 
presupposes a specific theory of physics in the history of science, i.e. Newton’s mechanics. Yet, 
at the same time, the Critique can rightfully be considered as eternal, insofar as its essential 
argument is independent of Newton’s mechanics, such that if the latter would scientifically be 
discredited, the Critique would still hold its philosophical value.  
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meaning; there is nothing to be known in them other than themselves. On the 
other hand, he who has mastered a language and at the same time has a 
comparative knowledge of other languages, he alone can make contact with the 
spirit and culture of a people through the grammar of its language; the same rules 
and forms now have a substantial, living value [erfüllten, lebendigen Wert]. 
Through the grammar, he can recognize the expression of spirit as such, that is, 
logic [Ausdruck des Geistes überhaupt, die Logik]. (WdL I: 53, SL: 57, my 
emphasis) 
The grammar of a language obviously co-evolves with the language itself. It is not the 
case that, first, there is a grammar, which then gets embodied in the language. Similarly, 
logic does not precede history, but develops as history develops. Interestingly, for Hegel, 
it is the abstract grammar of the language, rather than the lexicon or the semantics that 
expresses the inner life of the language. Similarly, I will show that it is the logic, rather 
than Hegel’s political philosophy, that expresses the spirit of capitalism.8 Hegel himself 
in the Preface to the second edition, which he drafts the year of his death (1831), 
describes his project in the logic as the “reconstruction” [Rekonstruktion] of the empirical 
world, the empirical world which is obtained through history (WdL I:30, SL 39)  (Cf. 
Pinkard 2002:250). Finally, the analogy of grammar and logic could be pushed further: 
There are different languages, and therefore different grammars. Correspondingly, there 
are different historical periods, and therefore different logics that express those historical 
periods. This could be read as a further ground how logic can be read historically, and not 
from the point of view of a transcendent god.  
 Of course, the analogy between logic and the grammar, on its own, is not 
compelling as to prove that the logic is historical. However, no matter what Hegel’s own 
                                                        
8 It is worthwhile to refer again to Negri who asserts, “it is only in the complexity of metaphysics 
that the modern age can be read.” (ibid: xix)  
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self-understanding of the logic is, my argument about historicity of the logic holds 
nonetheless. No direct argument in this case is possible. Rather, it is by showing that the 
major categories of the logic of essence correspond to the major categories that grasp the 
essential structure of capitalism that I argue for my thesis, namely, the thesis that the 
logic is not a free-floating logic, but it is the logic of a historically specific period, i.e. 
capitalism. 
In closing this section, I would like to emphasize that in arguing that there is a 
close link between logic and the structure of society in capitalism, I am following the 
general materialist thesis, according to which ideas are not simply autonomous, but they 
are dependent on the social context in which they arise. To use Adorno’s phrase, the 
seemingly abstract ideas have an “experiential content” [Erfahrungsgehalt]. Marcuse and 
Lukács also express the same point explicitly (See the two quotes in the beginning of this 
introduction.). Locating myself in this tradition of critical social theory, my project is 
exactly to make the “experiential content” of the logic explicit.  
 
2- The General Aims and Method 
The central concept of the dissertation is the concept of “power” [Macht]. Hegel is 
usually considered to be the philosopher of freedom, not the philosopher of power. 
However, upon a close reading of the Science of Logic, one realizes that the concept of 
power plays a pivotal role in Hegel’s ontology. It is true that Hegel does not use the 
concept of power frequently, yet when he does, he uses it quite decisively. The 
importance of power for Hegel is especially manifest in his discussion of “substance”. 
For Hegel, substance is the highest category of the logic of essence, and of objective 
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logic. Substance, therefore, is the most determinate ontological category for Hegel, and 
regressively provides the bedrock for all other categories. Importantly, both in the 
Science of Logic and in the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel conceives of substance as 
“absolute power” [absolute Macht]. I read the concept of power backwards in the logic of 
essence, and show how the development of the categories of essence is best understood in 
terms of the development of the concept of power. 
In focusing on power as an ontological category, I specifically have two distinct, 
yet closely interrelated, aims: (1) I will show that Hegel’s ontology in the logic of essence 
is ontology of power. In its most general sense, this means that power is constitutive of 
the structure of individuals. That is, individuals are what they are only in and through the 
relation of power that obtains between them. (2) I will show that Hegel’s ontology of 
power in the logic of essence specifically captures the structure of social domination in 
capitalism. In order to do this, I substantially use Marx’s mature critique of political 
economy in his London period as well as Adorno’s later social theory.  
In studying Hegel and Marx together, I do not simply compare them with each 
other. Rather, I offer a Marxist interpretation of Hegel’s logic, and a Hegelian 
interpretation of Marx. As this approach might seem to be confusing from a scholarly 
point of view, I would like to clarify it with two points: (1) The main focus of the 
dissertation is Hegel’s logic. Although a significant portion of the dissertation is on Marx 
and on Adorno, this does not mean, at any rate, that I am trying to force a Marxist 
interpretation on Hegel. Rather, my methodological principle is to analyze Hegel’s text 
closely, and to make explicit only what is already implicit in Hegel’s own text. I believe 
through a close and careful analysis of Hegel’s logic, new insights about the nature of 
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capitalism can be garnered, new insights that a merely cursory work with the text cannot 
afford. (2) However, although I mainly focus on Hegel, this does not mean that I use 
Marx and Adorno only as mere ancillaries to Hegel. Even judged by the standards of 
Hegel’s own writing, the Science of Logic is quite an impenetrable and hermetic text. One 
can easily get trapped into the language of Hegel, and reproduce a similarly impenetrable 
and hermetic commentary on Hegel in another level. Adopting a specifically Marxist 
perspective allows me to unravel Hegel’s complex text in a way that a just close study of 
Hegel’s logic cannot do. Thus, Marx’s work is not a mere ancillary for Hegel for me, but 
frames my entire interpretation of Hegel. Finally, I admit that there is a real tension 
between the two methodological principles – the two principles being reading Hegel on 
his own terms, and reading Hegel in light of Marx – but I believe the tension, rather than 
being constraining, is indeed productive.  
 
3- The Bases of Interpretation 
There are some essential themes that underlie my interpretation of Hegel, and of Marx. 
These themes recur throughout the dissertation, and in each chapter I address them from a 
different perspective. In this section, my aim is to give an initial exposition of these 
themes. The proper grounding of them will be achieved through the dissertation in its 
entirety. In the following, I begin first with the exposition of the essential themes of 
Hegel (3-1), and then continue to address those of Marx (3-2). 
 
3-1- The Bases of Interpretation of Hegel 
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Let me begin first by outlining the structure of the Science of Logic: 
Volume One: The objective logic 
   Book One: The doctrine of being  
   Book Two: The doctrine of essence  
Volume Two: The subjective logic or the doctrine of the Concept 
 
As we see, the Science of Logic is divided into two major volumes: the objective logic, 
and the subjective logic. The objective logic is itself divided into two parts: the doctrine 
of being (or simply the logic of being), and the doctrine of essence (or the logic of 
essence). The dissertation is about the logic of essence. For methodological reasons that 
become clear later in the dissertation, I entirely ignore the subjective logic or the logic of 
Concept (except for a brief discussion in the Conclusion.) Furthermore, I will deal with 
the logic of being only marginally; namely, only insofar as it is necessary for 
understanding the logic of essence. 
 Hegel presents his ontology in the objective logic. The task of the objective logic 
is, in general, to reconstruct the structure of things or individuals.9 This reconstruction 
occurs in two ways: (1) In the logic of being, Hegel reconstructs the logical structure of 
individuals as they are in their immediate being, i.e. as they appear to us in our everyday 
pre-critical consciousness. Thus, in the logic of being, Hegel discusses the category of 
“something” [Etwas], and such categories as “quality”, “quantity”, and “measure” that 
“something” harbors. (2) In the logic of essence, Hegel develops categories with which to 
grasp the essential structure of individuals, the essential structure that is not immediately 
                                                        
9 As Hegel states in the Introduction to the book, “the objective logic, then, takes the place rather 
of the former metaphysics which was intended to be the scientific construction of the world in 
terms of thoughts alone. If we have regard to the final shape of this science, then it is first and 
immediately ontology whose place is taken by objective logic – that part of this metaphysics 
which was supposed to investigate the nature of ens in general.” (WdL I:61, SL 63)  
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accessible to us. The categories of the logic of essence include, among others, cause and 
effect, ground and grounded, inner and outer, force and expression, and substance and 
accident.  
For Hegel the task of the logic of being is primarily critical; Hegel demonstrates 
that the common-sense ontology is not able to adequately determine the structure of 
individuals. Importantly, Hegel’s critique of the logic of being is not simply a critique of 
the categories of being, but more fundamentally, the critique of the way, according to 
which the logic of being operates; it is thus primarily the critique of the logic of being. 
For Hegel, essence is not merely a further continuation of, and a further elaboration on 
the categories of being. Rather, the transition from being to essence is a total paradigm 
shift; it is a shift from the logic of being to a fundamentally different mode of logic, the 
logic of essence. 
 In the following, I lay out the main bases of my interpretation of the logic of 
essence, in contrast to those of the logic of being. I need to mention that Hegel does not 
explicitly characterize the logic of essence and the logic of being in the following way; 
yet these points, as I will show in detail the dissertation, underlie his conception of being 
and essence.  
 
3-1-1- The Logic of Being as the Logic of the Relation of Gleichgültigkeit 
One particularly illuminating way to look at the objective logic is to grasp how Hegel 
understands the relations between individuals or categories (Cf. EnzL §240). Let me 
begin with the logic of being. In the logic of being the major form of relation between 
individuals is the relation of Gleichgültigkeit. The main meaning of Gleichgültigkeit is 
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“indifference”. Hegel exploits the meaning of Gleichgültigkeit to explain the logical 
relation between individuals. (Recall that individuals in the logic of being are grasped 
with the category of “something”.) In the logic of being, individuals are “indifferent” 
towards one another; since the relation between them is not constitutive of them. Namely, 
individuals are “self-subsistent” on their own, independently of the relation that obtains 
between them. This is not to say that individuals in the logic of being do not have any 
relation with each other; they indeed do. Yet, the relation is “external” to individuals. 
They have, so to speak, a non-relational core, to which the relation between them is 
subsequently added. It is important to emphasize that, for Hegel, the relation of 
Gleichgültigkeit has one further meaning: since the individuals have a core independently 
of each other, they are, to that extent, equal with each other. The relation between them, 
therefore, is the symmetrical relation of equality. The one determines the other to the 
same extent that the other determines the one. One other way to say the same thing is 
this: the relation of equality is “equally valid” [gleich gelten] for them. (In this 
dissertation, I translate Gleichgültigkeit mostly as equality. By equality here I mean a 
kind of equality that obtains through indifference of individuals towards one another.) 
 
3-1-2- The Logic of Essence as the Logic of the Relation of Domination [Herrschaft] 
The minimal condition of a relation to be called a relation of power10 is asymmetry. From 
the logical point of view, the two individuals that are in the relation of power or 
domination determine one another asymmetrically; the one that is dominating determines 
the one that is dominated. As I indicated above, in the logic of being the individuals, 
                                                        
10 I use the terms power and domination interchangeably.  
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through their indifference, determine each other equally. This implies that the relation 
between individuals in the logic of being is symmetrical, that is, devoid of power. In 
contrast, Hegel argues that the essential structure of world is constitutively defined 
through power. Thus, the categories of the logic of essence are constitutively the 
categories of power. It must be noted that the structure of power in the logic of essence is 
of special type: it is not a one-way relationship of the dominating over the dominated; 
rather, it is a two-way relationship with a specific structure, a specific structure that Hegel 
calls “reflective.” In order to understand the “reflective” structure of power in essence, 
consider the relation between two categories of the logic of essence: “essence” and 
“appearance”. The relation between the two can be formulated in the following way: (1) 
Essence determines appearance. (2) However, appearance is not a mere ancillary to 
essence. Rather, appearance also reflects back on essence, and forces essence to 
constitute (and reconstitute) itself as essence. (3) Although essence and appearance 
codetermine each other, it is ultimately essence that has the privileged status, and 
determines appearance: appearance remains ultimately the appearance of essence. Thus, 
there is an asymmetrical relation of power between essence and appearance, the relation 
of power that can be expressed as follows: (1′) Essence dominates appearance; (2′) yet, it 
incorporates within itself a moment of appearance dominating essence; (3′) And 
ultimately, it is essence that dominates appearance. The said structure of power recurs 
throughout the logic of essence, and forms the modus operandi of essence: such 
asymmetry, which incorporates a moment of symmetry within its structure, obtains 




3-1-3- The Logic of Essence as the Ontology of Absolute Relationality 
In the logic of being, things or individuals have primacy over relations that obtain 
between them. Individuals are first defined pre-relationally, and then are related to each 
other. By contrast, in the logic of essence, relations have primacy over individuals. That 
is to say, in the logic of essence, individuals are derived from the relations that obtain 
between them. It is important to emphasize that for Hegel relations have absolute priority 
over individuals: namely, individuals are solely, exclusively derived from relations that 
obtain between them. Hegel insists, 
In the sphere of being, relatedness is only in itself, by contrast, in essence it is 
posited. This is then in general the difference between the forms of being and 
those of essence. In being, everything is immediate; in essence, by contrast, 
everything is relational. [Im Sein ist alles unmittelbar, im Wesen dagegen ist alles 
relativ.] (EnzL. §111Z) 
Thus, Hegel’s ontology in the logic of essence is “ontology of absolute relationality.”12 
By proposing the ontology of absolute relationality Hegel makes a radical break from the 
traditional ontology, from what he himself calls  “the metaphysics of the past” [die 
vormalige Metaphysik] (EnzL §27). The traditional ontology is inspired by Aristotle’s 
ontology. For Aristotle, individuals are primarily defined through their “substance”. 
                                                        
11 The theses that the logic of being is the logic of the relation of Gleichgültigkeit and that the 
logic of essence is the logic of the relation of Herrschaft is first addressed by Michael Theunissen 
(1978). See Section 6 of this Introduction for a more detailed discussion of Theunissen’s work.  
12 The theses of absolute relationality of essence is defended through a close commentary  of the 
beginning of the logic of essence by Christian Iber in his Metaphysik absoluter Relationalität: 
eine Studie zu den beiden ersten Kapiteln von Hegels Wesenslogik (1990). 
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Substance in Aristotle’s Categories is a pre-relational “substratum” which lies 
underneath qualities and properties. This conception of substance, in one way or another, 
was adopted by medieval philosophers, as well as by modern philosophers as diverse as 
Descartes, Spinoza, and Locke. Hegel’s ontology is radically different. Whereas the 
traditional ontology is primarily ontology of things, Hegel’s ontology is ontology of 
relations. (I need to emphasize that although it is true that for Hegel “substance” is still 
the highest ontological category, nonetheless, Hegel’s conception of substance is 
radically different from that of traditional ontology. Namely, Hegel’s substance is not a 
“thing,” but solely obtains through the process of relationality, as I will explain later.) 
 
3-2- The Bases of Interpretation of Marx 
According to Marx, capitalism is not a further continuation, or some modification of 
previous societies, but it has a fundamentally different structure. Thus, the social 
ontology that underpins Marx’s analysis of capitalism is not transhistorical; it is rather a 
social ontology that is historically specific to capitalism. In this section, I briefly lay out 
two main features of the structure of society in capitalism that are important for my 
dissertation, the first is concerned with the absolute relationality of society in capitalism 
(3-2-1), and the second is concerned with the nature of power in capitalism (3-2-2). 
 
3-2-1- The Ontology of Absolute Relationality in Capitalism 
I argue that the structure of society in capitalism, according to Marx, is absolutely 
relational. The principle that makes society absolutely relational in capitalism is the 
relation of “exchange” [Austausch] of commodities. However, what makes capitalism, in 
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contradistinction with previous societies, a system of absolute relationality is not the 
mere presence of exchange of commodities. Rather, the absolute relationality in 
capitalism obtains through universalization of the relation of exchange. In those pre-
capitalist societies, where there was some sort of exchange of commodities, exchange 
remained a marginal phenomenon. The products were produced primarily for individual 
consumption, and only the excess or the surplus would get exchanged. By contrast, in 
capitalism, where the relation of exchange has become universal, the products of labor 
are produced primarily for exchange. That is to say, in pre-capitalist societies, the 
products of labor are not relationally (that is, in relation to other products of labor) 
defined. They become relational only ex post facto, only if they get exchanged. By 
contrast, in capitalism, where a system of absolute relationality is formed, commodities 




3-2-2- Domination in Capitalism Requires Equality 
In societies based on slavery, there was no equality between masters and slaves. Likewise, 
in feudal societies, there was no equality between lords and serfs. Social equality is a 
distinct achievement of capitalist societies. Yet, the fact that individuals are equal with 
each other in capitalism does not imply at any rate that there is no domination. Quite to 
the contrary: Domination in capitalism exists, and indeed requires equality. In other 
words, in capitalism, the relation of domination of capitalists over workers does not occur 
despite the relation of equality between them, but precisely through their equality.  
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3-2-3- The Impersonal and Abstract Character of Power in Capitalism 
In feudal societies, and societies based on slavery, the relation of domination was direct 
and personal. Slaves or serfs were bound to particular masters, or particular serfs. In 
contrast, in capitalism, the worker is not bound to any particular capitalist. A worker is 
able, or should be ideally able, to change the capitalist for whom he works. Yet, despite 
this change, he remains dominated all the same. This is because the mode of domination 
in capitalism is impersonal and anonymous. In Marx’s phrase, in capitalism individuals 
“are ruled by abstractions [Abstraktionen]” (MEW 42:97, G 164, original emphasis). 
Furthermore, I argue that the ground-level mode of domination in capitalism is not the 
domination of workers by capitalists, but by the domination of all individuals, i.e. both 
capitalists and workers by the totality of capital.  
 
4- The Summary of Chapters 
In this section, I will give a fairly elaborate summary of the chapters. The summary is not 
exhaustive of the content of the dissertation, and in the interest of space, I have to ignore 
many important discussions. Furthermore, I would like to emphasize that the chapters, 
although relatively independent from each other, are not self-standing on their own. 
Rather, each chapter presupposes all the other ones. The argument of the dissertation is 
one single argument, different aspects of which are discussed in different chapters.13  
 
                                                        
13 I do not provide any reference in the abstract. All the claims made in the summary, without 
exception, have references in the text of the dissertation.  
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Part I – The Logic of Illusion [Schein] 
Chapter 1 – Illusion [Schein] as Ideology  
We have learned that the logic of being describes the structure of individuals as they 
immediately appear to us, and that the logic of essence describes the essential structure of 
individuals. The question is now, how the surface appearance is related to the essential 
structure. Hegel uses the category of Schein to explicate such surface appearance. I will 
argue that Schein for Hegel is a false appearance that conceals the truth of essence. 
Accordingly, I translate Schein, dependent on context, as “semblance” or “illusion”. The 
surface appearance is an illusion, since, if it is considered on its own and independently 
of its relation to essence, it cannot but be misleading about the truth of essence. However, 
although semblance for Hegel is false, it is not a mere error that can be discarded away, 
but it is constitutive of essence. Hegel thus argues, firstly, that essence and semblance are 
so interpenetrated that it is not possible to have one without the other, and secondly and 
more determinately, that essence “posits” or generates semblance as essence’s own 
requirement, i.e. as essence’s own “presupposition”. The relation of essence to semblance 
is therefore a relation of power. Semblance does not exist on its own, but solely functions 
as a moment of essence that determines it. 
 I argue that Hegel’s logic of semblance captures the structure of ideology, 
specifically, of the ideology of equality and freedom in capitalism. Adorno defines 
ideology as a “socially necessary illusion [Schein]”. Ideology is “socially necessary” in 
the sense that it does not depend on the subjective attitude of people, but it is 
constitutively embodied within legal, social and political institutions of capitalism. 
Ideology is a “necessary illusion” in the sense, firstly, that it cannot be rooted out through 
 23 
enlightened reasoning, and secondly, that it is an illusion, by means of which the 
domination of capitalism obtains – capitalism cannot possibly function without ideology.  
 Marx’s mature economic theory provides a precise explanation, as to how 
equality and freedom work as ideology in capitalism. According to Marx, capitalism is 
necessarily a market economy. The institution of market presupposes free and equal 
individuals that enter into an equal and non-coercive relation of contract with each other. 
Thus, equality and freedom are necessary and objective in capitalism.  However, equality 
and freedom in capitalism, according to Marx, are at the same time “illusion” [Schein]. 
Marx emphasizes that the market, or in his own language the sphere of “circulation”, is a 
“pure semblance” [reiner Schein]; the agents involved in market transactions do not 
immediately see what lies behind the market, namely, the process of “production”. Yet, it 
is exactly the sphere of production that defines the essence of capitalism, since it is in the 
sphere of production that surplus value is created.  In contrast to the market, which 
embodies equality and freedom of individuals, the sphere of production is characterized 
by domination and inequality. The sphere of production is the sphere of domination of 
capitalists over workers, since the production process is entirely determined and 
organized by capitalists. The sphere of production is the sphere of inequality, since the 
workers are not compensated for the amount of value that they produce; the surplus-value 
created is systematically transferred to the capitalists. Finally, it needs to be emphasized 
that, according to Marx, although the institution of market is an illusion, it is a necessary 
illusion. The value created in the sphere of production loses its entire value, if it cannot 
be sold through the market. Domination in capitalism, therefore, does not obtain in spite 
of equality and freedom, but necessarily requires it. 
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Part II – The Logic of Opposition 
Chapter 2 – Opposition as the Basic Relation of Power  
In the second chapter, I argue that the most fundamental form of relation that obtains 
between individuals is the relation of opposition [Gegensatz], and that the relation of 
opposition, in its adequate form, is a relation of domination. These two claims together 
establish that Hegel’s ontology is ontology of power. This implies that for Hegel, I argue, 
individuals are not separable from the relation of power. Rather, they are constituted 
through the relation of power.  
For Hegel, the relation of opposition obtains between the categories of the 
“positive” and the “negative”, between, say, +A and –A.14 I will show that, for Hegel, the 
positive and the negative are solely derived from the relation of opposition that obtains 
between them. Each of the positive and the negative excludes its other, yet at the same 
time achieves its own identity entirely through the relation to its other. Although the 
positive and the negative are solely defined relationally, this does not mean that they are 
simply exchangeable. Rather, I will argue, the positive, for Hegel, is primarily a self-
centered individual that only subordinately relates to the negative in order to secure its 
identity; while the negative is primarily a de-centered individual, which achieves its 
identity primarily through relation to the positive. The relation between the positive and 
the negative is, therefore, asymmetrical, and thus, a relation of power. That is to say, 
although the positive and negative codetermine each other, the positive enjoys the 
privileged status, to which the negative must refer to.   
                                                        
14 To preempt misunderstanding, I should emphasize the “positive” in this context should not be 
confused with the mere given, as the phrase “positivist” social sciences has it. There is not such 
givenness in the logic of essence. Positive and negative are both relational terms. 
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The relation of opposition must be contrasted with the relation of “diversity” 
[Verschiedenheit]. In diversity, an individual is related to any arbitrary other (A is 
related to B, C, D, etc.). In contrast, in opposition, each individual relates to its own 
personal and singular other (A is related to –A). I will discuss how for Hegel opposition 
is more determinate than diversity, and that therefore diversity always presupposes 
opposition as its ground. In our everyday life, we tend to conceive of individuals as 
“diverse”, each as self-subsistent on its own, and as simply different from others. Such 
diversity, however, is an “illusion” [Schein], a constitutive “illusion”, which masks the 
deeper relation of opposition. 
I will, then, discuss how Marx’s conception of the opposition between capital and 
labor, at the logical level, accords with Hegel’s conception of opposition. According to 
Marx, value is solely created by labor. Simply owning the means of production does not 
create any value. Capitalism is based on private ownership of means of production, and 
the means of production is owned by capital. Consequently, the value created by labor, 
upon its very moment of production, belongs to capital. Labor, therefore, constitutes 
capital, which at the same time excludes it from itself. That is to say, labor is the 
“negative” that primarily exists not for itself, but for capital, which functions as the 
“positive” of the relation.  I argue that the seeming plurality of the relation of capital and 
labor in various economic settings in capitalism – say, in Sweden, in China, or in the 
United States – is an “illusion” which hides the essential nature of the relation of capital 
and labor, the essential nature that is defined in terms of opposition and domination. 
Finally, in an excursus, I demonstrate how Catharine MacKinnon’s conception of 
gender formation accords to Hegel’s logical conception of opposition – and this is the 
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case, although she does not refer to Hegel at all.  For MacKinnon, the relation of 
domination does not obtain between otherwise independently existing male and female, 
but the very categories of male and female are constituted through the relation of 
domination of male over female. That is to say, for MacKinnon there is no “stratum of 
human commonality” underneath men and women; rather, such supposedly human-
commonality is simply “the male standard.” Translated into Hegel’s language, for 
MacKinnon, male functions as the “positive”, to which female as the “negative” must 
necessarily relate in order to define itself as female. 
 
Part III – The Logic of Totality 
I have indicated above that there is a major paradigm shift from the logic of being to the 
logic of essence. I have discussed this paradigm shift along two axes: firstly, from the 
primacy of individuals over relations in the logic of being to the primacy of relations over 
individuals in the logic of essence, and secondly, from the relation of equality in the logic 
of being to the relation of domination in the logic of essence. This paradigm shift also can 
be explained through the conception of totality.15 The logic of being begins with 
individuals, and cannot determine the structure of individuals adequately, precisely 
because it cannot determine the structure of totality adequately. In contrast, for Hegel, 
essence is a totality; and the development of the categories of essence (in part 2 and 3 of 
the logic of essence) is in effect the development of the concept of totality. Whereas the 
logic of being the primacy is with individuals, in the logic of essence the primacy is with 
totality. It is worthwhile to emphasize that the two themes discussed above get united in 
                                                        
15 I use the terms “totality” and “whole” interchangeably.  
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Hegel’s conception of totality of essence: firstly, totality results solely through the 
process of relationality between individuals, and secondly, totality is defined as “absolute 
power” [absolute Macht]. Given the central significance of totality in Hegel’s logic of 
essence, I discuss the concept of totality in three long chapters: In Chapter 3, I reconstruct 
part 2 and 3 of the logic of essence on the basis of the concept of totality. I also show the 
social significance of Hegel’s conception of totality through motivating and elaborating 
on Adorno’s conception of the totality of society in capitalism. In Chapter 4, I elaborate 
on Marx’s conception of the totality of capital in capitalism, and demonstrate how it 
closely accords to Hegel’s conception of totality in the logic of essence. In Chapter 5, I 
discuss the modality of the power of totality, and explain how the power of totality over 
individuals is “necessary” both in the logic of essence, and in Marx’s conception of 
capitalism. I also argue how the freedom of individuals in capitalism is the freedom that 
obtains through “contingency.” Together these chapters give a coherent view of totality 
of essence for Hegel, and how it expresses the structure of capitalism.16 
 
Chapter 3 – Totality as Absolute Power 
The relation of power between two opposing individuals is unsustainable by itself.  
Rather, it must occur in a context, in a “totality” which supports this relationship. The 
task of this chapter is to carve out the exact structure of totality in the logic of essence. I 
begin my discussion of Hegel in this chapter by correcting two common misconceptions 
of Hegel’s totality, which are also articulated by Karl Popper: (1) Firstly, I argue that 
                                                        
16 In the interest of space, in this summary, I entirely ignore my discussion of Adorno in Chapter 
3, and my discussion of analytical Marxism in Chapter 4. 
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Hegel’s conception of totality is not the sum-total of all realities. By simply adding up, 
say, all the historical facts about the French Revolution, we won’t have at any rate the 
conception of the totality of the French Revolution. (2) Secondly, I argue that Hegel’s 
holism is not a part/whole holism. In part/whole holism, the parts are conceived as self-
standing, namely, as independent from each other, and the whole is conceived as a mere 
composition of the parts. Hegel argues that such conception of totality is only adequate 
for “mechanical” wholes, such as a table or a watch, which he designates as “untrue” 
wholes. 
 The true wholes for Hegel are organic wholes, not mechanical wholes. Hegel 
develops his organic conception of whole in the third and final chapter of the logic of 
essence. There, Hegel identifies true totality with the category of “actuality” 
[Wirklichkeit]. Actuality is not the sum-total of all individuals, but it is the structure that 
organizes individuals in relation to one another; it is an organization that gives “form” to 
the totality. Importantly, actuality for Hegel is not an “inner” that may or may not be 
“externalized.” Actuality is not an “inert” structure that lies underneath the phenomenon. 
Rather, Hegel’s actuality, quite like Aristotle’s actuality [energeia], is active, and exists 
within the phenomenon. Hegel thus defines actuality as the “self-moving of form” 
[Sichbewegen der Form], as “activation of what really matters” [Betätigung der Sache] in 
the phenomenon. I argue that for Hegel such form-giving activity is an effective power, 
which preserves the identity of totality amidst its changing states. For Hegel, actuality has 
the power to produce and reproduce itself. This means that actuality is in effect “the 
cause of itself”; it is sui generis. The fact that in actuality the cause and effect, the 
determining and the determined, are one and the same implies that actuality has a self-
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referential nature. The selfhood of actuality, however, is not a full-fledged selfhood, a 
full-fledged selfhood that is defined by freedom, but it is a self whose structure is 
determined through “blind necessity.” 
 The most determinate form of actuality, and thus the most determinate form of 
totality for Hegel in the logic of essence, is “substance”. In contrast to the relation of 
substance and modes in Spinoza, the relation of substance and accidents (or individuals) 
in Hegel is “reflective.” Accidents, of course, are dependent upon substance, but 
substance is also dependent on and constituted by accidents. Nonetheless, although 
substance is constituted by accidents, it retains contradictorily an independent status, 
which is able to produce or “posit” accidents as its own requirement, i.e., as its own 
“presupposition”. The ontology of absolute relationality gets its full articulation in the 
conception of substance, since substance is the identity of totality solely achieved through 
the processuality of the relation between substance and accidents.  
 It is now, in the maximally complex category of the logic of essence, i.e. in the 
category of substance, that Hegel explicitly and profusely uses the language of power. 
Indeed, Hegel outright identifies substance with “absolute power” [absolute Macht]. The 
totality of substance exerts a rich array of causal powers on individuals that constitute it. 
According to Hegel, substance has “creative” power over individuals, insofar as it causes 
them to come to be. It has at the same time “destructive” power over them, insofar as it 
causes them to cease to be, thereby substituting them with other individuals. Individuals 
might have the “illusion” [Schein] that they have power over one another, yet such power, 
in truth, is the power of substance, which “posits an unequal value” for the individuals. 
As the power of substance is constitutive of individuals, in the normal course of affairs, it 
 30 
is not visible to individuals. It becomes visible, though, when individuals endeavor to 
trespass the boundaries of the space for possible actions that substance has set for them. 
In such cases, the power of substance becomes manifest “violence” [Gewalt], which is 
able to coercively restore the normal status of substance as a self-maintaining totality. In 
order to show the radicalism of Hegel’s conception of power, I contrast Hegel’s power of 
substance with John Searle’s conception of power. For Searle, who formulates a liberal 
and juridical conception of power, power is always (1) volitional, and (2) personal. By 
contrast, for Hegel, I argue, the power of substance is emphatically (1′) non-volitional, 
and (2′) impersonal or anonymous. Indeed, Hegel relates the non-volitional and 
impersonal power of substance over individuals to the Greek conception of “fate” 
[Schicksal]. In contrast to Christian conception of God, for Greeks the power of fate was 
blind – impersonal, as well as non-volitional.  
 Finally, I will outline the social ontology that can be developed on the basis of the 
logic of essence. The social ontology based on the logic of essence is strongly holistic 
and has the following two main pillars: (1) The totality of society is sui generis. This 
implies, firstly, that, the totality of society exists in its own right. It can sustain and 
reproduce itself, independently of individuals. Secondly, the sui generis nature of totality 
of society implies that the totality has causal power over individuals. That is to say, the 
totality can override the actions of individuals, if those actions happen to be at odds with 
the logic of totality. (2) Although there must always be people to occupy the social slots 
that the totality of society provides them – the social substance is not a spiritual being, it 
is constituted solely through the action of individuals – a particular individual is simply 
dispensable. A particular individual can be replaced with another individual. 
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Chapter 4 – The Totality of Capital 
The object of Marx’s critique of political economy is the totality of social relations of 
production. In capitalism, such totality, Marx explains, is capital. Marx defines capital as 
a process that can be depicted as follows: 
 M-C (MP, and L)….P…C’-M’ 
In the formula above, M stands for the initial money that is advanced for investment. This 
money is used to purchase two sets of commodities: means of production (MP), and 
labor-power (LP). Through the process of production (P), which involves labor process, a 
new kind of commodity (C’) is produced. As labor process creates surplus-value, the new 
commodity has more value than the value of MP and L combined. The value of new 
commodity is realized, when it is sold on the market, and this results in the return of 
money (M’), which is more than the initial money invested. Importantly, for Marx, 
capital is not a one-time activity of investment and surplus-value (or profit) making, but 
the incessant and infinite process of reinvesting the surplus-value (or profit) already made.  
 Classical political economy has a reified conception of capital. In classical 
political economy, capital is a “stock” of money, or a “stock” of means of production. In 
contrast, Marx defines capital in a relational way. Capital, for Marx, is not money in 
isolation, or the process of production in isolation, or commodity in isolation but the very 
process that, so to speak, moves from one to the other. Thus, Marx writes capital is a 
“self-moving substance” [sich selbst bewegende Substanz] or a “self-moving totality” 
[sich bewegendes Ganze] that is “constantly changing from one form into the other 
without becoming lost in this movement”. Marx uses the phrase “metamorphoses of 
capital” [Die Metamorphosen des Kapitals] to explain the transformation of capital: A 
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butterfly changes its form from larva, to chrysalis, to moth, while remaining the same 
butterfly through its metamorphosis. Similarly, capital for Marx changes its form from 
money, to production, to commodity, while remaining capital throughout the movement. 
For Marx, thus, quite like Hegel’s actuality, capital has a self-referential character, and 
therefore is a self.  
 And quite like Hegel’s actuality, capital has a sui generis character. That is to say, 
capital is able to produce and reproduce itself.  It is important to emphasize that the sui 
generis character of capital, properly speaking, does not obtain at the level of an 
individual capital, which is perishable, but at the level of “total social capital” [das 
gesellschaftliche Gesamtkapital], which obtains through interlinking of all individual 
capitals. According to Marx, the relation of total social capital and individual capitals is 
by no means harmonious. Rather, what makes total social capital able to produce and 
reproduce itself is the competition between individual capitals, through which the less 
profitable capitals inevitably perish.  
 The sui generis character of the total social capital has two interrelated aspects: 
(1) Capital is able to produce and reproduce itself materially. Namely, capital is able to 
produce and reproduce commodities and circulate them throughout society. (2) Capital is 
able to produce and reproduce itself socially. That is to say, capital is able to reproduce 
and sustain the very social relations that are necessary for the existence of capital; it can 
reproduce capitalists on the one hand, and wage-laborers on the other hand. Regarding 
the second, social, aspect, what especially secures the sui generis character of capital is 
the relative surplus population which constantly obtains in capitalism. No matter what the 
natural rate of growth of population is, the function of capital necessarily renders masses 
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of people unemployed. The existence of the unemployed, which Marx calls “the 
industrial reserve army”, reduces the wage of those employed to a minimum, thereby 
providing a favorable ambience for capital to grow. For Hegel, actuality is sui generis, 
since it is able to produce or “posits” its own “presupposition.” For Marx, capital is sui 
generis, since it produces or “posits” an industrial reserve army that constitutes the very 
“presupposition” of capital.  
 Quite like Hegel’s conception of substance and accidents, Marx’s conception of 
the relation between the totality of capital and individuals is “reflective”. Being a 
consistent materialist, Marx believes that the totality of capital is constituted solely 
through the interaction of individuals. Yet at the same time, he believes that the totality 
exists independently of individuals, namely, as “an alien social power [fremde 
gesellschaftliche Macht] standing above them”. Indeed, he writes that the laws and 
regularities of capital function as a “fate” [Verhängnis] from which nobody can flee.  
Contrary to neoclassical economic theory, Marx argues that it is not up to individuals 
whether or not they would like to enter into the relation of exchange. Although I might be 
free with regard to what kind of commodities I would like to exchange, according to 
Marx, in capitalism I am absolutely unfree with regard to the fact that I have to enter into 
the relation of exchange. 
 Finally, I argue, quite like Hegel’s conception, power in capitalism has an (1) 
impersonal and (2) non-volitional character. (1) The power is impersonal, since in 
capitalism, individuals exert power over one another, not as private “personal” 
individuals, but primarily as “personification of economic categories.” (2) Capital has the 
structure of self, insofar as it is self-maintaining and self-reproducing. But such selfhood 
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does not involve any free will. Capital for Marx is “an automatic subject” [automatisches 
Subjekt] that blindly follows the necessary process of augmentation of value. As capital 
is completely determined by the necessity of augmentation of value, it cannot be properly 
called free.  
 
Chapter 5- The Power of Necessity 
According to Hegel, the power of totality over individuals is absolutely “necessary”. In 
order to understand what it means that the power of totality is necessary, I begin first with 
explaining three main points that underlie Hegel’s modal ontology. (1) In contrast to 
Spinoza, Hegel is not necessitarian. For Hegel contingency is real, and exists in the 
objective world. (2) Hegel has a much more expansive notion of necessity than the 
conception of necessity in mechanistic sciences. For Hegel, necessity is not merely 
defined in terms of causality. Rather, for Hegel, causality is only one form of necessary 
relations that obtains between individuals. Hegel defines the necessary as that which is 
embedded within the network of relationality. Since such network of relationality is the 
totality of substance itself, necessity for Hegel, must be always understood in relation to 
the totality of substance. (3) In traditional metaphysics, whose main object of study was 
God, necessity generally had the privileged status among modal categories. In contrast, 
for Hegel, whose logic is deeply social and historical, the category of “actuality” is the 
centerpiece of modal ontology. Indeed, Hegel defines necessity in relation to actuality. 
For Hegel, necessity is nothing but the process of actuality constituting itself as actuality,  
as the process that relates the necessary and the contingent in actuality to constitute 
actuality. 
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 I use Hegel’s “materialist” (my word) critique of cosmological proof of the 
existence of God to shed light on the dialectic of necessity and contingency in the logic. 
For Hegel, it is not the case that on the one hand there is a necessary God, and on the 
other hand there is a contingent world. No such dichotomy exists for Hegel between 
necessity and contingency. Rather, Hegel maintains that necessity is already “immanent” 
within the mass of contingent phenomena, and needs only to “raise itself up” [sich 
erheben] from the contingent phenomena. Thus, for Hegel, God does not exist beyond or 
separable from the contingent world, but it is immanent within the contingent world. That 
is to say, Hegel’s God, in effect, is “actuality” itself.  
  As Hegel defines necessity as that which is completely embedded within the 
totality of relations, correspondingly, he defines contingency, primarily as that which 
falls out of the network of relationality. Contingency for Hegel thus is an individual [das 
Einzelne] that results from “isolation” [Vereinzelung] from the totality. However, such 
isolation of the contingent from the necessary does not mean that the contingent is self-
standing on its own. Rather, the contingent is always dependent on necessity, and is 
supposed to produce what “the power of necessity” [Macht der Notwendigkeit] has 
already dictated. Hegel maintains that contingency is an “illusion” [Schein]: the 
contingent individuals appear on the “surface of nature”, and seem to be independent of 
necessity. Yet, at the same time, the contingent individuals are dependent on necessity, 
and inevitably contribute to the formation of necessity. The “illusion” of contingency, 
however, is constitutive of necessity – necessity only results from the interaction of the 
contingent.  
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 We can see now how Hegel makes a radical break with Newtonian type of 
explanation of natural laws. In Newtonian mechanics, the law is necessary, only the 
initial conditions are contingent. In Hegel’s logic, the law itself results from the 
interaction of contingent phenomena; the necessary law, therefore, is the law of 
contingency. The behavior of one individual bacterium is contingent, and as such cannot 
be known. Yet, this does not mean that the behavior of the bacterium in question is 
completely random. Rather, the behavior of the individual bacterium follows from the 
necessary regularities that the species has, the necessary regularities that themselves are 
the result of the interaction of contingent individual bacteria.   
 This conception of necessity, the conception according to which necessity evolves 
out of contingent phenomena, is underpinning the structure of modern society, and 
testifies how Hegel’s logic is historical. In capitalism, according to Marx, there cannot be 
any conscious or central regulation of production. Rather, production in capitalism is 
based on private property and private investment of individuals, and has therefore, from a 
social point of view, an essentially non-regulated “anarchic” character. However, such 
anarchic character, which appears on the surface of bourgeois society, is nonetheless 
defined by the necessity of laws of capitalist economy. Marx emphasizes that the 
“disproportions”, “incongruences”, and “fluctuations” that occur through lack of central 
planning are not a “defect” that needs to be remedied. Rather, they are necessary “for a 
mode of production whose laws can only assert themselves [sich durchsetzen] as blindly 
operating averages between constant irregularities.” Marx details how in capitalism the 
“despotism” of capital and the “anarchy” of the market mutually condition each other. 
The individuals might think that they are free, since their productive activity is not 
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centrally regulated; yet in fact they are entirely dominated by the necessary and invisible 
power of capital that stands above them.  
 Finally, I end the chapter with a discussion of the nature of freedom in capitalism. 
The freedom that obtains for individuals in capitalism is not the freedom of self-
determination, but the freedom that obtains through contingency. One main form of this 
freedom qua contingency in capitalism is the freedom of consumption. Since the worker 
receives his wage, not in kind, but in money, he is able to spend it as he pleases. Yet, 
freedom of consumption is contingent: whatever he chooses to purchase, he inevitably 
contributes to the process of accumulation of capital, which in fact subjugates him. The 
other main form of freedom in capitalism is the freedom for the workers to change their 
employers. In contrast to slave and feudal societies, where there has been a “necessary” 
personal bond between an individual slave and an individual master, or between an 
individual serf and an individual lord, in capitalism the bond between a particular worker 
and particular capitalist is contingent. Yet, such contingency, which appears to the 
worker to be his own freedom, is in fact only an “illusion”: Although the worker can sell 
his labor-power to any capitalist, he is nonetheless necessarily forced to sell his labor-
power to the capitalist class.   
 
5- Power as Constitution and the Critique of Distribution of Power  
So far I have given a fairly elaborate picture of the dissertation. In this section, I would 
like to indicate some more general significance of Hegel’s conception of power. My aim 
is not at any rate a thorough contextualization of Hegel’s conception of power; my aim is 
rather only to indicate how Hegel’s logical conception of power is directly relevant to the 
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discussions of power in political philosophy in the ways that go beyond discussions about 
the nature of capitalism. I will begin with a Hegelian critique of distributive conception 
of power, and continue with a more general, Hegelian, critique of individualistic 
conceptions of power.  
One major paradigm of liberal political philosophy defines justice in terms of 
distribution of “social goods”. A just society is a society, in which the primary social 
goods are distributed justly. The social goods that are to be distributed are both material 
goods (such as wealth, property, income, health care), and immaterial goods (such as 
human rights, basic liberties and self-respect.) Within the paradigm of distributive justice, 
power is either not discussed at all, or if it is discussed, it is just regarded as one other 
social good that must be, along others, justly distributed.  
From a Hegelian perspective, the theories of distributive justice are based on a 
social ontology that is based on the logic of being. In justice as distribution, individuals 
are primarily conceived – to use the language of Iris Marion Young – as “possessors”, 
who exist prior to, and thereby separable from, what they possess. Now, if power is 
conceived as a social good in this way, it is in effect regarded as some “thing”, some 
“stuff” that can be owned, can be alienated, and can be transferred from one to another.  
Individuals might have more or less of power; they might acquire or lose some power, 
but they remain what they are qua individuals, independently of the power that they 
possess. In Hegel’s language, power remains “external” to the structure of individuals. 
Corresponding to the externality of power to individuals, the major way that the 
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distributive conception can analyze power is “comparing” the power of an individual or a 
group of people and the power of another individual or another group of people.17  
From a Hegelian point of view, there are two major problems with the distributive 
conception of power: Firstly, and evidently, power is not a “thing” that can be owned or 
disowned. Power is rather essentially relational.18 It is only in relation to other people that 
it can be meaningfully said that I have or do not have power. Secondly, and more 
radically, for Hegel, there is no self-standing individual prior to the relation of power. 
Rather, individuals are the product of the relation of power that obtains between them. 
What appears to be on the surface-level the possession of power by an individual is in 
truth the effect of the social relations in which the individual stand.  
That Hegel criticizes the distributive conception of power does not imply, at any 
rate, that he denies the fact that some individuals or groups of individuals are more 
                                                        
17 See Iris Marion Young’s compelling criticism of the paradigm of distributive justice (1990: 
Chapter 1), from which I draw substantially in this section. Young does not refer to Hegel’s logic, 
yet the spirit of her criticism of distributive paradigm is quite Hegelian. Fully in accord with 
Hegel’s critique of the logic of being, Young writes: (1) “Justice [in distributive paradigm] 
involves an ensemble of possessive relations. In a possessive relation the individual is distinct 
from the object possessed…In such a possessive model the nature of the possessing subject is 
prior to and independent of the goods possessed; the self underlies and is unchanged by 
alternative distributions. Justice concerns the proper distribution of the allocation of the entities 
among such antecedently existing individuals” (17). (2) “All situations in which justice is at issue 
are analogous to the situation of persons dividing a stock of goods and comparing the size of the 
portions individuals have. Such a model implicitly assumes that individuals or other agents lie as 
nodes, points in the social field, among whom larger or smaller bundles of social goods are 
assigned. The individuals are externally related to the goods they possess, and their only relation 
to one another that matters from the point of view of the paradigm is a comparison of the amount 
of goods they possess. The distributive paradigm thus implicitly assumes a social atomism, 
inasmuch as there is no internal relation among persons in society relevant to considerations of 
justice.” (18) 
18 This point is also made by Young: “Conceptualizing power in distributive terms means 
implicitly or explicitly conceiving power as a kind of stuff possessed by individual agents in 
greater or lesser amounts…Regarding power as a possession or attribute of individuals tends to 
obscure the fact that power is a relation than a thing” (ibid:31). 
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powerful than others. The critique of distributive concept of power, rather, means that the 
seeming distribution of power occurs within an institutional framework, within a 
structure – namely, within a social “totality”, or a social “substance” – which determines 
such distribution. That is to say, the distribution of power is not self-standing, but it is a 
“surface appearance”, a “semblance” or an “illusion” [Schein] that is determined by the 
totality of social institutions.  
Although Marx (for good reasons) does not discuss the distribution of power, and 
focuses on distribution as an economic category, it is helpful to consider his critique of 
those economic theories that mainly focus on distribution. In his critique of the program 
of the Social Democratic Workers’ Party of Germany, the Critique of Gotha Program 
(1875), he writes, 
It was in general a mistake to make a fuss about so-called distribution 
[Verteilung] and put the principal stress on it. Any distribution whatever of the 
means of consumption is only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions 
of production themselves. The latter distribution, however, is a feature of the 
mode of production itself. The capitalist mode of production, for example, rests 
on the fact that the material conditions of production are in the hands of non-
workers in the form of capital and land ownership, while the masses are only 
owners of the personal condition of production, of labor power. If the elements of 
production are so distributed, then the present-day distribution of the means of 
consumption results automatically. If the material conditions of production are the 
collective property of the workers themselves, then there likewise results a 
distribution of the means of consumption different from the present one. The 
vulgar socialists (and from them in turn a section of the Democrats) have taken 
over from the bourgeois economists the consideration and treatment of 
distribution as independent of the mode of production and hence the presentation 
of socialism as turning principally on distribution. After the real relation has long 
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been made clear, why retrogress again? (MECW 24:88-9, MEW 19:22, original 
emphasis) 
In interpreting this passage, we must note, what Marx means by “mode of production” 
[Produktionsweise] is not merely the material process of production, but more 
expansively, the totality of relations that characterize social production and reproduction 
in a specific period of history. For Marx, distribution always takes place within the 
totality of production and reproduction of society, and thus is determined by that 
totality.19 A social-democratic program that focuses on distribution draws the attention 
away from capitalist mode of production in its entirety. Thus, such focusing on 
distribution, despite its good intentions, functions as ideology. The attempts at 
equalization of wages, or just distribution of resources in capitalism is doomed to failure, 
since distribution in capitalism is constitutively defined by the antagonistic and 
oppositional social relations between capitalist and workers, the antagonistic relations 
that foreclose, from the very beginning, any equal or just distribution of resources.  
Similarly, according to Hegel, the distribution of power is a surface-appearance of 
the institutional framework or the totality of relations that determine the terms and 
conditions of such distribution. That is to say, the distribution of power remains always 
subordinate to the constitution of power. Thus, it is not possible at all to change the 
                                                        
19 See also (1) the following illuminating passage from the Grundrisse: “The structure 
[Gliederung] of distribution [Distribution] is completely determined [vollständig bestimmt] by the 
structure of production. Distribution is itself a product of production, not only in its object, in that 
only the results of production can be distributed, but also in its form, in that the specific kind of 
participation in production determines the specific forms of distribution, i.e. the patterns of 
participation in distribution” (MEW 42:30, G 95), and (2) the following statement from Marx’s 
Economic Manuscripts 1861-3: “The relations of distribution are only the relations of production 
seen sub alia specie.” (MECW 32:248) 
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distribution of power, if the constitution of power remains the same. And understanding 
the constitution of power is the task of the logic of essence.20 
The distributive conception of power is one instance of more general 
individualistic conceptions of power. In order to better understand the significance of 
Hegel’s constitutive conception of power, it is helpful to briefly dwell on the 
individualistic conception. Consider Thomas Hobbes as a major proponent of the 
individualistic conception. In the Leviathan, he conceives of power primarily as an 
attribute of one single individual: “The power of a man (to take it universally) is his 
present means to obtains some future apparent good” (Chapter 10, $1, original emphasis). 
Hobbes does not deny that power can be attributed to an assembly of individuals, yet he 
believes that such power of the assembly results from the mechanical addition of the 
power of all individuals in that assembly. Furthermore, Hobbes believes that an 
individual can transfer his power to another individual at will. Indeed, these two points – 
the first point being that the power of the whole is equal with the addition of power of all 
individuals constituting the whole, and, the second point being that individuals can 
alienate and transfer their power to a third party – underpin his conception of the power 
of sovereign: all individuals first alienate their power and transfer it by their free will to 
one single centralized sovereign power, and then the sovereign power provides all 
individuals who are now powerless with safety and peace: 
                                                        
20 To be fair to the theories of distributive justice, they also demand that, in order for distribution 
of power to be just, the social institutions and the totality thereof should change. However, for 
them, the main question remains the question of distribution all the same. Generally, the theories 
of distributive justice are content with some vague invocations to the institutions, vague 
invocations that remain without any substantive content, without any actual analysis of what the 
institutions, in fact, are. 
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The greatest of human powers, is that which is compounded of the power of most 
men, united by consent in one person, natural or civil, that has the use of all their 
powers depending on his will; such as is the power of a common-wealth. (Chapter 
10, §3, emphases added) 
In a sharp contrast to Hobbes, for Hegel, power is not primarily an attribute of an 
individual. Precisely speaking, whereas for Hobbes individuals have power, for Hegel 
individuals are constituted by power. The very constitution of individuals, for Hegel, is 
the product of the totality of relations of power that obtains between individuals. Indeed, 
as I have already mentioned in the summary of Chapter 3, individuals have the “illusion” 
that they are actually the ones who exert power over one another. In truth, however, the 
power of individuals over each other is the effect of the power of social totality, which 
renders one powerful, and the other powerless. Moreover, since power is constitutive of 
individuals, they cannot alienate it from themselves at their will, or transfer it to 
somebody else – if they could, they would cease to be what they are. The power of 
totality does not result from any deliberate transferring of power, but obtains through the 
social interrelation of individuals, and independently of what individuals consciously 
think or do.21  
 
6- The Literature on Hegel’s Logical Conception of Power 
Writing a dissertation on the logical conception of power in Hegel occurred to me 
through reading Michael Theunissen’s groundbreaking work on the Science of Logic, 
namely, Sein und Schein: die kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik (1978). In the 
                                                        
21 For a helpful discussion of constitution of power (without referring to Hegel), See Martin Saar 
(2010). Also, See his book on Spinoza’s conception of power, where he defends the thesis that for 
Spinoza power is constitutive (2013).  
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introduction of the book, Theunissen makes two insightful claims that are pivotal to my 
dissertation, namely, the claim that the logic of being is the logic of the relation of 
“Gleichgültigkeit” (indifference), and the claim that that the logic of essence is the logic 
of the relation of “Herrschaft” (domination) (ibid: 25-37). Indifference and domination 
are terms that clearly have social connotations. Thus, by making those two claims, 
Theunissen in effect opens up the possibility of developing a social interpretation of 
Hegel’s logic, a task that he himself does not undertake in the book.  
 That the logic of being is the logic of indifference, and that the logic of essence is 
the logic of domination constitute the very basis of my interpretation of Hegel. Thus, the 
current dissertation would have not been possible without Theunissen’s work. Expressing 
my debt to Theunissen notwithstanding, my work takes a radically different route. Most 
notably, the theme of power is only marginal in Theunissen’s work; he deals with it 
mainly in the aforementioned introductory pages. In terms of content, almost half of 
Theunissen’s book is about the logic of being. Insofar as the logic of essence is 
concerned, he focuses on the beginning of the logic of essence, mainly, on the category of 
Schein, and to a lesser extent, on the determinations of reflection – and there is almost no 
discussion of totality. Finally and most importantly, there is only an indication of the 
possibility of social interpretation of the logic, and not an actual treatment. 
Correspondingly, the central thesis of my dissertation, the thesis that the logic of essence 
is the ontology of power in capitalism, is not treated at all in Theunissen’s book.22  
                                                        
22 However, in another short essay, “Krise der Macht: Thesen zur Theorie des dialektischen 
Widerspruchs” (1975), Theunissen offers some insightful parallels between Hegel’s logic and 
Marx’s critique of political economy. Yet, the scope of treatment is mainly limited to some 
general remarks on determinations of reflection. In addition to the aforementioned book and 
essay, Theunissen addresses the logical conception of power in Hegel in another essay, “Begriff 
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 Continuing Theunissen’s work, Hinrich Fink-Eitel in his Dialektik und 
Sozialethik: Kommentierende Untersuchungen zu Hegels Logik (1978) gives a 
commentary on the logic of being and the logic of essence to show how being and 
essence are to be understood, respectively, in terms of indifference and domination.23  
Although insightful in some parts, Fink-Eitel’s book remains in the framework of a 
commentary. My method of exposition and the way that I develop the theme of power in 
Hegel is entirely different from Fink-Eitel’s. My specific contribution is to show how 
Hegel’s logic expresses the structure of power in capitalism, and that is absent in Fink-
Eitel’s work.24  
                                                                                                                                                                     
und Realität: Hegels Aufhebung des metaphysischen Wahrheitsbegriffs” (1989 [1975]). In this 
second essay, Theunissen discusses the theme of power in the logic of the Concept. Theunissen 
understands Hegel’s Concept as that which has the power of “overreaching over reality” 
[Übergreifen auf Realität”] and interprets Hegel’s “idealism” in terms of the capacity of the 
Concept to mold reality. (“Das Hegelsche System beruht auf drei Hypothesen: erstens, dass der 
Begriff auf Realität überzugreifen vermöge, zweitens, dass sein Übergreifen sich im 
vollständigen Übergreifen vollende, und drittens dass beide Bewegungen durch ein “ewiges”, 
schlechthin anfängliches Übergreifen ermöglicht würden.” (351)). According to Theunissen, the 
power of the Concept to overreach over reality is grounded upon Hegel’s theology, which is a 
“Herrschaftstheologie” – a theology based on the belief of the “domination” of God on the Earth. 
Notably, Theunissen’s interpretation of the theological underpinning of Hegel’s logic of Concept 
in this essay is different from his book Sein und Schein. I do not deal with Hegel’s Concept 
(except in the Conclusion, where I also discuss Theunissen’s conception of the transition of 
essence to the Concept in Sein und Schein). Furthermore, I do not presuppose any kind of 
theology in interpreting the logic. (For a recent critique of Theunissen’s latter essay, see 
(Yeomans: 2015). 
23 Notably, Fink-Eitel wrote the book as a dissertation with the supervision of Theunissen. 
24 There is another, very brief, discussion of power in the logic in Emil Angehrn (1977: 66-70). 
He was also a student of Theunissen, and was also engaged with Marx. Finally, I would like to 
add that, from the point of view of sociology of knowledge, it is interesting to observe that all the 
works mentioned above have been written in 70s, when Marx was still an option. (Although this 
does not mean that the mainstream Hegel scholarship even then paid any substantial attention to 
Marx; the works cited are rather exceptions.) With the so-called demise of Marxism in 90s and 
onwards, the theme of power in Hegel’s logic was not discussed anymore. Hegel became in the 
departments of philosophy in Germany and in the Anglophone world, almost exclusively, the 


















However, the dialectical method does not permit us simply to 
proclaim the ‘falseness’ of this consciousness [i.e. ideology] and to 
persist in an inflexible confrontation of true and false. On the 
contrary, it requires us to investigate this ‘false consciousness’ 
concretely as a moment of the historical totality, to which it 
belongs, and as a layer in the historical process, in which it is 
effective. (Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, 1968 [1923]: 
50, my emphasis)25 
 
 
1- The Critique of “Our Moral Intuitions” of Equality and Freedom 
Liberal political philosophy, to make a good rough generalization, takes individuals to be 
free and equal, and then endeavors to construct ideal social and political systems that can 
accommodate and foster such freedom and equality. In one main branch of liberalism, 
one for which John Rawls is a major representative, no argument is given as to why 
individuals are to be conceived as equal and free. It is suggested, rather, that we share the 
                                                        
25 “Die dialektische Methode gestattet uns jedoch auch hier nicht, bei einem einfachen Feststellen 
der ‘Falschheit’ dieses Bewußtseins, bei einer starren Gegenüberstellung von wahr und falsch 
stehen zu bleiben. Sie fordert vielmehr, daß dieses »falsche Bewußtsein« als Moment jener 
geschichtlichen Totalität, der es angehört, als Stufe jenes geschichtlichen Prozesses, in dem es 
wirksam ist, konkret untersucht werde.”  
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basic moral intuition that we are equal and free, and that if anybody looks deep into his 
heart, he would automatically accept that moral intuition.26 
 From a Hegelian or a Marxist perspective, this way of procedure, i.e. beginning 
from moral intuitions of individuals and constructing a theory that accords to those moral 
intuitions, is deeply problematic. Intuitions, in the Hegelian or Marxist tradition, are not 
brute facts. Rather, intuitions are facts that are themselves in need of explanation; and 
they need to be explained through their status and function in the social context within 
which they arise. In case of freedom and equality, Marx is adamantly clear that the so-
called intuitions of equality and freedom emerge with the rise of capitalist market 
economy, and thus they should be explained by a thorough analysis of the capitalist 
market economy in its totality. Indeed, Marx believes that by such holistic analysis, it 
becomes clear that the moral intuitions of equality and freedom, far from being 
trustworthy, are indeed ideological. That is to say, in developed capitalist societies, 
individuals share the intuition that they are equal and free, yet they are in fact unequal 
and unfree.  
                                                        
26 For a powerful and compelling critique of Rawls’ reliance on our basic moral intuitions to 
construct a political philosophy, see Raymond Geuss (2008, Part II, p. 59-101). Geuss emphasizes 
(1) that intuitions are historically and culturally variable, and thus cannot serve as fixed starting 
points for political philosophy, and (2) that the intuitions shared by people in a specific society 
might be in fact ideological. See especially the following two passages: (1) “A weakness of 
approaches to politics through ‘intuitions’ is that such intuitions present themselves at any given 
time as if they were firmly fixed, deeply rooted in the bedrock of human nature, and utterly 
unchanging, although even a minimal amount of historical (or ethnological) research reveals that 
many of the most politically significant of these intuitions are in fact highly variable and change 
in ways that seem to some extent to reflect other social changes. It was at one time – for long 
periods of Western history – the very epitome of justice that one not treat all men as equal (and in 
particular that one not treat a free man like a slave or a slave like a free man).” (91). (2) “To think 
that an appropriate point of departure for understanding the political world is our intuitions of 
what is ‘just,’ without reflecting on where those intuitions come from, how they are maintained, 
and what interests they might serve, seems to exclude from the beginning the very possibility that 
these intuitions might themselves be ‘ideological.’” (90) 
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 From a philological point of view, it is noteworthy that in his mature works – in 
which Marx undertakes a systematic and detailed analysis of the economic structure of 
society in capitalism – Marx quite rarely uses the term “ideology”; rather he uses the term 
“Schein” to describe the status of freedom and equality in capitalism. Schein is a perfect 
term for Marx’s purpose; since, firstly, it captures the intuitive aspect of ideology, namely, 
as that which appears to us immediately to be the case, and secondly, it captures the 
illusory character of ideology, namely, as a surface-appearance which is wrong and 
misleading. For an adequate critique of ideology, Marx cannot simply appeal to some 
other intuitions that contradict the intuitions on which liberal political philosophy is based. 
(He cannot make an argument like this: Look at the status of black people in West 
Baltimore! How could they possibly be considered as free, and as equal with the CEOs in 
Wall Street?) Rather, in order to meet up with his standards of scientific and systematic 
explanation, Marx needs to show (1) why people, in capitalism, intuitively believe that 
they are equal and free, (2) why such belief in equality and freedom, in capitalism, is 
illusory, and (3) why despite the illusory character of the belief in equality and freedom, 
people continue to hold it.  
 My general aim in this chapter is to show how Hegel’s (critique of) Schein in the 
beginning of the logic of essence captures the logic of (the critique of) ideology. My 
more specific aim is to demonstrate that and how Hegel’s conception of Schein expresses 
the general structure of the ideology of equality and freedom in capitalism. In what 
follows, in Section 1, I begin with explaining Adorno’s conception of ideology in his 
later sociological works with the aim of carving out the logic that underpins such 
conception. I continue with discussing Hegel in three sections. In Section 2, I 
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contextualize the category of Schein within the Science of Logic. For Hegel Schein is 
being as reconceived within the structure of essence. In Section 3, I offer a detailed 
analysis of the dialectic of Schein in the Science of Logic in order to explain how Hegel 
conceives being within essence. I also indicate how Hegel’s dialectic of Schein helps us 
understand the relation of the ideology of equality and freedom to the essence of 
inequality and unfreedom in capitalism. I conclude the Hegel part, in Section 4, with a 
brief discussion of Hegel’s own conception of ideology in the Philosophy of Right in 
order to show how that conception  – at the logical level – accords to his conception of 
Schein in the Science of Logic. Finally, in Section 5, I turn to Marx, and through a fairly 
elaborate discussion of his economic theory on relevant points, demonstrate that and how 
Marx’s critique of the ideology of equality and freedom in capitalism closely parallels 
Hegel’s dialectic of Schein.  
 In closing of this introductory section, I would like to say a few words about 
translation. There is not any one single English word that can capture the full meaning of 
Schein. As a result, Schein has been translated in the literature on Hegel with various 
terms: semblance, seeming, show, shine, guise, mere appearance, surface appearance, 
illusion, illusory being, etc. In this chapter – and in this dissertation – I will translate 
Schein, for the most part, either as semblance or as illusion; since these two words 
capture both the intuitive aspect and the falsity of Schein. I will also, occasionally, use 
surface-appearance, when it is appropriate to the context. 
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2- Adorno’s Logical Conception of Ideology 
Adorno’s most focused discussion of ideology, in his later work, can be found in his 
essay “Beitrag zur Ideologienlehre” (1954) (GS 8:457-477). He also dwells on the 
concept of ideology in in his now published lectures, as well as in the Negative Dialectics 
(1966) (GS 6). In this section, my aim is to explain the general structure of Adorno’s 
conception of ideology. I will also outline how this general structure is at work in the 
critique of ideology of equality and freedom in capitalism. Adorno, quite 
characteristically, does not develop his insights in any sufficient, scientific detail. I will 
systematically substantiate these insights in the next sections on Hegel, and on Marx.  
For my purpose – my purpose being carving out the logical structure of ideology for 
Adorno – two main features characterize ideology: firstly, ideology is a “socially 
necessary illusion” [gesellschaftlich notwendiger Schein] (GS 6:348) (2-1), and secondly, 
ideology is at the same time true and false (2-2).27 
 
2-1- Ideology as “Socially Necessary Illusion” 
Marx’s conception of ideology radically breaks from the conception of ideology in the 
enlightenment tradition. According to the enlightened conception of ideology – for which 
Francis Bacon, Kant, and in the contemporary world, Noam Chomsky are among the best 
representatives – the primary locus of ideology is an individual subject. An individual 
holds ideological belief, since he lacks proper education; or he lacks courage or he is lazy 
to think on his own and instead prefer to rely on authorities; or he is afflicted with 
                                                        
27 For quite helpful discussions of the concept of ideology in the tradition of Critical Theory, see 
Jaeggi (2009), Geuss (1981:4-44), and Schnädelbach (1969). 
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prejudices; or simply because he is ignorant.28 Thus, in a nutshell, ideology in the 
enlightened tradition is a kind of cognitive error or cognitive failure held by individuals 
that can be remedied through proper education, through willingness to think on one’s 
own, and through enlightened, critical thinking. 
 By contrast, in the Marxist tradition, the locus of ideology is not individuals, but 
the social relations between individuals. In this tradition, not all false ideas, no matter 
how deeply they are held, would count as ideology. Rather, only those false ideas would 
count as ideology that are grounded in social relations – and not on any kind of social 
relations, but only on those social relations that are essential to a given society. To give 
an example, some people, out of some specific religious conviction, might believe that 
the age of the Earth is only a few thousand years. However, this plainly false belief is not, 
properly speaking, ideology. The belief or lack of belief of those people in the young 
Earth does not arguably affect the deeper social and political structure of society. By 
contrast, people’s belief that they are equal and free in capitalism is ideology, since such 
belief is grounded in the social relations that are essential to capitalism; capitalism cannot 
possibly exist without the belief of people that they are free and equal.  
 It is exactly in the spirit of this Marxist conception of ideology that Adorno 
defines ideology as “socially necessary illusion”. This definition has two interrelated 
                                                        
28 Bacon and Kant do not use the term ideology, yet they mean the same thing. (1) In the New 
Organon, Bacon positions the locus of ideology either in human nature common to all people 
(“idols of the tribe”), or peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of the individuals (“idols of the cave”), or 
regards ideology as originating from public human communication through careless exchange of 
words between individuals (“idols of the marketplace”). In all these instances, an individualistic 
conception of ideology is presupposed. (2) In An Answer to the Question: What is the 
Enlightenment, Kant ascribes the reason for people’s tendency to embrace ideology to their 
“laziness and cowardice”, their “lack of resolution to use understanding without the guidance of 
another”, and to their fixation on “dogmas and formulas.”(See Kant’s Political Writings, p54-55) 
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aspects: (1) ideology is “socially necessary”, and (2) ideology is a “necessary illusion”. In 
the following, I explain each in turn.  
(1) Ideology is “socially necessary” in the sense that it is embodied in social, 
political, and legal institutions that are constitutive of society. The belief of people in 
equality and freedom in capitalism is embodied in the relation of exchange of 
commodities, and in the legal contract that enforces it. The institution of exchange and 
the institution of contract thus have “ideational component”29, and cannot possibly exist, 
without such ideational component30. The necessity of ideology can be expressed in two 
logically interdependent aspects: systematic and functional. The necessity of ideology is 
systematic, in the sense that it fundamentally coheres with the essential structure or the 
totality of society. The belief in equality and freedom in capitalism strongly coheres with 
the institution of law, with the institution of market, and with the capitalist political state. 
The necessity of ideology is functional, in the sense that ideology has a proper function 
within the totality of society, a proper function that contributes to the self-maintenance 
and self-reproduction of society.31  
  (2) In contrast to the mere cognitive failures – the mere cognitive failures that we 
can designate, for the sake of clarity, as “errors” – ideology in the Marxist conception, is 
                                                        
29 The phrase “ideational component” is Roy Bhaskar’s, although he does not use it to explain the 
ideas that are constitutive of reality (2005:72) . See the next footnote. 
30 The radical change in the conception of ideology in Marx accords to the radical change that 
Hegel initiates in the conception of idea, which Marx subsequently assimilates. Very briefly, this 
radical change can be expressed in two points: Firstly, whereas in the enlightenment tradition, to 
make a crude generalization, ideas are representational of reality, for Hegel, ideas are constitutive 
of reality. Secondly, whereas in the enlightenment tradition, ideas are primarily theoretical and 
cognitive, for Hegel ideas are “actual” [wirklich], that is to say, they are active and “effective” 
[wirkend] in reality  (Cf. Jaeggi 2009:275 footnote 16). 
31 In Chapter 4, I argue in detail how capital for Marx is a totality that is sui generis, namely, a 
totality that is self-producing and self-maintaining.  
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an “illusion” that is “necessary”. That is to say, ideology cannot be wiped out through 
education, through enlightened reasoning, or through some voluntary resolution to think 
critically. I may have read all the three volumes of Marx’s Capital, and may have 
completely understood why equality and freedom in capitalism are ideology; yet I cannot 
help acting upon those very ideas: Whenever I engage in an economic transaction in 
capitalism – and that includes not only buying consumer goods, but also selling my labor-
power on a daily basis – no matter what I think, I practically, and in effect, act on the 
basis of the ideas of equality and freedom. That is to say, I am not, at any rate, in a 
position to undo my illusions. Thus, in contrast to the enlightened tradition, which 
focuses on education, for Marx, the only way that the ideological illusions can be 
removed is through a collective emancipatory praxis, a collective emancipatory praxis 
that would radically change the very social relations in which those illusions are 
institutionalized.  
 
2-2- Ideology as the “Interfolding of Truth and Untruth” 
The distinction between error and illusion is in fact helpful to approach the truth-content 
of ideology. While error is plainly false – the belief in the young Earth is plainly false – 
ideology is an illusion that, because of its necessity and objectivity participates in truth. 
Thus, Adorno insists that ideology is the “the interfolding of truth and untruth, which is 
distinct from complete truth as well as from mere lie” [Verschränkung des Wahren und 
Unwahren, die sich von der vollen Wahrheit ebenso scheidet wie von der bloßen Lüge] 
(GS 8:465). That ideology is the “interfolding” of truth and falsity needs explanation. The 
word “interfolding” might suggest that what are being interfolded can be unfolded from 
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each other – like my arms that I can fold together, and then unfold. However, For Adorno, 
the truth and falsity of ideology are so interpenetrated that it is impossible to have one 
without the other.32  
 That in ideology truth and falsity interpenetrate implies that ideology is in a sense 
contradictory. The contradiction involved in ideology, however, is not a contradiction of 
traditional logic. (By contradiction of the traditional logic I mean something of the 
following sort: The board is white, and the board is not white, at the same time and with 
the same respect.) The principle of non-contradiction that is formulated in the traditional 
logic is the minimal condition for any rational, consistent thought. And Adorno, 
following Hegel and Marx, completely adheres to the principle of non-contradiction. 
Rather, the contradiction inherent in ideology is a dialectical contradiction. Unfortunately 
Adorno does not elaborate on the structure of the dialectical contradiction of ideology. In 
the next sections, I discuss in detail the structure of the contradiction of ideology through 
Hegel’s logic, and through Marx’s economic analysis. For now, I would like to 
preliminarily indicate two principal ways that Adorno’s claim of the interfolding of truth 
and falsity of ideology, and the contradiction that ensues from it, can be understood. 
These points are meant to motivate my later discussion in Hegel and in Marx. In both 
points, I explain the interfolding of truth and falsity of ideology by using the case of 
ideology of equality and freedom in capitalism. 
 
                                                        
32 To give another example, ideology, for Adorno, is not a like a report in a newspaper, which 
contains both true and false facts, a report that can be purged of its falsities.  
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2-2-1- Ideology as Surface-Appearance, and as the Surface-Appearance of Essence 
The capitalist society necessarily appears to individuals as a system of equality and 
freedom. In a certain sense, individuals are indeed equal and free in capitalism. If they 
were not equal and free, they could not engage in market transactions – since market 
transaction necessarily presuppose equality and freedom. However, in capitalism, the 
equality and freedom that obtains in market is only a surface-appearance of a deeper 
essence, a deeper essence that is defined in terms of inequality and domination. Thus, 
viewed this way the ideology of equality and freedom is both true and false. It is true 
insofar as it is conceived as a surface-appearance that exists on its own. It is false insofar 
as it is conceived as a surface-appearance of an essence, as a semblance of an essence that 
conceals the essence.  
 
2-2-2- Ideology as Self-Standing Moment, and as the Moment of Totality 
As we will see later in detail in Chapter 3, Hegel conceives of essence as totality. In case 
of capitalism, the essence of capitalism is the totality of social relations constituting 
capitalism, and such totality, according to Marx, is capital itself. Thus the same point 
regarding the relation of essence and surface-appearance explained above can be 
translated as follows. The institution of market, which operates on the basis of equality 
and freedom, is not all that there is to capitalism. Rather, market functions as a moment 
of the totality of capital, as a moment that systematically and functionally coheres with 
the totality of capital. The ideology of equality and freedom thus is true insofar as the 
market is conceived in isolation from the totality of capital. However, the ideology of 
equality and freedom is false insofar as it is conceived as a moment of capital, as a 
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moment that does not exist on its own, or for its own sake, but as a moment that both 
coheres with the totality of capital and furthers the self-production and self-reproduction 
of the totality of capital.33  
* * * 
 Adorno considers ideological thinking – i.e. the kind of thinking that does not 
recognize ideology as ideology – to be “reified”.  According to Adorno, the hallmark of 
reified consciousness is “forgetfulness” [Vergessen] (NS-V 6:226). The reified 
consciousness forgets that the intuitions are not self-standing, and that they are the effect 
of essence. The reified consciousness “fetishizes” intuitions, and forgets the whole of 
which the intuitions are but a moment.34  As reified consciousness is marked by 
forgetfulness, the critique of reified consciousness (or the critique of ideology) consists 
exactly in the act of “remembering” [Erinnerung], the act of remembering that shows the 
systematic interconnection of ideology with the totality of essence. Thus, a successful 
critique of ideology does not simply point out some inconsistencies, or absurdities, or 
                                                        
33 There is a third, very important, aspect for ideology for Adorno that I express as follows: 2-2-3- 
Ideology as Self-Standing Value, and as Value in its Actualization.  To explicate: for Adorno, the 
ideas of freedom and equality are “in themselves” [an sich] good and desirable, yet such ideas 
within the actuality of capitalism become bad and oppressive; they become bad and oppressive, 
since they function solely as a moment of the totality of capital. Thus, Adorno writes, “Unwahr 
werden eigentliche Ideologien erst durch ihr Verhältnis zu der bestehenden Wirklichkeit. Sie 
können ‘an sich’ wahr sein, so wie die Ideen Freiheit, Menschlichkeit, Gerechtigkeit es sind, aber 
sie gebärden sich, als wären sie bereits realisiert.” (GS 8:473) Importantly, this third aspect of 
ideology, which is concerned with the status of values, is absent in Hegel’s logic of essence, as 
well as in Marx’s scientific analysis of capitalism. The distinction between value in itself, and 
value in its actualization is indeed reminiscent of Kant’s distinction between noumenal and 
phenomenal world, and testifies Adorno’s ultimately (post-Hegelian) Kantianism. There is no 
such Kantian distinction between values and facts in the logic of essence, and for that matter, in 
Marx.  
34 Also: “Man kann sagen, daß die Fetischisierung des Geschichtlichen, also die Verabsolutierung 
eines Gewordenen und das Vergessen dessen, was geworden ist, zu dem Wesen der Ideologie 
notwendig gehören.” (NS-V 6:226) 
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insufficiencies in ideology, but requires a detailed and through analysis of the totality, of 
which ideology is a moment. The critique of ideology is thus not a moralistic critique; it 
is rather – to use a term from Roy Bhaskar – an “explanatory critique”, a critique that by 




3- Semblance in the Logic of Essence 
I have argued so far that ideology for Adorno is an intuitive awareness that is socially 
necessary, an intuitive awareness that is embodied within the prevailing social, economic 
and political instituitions of capitalism. I have argued that such intuitive awareness is 
false, but such falsity is constitutive of the essence of capitalism, and thus cannot be 
wiped out through enlightened reasoning. In this section, my aim is to discuss what 
Schein in the logic of essence is. For Hegel, Schein is being as reconceived within the 
structure of essence. Thus, in order to know what it is that Hegel calls Schein, we need to 
know what being is, what essence is, and what being within essence is.  Thus, my first 
task is to contextualize Hegel’s discussion of Schein within the overall framework of the 
objective logic (3-1)35. I will then show that Hegel’s Schein is to be conceived as 
ideology and that Schein, as ideology, is necessary (3-2). I conclude with a brief 
explanation about the distinction between two categories that denote the way that essence 
appears: Schein (semblance), and Erscheinung (appearance) (3-3). 
 
                                                        
35 I have already discussed my general interpretive approach towards the logic of being and the 
logic of essence in the Introduction to the dissertation. This section further elaborates on the 
themes discussed there.  
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3-1- The Logic of Being as the Logic of Gleichgültigkeit and the Logic of 
Essence as the Logic of Domination 
Let me begin first with the logic of being. In the logic of being, Hegel conceives of the 
relation between individuals in terms of the relation of Gleichgültigkeit. For Hegel, the 
relation of Gleichgültigkeit has two aspects: (1) The two individuals that are in a relation 
of Gleichgültigkeit with each other are “indifferent” towards one another, and towards 
the relation between them. This means that the relation is not fully constitutive of the 
individuals, and remains external to them.  That is, the individuals in the logic of being 
are “self-subsistent” and exist independently from the relation between them. (2) The two 
individuals in this relation have a symmetrical relation with each other; the one defines 
the other to the same extent that the other defines the one. In this sense, the relation of 
Gleichgültigkeit is the relation of “equality”, since the relation is equally valid [gleich 
gelten] for both of them. The two aspects of the relation of Gleichgültigkeit for Hegel are 
strictly interrelated. When the individuals are equal with each other, there remains an 
indifferent core to them that is not determinable through the relation between them. 
Similarly, the equality of individuals obtains by virtue of their indifference to each other. 
In the logic of being the individuals remain unanalyzable “atoms” that cannot become 
fully determinate. They are simply given, or in Hegel’s language, immediate. The logic 
of being terminates with the category of “absolute indifference” that expresses the 
unsurpassable conceptual block that is attained within the framework of being. Hegel’s 
exposition of the logic of being therefore is to criticize it. 
The failure of the logic of being to be adequately determinate demonstrates that 
being is not sustainable by itself; rather it has to be situated within a more determinate 
category, namely essence, that gives determination to it. Importantly, essence is not 
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simply another category of the same nature as the categories of being that would emerge 
in further development of being; but it is fundamentally of “different nature” (WdL II:15, 
SL 390). This radically different nature can be articulated especially in the following two 
ways: (1) The ontology that Hegel develops in the logic of essence is absolutely relational. 
That is, in the logic of essence the categories are defined solely through their relation to 
each other. Whereas in the logic of being, individuals remain independent from the 
relations that obtain among them, in the logic of essence, individuals are solely derived 
from these relations. (2) The ontology developed in the logic of essence is the ontology of 
domination [Herrschaft]. In contrast to the relation of equality obtained in the logic of 
being, in the logic of essence the categories are in an asymmetrical relation with each 
other. This relation of domination, however, is of a special type. It is not direct or 
immediate; rather it obtains through incorporating a moment of the relation of equality. In 
other words, the relation of domination in essence obtains, not despite equality, but 
precisely through equality.  
It is helpful to illustrate the above points through examples. (1) The paradigmatic 
example of the relation of equality in the logic of being is the relation between 
“something” [Etwas] and “an other” [ein Anderes], between, say, a table and a chair.  The 
two define each other equally. Hegel writes, “if of two things we call one A, and the other 
B, then in the first instance B is determined as the Other. But A is just as much the Other 
of B. Both are, in the same way, Others.” (WdL I:125, SL:117, my emphases) Moreover, 
although there is a relation between something and other, nonetheless each exists 
independently from the relation. (Table and chair have a certain spatial or functional 
relation with each other; yet each of them exists independently of the other.) (2) A 
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paradigmatic example of the logic of essence is the relation of “substance” and 
“accidents”. They are, according to Hegel, solely defined through each other. Substance 
is always substance of accidents, and accidents are always accidents of substance. There 
is an asymmetrical relation of domination between the two; since it is ultimately 
substance that gives determination to accidents. However, the relation of domination 
contains a moment of equality; since inasmuch as accidents are dependent upon 
substance, for Hegel, substance is dependent upon accidents. The first instance of the 
relation of domination in the logic of essence is the one obtaining between essence and 
semblance. I will discuss this in detail later in the chapter. 
 
3-2- Hegel’s Semblance as Ideology 
The common-sense ontology that forms our intuitive awareness of the social world 
accords to the logic of being. That is to say, in our everyday life we conceive of the 
relation between individuals in terms of the relation of Gleichgültigkeit. Recall that 
Gleichgültigkeit has the two meaning of indifference, and equality. Intuitively, we see an 
individual – to use a term from Michael Sandel – as an “unencumbered self” (1984), as a 
self that is separable from the social relations in which he stands. The individual, so it 
seems to us, has an inner citadel, which is ultimately unaffected by, and, therefore, is 
indifferent towards the surrounding social relations. All individuals share such inner 
citadel, and thus, to that extent, all individuals are equal with each other. There is no 
relation of power between individuals, or if there is, it remains external to what makes the 
individual what he is. Indeed, such equality between individuals obtains through 
indifference of individuals to one another. And such indifference grants individuals 
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freedom: it seems to us that individuals are free to choose, as if from afar, what kind of 
social role they want to take on. Finally, in our intuitive awareness, we regard individuals 
as totally distinct from each other, and we distinguish individuals in terms of the qualities 
and quantities that they bear36. We tend to characterize a human being X as distinct from 
others, through, say, their gender, nationality, race, money, wealth, IQ score, etc. 
However, such conception of individuals – as equal, as free, and as distinct 
bearers of qualities and quantities – is not true. Rather, Hegel asserts, “the truth of being 
is essence” [Die Wahrheit des Seins ist das Wesen], and, then, continues:  
Being is the immediate. Since knowing has for its goal knowledge of the true, 
knowledge of what being is in and for itself, it does not stop at the immediate and 
its determinations, but penetrates it on the supposition that at the back of this 
being there is something else, something other than being itself, that this 
background constitutes the truth of being. (WdL II:13, SL 390) 
The logic of essence provides the essential categories to understand the invisible 
background of the visible individuals, the invisible background that is the “truth” of the 
visible individuals.  Now, what seems to be a particular human-being with particular 
qualities and quantities turns out actually not to be self-subsistent, but a result of certain 
relations, causes, grounds, conditions, forces etc. that constitute it. It turns out the 
individuals do not have any core, untouched by mediations, but they are thoroughly – 
absolutely – mediated. Thus, Hegel insists that, from the standpoint of essence, “being is 
illusion” [Das Sein ist das Schein] (WdL II:19, SL 395, original emphasis).  
                                                        
36 Quantity and Quality belong to the categories of the logic of being. Hegel writes, “ordinary 
consciousness [das gewöhnliche Bewußtsein]  takes things up as simply being [seiende] and 
regards them in terms of quality, quantity, and measure.” (EnzL. §111Z)  
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Similarly, the way that capitalism seems to individuals is formed through the logic 
of being. Capitalism is necessarily a market economy. Individuals in market transactions 
are equal before the law and exchange commodities of equal value. Marx writes, 
since they only exist for one another in exchange as equally worthy persons, as 
possessors of equivalent things, who thereby prove their equivalence, they are as 
equals at the same time also indifferent to one another. Whatever other individual 
distinction there may be does not concern them; they are indifferent to all their 
other individual peculiarities. (MEW 42:167-8, G: 242)37  
In market transactions, that is, individuals are self-subsistent atoms that remain external 
to the relation that makes them equal. Moreover, in market transactions individuals are 
free. The one does not appropriate the other’s property by force or through violence, but 
by treating him as the owner of property who can dispose of it at his own free will. This 
is, however, only the way that capitalism seems to individuals, and that seeming is indeed 
an illusion. The freedom and equality obtained in exchange “appears as the surface 
process, beneath which, however, in the depths, entirely different processes go on, in 
which this seeming [scheinbar] equality and freedom disappear.” (MEW 42:173, G 247) 
The truth is (1) that in capitalism individuals are inseparable from social relations, 
thereby thoroughly determined by them, and (2) that these social relations are relations of 
domination and inequality.  
 Recall that for Adorno ideology is false, but it is a falsity that is necessary and 
objective. To the extent that ideology is necessary and objective, ideology participates in 
truth. Thus, for Adorno, ideology is true and false at the same time. Exactly the same 
                                                        
37 „Da sie nur so als Gleichgeltende, als Besitzer von Äquivalenten und Bewährer dieser 
Äquivalenz im Austausche füreinander sind, sind sie als Gleichgeltende zugleich Gleichgültige 
gegeneinander; ihr sonstiger individueller Unterschied geht sie nichts an; sie sind gleichgültig 
gegen alle ihre sonstigen individuellen Eigenheiten”. 
 64 
structure holds in Hegel’s conception of illusion or semblance. Semblance, for Hegel, is 
true in so far as it captures our intuitive awareness correctly, that is to say, insofar as it 
captures the surface-appearance correctly. Yet, semblance is ultimately false, since 
semblance is not self-standing, but it is always semblance of essence – semblance is only 
a moment of essence, and not the essence itself. The fact that individuals are distinct from 
each other, that individuals are bearers of certain qualities and quantities is true. Yet, the 
same true fact becomes false, when it is conceived in relation to the essence that grounds 
that fact. In truth, individuals and the qualities and quantities that they bear are the mere 
effect of the invisible deeper network of relationality of essence that constitutes them as 
individuals in the first place.38  
                                                        
38 The point that semblance for Hegel is both true and false makes my interpretation of semblance 
different from Theunissen (1978). Theunissen distinguishes two distinct senses of “untruth” 
[Unwahrheit] in Hegel: (1) one-sidedness [Einseitigkeit] or undevelopedness [Unentwickeltheit], 
and (2) semblance [Schein] (70-91). According to Theunissen, in the first sense, untruth is 
opposed to Hegel’s dictum, “the True is the Whole”. In the second sense, untruth is opposed to 
“true actuality”, to Hegel’s “what in truth is” [was in Wahrheit ist] (71). For Theunissen, untruth 
in the first sense is “the not-yet-developed” [das noch Unentwickelte], but in the second sense, it 
is “the thoroughly empty” [das völlig Leere]. From these definitions, Theunissen concludes that 
whereas the untruth qua not-yet-developed remains a part of truth, the untruth qua semblance 
does not participate in truth at all (72). The untruth of semblance, he emphasizes, is “complete” 
[vollständig], and “total” (72-3). (Theunissen’s conception of semblance is wider than the 
category of semblance in the beginning of the logic of essence. He thinks that the whole objective 
logic must be considered as a unity of truth and semblance. Despite his wider usage, however, he 
asserts that Hegel’s own category of semblance in the beginning of the logic of essence has the 
same characteristics as those of his wider conception of semblance (74)). I find Theunissen’s 
distinction quite confusing – and simply wrong. It is quite unHegelian to think that there can be a 
kind of semblance that does not participate in truth at all. The central operator of “sublation” in 
Hegel’s logic is exactly meant to show that the earlier categories don’t simply get cancelled out, 
but they are to some extent preserved in the higher categories. This means, contrary to 
Theunissen, that semblance is not “total untruth”, but always a “partial untruth”. Theunissen 
seems to be aware of the unclear distinction that he makes, and later conceded that Hegel actually 
“blends” [vermengt] the two senses of untruth that Theunissen distinguishes (89). See also 
Yeomans (2012:47, footnote 10), who criticizes Theunissen on the same point. For a general 
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Thus, the simultaneous truth and falsity of being in essence implies that for Hegel, 
being in essence is not simply discarded away; being is rather preserved within essence – 
and it is preserved as a necessary moment of essence. The necessity of incorporation of 
being in essence accords to the general feature of Hegel’s dialectic, which he elsewhere 
expresses in the following way:  
The true system [das Wahre System] cannot have the relation to the false [das 
Falsche] of being merely opposed to it [i.e. the false]; since, if this were so, the 
[true] system, as this opposite, would itself be one-sided. On the contrary, the true 
system as the higher must contain the subordinate [false] system within itself. 
[Vielmehr als das Höhere muß es das Untergeordnete in sich enthalten]. (WdL 
II:250, SL 580) 
 
3-3- The Distinction between Semblance and Appearance 
We learned that for Hegel Schein is what seems to be the case. There is an important 
distinction for Hegel between what seems to be the case and what appears to be the case. 
Hegel uses the term Erscheinung (appearance) to designate the latter. The distinction, of 
course, is not merely verbal, and it is sometimes difficult to cling to a fixed terminology 
to refer to these concepts. Both semblance and appearance denote the realm of positivity 
of essence, the way that essence exists. For Hegel, appearance is a much more 
determinate category than semblance. While Hegel begins the logic of essence with 
semblance, he discusses appearance much later in the logic of essence, namely, after the 
category of “ground [der Grund]. Semblance is the remaining of being in essence. It is a 
kind of immediacy that is not yet fully taken up by the mediating activity of essence. By 
                                                                                                                                                                     
critical discussion of Theunissen’s conception of untruth, See (Fulda, Horstmann, Theunissen 
1980:15ff). 
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contrast, appearance is a kind of immediacy that is derived from essence. In Hegel’s 
words, appearance is “the essentiality that has advanced to immediacy” [die zur 
Unmittelbarkeit fortgegangene Wesenheit]; it is “a being that has come forth from 
negativity and inwardness” of essence [ein Herausgegangensein aus der Negativität und 
Innerlichkeit] (my emphases) (WdL II:124, SL 479). 39 This means that appearance is a 
kind of existence, which is fully mediated by, or generated through, the relationality of 
essence40. As I will discuss in Chapter 3, appearance is a totality, which shows the 
totality of essence. But semblance shows only some aspects of essence, it shows only 
those aspects that are remaining from the immediacy of being. Whereas appearance 
adequately expresses essence, semblance qua surface-appearance, is a partial expression 
of essence. Thus, for Hegel, it is semblance, rather than appearance, that signifies 
ideology. Because of its constitutive partiality and incompleteness, there is both truth and 
falsity in semblance. Semblance shows something of essence, but at the very same time 
disguises essence. Hegel thus occasionally refers to semblance as a “mere appearance” 
[nur Erscheinung], as a kind of appearance that is “essenceless” [wesenlos] (WdL II:148, 
SL 499). By designating semblance as “essenceless”, Hegel means that semblance is a 
kind of appearance that conveys that it independent of essence, although in truth it is 
thoroughly dependent on essence. In contrast to semblance, there is no falsity (in the 
relevant sense discussed here) in appearance qua Erscheinung; appearance manifests 
                                                        
39  Hoffmann calls Erscheinung “the immanent positivity of essence; its positedness” (2012:330). 
In contrast, one can call Schein the “external positivity of essence.” 
40 Compare to the following passage from the Encyclopedia Logic: “Appearance [Erscheinung] is 
in general the truth of being [i.e. of semblance] and a richer determination than the latter; insofar 
as appearance contains united in itself the moments of reflection-in-itself and reflection-in-
another. In contrast to this, being or immediacy [of semblance] is still the one-sided absence of 
relation and (seemingly) resting only on itself.” (EnzL. §131Z) 
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essence in the way that it actually is, in its full totality. Freedom and equality, as false and 
partial expressions of essence, are to be conceived as semblance that hides the essence of 
capitalism. But the tendency towards the lengthening of the working day, the incessant 
technological changes, the progressive mechanization of labor process, the mass 
unemployment, the destruction of nature, etc. are directly derived from the essence of 
capitalism, and thus belong to its appearance.41 
 
4- The Dialectic of Semblance as the Critique of Ideology 
I have indicated before that a critique of ideology, according to Marx and Adorno, is not 
merely judging that the ideology is false. Rather, a successful critique of ideology 
demands showing the systematic connection of ideology to the totality of social relations. 
The successful critique of ideology, additionally, needs to show how ideology has a 
certain function within the totality, i.e. how ideology contributes to self-maintenance and 
self-reproduction of the totality. By relating ideology to the totality, the critique of 
ideology, rather than being merely a moralizing or a psychologizing criticism, can 
scientifically explain (1) why people, in a given social totality, entertain the false beliefs 
as they do, and (2) why, despite the falsity of those beliefs, people continue to entertain 
those beliefs. In this section, I focus on the dialectical development of the category of 
semblance in the logic of essence. The dialectic of semblance has been the subject of 
extensive commentaries in the scholarship on Hegel42. In what follows, rather than 
                                                        
41 Marx’s usage of the terms Schein and Erscheinung is not consistent, nor Hegel’s own usage of 
the terms in his Realphilosophie. Generally speaking, however, they use the terms in the sense 
discussed above. 
42 For a classical interpretation of this chapter, See (Theunissen 1978: 301-82). For a short, good, 
commentary in English See (Houlgate 2011).  
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offering another exhaustive commentary, I will reconstruct the dialectic of semblance 
from the point of view of the themes of ideology, totality and power. This, in effect, 
shows how the dialectic of semblance captures the general logic of the critique of 
ideology. More specifically, I also show how Hegel’s conception specifically draws the 
logical contour of the critique of the ideology of equality and freedom in capitalism. I 
flesh out the details of such logic later through discussing Marx’s social theory in the 
next section. 
 The dialectical development of semblance is in fact the dialectical development of 
the relation of the totality of essence to semblance. This dialectical development occurs 
through three successive stages: In the first stage, which Hegel captures through the 
categories of “the Essential and the Unessential” [das Wesentliche und das 
Unwesentliche], Hegel shows that semblance is not separable from essence (A). In the 
second stage, Hegel shows how semblance is “posited” by the totality of essence (B), and 
finally, in the third stage, which Hegel calls “reflection” [die Reflexion], Hegel shows 
how semblance is “posited” by essence as essence’s own “presupposition” (C). (The 
letters are Hegel’s.) Through A and B Hegel shows how semblance has a systematic 
connection with essence. Through C, Hegel shows how semblance has a functional 
connection with essence, namely, how essence requires semblance in order to reproduce 
itself.  
 
 (A) Semblance is not separable from essence. 
The first and most intuitive way of thinking about essence and semblance is to think of 
essence as something hidden, which, so to speak, lies underneath semblance. This is a 
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kind of conception of essence that accords to the ordinary consciousness, whose mode of 
thinking is pictorial. The structure of reality, according to this conception, is bi-layered. 
The surface layer, what seems to us, is those qualities or determinations that are in truth 
not constitutive of reality – they are the Unessential [das Unwesentliche]. The deeper 
layer or the core is those invisible qualities and determinations that make reality what it 
is; they are the Essential [das Wesentliche].43 According to this conception, the 
semblance (the Unessential) is a false appearance that is separate from the true essence 
(the Essential) of reality44. In this way, according to Hegel, 
Essence itself is an existent [seiendes] immediate essence, and being is only a 
negative in relation to essence; [essence is] not in and for itself; therefore, essence 
is a determinate negation. In this way, being and essence relate to each other 
again as others; for each has a being, an immediacy, and these are indifferent 
[gleichgültig] to each other, and with respect to this being, being and essence are 
equal in value [stehen diesem Sein nach in gleichem Werte] (WdL II:18, SL 394). 
Conceptualizing the relation of essence and semblance in terms of the Essential and the 
Unessential is a “relapse” into the logic of being. Like something and other in the logic of 
being, here essence and semblance cannot define each other through the relation between 
them, and thus remain equal and indifferent to each other. Moreover – and this is another 
point – if we want to distinguish the Essential from the Unessential of reality, according 
                                                        
43 As we will see, Hegel’s conception of the Essential and the Unessential is entirely negative. 
That is to say, his concern is to show how the relation between essence and semblance should not 
be understood. I capitalize the terms essential and unessential, whenever I specifically refer to 
these categories. 
44 This conception of essence and semblance (in its different aspects) appears in different 
traditions in the history of philosophy. For Plato, the sensible world (in the standard reading) is 
false and detachable from the true realm of ideas. For Locke, the “real essence” is the “real 
internal” upon which “discoverable qualities” of objects are anchored. (However, those 
discoverable qualities for Locke, strictly speaking, are not false.) (Locke, An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, Book 3, Chapter 3, §15),  
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to Hegel, we end up with an indeterminate situation; since we cannot know what 
precisely the Essential is. The decision as to what to conceive as the Essential does not 
originate from objective reality itself. It rather falls upon our mere subjective attitude, 
such that “the same content can sometimes be regarded as the Essential and sometimes as 
the Unessential” (WdL II:19, SL 395). 
The indeterminacy of the relation of the Essential to the Unessential shows that it 
is wrong to conceive semblance as separable from essence. It shows via negativa that 
they thoroughly interpenetrate each other. This means that although we can use the 
pictorial metaphors of core/surface, center/periphery, inner/outer, background/foreground 
to describe the relation of essence and semblance in the natural language – as both Hegel 
and Marx frequently do – we should be fully aware that the metaphor is misleading and 
distorts the conceptual truth of the total imbrication of the two45. Thus, when Rosa 
Luxemburg in her pamphlet on the Russian Revolution writes, “we have always revealed 
the hard kernel of social inequality and lack of freedom hidden under the sweet shell of 
formal equality and freedom” (Luxemburg: 220), we should not take her claim quite 
literally; as if she meant that the “sweet shell” of ideology or semblance can be removed 
from the “hard kernel” of essence of capitalism through some enlightened reasoning. 
Rather, we should read her, in the same way that Adorno conceives ideology, when he 
writes, “ideology does not overlay the social being like a detachable layer, but is inherent 
in it” (GS 6:348). In capitalism, equality and domination are indissolubly bound with 
each other such that it is not possible to have the one without the other. This means that 
freedom and equality in capitalism only obtain by virtue of domination and inequality, 
                                                        
45 “To imagine show [Schein] as a veil thinly hiding a bright light involves precisely the wrong 
metaphor. The moment of being in which essence shows is within essence.” (Mure 1950:93)  
 71 
inasmuch as the capitalist system of domination can only exist by virtue of providing 
freedom and equality.46 
 
(B) Semblance is posited by essence.  
The result of the dialectic of the Essential and the Unessential is to show that it is wrong 
to understand essence as simply excluding being or semblance. In (B), Hegel conceives 
essence as a totality that contains – and not excludes – semblance. Semblance is not any 
more something that subsists side-by-side with essence, but it is conceived solely as 
semblance of essence.  Being or semblance “is not free”, Hegel now emphasizes, “but is 
present only as related with its [i.e essence’s] unity” (WdL: II:15, SL 391, my emphasis). 
That is to say, semblance does not exist on its own; but it is thoroughly dominated by 
essence. 
Hegel’s conception of essence as a totality is curious, in that he is equally 
committed to the two following contradictory claims: (1) the claim that essence is a 
totality that does not allow any otherness of being or semblance; (2) the claim that being 
or semblance retains some sort of otherness to essence. Instead of shying away from this 
contradiction, Hegel emphatically defines semblance in terms of contradiction:  
                                                        
46 One could argue that the antebellum US South was in fact a capitalist economy, yet based on 
slavery. Thus, the domination in capitalism is not necessarily bound up with freedom and 
equality. There are two points to be made against this objection: (1) The society of antebellum US 
South, to use Hegel’s jargon, was not “adequate” to the concept of capitalism, and thus it 
inevitably perished. Even from the economic point of view, the institution of slavery was not 
sustainable within a capitalist world. (2) Slavery in the South could exist in the first place, 
because it was thoroughly dependent on highly developed capitalist markets in the North and in 
Europe. (The cotton produced in plantations was not for the consumption of slaveholders, but for 
selling to capitalist textile industries.) The antebellum US South, thus, was an exception, which 
only proves the rule.  
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Being is semblance. The being of semblance consists solely in the sublatedness of 
being, in its nothingness; this nothingness it has in essence and apart from its 
nothingness, apart from essence, semblance is not. It is the negative posited as the 
negative. [Das Sein ist Schein. Das Sein des Scheins besteht allein in dem 
Aufgehobensein des Seins, in seiner Nichtigkeit; diese Nichtigkeit hat es im 
Wesen, und außer seiner Nichtigkeit, außer dem Wesen ist er nicht. Er ist das 
Negative gesetzt als Negatives.] (WdL II:19, SL 395)  
For Hegel, being or semblance functions as the other of essence, but this other is not 
“true”: “here we have no true other” [kein wahrhaft Anderes] (EnzL. §111Z), he writes. 
Being or semblance is, but not as something that is; rather as something that is not. Its 
mode of existence, therefore, is that of non-existence. It exists, but not as something 
positive; rather as something sublated or negated in essence. Hegel calls semblance “the 
inherently null” [das an sich Nichtige] (WdL II:21, SL 397). The nullity of semblance is 
not the nullity of complete absence of determination47. Rather, it is a nullity that results 
from the inherently unstable character of semblance48, from the simultaneity of its being 
related and not related to essence.  
I have already indicated that Hegel is fully committed to the law of non-
contradiction in the traditional logic. Rather, as I will show in Chapter 2, Hegel’s 
dialectical contradiction results from the necessary coherence of two mutually excluding 
moments constituting an entity.49 Semblance consists of two moments: A moment of 
being that exists independently of essence, and a moment of being that is fully taken up 
                                                        
47 Such conception of nullity is already discarded in the very first pages of the book in the 
dialectic of being-nothing-becoming. 
48Pippin calls the determinacy of semblance the “vanishing determinacy” (1989:203). 
49 For different, powerful interpretations of the speculative contradiction in Hegel, see Wolff 
(1981), Pippin (1978), Hösle (1987:156ff), Wandschneider (1995), and Horstmann (1984: esp. 
80ff).  
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by essence, and is therefore dependent on it. These two moments exclude each other; yet 
Hegel insists that it is exactly the unity of the two that makes semblance what it is. One 
should not try to solve this contradiction by denying one of the contradictory moments, or 
by conceiving of the contradictory entity as simply and purely non-existent, or by trying 
to transform the contradictory entity into other entities, but one should simply “grasp and 
assert the contradiction” [Auffassen und Aussprechen des Widerspruchs] (WdL II:77, SL 
441). In his exposition of the concept of contradiction in the Science of Logic, Hegel 
insists,   
Speculative thought consists only [nur] in holding firm [festhält] to contradiction 
and to itself in the contradiction, but not in the sense that, as it happens in 
ordinary thought, it would let itself be ruled by it and allow it to dissolve 
[auflösen] its determinations into just other determinations or into nothing (WdL 
II:76, SL 440, underline mine).50 
As the structure of Hegel’s contradiction shows, Hegel is emphatically against conceiving 
contradiction as a middle term or a mean between two opposing determinations51. It is 
not the case that semblance is partially determined by essence, and is partially not 
determined by essence. Hegel is unequivocal on this point, when he writes, “being in its 
totality has withdrawn into essence” [Das Sein ist in seiner Totalität in das Wesen 
                                                        
50 I have used Georg Di Giovanni’s translation with slight modification (The Science of Logic, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.383) 
51 Adorno had especially a keen eye on this point in Hegel’s philosophy, a point that he expresses 
in various contexts. According to Adorno, the conception of mediation that regards it as a “mean” 
between two extremes belongs to the ancient philosophy, specifically to Aristotle’s. This gets 
especially articulated in Aristotle’s ethical theory that regards virtue as a mean (properly 
understood) between two extremes (e.g. courage being a mean between cowardice and rashness). 
Logically speaking, mediation in this case is a separate thing that occurs in the space between the 
two extremes. According to Adorno, Aristotle did not have a proper conception of “dialectical” 
mediation, which relates and thereby constitutes the two extremes in their very extremity. (NS-V 
14:70ff, esp. S.75). See also (NS-V 2:264-5). Whether or not Hegel himself would agree with 
Adorno’s reading of Aristotle is not my concern here. 
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zurückgegangen.] (WdL II:21, SL 397, my emphasis). If we conceive being or semblance 
as being determined or dominated by essence in some respect, and as being free from the 
determination or domination of essence in some other respect, there will be again a 
“relapse” into the relation of the Essential and the Unessential. Such relation conceives of 
essence and semblance as excluding each other, and cannot thereby be adequately 
determinate. The moment of existence of semblance, and the moment of non-existence of 
semblance cohere with each other; they do not get watered down to a partial existence, 
and a partial non-existence. This logical point is extremely important in understanding 
the relation of domination and equality in capitalism, and I discuss it later.  
Hegel’s term for describing the relation of essence to semblance is “positing” 
[Setzen]. He writes, “semblance is essence’s own positing” (WdL II:17, SL 393). That 
essence posits semblance means that essence generates or produces semblance52. 
Semblance cannot exist untouched by or indifferent to essence, since it is already 
generated by essence53. Indeed, the act of positing distinguishes the logic of essence from 
the logic of being. In the logic of being, neither of the two individuals (something and an 
other) generates the other. Each can exist independently of the other and there is a 
relation of equality between them. It is first the act of positing in the logic of essence that 
establishes the asymmetrical relation of domination; since the posited (semblance) for its 
very existence is dependent upon the positing (essence). At this stage, the relation of 
domination seems to be one-way, one in which the dominated (semblance) does not exert 
                                                        
52 Pinkard even suggests that Setzen can be translated in English as “generate” or “produce” 
(Pinkard 1988:195). Also See Hegel’s own definition of “positing” in the Nürenberge Logik: 
“Insofar as the act [of essence] is a difference of essence from itself, through which being or 
determinacy is produced [hervorgebracht], the act is positing” (WW 4:17, my emphasis). 
53 In Klaus Hartmann’s terms, semblance is not a mere oppositum to essence, but an 
“innerwesensmäßiges Oppositum“– an oppositum that is internal to essence (1999: 170). 
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any effect on the dominating (essence). However, in (C) Hegel further develops his 
conception of domination, in order to show that there is indeed a reciprocal relation 
between the dominating (essence) and the dominated (semblance). I discuss this 
conception below.  
 
(C) Semblance is posited by essence as essence’s own presupposition. 
Hegel’s conception of essence and of its relation to semblance is peculiar in the history of 
philosophy. This peculiarity is articulated in “reflection”. I have explained before that the 
logic of essence is characterized by two themes: (1) It is the ontology of absolute 
relationality. (2) It is the ontology of domination. In reflection Hegel interweaves these 
two themes and articulates them in their unity. Hegel’s exposition of “reflection” in the 
Science of Logic is pivotal to his philosophy in general. In this section, I do not aim to 
show the systematic significance of reflection. I limit myself to explaining how reflection 
captures the relation of essence to semblance54.  
Reflection is of course a loaded term in the history of philosophy, and even in 
Hegel’s philosophy it has different significance in different periods of his thought. We 
need to be aware of the specific meaning that Hegel gives to it in the logic of essence. We 
tend to naturally believe that reflection is the subjective activity of thinking that takes the 
                                                        
54 For the classical interpretation of the chapter of reflection, See (Henrich 1978). Two brief but 
helpful expositions are the following: (1) Longuenesse (2007:52ff). She discusses reflection in 
the context of Hegel’s conception of contradiction. (2) Rose (2009: 205ff). She relates Hegel’s 
reflection in the logic of essence to Fichte’s concept of Tathandlung. Also, the chapter of 
reflection is productively appropriated (3) to explain the structure of agency in Hegel’s practical 
philosophy (Yeomans 2012:36-64), (4) to evaluate metaphysical import of Hegel’s logic in 
general (Moyar: 2012), and (5) to discuss the relation of spirit and nature in Hegel (Quante: 
2002). 
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objective world for granted, and then comes to scene to reflect on it. However, the 
subjective reflection for Hegel counts only as an insufficient form of reflection, as 
“external [äußere] reflection”. The “external reflection”, according to Hegel, “starts from 
something immediately given which is alien to it, regarding itself as a merely formal 
activity which receives content and material from outside and which, by itself, is only the 
movement conditioned by that content and material”. According to Hegel, reducing the 
concept of reflection in general to external reflection has legitimately put the concept in 
disrepute and has made it seem to be “polar opposite and hereditary foe of the absolute 
method of philosophizing” (WdL II:31, SL 405). Hegel attempts to save the concept of 
reflection from this reduction, and programmatically avers: “But what is under discussion 
here [i.e. in Hegel’s own logic] is neither reflection at the level of consciousness, nor the 
more specific reflection of the Understanding…but of reflection in general [Reflexion 
überhaupt]” (WdL II:30, SL 404)55. The problem with external reflection is that it takes 
reflection to be within thinking subject, to be external to the constitution of object itself. 
In contrast, for Hegel reflection is constitutive of the object; it makes the object what it is. 
More precisely, reflection is the very basic relation that constitutes essence as essence. 
In the logic of being, we learned that relation obtains between self-subsistent 
things, which can exist apart from the relation. In the logic of essence, reflection obtains 
between essence and semblance, which are constituted by reflection. As essence is 
defined in terms of relation of domination, and being in terms of relation of equality, 
reflection therefore is a relation obtaining between relations; it is thus a second-order 
relation.  “Reflection is the pure mediation as such” [die Reflexion ist die reine 
                                                        
55 For a helpful discussion about the concept of “reflection in general” or simply “reflection” and 
its difference from subjective reflection, see (Jaeschke: 1978). 
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Vermittlung überhaupt] (WdL II:81, SL 445, Hegel’s emphasis); namely, a kind of 
mediation which mediates between two forms of mediation.56  
What is specific to “reflection” as a mode of relation that constitutes essence? In 
the Encyclopedia, Hegel relates his conception of reflection to light when it hits a mirror. 
The light ray exists one time as forward-going, and the same light ray exists another time 
as backward-going (EnzL. §112Z).  What this simile shows of reflection is its recursivity. 
The relation of essence and semblance is always two-ways. Essence posits semblance, 
but through this positing, it constitutes itself as essence. In other words, there is a relation 
of essence to semblance, which then reflects back from semblance to essence, and makes 
essence what it is. Hegel uses different expressions to convey the recursivity of the 
reflection constituting essence: “The return of essence is …its self-repulsion from itself” 
[Die Rückkehr des Wesens ist....sein Sich-Abstoßen von sich selbst.] (WdL II:27, SL 401).  
“Its [i.e. reflection’s] self-repelling is the coming-to-itself” [Ihr Abstoßen von sich ist das 
Ankommen bei sich selbst.]  (WdL II:27, SL 402). The relation of essence to its other is 
“bent back” unto itself (WdL  II:34, SL 407). And:  “The reflective movement is to be 
taken as an absolute recoil [absoluter Gegenstoß] upon itself” (WdL II:26, SL 402). As all 
these formulations indicate, essence for Hegel is not a neo-Platonic pre-mediated One 
that emanates itself into the seeming world, but essence is nothing but the very relation 
between essence and semblance, which recursively constitutes essence. The reflexive 
                                                        
56 “Absolute Reflexion ist als eine Rückkehr zu oder in sich definiert, die nichts ist als dies, also 
ein Prozeß, dem kein Substrat zugrunde liegt.”(Theunissen 1978: 305) 
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structure of reflection makes essence a self-grounding category57. Essence relates to 
semblance, and in so doing it grounds itself as essence. 
In (B), we learned that Hegel conceives essence to be “positing” semblance. 
Hegel now shows that such conception is inadequate; since any act of producing or 
generating requires some materials with which it can produce or generate. In other words, 
any act of “positing” is at the same time an act of “presupposing”. Hegel’s conception of 
essence is peculiar in that he wants to show that essence uses or requires (“presupposes”) 
the very same material that it produces (“posits”). That is, what essence posits [Setzen] is 
the same as that which it has already in-advance-posited [Voraussetzen].  
In order to articulate that essence’s positing semblance and essence’s 
presupposing of semblance coincide, Hegel introduces three forms of reflection, what he 
calls (1) the “positing” [setzende] (2) the “external” [äußere] and (3) the “determining” 
[bestimmende] reflection. It is the third one that adequately expresses reflection, and the 
first two are one-sided abstractions from it. Hegel’s exposition of reflection is particularly 
cumbersome.58 But his general point is clear. (1) In “positing” reflection, essence is 
conceived to be creating semblance; but it is forgotten that in such creation essence 
already requires semblance. Essence is regarded therefore to be independent of 
semblance. Correspondingly, semblance is regarded to be a mere seeming, a mere 
illusion, that does not have any objective existence. (2) In “external” reflection semblance 
is conceived to be primary. It is forgotten that semblance is not self-standing; but is 
generated by essence. External reflection is the conceptual articulation of ideological 
                                                        
57 The structure of essence that I called “self-grounding”, Pinkard designates as “self-subsuming”: 
“Hegel’s talk of essence’s ‘return into self’ refers to the self-subsuming character of essence.” 
(1988:58) 
58 For the classical interpretation of the chapter of reflection, see (Henrich 1978).  
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“intuitive” thinking that clings to semblance, and ignores or forgets the genesis of 
semblance. In other words, external reflection or ideological “intuitive” thinking treats 
semblance merely as given, and not as mediated by essence.  (3) According to Hegel, “the 
determining reflection is the unity of positing and external reflection” (WdL II:32, SL 
404). The recursive structure of essence obtains in the determining reflection. Essence 
and semblance are now thoroughly related to each other. Essence produces semblance, 
but at the same time it is dependent on it; since it is only through relating to semblance 
that it can constitute itself as essence. We can depict the three forms of reflection with the 
following schema:  
Positing Reflection: (essence-semblance) 
External Reflection: (essence-semblance) 
Determining Reflection: (essence-semblance) – (essence-semblance)59 
 
The determining reflection adequately formulates the structure of domination in essence. 
In contrast to positing reflection, the relation of domination of essence over semblance is 
not one-way or immediate. Domination in determining reflection rather obtains by virtue 
of incorporating a moment of external reflection, i.e. a moment of essence equally 
determined by semblance. In determining reflection, there is a reciprocity between 
essence and semblance; but such reciprocity is eventually an illusion – though an 
objective illusion – since it is ultimately essence that determines semblance.  In other 
words, there is a symmetrical mutual determination of essence and semblance, but such 
                                                        
59 As the recursive structure of determining reflection shows, Hegel is emphatically against 
understanding determining reflection as simply a mean between two extremes of positing and 
external reflection. It is not the case that essence partially posits semblance (positing reflection), 
such that semblance partially retains an independent status from essence (external reflection). In 
contrast, the structure of determining reflection shows that the two opposites of essence and 
semblance do not get reduced to a middle position, but they are constitutively related to each 
other in their very polar opposition. 
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symmetry only exists within the framework of the asymmetrical relation of essence and 
semblance.60 
In conclusion of our discussion of the dialectic of semblance, let us now consider 
the implications of Hegel’s dialectical argument in (B) and (C) regarding the structure of 
the ideology of equality and freedom in capitalism. I would like to emphasize three 
points: First, Hegel’s argument shows that the structure of ideology is contradictory. 
Equality and freedom exist in capitalism, but not as something given that can exist on 
their own, but as something sublated or negated within the relations of domination of 
essence. Thus, the following two groups of people, in their very one-sidedness, are 
wrong: (a) Those libertarians or liberals who think capitalism is primarily a system of 
equality and freedom, and who deny that equality and freedom are generated through the 
essence of domination. (Their attitude is that of external reflection). (b) Those Marxists 
who think there is no freedom or equality in capitalism, and freedom and equality are 
merely some sham ideas that the ruling class has fabricated and propagated to keep the 
workers at bay. (Their attitude is that of positing reflection). Second, it shows that it is 
wrong to think equality and freedom are partially determined through the essence of 
domination, and partially escape from the determination of essence, such that there is a 
moment of freedom and equality for individuals in capitalism that is immune to the 
relations of domination. Rather, equality and freedom are completely taken up by the 
relations of domination, such that they solely function as a moment of the essence of 
                                                        
60 The language of symmetry/asymmetry is not perfectly apt to essence, and Hegel himself does 
not use such phrases in the logic of essence. The terms symmetry and asymmetry might suggest 
that the entities between which symmetry or asymmetry obtains are self-standing and can exist 
apart from the said relations. This is of course not what it is at stake in the logic of essence. Hegel 
uses instead the language of “interiorization” [Erinnerung] of semblance by essence. The choice 
of words notwithstanding, reflection has the structure that I described above. 
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domination. In other words, equality and freedom in capitalism only help the system of 
domination sustain itself. Third, the relation of domination in capitalism is not something 
natural or given but obtains through mediation of the relation of equality. More precisely, 
the essence of domination is nothing other than the relational structure that obtains 
between domination and equality, and recursively constitutes domination. The essence of 
domination requires (“presupposes”) equality for its function, but at the same time 
domination produces (“posits”) the required equality. This means that the structure of 
domination in capitalism is self-grounding; it does not need any appeal to any external or 
given authority, be it nature (as in ancient Greece) or God (as in medieval times) for its 
ground.   
 
 
5- The Logical Structure of Ideology in the Philosophy of Right 
I have discussed Hegel’s conception of semblance in the logic, and have thereby shown 
that semblance in the logic captures the structure of ideology. Now, I would like to 
briefly address Hegel’s own conception of ideology in his social philosophy, and 
especially to look at its logical structure. To clarify from the outset, although I argue that 
Hegel’s conception of semblance in the logic expresses Marx’s conception of ideology of 
freedom and equality in capitalism, nonetheless, I do not intend to suggest that Hegel’s 
conception of ideology in the Philosophy of Right is the same as Marx’s.61Yet, I believe, 
from the logical point of view there are certain similarities between the two. 
 Hegel does not use the term “ideology” in the Philosophy of Right, but his 
conception of “public opinion” [öffentliche Meinung] comes very close to what can now 
                                                        
61 See the Introduction to the dissertation for my take on the Philosophy of Right. 
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be regarded as ideology.62 In the following passage, Hegel both defines what he means 
by “public opinion,” and lays bare its fundamental logical structure:  
Formal subjective freedom, whereby individuals as such entertain and express 
their own judgments, opinions, and counsels on matters of universal concern, 
makes its collective appearance in what is known as public opinion. In the latter, 
the universal in and for itself, the substantial and the true, is linked with its 
opposite, with what is distinct in itself [dem für sich Eigentümlichen] as the 
particular opinions of the many. This existence [of public opinion] is therefore a 
manifest self-contradiction, an appearance of cognition; in it, the essential is just 
as immediately present as the inessential. [diese Existenz ist daher der vorhandene 
Widerspruch ihrer selbst, das Erkennen als Erscheinung; die Wesentlichkeit 
ebenso unmittelbar als die Unwesentlichkeit.] (GPR §316) 
Public opinion for Hegel is analogous to what can be grasped nowadays by various sorts 
of polls; that is, a kind of collective data that is obtained through asking individual people 
of their opinion about a specific issue. According to Hegel, public opinion is the result of 
“all the contingencies of opinion, with its ignorance and perverseness, its false knowledge 
and its errors of judgment”  (GPR §317), and for that reason, it can be equated with 
ideology. Although Hegel does assert that public opinion or ideology is rampant with 
falsity, he does not regard it as pure falsity. Rather, he defines it in terms of  “a manifest 
self-contradiction” (GPR §316) in which “simultaneously…truth and endless error are 
closely united within it.” (GPR §317) Recall that for Hegel there is both falsity and truth 
in the category of semblance in the logic.  Semblance is false insofar as it is conceived to 
be self-subsistent.  It is true insofar as it is conceived to be a constitutive moment of 
                                                        
62 Cf. Adorno’s exposition of Hegel’s conception of “public opinion” (NS-V 6: 162ff). For a 
general discussion of Hegel’s conception of public opinion in the context of other thinkers of the 
period in Germany, See (Liesegang: 2004) 
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essence. Here we see a similar logical structure at work.63 Public opinion is false, but it is 
a kind of falsity that at the same time participates in truth.  Public opinion is false, insofar 
as it is “distinct” from the “substantial” basis of the society, from its essence, and because 
of this inevitable dissociation, it can and does contain blatant errors. The institutional 
structure of society, i.e. the “substantial”, is logically independent from public opinion, 
and cannot be known through it, rather “it can be known only in and from itself”  [nur aus 
und für sich] (GPR §317). However – and this is why public opinion is contradictory – 
although public opinion seems to be independent of the substantial, it nevertheless 
depends on it. It therefore can manifest, although in a distorted form, “the true needs and 
legitimate tendencies of actuality” [die wahrhaften Bedürfnisse und richtigen Tendenzen 
der Wirklichkeit] (§317).  
 In the interpretation of Marx that I have offered, ideology is not primary the 
subjective opinions of individuals, rather; ideology is embodied within the essential legal, 
social and political institutions. It is for this reason that ideology for Marx is socially 
necessary, and thus those “contingencies of opinion, with its ignorance and perverseness, 
its false knowledge and its errors of judgment” (Hegel’s phrase) cannot count, for Marx, 
as ideology. However, there is a deeper sense that Hegel and Marx come close to each 
other. That is the sense when we disregard the content of public opinion, namely, what 
people in fact believe or say, and instead consider the fact that people, in modernity, can 
believe or say whatever comes to their mind. According to Hegel, the principle of 
                                                        
63 The term that Hegel uses in the above quote of §316 is Erscheinung, and not Schein. Hegel 
does not use the logical terms in his Realphilosophie quite consistently. From his analysis of 
public opinion, it is obvious that he is in fact speaking about Schein, not Erscheinung. Similarly, 
the terms essential and inessential in the block quote above does not refer to the categories of the 
logic that Hegel discusses in the dialectical development of semblance in (A).  
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subjective freedom of individuals is constitutive of  – and therefore socially necessary in 
– modernity. An individual in modern times is entitled to entertain his own ideas – even if 
they are blatantly false – and accordingly, he is entitled to be recognized by others for 
having such ideas. This makes public opinion an essential part of the social structure in 
modernity, an essential part that cannot be ignored. Thus, Hegel concludes,  
Public opinion therefore deserves to be respected [geachtet] as well as despised 
[verachtet] – despised for its concrete consciousness and expression, and 
respected for its essential basis, which appears [scheint] in that concrete 
consciousness only in a more or less obscure manner. (GPR §318) 
 
 
6- The Logical Structure of Marx’s Critique of the Ideology of Equality 
and Freedom in Capitalism 
In this section, my aim is to show that Marx’s conception of the ideology or semblance 
[Schein] of equality and freedom, in terms of its logical structure, has a close affinity to 
Hegel’s semblance in the logic of essence. Importantly, Marx, for all his contempt for 
schematic thinking, never facilely applies Hegelian logical categories to political 
economy; rather, he carves out a mode of dialectic that is immanent to the specific subject 
matter that he is dealing with. In the case of illusion or semblance, as far as I can verify, 
he never makes any reference to the Hegel’s category in the logic. Yet, as his dialectical 
conception in general is greatly influenced by Hegel, it is not surprising to observe the 
structural homology between the two. In what follows, first, I discuss that the basis of 
Marx’s critique of political economy is the ontological distinction between essence and 
semblance (5-1). I will then explain Marx’s critique of the ideology of equality and 
freedom by showing how the ideology of equality and freedom is systematically and 
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functionally related to the totality of capital. I will also show how Marx’s dialectical 
critique of ideology of equality and freedom accords to the dialectical development of the 
category of semblance in the logic of essence, from (A) to (B), to (C), as I discussed in 
section 3 (5-2). 
 
6-1- Marx’s Critique of Ideology as the Critique of Semblance 
It is not an exaggeration to claim that Marx’s economic theory – in its entirety – is based 
on the ontological distinction between what seems to be the case and what is actually the 
case, i.e. between surface-appearance and essence. It is indeed on the basis of the 
distinction between surface-appearance and essence that Marx criticizes (a) vulgar 
economy [Vulgärökonomie], and (b) classical political economy [klassische politische 
Ökonomie]. Marx regards vulgar economists (Bastiat, Say, Senior, etc) as pure 
ideologues of capitalism. By contrast, while criticizing classical political economists 
(Petty, Smith, Ricardo), Marx regards them as committed to scientific investigation, 
thereby deserving due attention.  (a) Regarding vulgar economics, Marx writes,  
Vulgar economics indeed does nothing more than interpret, systematize and turn 
into apologetics the intuitive awareness of agents trapped within bourgeois 
relations of production. [Die Vulgärökonomie tut in der Tat nichts, als die 
Vorstellungen der in den bürgerlichen Produktionsverhältnissen befangenen 
Agenten dieser Produktion doktrinär zu verdolmetschen, zu systematisieren und 
zu apologetisieren]. (MEW 25:825, C III: 956) 
For vulgar political economy, the surface-appearance of capitalism – i.e. the way that 
capitalism immediately appears to individuals, and thus forms their beliefs – is all that 
there is to capitalism. There is no essence to be further investigated. Thus, what remains 
to vulgar political economy, according to Marx, is only a “pedantic systematization” of 
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the surface-appearance of society into more or less consistent theory (MEW 23:95, C I: 
175). Vulgar political economy effectively counts, in the strict sense of the word, as pure 
ideology; since it takes what people believe at face value, and does not question further 
their validity.64  
 (b) In contrast to vulgar economy that denies that there is any essence at all, Marx 
credits the classical political economy with a genuine interest in investigation of “the 
inner framework of bourgeois relations of production” [den innern Zusammenhang der 
bürgerlichen Produktionsverhältnisse]. Thus, to the extent that classical political 
economy does not confine itself to “the merely apparent framework” [scheinbarer 
Zusammenhang] and seeks to penetrate to the “inner framework” of capitalism, it is 
indeed science (MEW 23:95, C I: 174).65 According to Marx, the problem with the 
classical political economy is not that it is not committed to investigating the essence 
behind the veil of semblance. The problem is rather that – because of the empiricist 
framework classical political economy deploys – “even its best representatives remained 
more or less trapped in the world of semblance their own criticism had dissolved.”  
(MEW 25:838, C III:969). According to Marx, had classical political economy been able 
to abandon its empiricism, it would have been able to recognize that the surface-
appearance of capitalism is not only different from the essence of capitalism, but indeed 
distorts and falsifies that essence – hence, Marx’s own usage of the term “semblance” 
                                                        
64 “The vulgar economists confine themselves to systematizing in a pedantic way, and 
proclaiming for everlasting truths, the banal and complacent beliefs held by the bourgeois agents 
of production about their own world [die banalen und selbstgefälligen Vorstellungen der 
bürgerlichen Produktionsagenten], which is to them the best possible one.” (MEW 23: 95, C 
I:175) 
65 Cf. Also with the following passage: “All science would be superfluous, if the outward 
appearance of things and the essence of things immediately coincided.” (MEW 23:825, C III: 
956). 
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[Schein] to describe the surface-appearance of capitalism.66 Marx emphasizes,  
The finished shape of economic relations [in capitalism], as these are visible on 
the surface, in their real existence, and therefore also in the intuitive awareness 
with which the bearers and agents of these relations seek to gain an understanding 
of them, is very different from the shape of their inner core, which is essential but 
concealed, and the concept corresponding to it. It is in fact the very reverse and 
antithesis of this. (MEW 25:219, C III: 311, my emphasis)67 
Note how Marx emphasizes that the surface-appearance in capitalism is not only “very 
different” from essence, but also, it is the exactly the “reverse and antithesis” [verkehrt, 
gegensätzlich] of what is essentially the case. This point is poignantly clear in the case of 
ideas of equality and freedom. In capitalism, individuals entertain the belief that they are 
equal and free; yet they are, in fact, unequal and unfree. The false belief of individuals in 
equality and freedom, however, is not an arbitrary subjective error that does not need to 
be explained. Rather, the ideology of equality and freedom is objective – it is socially 
necessary, it “arises from the very relations of production” (MEW 23:559, C I:667). The 
task of critique of ideology for Marx is not simply judging that people are not free and 
equal, but in explaining how such belief in equality and freedom, while being false, is 
nonetheless necessary.   
 
                                                        
66 Note that Marx does not make a historically invariant claim that in all social formations the 
surface-appearance is false; he rather makes a historical claim that it is in capitalism that surface-
appearance is illusory. 
67 “Die fertige Gestalt der ökonomischen Verhältnisse, wie sie sich auf der Oberfläche 
zeigt, in ihrer realen Existenz, und daher auch in den Vorstellungen, worin die Träger und 
Agenten dieser Verhältnisse sich über dieselben klarzuwerden suchen, sind sehr verschieden von, 
und in der Tat verkehrt, gegensätzlich zu ihrer innern, wesentlichen, 
aber verhüllten Kerngestalt und dem ihr entsprechenden Begriff.” 
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6-2- The “Inexorable Overturning” of Equality and Freedom into Inequality 
and Domination in capitalism 
In this part, I give a short account of Marx’s economic theory, insofar as it relates to the 
ideology of equality and freedom in capitalism. The account given here will be further 
complemented with my detailed discussion of the totality of capital in Chapter 4.  
 According to Marx, the defining feature of capitalism – what distinguishes 
capitalism from the previous modes of production – is the institution of wage-labor. The 
relation of wage-labor at the same time is the very source of the semblance of equality 
and freedom in capitalism. Marx writes:  
We understand the decisive importance of the transformation of the value and 
price of labor-power into the form of wages. All the notions of justice held by 
both the worker and the capitalist, all the mystifications of the capitalist mode of 
production, all capitalism’s illusions about freedom, all apologetic tricks of vulgar 
economics, have as their basis this form of appearance, which makes the actual 
relation invisible, and indeed presents to the eye the precise opposite of that 
relation  (MEW 23:562 , C  I:680). 
Marx analyses the relation of wage-labor in two consecutive stages: (1) insofar as it 
occurs in the realm of the market, or what he calls the sphere of “circulation” of 
commodities. The transactions made in the market are that aspect of capitalism that is 
visible to individuals; and (2) insofar as it occurs as a moment of the totality of economy, 
which includes – in addition to the sphere of circulation – the sphere of “production” of 
commodities. For Marx, the totality of economy is “capital” itself, which is a relational 
structure that is invisible to the individuals, and can be understood only through analysis. 
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(1) Labor contracts are made in the sphere of circulation or the market. The 
worker sells the commodity that he possesses, i.e. his “labor-power”68, to the capitalist, 
for which he receives a wage. In capitalism, the worker is free, in the sense that he can 
alienate his labor-power and sell it, in exchange for a wage, to whomever he wants. 
Moreover, the transaction between the capitalist and the worker exactly follows – Marx 
never gets tired of emphasizing – the general law of exchange of equivalents. The 
capitalist pays the full value of labor-power, and this involves no cheating.69 Marx 
concedes that “the sphere of circulation is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. 
It is the exclusive realm of freedom, [and] equality” (MEW 23:189, C I: 280).  The 
freedom and equality obtained through market transactions are real and objective. Yet 
Marx identifies them – and indeed the whole market – with “pure semblance” [reiner 
Schein]. The market, he writes, is “the phenomenon of a process taking place behind it.” 
(MEW 42:180, G: 255). The process taking place behind is the process of production of 
commodities.  
(2) Labor-power is a special commodity. Its use-value, its consumption, is the 
actual process of labor, which constitutes the sphere of production. In the process of 
                                                        
68 There is an important distinction in Marx’s analysis between “labor-power” [Arbeitskraft] and 
“labor” [Arbeit]. What the worker sells to the capitalist is his “labor-power,” which is his 
“capacity to labor” [Arbeitsvermögen], not his actual “labor”. Once the worker has sold his 
“labor-power”, he sets it into motion in the sphere of production, which results in “labor”. For 
Marx, labor is not at all a commodity that can be sold or exchanged. He writes, “labor is the 
substance, and the immanent measure of value, but it has no value itself.” (MEW 23:559, C I:677) 
(See Heinrich (2006: 257), Iber (2005: 122)). The distinction between labor-power and labor is 
one of theoretical innovations of Marx, and is meant, as we will see, to show how production of 
surplus-value does not violate the law of exchange of equivalents. In other words, it is meant to 
explain how equality is objective, and at the same time consistently coheres with inequality. 
69The value of labor-power is determined through the value embodied in the products that the 
worker consumes in his life, such as food, clothing, shelter, car, computer, etc. It does not have 
anything to do with the value that the worker produces for the capitalist through his actual labor. 
That happens in the sphere of production. 
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production, the worker through his labor produces more value than the value that he has 
been paid for. Marx divides the working day (say, 10 hours) into two parts. The first part 
during which a value equal to the value of labor-power (say, 4 hours) is produced, he 
calls the “necessary labor”. Any work that is done beyond the necessary labor, he calls 
“surplus labor” (here, 6 hours) (MEW 23:231, C I: 325). As the production of surplus-
value is a necessary feature of capitalism, there must always be surplus-labor. Indeed, the 
sole reason that the capitalist hires the worker is for the latter’s surplus-labor. This means 
that, seen from the viewpoint of the totality of economy, there is no exchange of 
equivalents, and the exchange of equivalents in the sphere of circulation has been only a 
semblance:  
This exchange of equivalents proceeds; it is only the surface layer of a production, 
which rests on the appropriation of alien labor without exchange, but with the 
semblance [Schein] of exchange. This system of exchange rests on capital as its 
basis, and when it is regarded in isolation from capital, as it appears on the surface, 
as a self-subsistent system, then it is a mere illusion [Schein], but a necessary 
illusion [ein notwendiger Schein]. There is no longer any ground for astonishment 
that the system of exchange values – exchange of equivalents measured through 
labor – turns into, or rather reveals as its hidden background the appropriation of 
alien labor without exchange, complete separation of labor and property. (MEW 
42: 417, G 509)  
The extraction of surplus-labor is not specific to capitalism. In all class societies, a group 
of people must work more than what is necessary for their subsistence. What is specific 
to capitalism, though, is the specific form that the extraction of surplus-labor takes on. In 
capitalism, the extraction of surplus-labor has to be always mediated through the 
semblance of equality obtained in the market. This equality is false, but it is a falsity that 
is objective.  
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(A) Equality is not separable from domination. 
For Hegel equality and domination, or the semblance and essence are thoroughly 
interpenetrated with each other, and it is not possible to dissociate the former from the 
latter. In order to understand the same point in Marx’s analysis of capitalism, let us 
compare the work of a peasant in feudal Europe liable to compulsory work (corvée) with 
the work of a worker in capitalism (MEW 23:593, C I:713). The peasant is obliged to 
work, say, three days a week for his lord on the lord’s domain. The other three days, he 
works for himself on his own land. The sphere of equality and domination are sharply 
distinguished from each other – substantially, temporally and spatially. In the eye of the 
peasant, the forced labor for the lord never gets the character of his own voluntary labor. 
There is no semblance or illusion of equality involved here. The extraction of surplus-
labor is immediate and direct; and the relation of domination is transparent.  Now let us 
look at the worker in capitalism. The worker still works, say, three days a week for 
himself, i.e. the necessary labor to compensate for the value of his labor-power. The other 
three days, he works for the capitalist to generate surplus value. But this is not the way 
the working week seems to the worker. The six days of work appear to him as one single 
block of work, in compensation for which he receives a wage. In the wage-labor, 
therefore, even the part of the work that is unpaid seems to be paid. Marx even warns that 
the sharp distinction that he makes between the necessary and the surplus labor in 
capitalism is only of a heuristic purpose. In the actual labor process, right from the 
beginning every minute and every second of the labor process is an intermingling of the 
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necessary and the surplus labor, such that it is not possible to dissociate the one from the 
other70.  
 
(B) Equality is posited by domination. 
For Hegel the structure of semblance is contradictory. Semblance exists; however, not as 
something positive that can exist apart from essence; but as something that is sublated or 
negated within essence. The same point holds for Marx. The semblance of equality, or 
the sphere of circulation in general, exists; however, not as something positive that can 
exist apart from the totality of capital, but as something that gets sublated or negated in it. 
In an important passage in Capital that serves as a conclusion to his argument, Marx 
writes,  
It is quite evident from this that the law of appropriation or of private property, 
laws based on the production and circulation of commodities, turns into its direct 
opposite through its own internal and inexorable dialectic [schlägt…durch seine 
eigne, innere, unvermeidliche Dialektik in sein direktes Gegenteil um]. The 
exchange of equivalents, the original operation with which we started, is now 
                                                        
70 The point that semblance and essence interpenetrate such that it is not possible to dissociate the 
former from the latter also helps us criticize one common misreading of Marx. According to this 
common misreading, Marx’s critique of the ideology of equality and freedom consists in him 
showing that, although the individuals are legally free and equal they are materially unfree and 
unequal. This view – namely the view that regards individuals to be free and equal in one aspect, 
and unfree and unequal in another aspect – is, of course, correct. But if this was all that Marx 
could offer, his critique was not particularly incisive, or even for that matter interesting. In this 
view, the fact of freedom and equality is not systematically related to the fact of unfreedom and 
inequality. Rather, the two are only externally added together. Such external addition implies, 
firstly, that it is possible in capitalism to have legal freedom and equality without unfreedom and 
inequality (say, through fair distribution of material resources), and secondly, that it is possible to 
have unfreedom and inequality in capitalism without legal freedom and equality (say, through 
having slavery in capitalism). Marx’s commitment to the organic conception of totality outright 
precludes these two possibilities.   
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turned round in such a way that there is only a seeming exchange [zum Schein 
ausgetauscht wird], since, firstly, the capital which is exchanged for labor-power 
is itself merely a portion of the product of the labor of others which has been 
appropriated without an equivalent; and, secondly, this capital must not only be 
replaced by its producer, the worker, but replaced together with an added surplus. 
The relation of exchange between capitalist and worker becomes a mere 
semblance belonging only to the process of circulation [ein dem 
Zirkulationsprozeß angehöriger Schein], it becomes a mere form, which is alien to 
the content of the transaction itself, and merely mystifies it. The constant sale and 
purchase of labor-power is the form; the content is the constant appropriation by 
the capitalist, without equivalent, of a portion of the labor of others which has 
already been objectified, and his repeated exchange of this labor for a greater 
quantity of the living labor of others. (MEW 23:609, C I:729-30) 
Note the contradictory formulations that Marx uses in this passage to articulate the 
semblance of equality as both existent, and non-existent. Capitalist production requires 
the law of exchange of equivalents, but at the same time negates this law.71 Moreover – 
and this is another point – for Marx, quite like Hegel, the sublation or negation of 
semblance in essence is complete, and not partial. The equality that obtains through 
market transactions “turns into its direct opposite” in its completeness; since the money 
                                                        
71 Norman Geras quotes this passage of Marx, and castigates him for his dialectical language: 
“This turning into opposites is just a logical trick, or more generously perhaps – though that point 
stands – the enjoyment of intellectual paradox and surprise. It is a game with the two different 
senses of equivalence. Nothing, in fact, changes into its opposite in this matter.” Therefore, 
“Marx cannot really mean what he says.” (1984: 52-3). Geras is right that there are two different 
senses of equivalence involved here, one insofar as it occurs in the sphere of circulation, and the 
other insofar as it occurs as a moment of the totality of capital. However, he thinks that because 
the two senses of equivalence are perfectly “consistent” with each other, there cannot be any 
dialectic. I have indicated before that Hegel’s and Marx’s dialectic completely abide by the law of 
non-contradiction, which is the minimal requirement of any rational thought. Nonetheless, by 
dismissing dialectics as a mere “prevarication” that only “muddies the water”, Geras misses the 
point that the equivalence obtained in the market is false, yet objectively so. In order to be true to 
the Marxist understanding of ideology, one needs to accept both objectivity and falsity of 
ideology at the same time, and this one can arguably do only through dialectical thinking.  
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with which the capitalist pays the wage of the worker on the basis of equality of exchange 
is already accumulated through past labor of other workers. With respect to the 
individual worker, the analysis shows that it is the surplus labor that is appropriated 
without exchange. But with respect to the class of workers and the class of capitalists, the 
whole working day is appropriated without exchange.72  
 
(C) Equality is posited by domination as domination’s own presupposition.  
For Hegel, essence requires (“presupposes”) semblance, but at the same time essence 
produces (“posits”) this very presupposition. The same point holds for Marx. The relation 
of domination of capital requires (“presupposes”) equality; since it is solely through 
market transactions that capitalist exploitation can occur. This “presupposition”, however, 
is not external to capital. It is not the case that capital simply finds the equality available, 
and then comes to the scene to use it. Rather, capital is a self-maintaining and self-
reproducing social system that is able to generate (“posits”) its necessary 
presupposition.73  In the end of each production cycle, the worker is coerced to exert his 
freedom and equality through making a new transaction in the labor-market, mainly 
because the product of his labor has been expropriated from him, and he remains as much 
without access to the means of production as before.74 
                                                        
72 It is appropriate to emphasize that for Hegel, as I have indicated in the Introduction to the 
dissertation, the standpoint of the logic of being is the standpoint of individuals that relate to each 
other atomistically. The class analysis is the analysis from the standpoint of totality, and accords 
with Hegel’ logic of essence.  
73 I will discuss the self-maintaining and self-reproducing nature of the totality of capital in detail 
in Chapter 4.  
74 In the Grundrisse, Marx several times uses the language of “positing” and “presupposing” to 
describe the structure of capital. See especially (MEW 42:180-7, Grundrisse 255-263) 
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 In closing, I would like to reiterate the three desiderata that I set for Marx in the 
introduction, the three desiderata that he needs to fulfill, such that his critique of ideology 
can be considered as successful. Marx needs to explain (1) Why people, in capitalism, 
intuitively believe that they are equal and free, (2) Why such belief in equality and 
freedom, in capitalism, is illusory, and (3) Why despite the illusory character of equality 
and freedom, individuals continue to hold those beliefs. Now, after having explained 
Marx in a fair detail, we can realize that he indeed successfully explains the three 
desiderata: (1) People in capitalism intuitively believe that they are equal and free, 
because they are necessarily involved in market transactions, and because market 
transactions necessarily presuppose equality and freedom. (2) People’s belief in equality 
and freedom is illusory, since market is only a moment of the totality of capital. The 
market transactions – which seem to embody equality and freedom from the point of 
view of the market – turn out to embody inequality and unfreedom from the point of view 
of the totality of capital. (3) Despite the illusory character of equality and freedom, 
individuals continue to hold those beliefs, since the totality of capital reproduces itself, 
independently of individuals, and thereby forces individuals to continuously sustain their 



















1- The Critique of the Symmetrical Relation of Recognition  
In recent years, Axel Honneth has undertaken a project of “normative reconstruction” of 
Hegel’s social and political philosophy on the basis of the concept of “recognition”.75 
From the point of view of social ontology, recognition implies (1) that there are no 
individuals prior to and independent from the relation obtaining between them and (2) 
that the relation between individuals is reciprocal. Importantly, Honneth regards the 
reciprocity involved in recognition to be symmetrical.76 This implies that the recognizer 
and the recognizee depend on and determine each other to the same extent. Thus, it is 
supposed that individuals in recognitive state are equal with each other: A holds B 
                                                        
75 Honneth pursues this aim in several of his works. I content myself with citing two occasions in 
which Honneth clearly states his project: (1) “The ethical sphere [for Hegel] contains different 
classes of actions that are distinct in themselves but are all marked by the common quality of 
being able to articulate a certain form of reciprocal recognition.” (2010:51, emphasis added) (2) 
“In the Philosophy of Right, he [i.e. Hegel] explains every ethical institution with reference to a 
particular form of recognition.” (2007:352, emphasis added) 
76 Honneth explicitly uses the word “symmetry” to describe the relation of recognition. See, for 
example, (1995: 122, 128). 
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accountable to the claims that B makes to the same extent that B holds A accountable for 
the claims that A makes.  
Arguably, such a normative conception of symmetrical recognition does not do 
justice to contemporary realities, where the relations between individuals are structurally 
saturated with power. For example, consider that the relationship between some 
particular capitalist and some worker of his cannot be, even remotely, symmetrical. This 
has nothing to do with moral integrity of the capitalist in question, but with the 
institutional and economic organization of capitalism, which produces and maintains the 
relation of asymmetry. As Marx has shown, the function of capital necessarily causes 
massive unemployment. Within the capitalist framework, the unemployed, taking on the 
form of an “industrial reserve army”, significantly reduce or entirely eliminate the 
bargaining power of workers. This economic arrangement makes workers inherently 
subordinate to capitalists; if ever a worker insists on his demands, the capitalist can 
simply replace him with one of those in the “reserve.” 
Honneth simply regards reciprocal relations that are based on power as cases of 
“non-recognition” or “misrecognition”. Thus, he clearly implicates a strict dichotomy 
between relations characterized by recognition and relations characterized by power; and 
so, he effectively bans the inclusion of power within recognitive structure. In this way, 
Honneth conceives of power relations as “social pathologies”, which are mere aberrations 
from the otherwise healthy norms of the bourgeois-capitalist social order. While 
recognition constitutes the basis of sociality in this social order, such cases of “non-
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recognition” or “misrecognition” spark a “struggle for recognition” which has the 
potential to restore the normal recognitive structure.77 
It is appropriate to emphasize that the view that Honneth represents – the view 
that holds recognition to be symmetrical – has become widespread in current scholarship 
on Hegel. According to Robert Pippin, the “conditions of successful agency” for Hegel  
cannot be satisfied unless individuals are understood as participants in an ethical 
form of life, Sittlichkeit, and finally in a certain historical form of ethical life, in 
which such relations of recognition can be genuinely mutual, where that means 
that the bestowers of recognition are themselves actually free, where the 
intersubjective recognitional (sometimes called “communicative”) relation is 
sustained in a reciprocal way. (2007:67, emphases added) 
Similarly, Robert Brandom holds that “recognition is an equivalence relation”. He argues 
that “reciprocal (that is, symmetric) recognition” (original emphases) is a “necessary 
condition” for an individual’s recognition of himself as an individual; symmetrical 
recognition is therefore constitutive of the individual:  
Insofar as recognition is de facto not symmetric, it cannot be reflexive. I cannot be 
properly self-conscious (recognize myself) except in the context of a recognition 
structure that is reciprocal: insofar as I am recognized by those I recognize. 
(2007:137) 
                                                        
77 In a more recent essay, Honneth explicitly admits that he has defined recognition in exclusion 
to power: “Recognition has always been treated [by Honneth] as representing the opposite of 
practices of domination or subjection. Such forms of exercising power were to be regarded as 
phenomena of withheld recognition…such that recognition could never come under suspicion of 
functioning as a means of domination.” (2012:76) In order to address the issue of power, Honneth 
in the said essay endeavors to distinguish ideological instances of recognition, which secure 
social domination, from recognition in its normal function, which positively contributes to the 
formation of the autonomy of individuals. However, still he regards such ideological instances of 
recognition to be infrequent, and sees them as aberrations from recognition in its normal state, 
thereby reiterating the dichotomy between recognition and power in a different register.  
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It is certainly true that, for Hegel, reciprocal [gegenseitig] relation is a necessary 
condition for reflexivity, and reflexivity is that which constitutes the individual qua 
individual. Yet, by conflating reciprocity with symmetry, Brandom, quite like Honneth 
and Pippin, plainly assumes that recognitive relation is devoid of power.78  
I concede that Hegel, in the Philosophy of Right, presupposes recognition as a 
symmetrical relation that undergirds modern social institutions. Nonetheless, given the 
blatant presence of power relations in the modern capitalist world, I believe it is 
necessary – despite the Philosophy of Right – to explicate an account of recognition that 
is structurally asymmetrical. Indeed, Hegel in the official locus of his discussion of 
recognition, the dialectic of lordship and bondage in the Phenomenology of Spirit, does 
not discuss power as an aberration from, and therefore external to, the recognitive 
structure, but rather he discusses power as constitutive of this structure.79 Yet, the 
dialectic of lordship and bondage is already profusely discussed in the literature, and I do 
                                                        
78 Pippin’s and Brandom’s cases, however, are more nuanced than Honneth, as it seems that both 
Pippin and Brandom grant that the relation of power is already a relation of recognition, but they 
maintain that such a case of recognition is not a “true” or “successful” recognition (Pippin), or is 
a “defective” form of recognition (Brandom). Despite the difference, however, the two are very 
close to Honneth, insofar as all regard the symmetrical relation of recognition as the basis of unity 
in modern society, from which the asymmetrical relation of power is a deviation. See also (Pippin 
2000:156) 
79 It seems that the dialectic of lordship and bondage for Honneth, Pippin and Brandom simply 
belongs to the pre-history of modernity, or even prehistory of mankind, and in modern bourgeois-
capitalist social order, such an asymmetry has given way to a genuinely symmetrical relation. 
Indeed, as far as I see it, they regard the collapse of the dialectic of lordship and bondage in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit as a kind of negative proof, which demonstrates the necessity of 
establishment of the symmetrical relation between individuals. I do not intend to question this 
way of reading of the dialectic of lordship and bondage, but this does not change the fact that 
Hegel there explicitly discusses power as constitutive of the structure of recognition. This is the 
reason that despite the systematic place of this chapter within the overall structure of the book, 
the dialectic of lordship and bondage in isolation from other parts of the book has served as an 
almost endless source of inspiration for Marxists, feminists, and other radical thinkers.   
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not intend to go over this well-trodden territory. Rather, in the framework of this 
dissertation, in order to explicate the asymmetrical character of the relation between 
individuals, I turn to the chapter, “determinations of reflection” 
[Reflexionsbestimmungen], in the Science of Logic. 
Given the subject matter of the Science of Logic, Hegel in his exposition of the 
determinations of reflection does not refer to recognition, or to any other explicitly social 
or political issues. Rather, as I will show, he discusses the general “logical” structure of 
individuals, and he does so, solely through examining the relations between individuals. 
Although I will not ground this claim in this chapter, the logic of the determinations of 
reflection in the Science of Logic is indeed akin to the logic that underpins the relation 
between lord and bondsman in the Phenomenology of Spirit.80 Our present focus on the 
Science of Logic is even more justified in virtue of the fact that the explicitly experiential 
content of the Phenomenology, and Hegel’s discussion of self-consciousness, desire, and 
labor within the context of the dialectic of lordship and bondage, might distract us from 
the current project of carving out the social ontology undergirding that dialectic.  
In the chapter “determinations of reflection”, Hegel discusses the structure of 
individuals through various relations that obtain between individuals. These relations 
include “identity” [Identität], “difference” [Unterschied], “diversity” [Verschiedenheit], 
“opposition” [Gegensatz], and “contradiction” [Widerspruch]. I will argue that Hegel’s 
discussion of the determinations of reflection establishes (1) that there is no pre-relational 
                                                        
80 Since Hegel never wrote a distinct “logic” of the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit, there is an 
unsettled controversy about the nature of this logic, especially because he wrote the Science of 
Logic later (1812/13) and with a different conception. I do not want to enter into this controversy 
here, but I hope the reader who is familiar with the dialectic of lordship and bondage through this 
chapter will realize that the logic of determinations of reflection in the Science of Logic is very 
similar to the logic that underpins the relation between lordship and bondage.   
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individual. Rather, individuals are solely constituted in and through relations; (2) that the 
most fundamental form of relation between individuals is the relation of opposition; and 
(3) that the relation of opposition, in its adequate form, is essentially asymmetrical. As 
the asymmetrical relation is a relation of power, these claims together demonstrate that – 
contrary to Honneth, Pippin and Brandom – for Hegel power is not external to the 
structure of the individuals, but is constitutive of it. As I will show, for Hegel the 
asymmetry that obtains through the relation of opposition has a complex structure. 
Namely, it does not obtain in exclusion of symmetry and equality, I argue, but has a 
necessary moment of symmetry and equality built into it. Such symmetry and equality 
function as an illusion – indeed a constitutive illusion – that conceals the asymmetrical 
relation of power.81  
In what follows, I begin with a general account of the determinations of reflection, 
what they are, and how they are related to each other (Section 2). I continue with 
discussing the dialectical development of the determinations of reflection, in order to 
show how opposition, as well as the contradiction that ensues from it, constitutes the 
individuals (Section 3). I explicate then why the relation of opposition is essentially 
asymmetrical, and why the relation of opposition is more fundamental than the relation of 
diversity. (Sections 4 through 6) Thereafter, I explain how Hegel’s logic of opposition 
underpins Marx’s conception of the opposition of labor and capital in capitalism, and 
                                                        
81 It is worth mentioning that Iris Marion Young has also criticized Honneth’s exclusion of power 
from recognitive relation. Young discusses the first form of recognition for Honneth, namely, 
love in the sphere of family, and argues, contra Honneth, that “the relation between caring adult 
and child…is necessarily asymmetrical – because the care receiver depends on the caregiver in a 
way that the giver does not depend on the receiver.” (2007: 207) While I definitely agree with 
Young, my approach is quite distinct from hers, as she does not engage in any logical analysis of 
the relation of recognition.   
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Catharine MacKinnon’s conception of gender formation (Sections 7 and 8). Finally, I 
recapitulate my discussion by comparing a social ontology based on asymmetrical of 
opposition with one based on a symmetrical relation of recognition (Section 9).  
 
2- The Determinations of Reflection and the Fundamentality of 
Opposition 
In the Introduction to the dissertation and the first chapter, I have argued for the 
following two claims: (1) In the logic of essence, Hegel develops an ontology that is 
absolutely relational. In contrast to an ontology based on priority of things over relations 
prevalent in the history of philosophy since Aristotle, Hegel’s ontology in the logic of 
essence is based on priority of relations over things. (2) The ontology of absolute 
relationality in the logic of essence is at the same time the ontology of domination. The 
relation of “equality” that obtains by virtue of “indifference” of individuals to each other 
– i.e. the relation of Gleichgültigkeit – is an “illusion” [Schein] that conceals the true 
relation of domination. This illusion, however, is not an arbitrary error that can be 
dispensed with through enlightened reasoning, but it is objective and immanent to the 
structure of the (social) world (in capitalism). Hegel’s discussion of the “determinations 
of reflection” presupposes these two basic claims, but at the same time further grounds 
them.82 
                                                        
82 This accords to Hegel’s general mode of exposition. Hegel’s arguments in the logic are not 
simply deductive and linear. Rather, the argument of the logic, as Klaus Hartmann notes, is “a 
complex unity of linearity, progression and regression, and architectonic” (1976:106). 
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According to Hegel, determinations of reflection are categories that obtain solely 
through relation (hence, the very naming of the term: determination of reflection) and 
“are valid for everything” [von allem gelten] (WdL II:36, SL 409). They include:  
A- Identity [Identität] 
B- Difference [Unterschied] 
 1- Absolute Difference [absoluter Unterschied] 
 2- Diversity [Verschiedenheit] 
 3- Opposition [Gegensatz] 
C- Contradiction [Widerspruch] 
According to George Lukács, “the discovery of determinations of reflection and putting 
them in the center [is] the revolutionary deed of Hegel in philosophy.” (GLW 13:533) Of 
course, Lukács does not mean that Hegel simply found these concepts, which are 
perennial in the history of philosophy. What he means is that Hegel was the first 
philosopher who developed these concepts solely in relation to each other, and showed 
that these concepts, in a very strong sense, are all internally related to each other. Hegel 
writes:    
It is of the greatest importance to perceive and to bear in mind this nature of the 
determinations of reflection, namely, that their truth consists only [nur] in their 
relation to one another, that therefore each in its very concept contains the other; 
without this knowledge, not a single step can really be taken in philosophy. (WdL 
II:73, SL 438, emphasis added)  
For Hegel, the development of essence is one of “remaining-inward” [Insichbleiben] 
(Nürnberge Logik §34, WW 4:17). This means that in the logic of essence, there is no 
new content added from outside, so to speak. Rather, with the development of essence, 
the content, which is derived from relation, is re-configured through re-configuration of 
relation. This is precisely what is going on in the progress of determinations of reflection. 
That is, for Hegel, the determinations of reflection which are expressed in the following 
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propositions are intimately interpenetrated with each other; each implies the others; each 
contains the others:  
(1) The proposition of identity: “Everything is identical with itself; A =A” [Alles ist 
mit sich identisch; A=A] or its negative expression: “A cannot at the same time be 
A and not A” [A kann nicht zugleich A und nicht A sein]. (EnzL. §115, also WdL 
II:36, SL 409) 
(2) The proposition of diversity: “Everything is diverse.” [Alle Dinge sind 
verschieden], or its negative expression: “There are no things that are the same as 
each other.” [Es gibt nicht zwei Dinge, die einander gleich sind.] (WdL II:52, SL 
422) 
(3) The proposition of opposition:  “Everything is opposite” [Alles ist 
Entgegengesetzt.](EnzL. §119Z), or “Everything is an opposite, is determined 
either as positive or as negative” [dass Alles ein Entgegengesetztes ist, ein 
entweder als positive oder als negative Bestimmtes] (WdL II:73, SL 438) 
(4) The proposition of contradiction: “Everything is inherently contradictory” [Alle 
Dinge sind an sich widersprechend] (WdL II:74, SL 439)  
The claims that each of identity, difference, opposition and contradiction is in the others – 
for example, contradiction is in identity, or opposition is in identity –and that everything 
is at the very same time identical, different, diverse, opposite and contradictory83 are 
extremely important for Hegel’s philosophy in general.  Hegel often criticizes 
representational thought because it is unable to grasp the close interrelation of 
determinations of reflection, and contents itself with mere “enumerating them one after 
the other” (WdL II: 38, SL 411). He castigates “external reflection” for which, “reason is 
nothing more that a loom on which it externally combines and interweaves the warp, of 
say, identity, and then the woof of difference”, without attempting to understand the 
internal relation between the two (WdL II:39, SL 412). However, although – and this is an 
                                                        
83 Cf. Nicolai Hartmann: “Faßt man die Reflexionsbestimmungen in der Form von Gesetzten des 
Wesens, so besagen sie dieses: alle Dinge sind zugleich identisch, verschieden, gegensätztlich 
und widersprechend.” (1929: 441, emphasis added)  
 106 
extremely important point – the determinations of reflection are of the same nature for 
Hegel, this does not mean that they are of the same order of importance. Rather, for 
Hegel there is a progressive dialectical development from identity, to difference, to 
diversity, to opposition, to contradiction. Comparing identity and contradiction, Hegel 
carefully writes that they express the same content, 
but in fact, if it were a question of grading the two determinations and they had to 
be kept separate, then contradiction would have to be taken as the deeper 
determination and more characteristic of essence [das Tiefere und Wesenhaftere]. 
(WdL II:75, SL 439) 
The proposition of contradiction, he emphasizes, “in contrast to others expresses more the 
truth and the essence of things” (WdL II:74, SL 439). This means that although the 
determinations of reflection in some sense are the same, nevertheless, there is, to adopt a 
term from Klaus Hartmann, a “Steigerungs-Kaskade” (escalating cascade) from identity 
to difference to diversity to opposition to contradiction (1999:179). Hegel himself uses 
the term “zuspitzen” (i.e. to sharpen, to pinnacle, to come to the point) to describe this 
dialectical progression. What is already present in its “dull” [abgestumpft] form in 
identity and diversity gets its “sharpened” form in opposition and contradiction, which 
are the most adequate determinations of reflection and make all things, Hegel asserts, 
“lively” and “active” (WdL II:78, SL 442). 
In the dialectic of the determinations of reflection, Hegel’s desiderata, therefore, 
are the following: (1) to show that identity, difference, diversity, opposition and 
contradiction in a very strong sense are interrelated to each other and cohere with each 
other, in such a way that each implies all the others; and (2) to show that opposition and 
contradiction are the most fundamental of determinations of reflection, and it is by virtue 
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of opposition and contradiction that identity, difference and diversity become what they 
are. Importantly, as I will show later, the relation of opposition, as well as contradiction 
that ensues from it, forms a relation of domination. Since opposition and contradiction 
are the “deepest” forms of relation between individuals, the claim that opposition and 
contradiction are relations of domination amounts to the claim that Hegel’s ontology is 
ontology of power. I will explain some of the important social implications of this claim 
later in the chapter. For now, it is appropriate to zoom in on Hegel’s exposition of the 
dialectical path from identity, to difference, to diversity, to opposition, to contradiction. A 
proper treatment of this dialectical path requires a book.84 In the following, my treatment 
is brief, with the aim of indicating how the concept of power plays a crucial role in this 
dialectical development. 
 
3- The Dialectic of the Determinations of Reflection 
In the Encyclopedia, Hegel describes the general method of dialectical progression in the 
logic as “nothing other than merely the positing of what is already contained in a concept.” 
(EnzL. §88) It is only through adherence to the principle of making explicit what is 
already implicit in a category, Hegel thinks, that the “necessary progression” of 
categories can be established. In what follows, I detail how Hegel grasps the necessary 
progression from identity to difference (3-1), to diversity (3-2), to opposition (3-3), and 
finally to contradiction (3-4). 
 
                                                        
84 For a helpful commentary on the chapter of determinations of reflection, See Iber (1990:239ff).  
 108 
3-1- From Identity to Difference 
According to Hegel, the relation of identity has to be captured in the following way: 
“Everything is identical with itself; A=A” (EnzL. §115). In the relation A=A, Hegel 
believes, the first A (which comes before the equality sign) is different from the second A 
(which comes after the equality sign). The first A identifies itself with the second A. But 
the second A is being identified with the first A. That is, in the very expression of the 
proposition of identity, the proposition of difference is already implied85. Hegel calls this 
difference, the “absolute difference”, namely, the difference which is already in identity 
(WdL II:46, SL 417). True to the general form of the logic of essence, it is not the case 
that first there is identity, only then there is difference: but the act of identification of (the 
first) A with (the second) A is at the very same time the act of differentiation of (the first) 
A from (the second) A. This means that identity and difference are entirely integral to 
each other.  
 
3-2- From Difference to Diversity 
In the second dialectical move, Hegel maintains that in order that the relation of identity 
and absolute difference (A=A) could be held, there should be other individuals different 
                                                        
85 “Wir können ihn [den Satz der Identität] zwar auf die Formel A=A bringen und diese 
anschreiben. Aber wir schreiben auf diese Weise drei Zeichen an, darunter zwei (notwendig) 
verschiedene A, nämlich eines, das links vom Gleichheitszeichen steht, und ein anderes, das 
rechts von ihm erscheint. Wer den Identitätssatz verstanden hat, hat natürlich auch verstanden, 
daß es ‘wesentlich’ (nicht seinshaft) gleichgültig ist, auf welcher Seite ein Zeichen jeweils steht. 
Im Identitätsgedaneken soll gerade alle unmittelbare Differenz aufgehoben sein. Die Formel A=A 
verstanden haben heißt gerade, den Gedanken sich von ihr abstoßen zu lassen und auf diese 
Weise das reine Sich-Herstellen der Einheit zu vollziehen. Dieses Sich-Herstellen der Identität ist 
aber unmittelbar ein Negieren, ein Unterscheiden.” (Hoffmann 2012: 337) 
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from A, from which A can be differentiated. This results in the relation of diversity, 
namely the relation between A and B, which is a variation of the relation of difference. 
The relation between A and B for Hegel is a relation of externality or indifference, as the 
individuals remain self-standing apart from the relation obtaining between them. In the 
relation of diversity, Hegel writes, “each of the different is what it is for itself, and each is 
indifferent against its relation to the others, so that the relation is an external one for it” 
(EnzL. §117). Or he writes, “the diverse do not relate to each other as identity and 
difference do, but merely as simply diverse that are indifferent  [gleichgültig] to one 
another and to their determinateness” (WdL II:48, SL 419).  
 For Hegel, the two diverse individuals are identical to each other in some respect, 
and are different from each other in some other respect. But the internal relation between 
identity and difference of diverse individuals cannot be conceptualized through the 
relation of diversity. This is the reason that Hegel regards diversity as an “immediate” 
unity of identity and difference (EnzL. §117).  To give an example, if we understand the 
relation of races in terms of diversity, we can say that a black American and a white 
American are identical with each other, with respect to their both being American, and 
they are different from each other, with respect to the color of their skin. Within the 
framework of the relation of diversity, it is not clear how the fact of being American 
relates to the fact of being white or black. The relation between being an American and 
race is simply a matter of externality, a matter of indifference.  
The indifference of individuals to one another reminds us of the logic of being, and 
its atomistic ontology. The relation of two diverse individuals is similar to the relation of 
something [Etwas] and an other [ein Anderes] in the logic of being, and is therefore 
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subject to a similar sort of problems: the infinite regress of diverse individuals, and the 
impossibility of complete determination of each individual. It is for this reason that Hegel 
designates the act of reflection that obtains between diverse individuals as “reflection 
alienated from itself” [sich entfremdete Reflexion], a kind of reflection that has relapsed 
to the logic of being. He writes:  
In reflection thus alienated from itself, likeness [Gleichheit] and unlikeness 
[Ungleichheit] present themselves, therefore, as themselves unrelated, and reflection 
keeps them apart, for it refers them to one and the same something by means of ‘in 
so far,’ ‘from this side or that,’ and ‘from this view or that.’ Thus diverse things that 
are one and the same, when likeness and unlikeness are said of them, are from one 
side like each other, but from another side unlike, and in so far as they are alike, to 
that extent they are not unlike. Likeness thus refers only to itself, and unlikeness is 
equally only unlikeness. (WdL II:50, SL 420)86. 
Within the framework of the relation of diversity, Hegel talks about “likeness” 
[Gleichheit] and “unlikeness” [Ungleichheit] of individuals to each other instead of their 
“identity” and “difference”. The two individuals are like each other, only in some 
respects, not in all respects. If they were to be like each other in all respect, they would 
be identical with each other, not like each other. Therefore, according to Hegel, “likeness” 
is not identity proper, but “external identity”, and similarly, “unlikeness” is not difference 
proper, but “external difference”  (WdL II:49, SL 419, See also EnzL. §117). In contrast to 
identity and difference that belong to the constitution of individuals – individuals are 
what they are by virtue of their identity and difference – likeness and unlikeness only 
exist for an “external” or “third” standpoint, which, Hegel avers, merely “compares” 
[vergleichen] the one with the other, incessantly “passing to and fro between likeness and 
                                                        
86 I have used Di Giovanni’s translation of this passage (364), with modification. 
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unlikeness” (WdL II:50, SL 420). We have learned that the logic of being is the logic of 
representational thought or external reflection that regards the individuals as given, and 
then comes to the scene to determine them. Similarly, the act of comparing is “a 
subjective activity which falls outside” the individuals [ein subjektives, außerhalb ihrer 
fallendes Tun] (WdL II:51, SL 421), and by doing so in effect takes the individuals as 
given.  
In the passage quoted above, Hegel maintains that, on a closer analysis, likeness 
only refers to itself, and unlikeness only to itself. This is another way of expressing the 
atomistic ontology underlying the relation of diversity. We cannot understand how 
likeness (being American) is related to unlikeness (being white or black), as either of 
likeness or unlikeness is regarded as a determinacy that is self-standing by itself. The 
transition from the relation of diversity to the relation of opposition is motivated by the 
need to determine the relation between likeness and unlikeness. I will discuss this 
transition below.87 
                                                        
87 Hegel’s critique of the relation of diversity can be read as a critique of the language of 
equality/inequality that is pivotal in current discussions in liberal political philosophy. (To make 
it even more explicit, one can translate “Gleichheit” as “equality” and “Ungleichheit” as 
“inequality”). It is interesting to observe that Marx and Engels were also both extremely critical 
of any political agenda whose primary aim was equality.  For Marx and Engels, the language of 
equality/inequality is too abstract to be philosophically meaningful, and politically helpful. 
People are always equal in some respect, and unequal in another respect, and if we aim to reduce 
equality in one respect, it might well increase inequality in another respect. The language of 
equality and inequality, as Hegel’s logic shows us, presupposes an atomistic ontology, and it is 
this ontology that Marx and Engels were fundamentally against. A worthwhile political agenda 
must aim at radical transformation of social relations, which constitute the individuals in the first 
place. See especially Marx’s critique of the program of Social Democratic Workers’ Party of 
Germany in his “Critique of the Gotha Program” (MEW 19:20ff, MECW 24:86ff). Also Engels’ 
letter to Bebel, March 1875, where he criticizes the same program: “‘The elimination of all social 
and political inequality’, rather than ‘elimination of all class differences’, is similarly a most 
dubious expression. As between one country, one province and even one place and another, living 
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3-3- From Diversity to Opposition  
We have learned that the relation of identity (between A and A) presupposes the relation 
of diversity (between A and B). In a further dialectical move, Hegel wants to show that 
the relation of diversity, in its turn, presupposes the relation of opposition. The relation of 
opposition obtains between what Hegel calls the “positive” and the “negative”, and can 
be captured in terms of the relation between +A (or simply A), and –A. (Note that the 
“positive” in this context should not be confused with the mere given, as the phrases of 
positive social sciences, or positivism may refer to. There is no such givenness in the 
logic of essence. “Positive” and “negative” are both relational terms.) In relation of 
opposition, Hegel writes,  
What is different does not have an other in general [nicht ein Anderes überhaupt], 
but its own other [sondern sein Anderes] confronting it, that is to say, each has its 
own determination only in its relation to the other; it is only in itself reflected 
insofar as it is reflected into the other, and the other likewise; thus each is the 
other’s own other” (EnzL. §119, underline mine).  
In the relation of diversity, any arbitrary individual (such as B, C, D, etc,) can function as 
the other of A, but in the relation of opposition, the other of A is only –A, and not any 
other individual. Likewise the other of –A is only A and not any other individual.88 In 
                                                                                                                                                                     
conditions will always evince a certain inequality which may be reduced to a minimum but never 
wholly eliminated. The living conditions of Alpine dwellers will always be different from those 
of the plainsmen. The concept of a socialist society as a realm of equality is a one-sided French 
concept deriving from the old ‘liberty, equality, fraternity’, a concept which was justified in that, 
in its own time and place, it signified a phase of development, but which, like all the one-sided 
ideas of earlier socialist schools, ought now to be superseded, since they produce nothing but 
mental confusion, and more accurate ways of presenting the matter have been discovered.” (MEW 
34:129, MECW 24:71)  
88 “Entgegengesetzt verhalten sich zwei Relate x und y genau dann, wenn x identisch ist mit 
nicht-y und y identisch ist mit nicht-x […]. Zu irgendeiner beliebigen Bestimmung x liegt also 
eine entgegengesetzte Bestimmung dann vor, wenn es nicht nur andere Bestimmungen y, z, etc 
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other words, within the relation of opposition, the law of excluded middle holds: 
“something is either A or not A; there is no third.” (WdL II:73, SL 438)89 
Hegel defines the positive and the negative in terms of a relation that obtains 
between likeness and unlikeness. Whereas in the relation of diversity, likeness and 
unlikeness simply refer to two aspects of individuals and fall apart from each other, in the 
relation of opposition, likeness and unlikeness form a unity. “Diversity whose indifferent 
sides are just as much simply and solely moments of one negative unity is opposition”, 
Hegel writes (WdL II:52, SL 421). In order to understand how likeness and unlikeness 
strongly cohere with each other in the relation of opposition, let us focus on the 
definitions of the positive and the negative. Importantly, although the positive and the 
negative are defined solely in relation to each other, their definition is different from each 
other. According to Hegel, “the self-likeness reflected into itself that contains within itself 
the relation to unlikeness is the positive; and the unlikeness that contains within itself the 
relation to its non-being, to likeness is the negative” (WdL II:56, SL 424, Hegel’s 
emphases). That is, in the positive, the moment of self-likeness is the defining feature, 
and the unlikeness to the negative is only for the sake of securing the identity of the 
positive. In contrast, in the negative, the moment of self-unlikeness is the defining feature, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
gibt, die von x verschieden sind, sondern wenn es zu x genau eine Bestimmung y gibt, die mit 
nicht-x identisch ist.” (Iber 1990: 371)  
89 This is a special meaning that Hegel gives to the traditional Aristotelian law of excluded 
middle. According to the traditional view, the law of excluded middle applies to the properties of 
an individual: The plant is green or not green. There is no third alternative. Understood in this 
way, Hegel asserts, the law is “so trivial that it is not worth the trouble of saying it” (WdL II:73, 
SL 438). Hegel’s own version of law of excluded middle applies to the individuals themselves, 
and not their properties. This is in accord with the general programmatic of the logic of essence 
that primarily deals with the constitution of individuals, and not merely with their qualities.   
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and self-likeness has a subordinate importance90. As the formulation of the Encyclopedia 
has it, the positive is “the identical relation to self in such a way that it is not the 
negative”, and the negative is “what is different on its own account in such a way that it 
is not the positive” (EnzL. §119). That is, in the positive, the emphasis is on self-identity, 
and in the negative, the emphasis on difference from the positive.  We can depict the 
relation of the positive and the negative in the following way: 
The Positive – The Negative 
Likeness-Unlikeness – Likeness-Unlikeness 
 
As this formulation shows, for Hegel the positive and the negative are second-order 
relational structures that consist of two relational moments of likeness and unlikeness. 
This is in a sharp contrast with the logic of being, where the individuals are ultimately 
defined atomistically, as individuals that have a core untouched by relation to others. 
Here in the logic of essence, it is not the case that first the individuals are given, and only 
then they enter into a relation of opposition; rather the individuals are derived from the 
relation of opposition that obtains between them.  
 
3-4- From Opposition to Contradiction 
In the literature on Hegel, there is an abundant emphasis on the concept of contradiction. 
Given the centrality of contradiction in Hegel’s philosophy, this emphasis is appropriate. 
Nonetheless, the focus on contradiction itself may draw our attention away from the 
                                                        
90 “What predominates in the positive is the aspect of self-identity; the relation to the other has the 
sole function of securing this self-identity. On the contrary, what predominates in the negative is 
the aspect by which self-identity disappears in the relation to the other.” (Longuenesse 2007:64).  
 115 
genesis of contradiction through opposition. My emphasis on opposition is justified when 
we consider that the transition from opposition to contradiction is minimal. Indeed, in 
opposition, contradiction is already contained.91 For, each of the positive and the negative 
consists of two moments of likeness and unlikeness, which simultaneously cohere and 
exclude one another. According to Hegel, the positive and the negative are self-subsistent 
individuals that gain their very selfhood through their relation to each other; these 
individuals are entirely co-dependent at the very same time that each purports to exclude 
the other from itself. This is essentially what Hegel means by contradiction:  
As this whole, each [of the opposites] is mediated with itself by its other and 
contains it. But further, it is mediated with itself by the non-being of its other; 
thus it is a unity existing on its own and it excludes the other from itself. The self-
subsistent determination of reflection that contains the opposite determination, 
and is self-subsistent in virtue of this inclusion, at the same time also excludes it 
in its self-subsistence, therefore, it excludes from itself its own self-subsistence. 
[so schließt sie in ihrer Selbständigkeit ihre eigene Selbständigkeit aus sich aus.] 
[…] It is thus contradiction.  (WdL II: 65, SL 431) 
We can also make sense of Hegel’s contradiction in the following way. In Hegel’s 
ontology of absolute relationality, which is adequately articulated through the relation of 
opposition, each individual is solely the result of the relation of opposition. Yet, at the 
same time there must have been, from the beginning, individuals between which the 
relation of opposition could obtain. This state of affairs – where every individual is 
always already derived from a relation of opposition, while the individual asserts itself as 
                                                        
91 This point is also made by Klaus Hartmann, who maintains that although Hegel treats 
opposition and contradiction separately, in contradiction “nothing new is added at any rate” to 
opposition (Hartmann 1999:188).  
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self-subsistent and, as it were, as prior to the relation of opposition – is what Hegel calls 
contradiction. 
 Hegel holds that contradiction is “the opposition [that] is reflected into itself” 
(WdL II:36, SL 409). That is to say, contradiction is the opposition that relates to itself 
and, in so doing, constitutes itself as a unity. The self-referential character of 
contradiction makes it an individual proper. Thus, in contradiction the individuality of the 
positive and the negative, the individuality that is already implicitly present in the relation 
of opposition, is explicitly attained. We can also infer this point from the architectonic of 
Hegel’s exposition of the determinations of reflection: (A) identity, (B) difference, and 
(C) contradiction. As the order of the categories suggests, for Hegel the identity that is 
achieved through difference is contradiction. The fact that the determinate form of 
difference is opposition clearly indicates that, for Hegel, contradiction is the identity that 
is achieved through opposition. To put the same point in a metaphorical language, we 
may say that contradiction is an identity, which represents the congealment of the process 
of relationality of opposition, the congealment through which the positive and the 
negative are constituted as distinct individuals. We shall, therefore, conclude that, 
whereas the relation of opposition, precisely speaking, obtains between two opposing 
individuals, contradiction occurs within each opposing individual – contradiction for 
Hegel is primarily self-contradiction.92 
 
                                                        
92 This point – that dialectical contradiction is self-contradiction – is well grasped by Adorno: 
“The concept of contradiction will play a central role here, more particularly, the contradiction in 
things themselves, contradiction in the concept, not contradiction between concepts.” [Der Begriff 
des Widerspruchs, und zwar des Widerspruchs in den Sachen selbst, des Widerspruchs im 
Begriff, nicht des Widerspruchs zwischen Begriffen] (NS-V II: 17, Lectures on the Negative 
Dialectics: 7).   
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4- The Asymmetrical Nature of Opposition 
The transition from the relation of diversity to the relation of opposition is the transition 
from the relation of equality qua indifference, where the individuals have a symmetrical 
relation with each other, to the relation of domination, where there is an asymmetrical 
relation between the individuals. Note that asymmetry is the minimal condition for a 
relation to be called a relation of power. In the logic of essence there are more 
determinate conceptions of power, especially the power of totality over all individuals 
that involve a rich array of causal relations. (I will discuss this in Chapters 3 through 5). 
But all such more determinate conceptions of power presuppose asymmetrical relation of 
opposition, and are based on it.  Regarding the relation of opposition, we should note that 
the relation of the positive and the negative is asymmetrical; since whereas the positive is 
a self-centered individual that relates to the negative only subordinately, the negative is a 
de-centered and disjointed individual that is defined by difference from its center in the 
positive.93 I will discuss some social implications of Hegel’s conception of opposition in 
the work of Marx, Adorno and MacKinnon later in the chapter – but for now, I would 
like to briefly mention that such a conception underlies Simone de Beauvoir’s project of 
defining woman as the “second sex”. According to de Beauvoir, 
The terms masculine and feminine are used symmetrically only as a matter of 
form, as on legal papers. In actuality the relation of the two sexes is not quite like 
that of two electrical poles, for man represents both the positive and the neutral, as 
                                                        
93 This conception of the positive and the negative is similar to Hegel’s discussion of lord and 
bondsman in the Phenomenology of Spirit. From the logical point of view, the lord and bondsman 
reciprocally mediate each other, yet it is the lord that is eventually self-centered. Hegel defines 
the lord and bondsman in the following way: “One is the independent consciousness whose 
essential nature is to be for itself, the other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature 
is simply to live or to be for another. The former is the lord, the latter is the bondsman.” (PhG 
§189, Miller’s translation)  
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is indicated by the common use of man to designate human-beings in general; 
whereas woman represents only the negative, defined by limiting criteria, without 
reciprocity (1952: xxi). 
And even more explicitly:  
Thus humanity is male and man defined woman not in herself, but as relative to 
him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being […]. She is defined and 
differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the 
incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the subject, he is the 
absolute – she is the other (ibid: xxii).94 
In the relation of diversity, there is a third standpoint, an “impartial spectator” (Adam 
Smith’s phrase) so to speak, from which the diverse individuals are compared. The 
criteria by means of which the diverse individuals are compared are located, precisely 
speaking, not in individuals themselves, but in the third non-situated “neutral” standpoint. 
Hegel’s analysis of the relation of opposition shows us that such “neutral” standpoint is a 
mere figment of imagination; it is not objective in the individuals.  Rather, the so-called 
“neutral” standpoint is the positive itself.  It is the positive that provides the criteria both 
for itself and for the negative. (I will discuss this point in more detail in the next section.) 
In de Beauvoir’s words, “man is at once judge and party to the case” (ibid: xxxiii).  
The asymmetrical relation of opposition is not limited to the case of men and 
women. Indeed, the social world is permeated with such relations of power. Just to give 
few examples, in international relations, it is the central capitalist countries that are the 
                                                        
94 When de Beauvoir claims that there is no reciprocity between men and women, or that women 
are only the inessential, one should not take her claim quite literally. There is of course a 
reciprocal relation between men and women – and for this reason, both are essential – yet this 
reciprocity is asymmetrical. De Beauvoir is totally aware of this point, when she writes, “here is 
to be found the basic trait of woman: she is the other in a totality of which the two components 
are necessary to one another.” (ibid: xxvi) 
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positive and the self-alike, and the peripheral countries that are the negative and the self-
unlike. In race, it is white that is the positive and the self-alike, and black that is the 
negative and the self-unlike. In the realm of economy, it is the capitalists that are the 
positive and the self-alike, and the workers that are the negative and the self-unlike.  
I have explained that the positive and the negative are both contradictory, in that 
each contains the other as its own constitutive moment; yet excludes it at the same time. 
It is important to emphasize that, corresponding to asymmetrical relation between the 
positive and the negative, the contradiction that obtains in the positive is distinct from 
that of the negative. According to Hegel, “the positive is only implicitly the contradiction, 
whereas the negative is contradiction posited.” [Aber das Positive ist nur an sich dieser 
Widerspruch; das Negative dagegen der gesetzte Widerspruch.] (WdL II:66, SL 432). 
Contradiction in the positive is implicit, since the positive is primarily defined in terms of 
its identity, which is subordinately contrasted to difference. In contrast, the contradiction 
of the negative is explicit, since its very identity is primarily defined in terms of non-
identity, in terms of difference from the positive. In order to illustrate this point, it is 
helpful to bring in Marx’s conception of the relation of opposition between capital and 
labor, which he in his early work, the Holy Family (1845), conceptualizes in the 
following way:  
Proletariat and wealth are opposites; as such they form a single whole. They are 
both creations of the world of private property. The question is exactly what place 
each occupies in the opposition. It is not sufficient to declare them two sides of a 
single whole. Private property as private property, as wealth, is compelled to 
maintain itself, and thereby its opposite, the proletariat, in existence. That is the 
positive side of the opposition, self-satisfied private property. The proletariat, on 
the contrary, is compelled as proletariat to abolish itself and thereby its opposite, 
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private property, which determines its existence, and which makes it proletariat. It 
is the negative side of the opposition, its restlessness within its very self, 
dissolved and self-dissolving private property. (MEW 2:37, MECW 4:36-7, 
original emphasis) 
According to Marx, thus, the workers and capitalists (in this passage, the “proletariat” 
and “wealth”) constitute a relation of opposition; the capitalists are the “positive” that are 
primarily self-identical (“self-satisfied”), and the workers are the “negative” whose 
identity are formed through their very difference (“restlessness within its very self”). The 
capitalists and the workers are both essentially contradictory, yet the former gets power 
through the contradiction that is constitutive of it, while the latter becomes powerless 
through its contradiction. As both are enmeshed in relations of power, both are alienated 
from what makes them human-being; yet their mode of alienation is distinct from each 
other: 
The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same human self-
estrangement. But the former class feels at ease and strengthened in this self-
estrangement, it recognizes estrangement as its own power and has in it the 
semblance of a human existence. The latter feels annihilated in estrangement; it 
sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhuman existence. It is, to 
use an expression of Hegel, in its abasement the indignation at that abasement, an 
indignation to which it is necessarily driven by the contradiction between its 
human nature and its condition of life, which is the outright, resolute and 
comprehensive negation of that nature. (ibid)95 
                                                        
95 It goes too far to immediately identify Marx’s conception of the relation of opposition between 
the capitalists and the workers in this passage with the Hegelian one. In Marx’s early writings, the 
concept of “alienation” presupposes a distinct understanding of “human nature” as a being that 
realizes self through work. However, from the Hegelian perspective that I have been advocating 
so far, there is no pre-relational human nature, and if there is anything as human nature, it is 
solely derived from social relations. Marx himself later abandoned grounding his theory on the 
concept of human nature. His theory in Capital is primarily based on the analysis of social 
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It is important to emphasize that for Hegel, as well as for Marx, although the positive is 
in the position of power, it is the negative that is associated with “activity” and “liveliness” 
(Hegel’s phrases) – an activity that can potentially change the relations of power. This 
theme is explicitly formulated in lord-bondsman dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
where the bondsman (or the negative) eventually, through his labor, manages to abolish 
the relations of power that are constitutive of both the master (or the positive), and of 
himself. Similarly, for Marx, it is the “positive” that is associated with conservation of 
power-relations, whereas the “negative” is potentially disruptive. Marx writes, “within 
this opposition, the private property-owner is therefore the conservative side, the 
proletarian the destructive side. From the former arises the action of preserving the 
opposition, from the latter the action of annihilating it.” (ibid) That Hegel ascribes true 
agency to the negative is evidence that Hegel’s philosophy – despite its occasional 
reputation for being conservative – is revolutionary at its logical core. Since my concern 
in this dissertation is to carve out the logical structure of domination in capitalism, I leave 
the question of agency aside. Needless to emphasize that any such conception of 
emancipatory praxis presupposes an adequate understanding of the dynamics of power, 
and should have as its starting point the concerns similar to the concerns of this 
dissertation.  
 
5- The Logical Proof for the Asymmetrical Nature of Opposition 
In this section, I focus on the dialectical development of the relation of opposition in 
order to show how Hegel proves that the relation of opposition in its adequate form is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
relations, which is quite consistent with the ontology of absolute relationality in Hegel’s logic of 
essence.  
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essentially asymmetrical. In doing so, I also show how equality and symmetry are 
integrated within the structure of power that obtains in the relation of opposition. 
Consider the following two groups of examples of the relation of opposition. (1) 
One group includes the relation between up and down, right and left, north and south, 
east and west, etc. (2) The other group includes the examples that I mentioned in the 
previous section, namely, the relation between capitalists and workers, between men and 
women, between central capitalist countries and the peripheral ones, etc. In both groups, 
there is a relation of opposition between relata; each relatum is related, not to some 
arbitrary others (in plural), but to its own singular other, such that its  (east, men) 
negation immediately results in the other relatum (west, women). Yet there is a distinct 
difference between (1) and (2), namely, it is only in (2) that the relation of opposition is 
explicitly asymmetrical. That is, it is only in (2) that the relation of power is being 
stabilized and secured.  
Indeed, Hegel’s dialectical exposition of the relation of opposition goes through 
two consecutive stages that correspond to the two groups of examples that were 
considered above. Importantly, (1) and (2) are not simply two varieties of the relation of 
opposition that exist side-by-side each other. Rather, type (1) for Hegel is “the empty 
opposition of the Understanding” which “has its place in the context of such abstractions 
as number, direction, etc.” (EnzL. §119), while in the more concrete instances, such as in 
the Spiritual and social relations, the relation of opposition is of type (2).96 From a logical 
point of view, there is a progression from (1) to (2), such that (2) expresses the relation of 
                                                        
96 One other example of the relation of opposition of type (2) is the relation of spirit and nature. 
Spirit and nature are interdependent – neither can exist without the other. Yet, the 
interdependence involved is asymmetrical. For Hegel, nature is primarily external to itself and 
exists for spirit (EnzL §119Z). 
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opposition more adequately. Hegel’s exposition of the relation of opposition in the main 
text (WdL II:55-9, SL 424-7) is different from the Remark (WdL II: 60-4, SL 427-31), but 
the content is the same. In the main text, he conceives of (1) as “opposition in itself” and 
(2) as “opposition in and for itself”. In the Remark, in (1) he regards the positive and the 
negative equally as “opposite as such” [Entgegengesetzte überhaupt], whereas in (2) he 
regards the positive as “the non-opposed” [das Nichtentgegengesetzte], and the negative 
as “the opposed” [das Entgegengesetzte]. In the following, I give a short account of the 
dialectical progression from (1) to (2).97 
 
5-1- “Opposition in itself” or the “Opposite as such” 
The hallmark of the relation of opposition in this, first, stage – that is, for example, 
between “6 miles in an easterly direction” and “6 miles in a westerly direction” (Hegel’s 
example, EnzL. §119) – is that the positive and the negative can be “exchanged” with 
each other. In the relation between east and west, either of east or west can be equally 
considered as the positive or the negative.98 According to Hegel, whether east is positive 
or negative does not belong to the constitution of east itself, but it is only from an 
external point of view that it is regarded as positive or negative. The indifferent 
exchangeability of relata and their indeterminacy make relation of opposition in this stage 
similar to the relation of diversity. Indeed, Hegel calls the relata of this relation “diverse 
opposites” [die entgegengesetzte Verschiedene]: 
                                                        
97 My account is indebted to Michael Wolff’s insightful treatment of the subject (Wolff: 1981, 
1986), yet it is different from it in one crucial point, as it becomes clear later.   
98 “Although one of the determinacies of positive and negative belongs to each side, they can be 
changed around [sie können verwechselt werden] and each side is of such a kind that it can be 
taken equally well as positive as negative.” (WdL II:58, SL 426) 
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This opposition, therefore, is not regarded as having any truth in and for itself, 
and though it does belong to diverse sides, so that each is simply an opposite, yet, 
on the other hand, each side exists indifferently on its own, and it does not matter 
which of the two diverse opposites is regarded as positive or negative. (WdL II:60, 
SL 428) 
In the Remark, Hegel analyzes the relation of “diverse opposites” to one another in the 
following way: The positive and the negative are “on the one hand, merely opposite as 
such” and “on the other hand”, they are “indifferent” towards each other (WdL II:62, SL 
429). Thus, in the relation of “6 miles in a westerly direction” and “6 miles in an easterly 
direction”, the two, on the one hand, are “merely opposite” insofar as they sublate each 
other, and on the other hand, they are “indifferent” to each other, insofar as they are 
“simply 6 miles of way or space”.99 To formulate it with a mathematical language, as 
Hegel himself does, “+a” and “–a” is an oppositional pair. Insofar as they confront each 
other, they are “opposition as such”, but insofar as each is “a” (without plus or minus 
sign), they are “indifferent” to each other:100 
The +a and –a are simply opposite magnitudes; the a is the unity that stands in-
itself at the base of both [zum Grunde liegende ansichseiende Einheit] – itself 
indifferent towards the opposition and serving here as a dead base [tote 
Grundlage] without further conceptual consideration. The –a is indeed designated 
as the negative, the +a as the positive; but the one is just as much an opposite as 
the other. (WdL II:60, SL 428) 
                                                        
99 Another example of Hegel is credit and debt. Insofar as they reciprocally sublate each other, 
they are “opposition as such”. But insofar as each is “a sum of money”, they are “indifferent” to 
each other (WdL II:61, SL 428). 
100 Wolff has shown that the “a” here (without plus or minus sign) is tantamount to the “absolute 
value” in algebra. Interestingly, according to Wolff, the concept of “absolute value” appears in 
mathematics in 19th century, contemporaneous with Hegel. (Wolff 1981: 91f)  
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As we see in this passage, Hegel calls the “a” which underlies “+a” and “–a”, the “unity 
that stands in-itself at the base” of the opposites. Michael Wolff calls this underlying 
unity “reflection-logical substratum” [das reflexionslogische Substrat] (Wolff 1981: 
113ff). I find this terminology unfortunate, as the term “substratum” might be associated 
with an Aristotelian hypokeimenon, which is a being that lies underneath, thereby 
independent from, the properties or relations of an individual. Yet, as Wolff correctly 
emphasizes, the reflection-logical substratum does not exist independently from the 
relation of opposition; rather it is derived from such relation. In other words, it is not the 
case that first there is a substratum, to which then the character of the positive or the 
negative is added; but the so-called substratum is already produced through the relation 
of opposition – hence, the term reflection-logical substratum.  
 
5-2- “Opposition in-and-for-itself” or the “Opposed” and the “Not-opposed” 
The relation of “opposition in itself” is not adequately determinate. Firstly, the two relata 
can indifferently be exchanged with each other. Secondly – and this point is related to the 
first – the constitution of relata consists of a reflection-logical substratum that relates to 
the positive or to the negative indifferently. In the second dialectical move, Hegel 
maintains that it is wrong to conceive of the reflection-logical substratum as a “dead base” 
that lies underneath the positive and the negative, rather – and I cannot overemphasize 
this point – we should see that the so-called reflection-logical substratum is the positive 
itself. In other words, the common basis of the positive and the negative is not a common 
substratum that is equally detached/attached from/to them; instead, the basis is the 
positive itself. According to Hegel, this truth is also expressed in mathematics, since “a” 
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in mathematics is identical with “+a” (WdL II:62, SL 429). With this second dialectical 
move, we have the adequate conception of the relation of opposition that I explained in 
the previous section. The positive, Hegel in the Remark writes, is the “non-opposed” that 
is primarily self-identical, and the negative is “the opposed” that gets defined primarily in 
relation to the positive.  
The move from conceiving of reflection-logical substratum as a neutral ground 
underlying the opposites to conceiving it as the positive itself is not explicitly addressed 
by Wolff. For this reason, his account falls short of understanding the relation of 
opposition as an asymmetrical relation of power. This move also shows how we should 
understand the relation of equality as an integral moment of the relation of power 
involved in opposition. The positive and the negative are equal with each other and have 
a symmetrical relation with each other; since they both share the same reflection-logical 
substratum. Nonetheless, they are at the same time in a relation of power; since the 
reflection-logical substratum is nothing but the positive itself. This means that the 
relation of equality of the positive with itself is imposed upon the negative; the negative 
is what it is only by conforming to the relation that the positive establishes within itself. 
This conception of the interrelation of power and equality is extremely helpful for 
understanding modern structures of power, where the claims of equality have become 
common cultural assets across the world. In contrast to the pre-modern times, men and 
women are equal with each other; yet – as we will see in more detail later – the terms of 
such equality are defined by men. Consider also the relation of lord to serf in feudalism 
or master to slave in ancient Greece or Rome; neither socioeconomic order allowed for 
claims of equality. In modernity, by contrast, capitalist and worker, or employer and 
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employee are equal with each other. We must notice, however, that it is in their very 
equality that they are unequal; it is the capitalist or the employer that ultimately defines 
the terms of equality (obtained in contract). Finally, and more broadly speaking, notice 
that the equality assured by law can provide no guarantee against the relation of power; 
although the powerful are (ideally) circumscribed by the equality under law, nonetheless, 
the powerful are those who write and enforce the law. We should grasp, then, that neither 
equality nor reciprocity implies a symmetry – power is both consistent with and essential 
to a variety of modern systems that propound equality.   
 
 
6- The Clarification of Priority of Opposition to Diversity 
It is the transition from diversity to opposition that makes Hegel’s logic of essence the 
ontology of power. In the relation of diversity, all individuals share a common substratum, 
and the differences remain only external to the constitution of individuals. Hegel’s 
critique of diversity shows that such common substratum that is shared by all individuals 
is always already the product of the relation of opposition, and that the relation of 
opposition is principally a relation of power. The relation of opposition is more essential 
than the relation of diversity, since it is through opposition that individuals achieve their 
own identity, and become thus what they are. In this section, I further clarify what it 
means that opposition is more essential than diversity. In order to do this, I explain 
Benedetto Croce’s objection to Hegel on this point, and answer it (6-1). Then, I indicate 
how Hegel’s logical critique of diversity is helpful to develop a critique of the ideology 
of pluralism in the current so-called “multiculturalist” society (6-2).  
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6-1- Benedetto Croce’s Objection: Hegel’s Confusion of Diversity and 
Opposition  
In What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel, Croce identifies the 
source of what is dead in Hegel in “confusion of the theory of the different and the theory 
of opposites”, which “produces the gravest results; that is to say, from it arises … all that 
is philosophically erroneous in the system of Hegel.” (1915:99) According to Croce, 
reality, which is a pluralistic order, is constituted by the principle of difference. The 
problem of Hegel is that he forcefully applies his dialectical method, which according to 
Croce is based on the relation of opposition, to everything, including to those parts of 
reality that do not have an antagonistic character. Croce does not deny that there exists 
antagonism and opposition in reality; what he denies is the universality of antagonism 
and opposition. Thus he writes, “the organism is the struggle of life against death; but the 
members of the organism are not therefore at strife with one another, hand against foot, 
or eye against hand” (ibid:93). 
Croce’s criticism is acute, yet misses what Hegel is getting at. Hegel never denies 
that there is a relation of diversity in reality. As I have already indicated, his point is 
rather that the “truth” of diversity is opposition, and that it is opposition that is “deeper” 
and “more essential” than diversity.101 Opposition is deeper and more essential than 
diversity, since it is through opposition that individuals can be determinately identified; 
diversity always remains under-determinate. Consider, as one important example, what 
                                                        
101Cf. Charles Taylor’s account: “But it is not Hegel’s intention to claim that the notion of 
diversity is without application. Of course, there is a diversity of things in the world. What he 
does have to claim, however, is that seeing things in the world as simply diverse, involving as it 
does seeing them as being merely contingently related to each other, is a superficial view. 
Understood at a more fundamental level, each thing is what it is only in a relation of contrastive 
and interactive opposition with another, which is thus ‘its other’.” (1975:261)  
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makes the essence of the political. It is through opposition that a polity can identify itself 
as a polity, and that it can thus become a distinct polity in the first place. Namely, the 
polity becomes what it is through excluding its own personal other, while at the same 
time such relation of exclusion is constitutive of, and thus contained in, the said polity. 
Within the polity there is always diversity – diversity of, say, lifestyles, values, 
conceptions of good life, etc. – but such diversity is grounded on a deeper oppositional 
determination. (Islamic way of life is fundamentally “opposed” to our way of life, and 
thus should not be tolerated in our otherwise “diverse”, “pluralistic” social order.)102 
                                                        
102 I am following here Carl Schmitt’s conception of the political, which he defines in 
oppositional terms, namely, through the opposition between friend and enemy: “The specific 
political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend 
and enemy.” (1996 [1932]: 28) There are two important similarities between Hegel’s conception 
of opposition and Schmitt’s conception of the political. (1) For Hegel, opposition need not be 
explicit, yet opposition is the ground of diversity, and, thus, diversity can always “sharpen” into 
opposition. Similarly, for Schmitt, what makes the essence of the political is the friend-foe 
opposition, but such opposition need not be always explicit. Schmitt writes, “the political enemy 
need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and 
it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, 
the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, 
existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are 
possible. (ibid: 27, emphasis added) (2) Hegel’s conception of the logic of essence in general, and 
of opposition in particular is not morally evaluative. Similarly, Schmitt’s conception of the 
political is not morally evaluative, it is realist through and through: “It is irrelevant here whether 
one rejects, accepts, or perhaps finds it an atavistic remnant of barbaric times that nations 
continue to group themselves according to friend and enemy, or hopes that the opposition will 
one day vanish from the world, or whether it is perhaps sound, for the sake of education, to fake 
that enemies no longer exist at all. The concern here is neither with fictions nor with normative 
ideals, but with inherent reality and the real possibility of such a distinction. [Hier handelt es sich 
nicht um Fiktionen und Normativitäten, sondern um die seinsmäßige Wirklichkeit und die reale 
Möglichkeit dieser Unterscheidung.] One may or may not share these hopes and educational 
ideals. But, rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that nations continue to group themselves 
according to the friend and enemy opposition, that the distinction still remains actual today, and 
that this is an ever present possibility for every people existing in the political sphere.” (ibid: 28, 
emphasis added).  
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The example of the affinity of the political to the oppositional103 directs us to a 
pivotal point: Hegel’s dialectical logic is not meant to apply to all spheres of reality in the 
same way, and to the same degree. Rather, Hegel believes, as it were, in degrees of 
dialecticity in reality. Opposition as the most determinate form of the determinations of 
reflection is the category that captures the essence of human social and political world. In 
the realm of nature, opposition is generally not the primarily relevant determination of 
reflection. In his Philosophy of Nature, Hegel writes,   
It would be unphilosophical to try to show that a form of the Concept exists 
universally in nature in the determinateness in which it is as an abstraction. 
Nature is rather the Idea in the element of asunderness, so that like the 
Understanding it, too, holds fast to the moments of the Concept in 
their dispersion, and represents them thus in reality; but in higher things the 
differentiated forms of the Concept are unified to the extreme of concretion.104 
(EnzN §312)  
In so far as a natural being is not in a relation of opposition with another natural being, 
it cannot constitute itself as an individual proper; rather it remains “dispersed” 
[zerstreut], and thus without concrete unity. Hegel regards nature as lacking power to 
adequately develop itself from diversity into opposition, and, so, as “powerless” to 
constitute itself as a unity proper. In the Science of Logic, insisting on the 
                                                        
103 I cannot pursue the relation of dialectical opposition and politics in more detail in this space. 
For a helpful discussion, see Peter Furth’s “Asymmetrische Gegensätze in der Sprache der 
Politik” (2008 [1991]). Furth explains how “ es eine gewisse Strukturähnlichkeit zwischen 
Dialektik und Politik gibt, insofern nämlich, als in beiden Fällen der Zusammenhang von Einheit 
und Gegensatz den Kern zu lösenden Probleme darstellt.” (227) 
104 “Eine Begriffsform so in der Natur vorhanden aufzeigen wollen, daß sie in der Bestimmtheit, 
wie sie als eine Abstraktion ist, allgemein existieren solle, wäre ein unphilosophischer Gedanke. 
Die Natur ist vielmehr die Idee im Elemente des Außereinander, so daß sie ebenso wie der 
Verstand die Begriffsmomente zerstreut festhält und in Realität darstellt, aber in den höheren 
Dingen die unterschiedenen Begriffsformen zur höchsten Konkretion in einem vereint.” (EnzN. 
§312) 
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powerlessness of nature, Hegel writes, “it is the impotence of nature that it cannot 
adhere to and exhibit the rigor of the Concept”. [Es ist dies die Ohnmacht der Natur , die 
Strenge des Begriffs nicht festhalten und darstellen zu können.] (WdL II:282, SL 607). 
 Thus, contrary to Croce, for Hegel, there is no confusion between diversity and 
opposition. Diversity and opposition both exist; yet especially in social and political 
world, there is an objective tendency for diversity to “sharpen” into opposition, and so, 
opposition should be conceived as “more essential” than diversity. The transition from 
diversity to opposition is motivated by the by quest for “further determination” 
[Fortbestimmung] in order to abolish the indeterminacy inherent in the relation of 
diversity. I have explained the transition from diversity to opposition before, but I would 
like to emphasize that Hegel’s argument for the priority of opposition to diversity is not 
limited to the few pages of the chapter of determinations of reflection in the logic of 
essence. The main argumentative work about why external relations cannot be adequately 
determining occurs throughout logic of being, and that argument is already presupposed 
in the logic of essence.105 Moreover, and this is even more important, the priority of 
opposition to diversity is not limited to the discussions in the logic. Hegel’s philosophy, 
in general, is a philosophy of negation and negativity. One prominent feature of negation 
in all its variations is contrastive exclusion. The relation of opposition expresses the truth 
of contrastive exclusion more adequately than the relation of diversity; since the relata in 
                                                        
105 Cf. Robert Wallace’s account: “Thus, although Hegel intends his discussion of diversity and 
its transition into opposition to serve as a critique of what we might call a common sense 
ontology of diverse entities […] it should not be surprising if his critique is not enough, by itself, 
to persuade advocates of common sense ontologies to follow Hegel by substituting “opposition” 
for the diversity to which they are presently wedded; for they may well not understand that 
diversity in the way that Hegel, coming from the doctrine of being, understands it. To stand a 
decent chance of persuading them, one would have to bring to bear the whole argument of the 
doctrine of being (as well as the first two chapters of essence).” (Wallace 2005:180). 
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the relation of opposition are solely constructed through moments that mutually exclude 
each other.   
 
 
6-2- The Critique of Diversity as the Critique of Pluralism in Capitalism 
The fact of “pluralism” and diversity is much celebrated in contemporary culture, and is 
accordingly reflected in contemporary political philosophy. Rawls, to give one prominent 
example, takes the fact of pluralism in contemporary society as given, and then searches 
for a political basis, a state, that can legitimately use coercive power to maintain the unity 
of society. Rawls does not adequately address the more fundamental question: what are 
the preconditions of pluralism in contemporary society? When he asks such a question, 
he reduces the answer to the autonomy of individuals – an answer that accords to his 
ultimately atomistic social ontology – or to some vague conception of public political 
culture. From a logical point of view, pluralism corresponds to the relation of diversity in 
Hegel and implies (1) that individuals are like each other, insofar as they are human 
beings, or citizens of a state. Insofar as they are like each other, they must be treated 
equally; (2) that individuals are unlike each other, insofar as they have different religion, 
ethnicity, race, culture, food preference, etc. The political state should be indifferent to 
the differences of individuals, and should provide a milieu in which each individual can 
exercise his or her specific difference; (3) that the likeness and unlikeness of individuals 
is externally added together. The internal bond between such likeness and such 
unlikeness is not, need not be, grasped. Obviously, as stated above, Hegel’s logic of 
essence does not deny the fact of diversity and pluralism; but it holds that such diversity 
and pluralism presupposes a more determinate relation, the relation of opposition, which 
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is at the same time “deeper” and “more essential”. For Hegel, the “truth” of pluralism is 
the relation of opposition; it is opposition that grounds pluralism and makes it possible. 
Quite in the spirit of Hegel’s logic, Adorno in the sixties, in the age of proliferation of 
diversity in cultural products and life styles, warns his students that, 
The term ‘pluralism’ is acquiring increasing currency in our own time. It is 
presumably the ideology describing the centrifugal tendencies of a society that 
threatens to disintegrate into unreconciled groups under the pressure of its own 
principles. This is then represented as if it were a state of reconciliation in which 
people lived together in a harmony while in reality society is full of power 
struggles… I would like to recommend that you adopt an extremely wary attitude 
towards the concept of pluralism, which…is preached at us on every street corner. 
To transfigure and ideologize the elements of discontinuity or of social 
antagonisms in this way is a part of the general ideological trend. In the same way, 
it is very characteristic of our age that the very factors that threaten to blow up the 
entire world are represented as the peaceful coexistence of human beings who 
have become reconciled and have outgrown their conflicts. This is a tendency 
which barely conceals the fact that mankind is beginning to despair of finding a 
solution to its disagreements. (NS-V 13: 140, HF: 95) 
Note that Adorno’s critique of pluralism is not that pluralism is per se bad or wrong. He 
is, of course, not aspiring for an authoritarian state that ruthlessly controls the lives of 
individuals. His criticism is rather that the institutional arrangements in capitalist 
societies are based on power-relations of opposition and antagonism. Thus, the apparent 
pluralism only masks the power-relations, thereby contributing to their perpetuation. His 
criticism is not that there should not be pluralism, but that there cannot be genuine 
pluralism within capitalism. Moreover – and this point is important – in contrast to Rawls, 
for Adorno the source of cohesion in capitalist societies is not a shared political culture, 
underneath or alongside the plurality of worldviews and lifestyles, but contradictorily the 
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very relations of opposition that rend the society106. This is very similar to Hegel’s logic 
of essence, where unity (in the figure of contradiction) is achieved through opposition. 
All this means that for Adorno resisting the ideology of pluralism is not resisting 
pluralism per se; it is rather resisting a society, whose structure accords to the logic of 
essence. 
 
7- Marx’s Logical Conception of Opposition between Capital and Labor 
According to Marx, capitalism is based on two essential instances of relation of 
opposition: (1) The opposition between exchange-value and use-value, and (2) the 
opposition between capital and labor. In both, there is an essential relation of domination: 
In the first, it is exchange-value that dominates use-value, and in the second it is capital 
that dominates labor. In this dissertation, for the sake of space, I only focus on the 
opposition between capital and labor. 
 
                                                        
106 In another series of lectures, Adorno illustrates the idea of unity and self-preservation of 
society through contradiction in the following way: “The essence of this [Adorno’s] model of an 
antagonistic society is that it is not a society with contradictions or despite its contradictions, but 
by virtue of its contradictions. In other words, a society based on profit necessarily contains this 
division in society because of the objective existence of the profit motive. This profit motive 
which divides society and potentially tears it apart is also the factor by means of which society 
reproduces its own existence. To remind you of an even crasser fact, likewise by way of 
illustration, it is probably true that today almost the entire economy can be sustained only because 
a very large part of the social product is devoted to the production of weapons of mass destruction, 
in particular, nuclear weapons and everything connected with them […]. This means that the 
ability of our society to withstand crises, an ability that is generally held to be one of its finest 
achievements, is directly linked to the growth in its potential for technological self-destruction.” 
(NS-V II: 20, Lectures on Negative Dialectics: 9).  
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7-1- The Opposition between Capital and Labor in the Economic-Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844 
Throughout his career, Marx conceives of the relation of capital and labor as a relation of 
opposition. In this section, I focus on Marx’s early conception in the Economic-
Philosophic Manuscripts (1844). Marx’s political economy in this period is rather crude 
and schematic. The intricate conceptual distinctions between abstract labor and concrete 
labor, between labor and labor-power, which are foundational for his later work in 
Capital, are still absent in this period; so is his complex conception of labor theory of 
value, which at the same time includes a monetary conception of value. Be that as it may, 
at the most basic logical level, the contours of his political economy arguably remains the 
same. As he profusely – and explicitly – uses Hegel’s concepts in his youth, it is easier to 
trace the Hegelian origins of his thought in this period. There is a passage in the said 
manuscripts in which Marx expresses the relation of “private property” (or “capital”) and 
“labor” with some key words:  
The character of private property is expressed by labor, capital, and the relations 
between these two. The movement through which these constituents have to pass 
is:  
First. Unmediated or mediated unity of the two.  
Capital and labor are at first still united. Then, though separated and estranged, 
they reciprocally develop and promote each other as positive conditions.  
[Second.] The two in opposition, reciprocally excluding each other. The worker 
knows the capitalist as his own non-being, and vice versa: each tries to rob the 
other of his being.  
[Third.] Opposition of each to itself. Capital=stored-up labor=labor.… 
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Hostile reciprocal opposition.107 (MEW 40:529, MECW 3:289) 
Although these notes are abstract and schematic, they contain the kernel of Marx’s 
critique of labor relations in capitalism. According to Marx, private property and labor in 
some archaic pre-historical period are still united; those who work do own the property 
that they produce (“unmediated unity”). Then, comes the period (logical or historical) 
that private property and labor are in a harmonious relationship with each other; each is 
necessary for the other, each cooperates with the other in a way that benefits both 
(“mediated unity”). In capitalism, however, the relation of capital and labor is one of 
antagonistic reciprocal dependence and exclusion (“hostile reciprocal opposition”); such 
antagonistic exclusion that simultaneously constitutes each as a self-contradiction 
(“opposition of each to itself”).  
 In order to understand why in capitalism, there cannot be a harmony of interests 
between capital and labor, we need to know that Marx’s account of capitalism is based on 
labor theory of value, namely, the theory that the economic value of commodities is 
solely derived from the labor that is put into their production. Simply owning means of 
production does not create any value. It is only labor that creates value. Moreover, even 
the value of the means of production that are owned by the capitalists are already the 
“stored up” past labor of the workers. In this economic setting based on private 
ownership of means of production, the commodities, although being produced by the 
                                                        
107 “Das Verhältnis des Privateigentums ist Arbeit, Kapital und die Beziehung beider. Die 
Bewegung, die diese Glieder zu durchlaufen haben, sind: Erstens. unmittelbare oder vermittelte 
Einheit beider. Kapital und Arbeit erst noch vereint; dann zwar getrennt und entfremdet, aber sich 
wechselseitig als positive Bedingungen hebend und fördernd. 
[Zweitens] Gegensatz beider. Schließen sich wechselseitig aus; der Arbeiter weiß den 
Kapitalisten und umgekehrt als sein Nichtdasein; jeder sucht dem andren sein Dasein zu 
entreißen.[Drittens] Gegensatz jedes gegen sich selbst. Kapital = aufgehäufter Arbeit = Arbeit... 
Feindlicher wechselseitiger Gegensatz.” 
 137 
workers, from the very moment of their production, belong to the capitalists. Labor, 
therefore, constitutes capital, which at the same time excludes it from itself. In Hegel’s 
language, labor is the “negative” that primarily exists for capital (the “positive”), and can 
thus constitute itself only in this negative relation. Marx writes,  
As soon, therefore, as it occurs to capital (whether from necessity or caprice) no 
longer to be for the worker, he himself is no longer for himself: he has no work, 
hence no wages, and since he has no existence as a human being but only as a 
worker, he can go and bury himself, starve to death, etc. The worker exists as a 
worker only when he exists for himself as capital; and he exists as capital only 
when some capital exists for him. The existence of capital is his existence, his 
life; as it determines the tenor of his life in a manner indifferent to him. (MEW 
40:523, MECW 3:283) 
All these fit well with Marx’s claim that in capitalism, all labor – and not only the labor 
that is done in assembly lines in sweatshops – is “alienated”; since the institutional 
arrangement in capitalism is such that those who work do not own the means of 
production, and therefore the products of their labor immediately belong to those own the 
means of production.108  
 It is helpful to compare Marx’s conception of the relation of capital and labor with 
current dominant discussions in distributive justice. In general, the theories of distributive 
justice presuppose the wealth of society as given, and then try to come up with some 
criteria of fairness, according to which the presupposed wealth should be distributed 
                                                        
108 Marx’s conception of the antagonistic relation of capital and labor in capitalism does not 
exclusively rely on labor theory of value. In her An Essay on Marxian Economics (1942), the 
Cambridge economist Joan Robinson argues that Marx’s labor theory of value is untenable, yet 
his account of “exploitation” – the view that the products of labor are systematically robbed from 
the workers by the capitalists – remains true all the same. Moreover, the nature of Marx’s theory 
of value in his later work is highly controversial, inasmuch as some people even deny that Marx 
in Capital had a labor theory of value at all (Backhaus 1997, Morishima 1973).   
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among the members of society. Therefore, in theories of distributive justice the statement 
“A has more money than B” can only be criticized from moral grounds – there is no 
account that systematically links the wealth of A to the poverty of B. Marx, however, 
shifts the main question from distribution of wealth to the production of wealth.  Within 
capitalism, wealth is always produced by a group of people only to be expropriated by 
another group. According to Marx,  
The opposition between lack of property and property, so long as it is not 
comprehended as the opposition of labor and capital, still remains an indifferent 
opposition, not grasped in its active connection, in its internal relation, not yet 
grasped as a contradiction (MEW 40:533, MECW 3:294-5). 
In theories of distributive justice, the wealth of A and B is only a matter of external 
comparison, as a matter of Hegel’s relation of diversity, which Marx in the quoted 
passage calls “indifferent opposition”. For Marx, however, there is an “active connection” 
[tätige Beziehung], an “internal relation” [inneres Verhältnis] between wealth of A and 
poverty of B, such that each is constituted solely through the other, thereby forming a 
relation of opposition and “contradiction”. In other words, in Marx’s account, the 
statement “A has more money than B” – as Jon Elster argues – is tantamount to the 
statement “A exploits B” or “A’s wealth is the cause of B’s poverty”.109  
 
                                                        
109 Elster’s comments on the same quoted passage of Marx (1985:93ff). He also makes a helpful 
reference to Marx’s later “Marginal Notes on Adolph Wagner” where Marx, in passing, 
distinguishes between “to stand in a relationship”  [in einem Verhältnis zu stehen] and “to relate 
actively” [sich aktiv zu verhalten] (ibid: 64ff). Although Elster, who endeavors to systematically 
undermine Marx’s heritage from Hegel’s logic, does not state it, it can arguably be shown that the 
former is similar to Hegel’s relation of diversity, and the latter to the relation of opposition.  
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7-2- Klaus Hartmann’s Objection 
According to Klaus Hartmann (1970: 164ff), Marx’s “abstract” analysis of the relation of 
capital and labor, which is based on the logic of essence, does not allow any room for the 
“concrete plurality” of the relation of capital and labor; such “concrete plurality” through 
which the initial relation of opposition may eventually develop into an “equilibrium” or a  
“balance”.110 We can understand the said “concrete plurality” in two ways, namely (1) 
empirical, and (2) theoretical.  
 (1) According to Hartmann, there can be, indeed are, empirical situations that 
capital and labor constitute a harmonious relationship with each other, in a way that 
benefits both. For example (my example), some argue that in those underdeveloped 
countries where the rate of unemployment is high, the investment of foreign capital is 
beneficial for both labor and capital: it is beneficial for labor, since people would get a 
job (although poorly paid), which otherwise they wouldn’t; it is beneficial for capital, 
since it can hire workers with lower wages than in the developed countries, thereby 
increasing its profit. The relation of capital and labor, in this way, is not anymore a 
relation of antagonism, but a relation of mutual cooperation. 
 (2) According to Hartmann, once we take into account the “totality of social 
relations” in modern society, which is consistent with the rule of private property, the 
initial relation of opposition can indeed be “mitigated”,  “domesticated”, or altogether 
                                                        
110 “Der Einwand … lautet, ob das Privateigentum oder Kapital sich nicht mit seinem Widerpart 
zu einem Ausgleich entwickelt oder ob es sich nicht bei Berücksichtigung der sozialen Pluralität 
von Eigentümern modifizieren und domestizieren, kurz, ob der Fortgang der Bewegung dann 
nicht ein anderer sein würde. Dieser Gedanke einer Modifikation des Wesens durch die konkrete 
Pluralität, durch die Gesamtheit der Eigentumsverhältnisse – wir können auch sagen: durch ihr 
System, derart, daß sich durchaus auch theoretische und nicht nur empirische Aussagen darüber 
machen lassen –, ein solcher Gedanke… findet sich nicht.” (1970:164) 
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“modified” into other sorts of relations. Most importantly, the political state, through 
regulation of labor-market and imposition of tax, can implement strong redistributive 
programs that eventually would benefit the workers. It is not clear, when such measures 
do change the status of workers, why we must still think of the relation of capital and 
labor in terms of a relation of opposition. From the logical point of view, Hartmann holds, 
Marx’s analysis is based on the logic of essence, which is the logic of alienation and 
opposition. Contrary to Marx, however, the intervention of the modern state abolishes 
such alienation and opposition, and implements the transition to the logic of Concept, in 
which all individuals equally attain the status of “concrete universality.” The logic of 
essence, therefore, is not but a transitory stage that is superseded in the logic of Concept.  
 Hartmann’s arguments, although have a strong intuitive appeal, are not effective 
against Marx.111 Regarding (1): The variation of “empirical” setting does not affect the 
“logical” truth of the relation of capital and labor. From a Marxist standpoint, which is 
consistent with Hegel’s logic of essence, such variety in the empirical world is only a 
seeming, an illusion that conceals the more fundamental “logical” state of affairs. No 
matter how the empirical setting changes in capitalism, it does not touch the basic point 
that still it is the workers that produce value, which at the same time is expropriated from 
them by capital.  
                                                        
111 Hartmann himself is aware that these arguments are not effective against Marx. Yet, he 
regards the sealed “transcendental” character of Marx’s argument, which makes it immune to 
such criticism, as a reason that Marx’s argument as a whole is a petitio principii: Marx 
presupposes that capitalism is based on the logic of essence, only to prove that it is so. “Die 
[Marxsche] Theorie läßt keinen anderen Weg offen als den der Begriffsbewegung, der Entfaltung 
der Untugenden des Wesens, d.h. seiner Negativität. Die Theorie ist Funktion desjenigen 
Prinzips, das das Gewünschte zu zeigen gestattet.” (ibid:165). I cannot discuss this point in this 
space, but the circularity of transcendental arguments does not necessarily mean that they are 
petitio principii, or at least so is the case with Marx’s analysis. 
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 Regarding (2): Hartmann’s objection is based on the Hegelian idea that the 
political state in modernity is able to successfully tame and contain the sphere of civil 
society, thereby providing a milieu in which each individual would enjoy freedom to the 
same extent that other individuals do. In this space, I cannot discuss in any detail Marx’s 
critique of Hegel’s conception of state in capitalism. For Marx, the political state is only a 
reflection of the antagonistic structure of the sphere of civil society, and maintains and 
stabilizes such antagonism. For Marx, the “political” freedom and equality that obtains 
through the state is nothing but another symptom of “alienation” of life in civil society.  It 
indicates that the antagonism inherent in the “real” or the “material” life of people cannot 
be solved, and has to be seemingly annulled in the “ideal” world of politics. Moreover – 
and this is another point – even if the state manages to considerably redistribute wealth, it 
cannot change the mode of production of wealth, which solely obtains through the 
antagonism between capital and labor. Thus, Marx unequivocally argues against the 
motto of “equalization of classes” that had gained momentum in the liberal socialists of 
his time: 
The “equalization of classes”, literally interpreted, comes to the “harmony of 
capital and labor” so persistently preached by the bourgeois socialists. It is not 
the logically impossible “equalization of classes”, but the historically necessary, 
superseding “abolition of classes”, this true secret of the proletarian movement, 
which forms the great aim of the International Workers’ Association (MEW 
16:349, MECW 21:46)   
This discussion makes clear both the importance and the limits of the logic, when it 
comes to think about social issues. Logic is, relatively speaking, both independent from 
and dependent on social reality. It is independent, insofar as it provides the foundation for 
the social reality; it captures what is “actual” in social reality independent of the manifold 
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empirical manifestation. It is dependent, insofar as it is already informed by social and 
political arguments that are not necessarily logical in character. It is not for logical 
reasons that, for Marx, the transition from the logic of essence to the logic of Concept 
cannot transpire; rather the social and historical institutions in capitalism are such that 
they would not allow such a transition. It is not the “matter of the logic” [die Sache der 
Logik] that defines the social world, Marx emphasizes, but the “logic of the matter” [die 
Logik der Sache] (MEW 1:216, MECW 3:17-8). 
 
8- MacKinnon’s Conception of Genders in terms of Opposition 
I have briefly indicated that de Beauvoir’s conception of the relation of men and women 
has a close affinity with Hegel’s relation of opposition. In this section, I focus on 
Catharine MacKinnon’s conception of gender formation, as primarily explained in her 
essay, “Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination” (1987a). MacKinnon 
explicitly articulates the relation of men and women in terms of power, and radically 
pushes de Beauvoir’s argument to its logical conclusion. As we will see, MacKinnon’s 
theory neatly fits with Hegel’s conception of the relation of opposition, as I have 
presented it. Interestingly, MacKinnon does not invoke Hegel’s logic in this essay, nor –
as far as I can verify – does she explicitly discuss the logic in any other of her works. In 
the following, I will give a close reading of MacKinnon’s essay, and I make copious 
references to the essay so as to avoid forcing a Hegelian interpretation on her work. 
MacKinnon begins her essay with the query, “what is a gender question112 a 
                                                        
112 MacKinnon does not subscribe to the distinction between “sex” (that is based on biology) and 
“gender” (that is socially constituted), which is of pivotal importance for many second-wave 
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question of?” This query, she holds, can be answered in two ways: in terms of (1) 
sameness and difference or (2) dominance (ibid: 32). Understanding gender issues in 
terms of sameness and difference is the prevailing approach, against which MacKinnon 
offers her own approach of dominance.  
(1) According to the sameness and difference approach, “sex is a difference, a 
division, a distinction, beneath which lies a stratum of human commonality, sameness” 
(ibid: 33). This approach undergirds the existing liberal legal and moral framework: as 
long as men and women are equal, the law should be gender neutral, disregarding the 
gender of the person in question; and as long as women are different from men the law 
should accommodate the difference, and should take an affirmative action to compensate 
for it. According to MacKinnon, there is a fundamental flaw in this approach:  
Under the sameness standard, women are measured according to our [women’s] 
correspondence with man, our equality judged by our proximity to his measure. 
Under the difference standard, we [women] are measured according to our lack of 
correspondence with him, our womanhood judged by our distance from his 
measure. Gender neutrality is thus simply the male standard. (ibid: 34)  
There is, in other words, no neutral point of view from which it can be judged in what 
respect women and men are the same, and in what respects they are different. Rather, that 
supposedly neutral standpoint is the male standpoint. MacKinnon gives a poignant 
example to illustrate her point: In anatomy classes in medical school, a male body is 
considered to be the human body, and the additional organs that women have are studied 
in ob/gyn (ibid: 34). Similarly, according to MacKinnon, sports are generally defined 
with reference to men’s physiology, car and health insurance coverage with reference to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
feminists, and uses the terms “sex” and “gender” interchangeably. For her, there is no brute 
natural fact that defines sex; sex is socially mediated through and through. (See Allen (2014)) 
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men’s needs, and “workplace expectations and successful career patterns” with reference 
to men’s biographies (ibid: 36). There is no such neutral standpoint for the evaluation of 
so-called successful women; these women are, in general, those who have been able to 
construct a C.V. that is close to the male norm (ibid: 37). As the sameness/difference 
approach is blind to the “hierarchy of power” between men and women, it does not 
realize that “maleness is the referent for both” men and women (ibid: 34). The 
sameness/difference approach claims to treat men and women equally. Yet, as the criteria 
for such equality are defined by men, equality can never obtain. Thus, within the 
framework of sameness/difference, MacKinnon emphasizes, “sex equality is conceptually 
designed never to be achieved.” (ibid: 44) 
(2) In reaction to the conceptual inconsistency involved in sameness/difference 
approach, MacKinnon offers her own approach, according to which the question of 
gender is primarily the question of domination of men over women. She writes: 
Gender here is a matter of dominance, not difference [...]. Another way to say that 
is, there would be no such thing as what we know as sex difference […], were it 
not for male dominance. Sometimes people ask me, ‘Does that mean you think 
there is no difference between women and men?’ The only way that I know how 
to answer that is: of course there is; the difference is that men have power, and 
women do not. (1987b: 51)  
It is power, according to MacKinnon, which through constructing social reality 
“derivatively” produces the so-called sameness and difference between sexes. For 
MacKinnon, the difference between men and women is not a difference that designates 
an equal value, but is a difference constituted by the relation of power. For her, the 
relation of power precedes gender: It is not the case that first there are self-standing 
genders, upon which the relation of power is afterwards superimposed; rather, gender 
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from the beginning is, constituted by power.113 “Gender might not even code as 
difference, might not mean distinction epistemologically, were it not for its consequences 
for social power” (1987a:40). 
These two approaches in understanding social reality have radically different 
practical significance. From the point of view of sameness/difference approach, “sex 
inequality would be a problem of mere sexism, of mistaken differentiation, of inaccurate 
categorization of individuals.” (1978a: 42) In other words, in the sameness/difference 
approach the status quo as a whole is regarded as just, as the standard, and the issue is 
merely identifying the aberrant forms of sex discrimination and sexism. From the point of 
view of dominance approach, MacKinnon believes, the sameness/difference approach 
“invisibly and uncritically accepts the arrangements under male supremacy”. In this sense, 
she concludes, the sameness/difference approach is “masculinist”, although it might be 
expressed by women themselves (ibid: 43). In contrast, for the dominance approach the 
issue of inequality is not an idiosyncrasy or an exception. Rather, the inequality of power 
is that which makes genders what they are. Thus, the dominance approach focuses on the 
“systemic dominance” of men over women. Correspondingly, its focus is on “politics”, 
whose horizon is changing the totality of relations, not the individual cases of supposedly 
explicit sexism.  
The resemblance of MacKinnon to Hegel is obvious. I will content myself with a 
brief summation of her points appropriately couched in Hegel’s language: (1) For 
                                                        
113 MacKinnon gives a metaphorical account of sex differentiation: “On the first day that matters, 
dominance was achieved, probably by force. By the second day, division along the same lines had 
to be relatively firmly in place. On the third day, if not sooner, differences were demarcated, 
together with social systems to exaggerate them in perception and in fact, because the 
systematically differential delivery of benefits and deprivations required making no mistakes 
about who was who.” (1987a:40)  
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MacKinnon gender is not a biological entity, originating from some thing like DNA, 
brain, hormones, genitalia, etc., but is fundamentally relational. (2) The 
sameness/difference approach regards the relation between male and female as an 
instance of the relation of diversity. According to this approach, men and women are in 
some respects equal, and in some other respects unequal. This is an instance of relation of 
indifference and externality, where each of the two relata ultimately exists independently 
from the other. (3) The dominance approach understands the relation between men and 
women as an instance of relation of opposition, where the positive is male, and the 
negative is female. The very categories of male and female are contradictorily derived 
from the relation of power of male over female. (4) The relation of dominance of male 
over female has an in-built relation of equality as its moment, insofar as male and female 
are equal with each other, obviously, under the rules that male sets.  
 
9- Conclusion: Opposition vs. Recognition 
According to Honneth’s “normative reconstruction” of Hegel’s social and political 
philosophy, in bourgeois-capitalist social order the basic form of social relation that 
obtains between individuals is recognition. For Honneth, recognition is essentially 
symmetrical, and the asymmetries of power are mere aberrations from the recognitive 
state. For him, the symmetry involved in recognition renders individuals equal with each 
other. Although there are always cases of inequality, equality remains real. In the view 
that I have developed through Hegel’s conception of determinations of reflection, things 
look quite differently. In this view, the basic form of social relation that obtains between 
individuals is opposition. This relation is essentially asymmetrical, and based on power. 
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There is equality involved in the relation of opposition, yet the measure of such equality 
is always established by those who are already in power. This equality, therefore, can 
never be a true equality. It is rather a constitutive illusion that conceals the relations of 
power. Corresponding to these two ways of understanding social ontology, there are two 
kinds of politics. In Honneth’s approach, the totality of the bourgeois-capitalist social 
order is fine and healthy, and there is only need for piecemeal reform, aimed at correcting 
the deviant “social pathologies.” In the view that I have offered, the problems are the 
constitutive social relations themselves, and they need to be addressed at the root level.114  
A question remains, however. If it is a logical requirement that the basic social 
relation be opposition, can there be any hope for emancipation at all? That is, can there be 
any hope to have a future society that is truly based on the symmetrical relation of 
recognition?  Does Hegel’s logic teach us, to invoke a phrase from Adorno, that a “pre-
established disharmony” governs society? (GS 6:25) In answering this question, I would 
like to emphasize that there are (at least) two ways of reading Hegel’s logic: (1) as a 
theory of purely a priori categories that does not change across history; (2) as a theory 
that aims to “reconstruct” social reality in the bourgeois-capitalist social order at the 
categorial and logical level. In the Introduction, I have argued how I opt for the second 
reading. I hold that the “structure” of bourgeois-capitalist social order is based on the 
relation of opposition, and such oppositional structure cannot possibly accommodate the 
“ethical norms” of the symmetrical relation of recognition. That the structure of society is 
based on opposition, however, is a historical fact. Through radical change in the very 
structure of the current society, there may be a possibility of the formation of a new 
                                                        
114 See the Conclusion of the dissertation for a more elaborate discussion. 
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society, which would embody a radically different social ontology. Indeed, it may be 
possible that “in place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class oppositions”, 
we can collectively build “an association, in which the free development of each is the 






















The infinite weak point in every critical position (and I would like 
to tell you that I include my own here) is that when confronted 
with such criticism, Hegel simply has the more powerful argument. 
This is because there is no other world than the one in which we 
live, or at least we have no reliable knowledge of any alternative 
despite all our radar screens and giant radio telescopes. So that we 
shall always be told: everything you are, everything you have, you 
owe, we owe to this odious totality, even though we cannot deny 




In short, man, the lord of his creation, appears as the 
servant of that creation. (Karl Marx, Excerpts from James 




1- Against Recognition-Hegel; For Substance-Hegel 
It is not an exaggeration to claim that almost all recent major attempts at “re-actualization” 
of Hegel’s political philosophy especially in the Anglophone world have aimed to 
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accommodate him to liberalism. It is true that Hegel is not regarded as a conventional 
liberal philosopher, who would base his theory on some given conception of human-
nature, or some consequentialist argument based on an account of instrumental reason; 
nonetheless, it is strongly believed that Hegel provides an “alternative” way for 
justification of liberal social and political order115 (Pippin: 2007).  
The major concept used to reconstruct Hegel as a philosopher of liberalism is the 
concept of “recognition”. Such reconstruction occurs along two lines: (1) The process of 
recognition (or “communicative freedom”) logically exists prior the individuals, and 
constitutes them as being equal and free. (2) The relation of recognition is anchored in, 
and supported by the major social institutions of capitalist modernity, namely, the nuclear 
family, the market economy, and the political state. Through participating in these social 
institutions, which are dubbed as “the spheres of recognition” (Honneth 2003:143), 
individuals are able to recognize each other, and be recognized by each other, thereby 
forming and promoting their own individuality, as well as the individuality of the others. 
(Indeed, having so much trust in the modern institutions, Honneth unabashedly states that 
his overall task is “to interpret bourgeois-capitalist society as an institutionalized 
recognition order” (ibid:138))  
We can interpret the above two claims about recognition as explaining two forms 
of “symmetrical” or “horizontal” relation: (1) The symmetrical or horizontal relation 
between individuals, (2) the symmetrical or horizontal relationship between individuals 
                                                        
115 By liberalism here, I mean a theory that presupposes individuals to be equal and free, and to be 
bearer of certain inalienable human rights. The task of liberal political philosophy is then to 
construct a political organization that secures the already presupposed equality, freedom and 
human rights for individuals.  
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and institutions. The idea of (2) is this: social institutions are to a considerable extent 
malleable to the action of individuals. The institutions do not really “force” individuals to 
abide by their logic; but they provide sets of “orientation” for individuals to act 
(Pinkard’s phrase 2010:137). Individuals thus can step back from the institutions, reflect 
on them, and act according to what they (individuals) deem to be good and desirable116. 
In so doing, therefore, individuals can reciprocally change the institutions. Thus, the 
dialectical relation between individuals in (1) is transformed into “a playing out of the 
moral dialectic of the universal [i.e. institutions] and the particular” (Honneth ibid:152) in 
(2), thereby re-enforcing and concretizing the already existing horizontal relation 
between individuals. 
Interpreting Hegel through the concept of recognition makes Hegel a liberal 
philosopher, insofar as it regards individuals in capitalism to be –although in a 
roundabout way, through recognition – equal and free. Granted that the philosophers of 
recognition agree that the current conjuncture in bourgeois-capitalist order is far from 
realizing the recognitive relation, yet they stress that recognition is the (ethical) norm 
underlying this social order, and is indeed already embedded (and “actual”) in it. One of 
my aims in this dissertation has been to show that no matter the extent of reform, the 
rules and regularities (i.e. the non-ethical structural norms) that govern the capitalist order 
cannot possibly accommodate a recognitive relation between individuals. From the 
logical point of view, in Chapter Two I argued against (1). I showed that for Hegel in the 
logic of essence the most fundamental form of relation between individuals is not the 
relation of symmetrical recognition, but the relation of opposition, which is essentially 
                                                        
116 Pinkard is well aware that this “orientation” model is Kantian; nonetheless, he uses it to 
explain Hegel.  
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asymmetrical. To complete the argument, in this chapter I aim to undermine (2). Namely, 
I will show that the relation of social institutions and individuals in capitalism is not in 
any sense symmetrical, but emphatically asymmetrical. More precisely, I will argue that 
the social institutions in capitalism and especially the “totality”117 thereof do not provide 
points of “orientation” for individuals to act; rather, the institutions “coerce” individuals 
– on pain of perishing – to do what they (individuals) need to do.  
My focus is on Hegel’s logic of essence where Hegel conceives of totality in 
terms of “substance” [Substanz], which exerts “absolute power” [absolute Macht] over 
individuals, who remain its “accidents”. The strongly holist argument that Hegel 
advances in the logic of essence is a good reason that the philosophers of recognition 
emphatically dissociate Hegel’s political philosophy from his logic. (Honneth clearly 
regards the basic presupposition of any attempt to re-actualize Hegel’s political 
philosophy to “our own post-metaphysical standards of rationality” to be discarding the 
logic altogether (2001:5)). Nonetheless, it is absolutely undeniable that Hegel himself 
regards the logic to constitute the ground of the Philosophy of Right (GPR §2, §31, 
§33)118. In what is without doubt one of the most important parts of the book, the 
beginning of the ethical life [Sittlichkeit] (GPR §142 through §158, also EnzG §513 
through §517), Hegel repeatedly and clearly identifies the ethical life with “substance”. 
These passages are very difficult, one could say even impossible, to be squared with 
liberalism. Here Hegel claims that the “substance” of society is self-standing and 
independent of individuals, that individuals are mere “epiphenomena” of the totality of 
society, that the social institutions are “ethical powers” that govern the lives of 
                                                        
117 I use the terms “whole” and “totality” interchangeably, as Hegel, Marx and Adorno do.  
118 See the Introduction for a more detailed discussion of the relation of logic to politics in Hegel. 
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individuals such that individuals necessarily “disappear” if they do not follow the rules 
and regularities of the totality of society. Here are some typical passages: 
The fact that the ethical sphere is the system of these determinations of the Idea 
constitutes its rationality. In this way, the ethical sphere is freedom, or the will, 
which has being in and for itself as objectivity, as a circle of necessity whose 
moments are the ethical powers, which govern the lives of individuals. In these 
individuals – who are accidental to them – these powers have their representation, 
phenomenal shape, and actuality. [Kreis der Notwendigkeit, dessen Momente die 
sittlichen Mächte sind, welche das Leben der Individuen regieren und in diesen 
als ihren Akzidenzen ihre Vorstellung, erscheinende Gestalt und Wirklichkeit 
haben.] 
 Addition. Since the determinations of ethics constitute the concept of 
 freedom, they are the substantiality or universal essence of individuals, who are 
 related to them merely as accidents. Whether the individual exists or not is a
 matter of indifference to objective ethical life, which alone has permanence and is 
 the power by which the lives of individuals are governed. Ethical life has 
 therefore been represented to nations as eternal justice, or as gods who have being 
 in and for themselves, and in relation to whom the vain pursuits of individuals are 
 merely a play of the waves. (GPR §145) 
And: 
In this way, ethical substantiality has attained its right, and the latter has attained 
validity. That is, the self-will of the individual, and his own conscience in its 
attempt to exist for itself and in opposition to the ethical substantiality, have 
disappeared [verschwunden] (GPR §152). 
Faced with such pivotal and unequivocal passages that reveal “illiberal” views of Hegel, 
essentially two approaches are taken by the philosophers of recognition: (1) One is 
adopted by Habermas (1973), Theunissen (1982), Hösle (1987), and earlier Honneth 
(1996), according to which Hegel in his Jena period developed a “dialogic” theory of 
intersubjectivity and recognition, but then abandoned it in his Berlin period in the 
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Philosophy of Right for a “monological” theory based on metaphysics of substance, and 
such a move is a  “Verfallgeschichte” (Theunissen’s phrase), a decadence that must be 
repudiated. (2) One is adopted by later Honneth (2000) and Pippin (2008), among others, 
who argue that Hegel’s theory of horizontal recognition and intersubjectivity is still 
pivotal in the Philosophy of Right, and such passages as the quoted one must be simply 
ignored in favor of some other (much less explicit) passages that support horizontal 
conception of recognition.  
 By rejecting or ignoring Hegel’s logic of substance, the philosophers of 
recognition, in effect, discard what I believe constitutes the main aspect of Hegel’s 
revolution in modern social and political philosophy. It is exactly through conceiving of 
society as substance that Hegel radically departs from the tradition of liberalism in 
general, and of social contract theory in particular. The philosophers of recognition are 
wary to use the category of substance, presumably because they think conceiving of 
society in terms of substance automatically implicates the endorsement of the notion that 
individuals are mere accidents, and that as accidents they can be simply replaced by other 
individuals. Now there is no doubt that, in conformity to his project of legitimation of 
bourgeois-capitalist society in the Philosophy of Right119, Hegel in that book uses the 
concept of totality or substance affirmatively. To clarify, although Hegel conceives of the 
ethical life as substance for which individuals remains accidents, nonetheless, at the same 
time he believes that in modernity the ethical life has reached such maturity that would 
allow individuals to be self-determining in a genuine way. (“The right of individuals to 
                                                        
119 See the Introduction for a detailed discussion of my take on the Philosophy of Right. 
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their particularity is likewise contained in ethical substantiality.” GPR §154)) 120 But one 
does not necessarily need to use the concept of totality affirmatively. Indeed, there is a 
rich tradition – initiated by Marx and continued then by Lukács and Adorno – that uses 
the category of substance or totality in a critical way. 121 According to this tradition, 
totality provides the basis of sociality in bourgeois-capitalist social order, and, thus, 
should be conceived as the central category in social and political philosophy.122 As I will 
discuss in the Conclusion to the dissertation, the critical usage of the concept of 
substance finds support in Hegel too, but not in the Philosophy of Right, rather in the 
logic of essence of the Science of Logic.  
 In what follows, I begin with a discussion of Adorno’s conception of society as 
totality (Section 1), and then turn to Hegel in the rest of the chapter. Given the prevailing 
misconceptions of Hegel’s conception of totality, I need to discuss in detail two such 
misconceptions. I argue that Hegel’s totality is not the sum-total of all determinations, 
and that Hegel’s holism is not a part-whole holism (Section 2). Thereafter, I discuss why 
within the framework of the logic of essence Hegel needs the category of totality, and 
that the totality must be understood as “actuality” [Wirklichkeit], which is a principle at 
                                                        
120 However, this point – that the subjective right of the individual is preserved in ethical life in 
modernity – does not mean that such a right is formed through recognitive relation. See Christoph 
Menke for an illuminating discussion (2009).  
121 The confusion between the critical usage of the category of totality and the affirmative usage 
of it lies at the heart of the conservative and conformist reading of Hegel, propounded by the 
tradition of British Idealism (Bradley, T.H.Green, Bosanquet). A paradigmatic statement is 
Green’s: “To ask why I am to submit to the power of the state is to ask why I am to allow my life 
to be regulated by that complex institutions without which I literally should not have a life to call 
my own, should not be able to ask for a justification of what I am called on to do (1895:122, 
quoted by Pippin 1997:421). 
122 That later Habermas and Honneth regard the central category of social and political 
philosophy to be recognition, rather than substance, shows the distance that they have from 
Adorno and Marx. 
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work that brings about unity and organization (Section 3). More determinately, I discuss 
how Hegel’s totality is “substance” which is the highest and most determinate category of 
the logic of essence. I elaborate on Hegel’s critique of Spinoza’s substance, and show 
how this critique will be reflected in Hegel’s social ontology. I also discuss what it means 
that Hegel’s substance has “absolute power” over individuals (Section 4). Finally, I 
discuss the contours of a social ontology based on the logic of essence. Specially, I argue 
that the power of totality of society over individuals is non-volitional and impersonal 
(Section 5). The argument of this chapter continues in the next two chapters. In Chapter 
Four, I discuss Marx’s conception of totality of capital, and demonstrate how it accords to 
Hegel’s conception of substance. In Chapter Five, I discuss the dialectical interrelation of 
necessity and contingency in Hegel’s logic of essence, and show how freedom of 
individuals in capitalism obtains through contingency and randomness.  
 
2- Adorno’s Conception of Society qua Totality in Capitalism 
In the heated philosophical-political dispute in the sixties in West Germany between the 
“dialectical” theories of society, represented by Theodor Adorno and his then assistant 
Jürgen Habermas, and the empiricist or the so-called “positivist” theories of society, 
represented by Karl Popper and Hans Albert, perhaps the most decisive point of 
divergence is the former’s emphasis on the concept of “totality”. Yet, as Albert – not 
quite unjustifiably – complains, although “the dialectical concept of totality…constantly 
recurs in theoreticians who follow in Hegel’s footsteps”, and although these thinkers 
“look upon this concept as being in some way fundamental”, they fail to provide a 
“precise formulation of this concept” (PD 167). Popper is even more trenchant than 
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Albert, as he claims that Adorno’s concept of totality is “completely trivial”, since it 
simply signifies that societal totality consists of social relationships, which are all inter-
connected with each other, and this triviality has been presented by “countless 
philosophers and sociologists” (PD 297).  
 We should take Popper’s triviality charge quite seriously. In fact, there is always 
a danger in any holistic thought, Hegelian one included, to become devoid of content. In 
response to the question why an individual fact is such and such, it is sometimes merely 
asserted that the individual fact cannot be explained on its own, and has to be explained 
through whole, which makes the individual fact what it is. Yet, when one presses, what is 
exactly this whole that is the ultimate explanans of all explananda, the answer is not clear. 
The whole, in this way, becomes a means for non-explanation, perhaps a rhetoric device 
to persuade, but not to determinately explain. In this section, my aim is to carve out in 
detail what Adorno means by the concept of totality, and show that his conception is far 
from trivial.  
 To begin with, it is important to emphasize that Adorno locates himself in the 
tradition of critical social theory, which allows itself to make use of metaphysical and 
philosophical concepts to explain the social and political world. True to the spirit of this 
tradition, Adorno identifies the concept of “totality” with the concept of “society”. 
According to Adorno, human society constitutes a totality in which all facts and 
phenomena take place.  However, it is not the case that any human community 
throughout history constitutes a totality. Rather, it is only in capitalism in which all 
individuals become so interrelated that society becomes a totality. The building block of 
this totality, a principle that permeates the modern social world and connects all 
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phenomena with each other, is the “exchange principle” [Tauschprinzip]. Adorno, 
following Marx, believes that capitalism is a social formation in which the commodities 
are primarily produced not for the sake of being used by the producer, but for the sake of 
getting exchanged with other commodities. The principle of exchange thus makes human 
community in capitalism “a radically socialized society” [eine radikal vergesellschaftete 
Gesellschaft] (GS 5:273), a society in which all social phenomena become interrelated to 
form a totality123.  That is, according to Adorno  – and this point is not necessarily 
Marx’s – the principle of exchange in advanced capitalism not only forms the domain of 
what we ordinarily call market or the realm of economy, but transforms virtually all 
aspects of life: from our very intimate personal relationship in the case of romantic love, 
to how we spend our leisure time, to the ostensibly more exalted areas of life, including, 
culture, art, to even the way we do philosophy124.  
 According to Albert, using the concept of totality or society in sociology is 
useless and even misleading, since totality or society as such is not empirically “testable” 
or “verifiable” (PD 175)125. We always encounter particular social phenomena, occurring 
in particular social context. Therefore, we will be better off if we limit our investigation 
to the realm of the factual, since it is only through attention to the facts that we can test 
                                                        
123 “A world integrated through production, through the exchange relationship, depends in all its 
moments on the social condition of its production, and in that sense actually realizes the primacy 
of the whole over its parts.” (GS 5:275, Three Studies: 27). “The context of the social individual 
actions must be tied together into a seamless totality, predetermining for the individual, as never 
was the case in the feudal epoch” (GS 6:313) 
124 “They are not merely character-masks [the owner of commodities], agents of [economic] value, 
in some presumed special sphere of the economy. Even where they think they have escaped the 
primacy of the economy, all the way down to their psychology, the maison tolérée [universal 
home] of what is unknowably individual, they react under the compulsion of the generality 
[obtained through exchange principle]” (GS 6:206). 
125 See also Adorno’s discussion of this point in the Introduction (PD 13ff). 
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our theory and find out whether the theory works or not. Adorno’s answer to this 
criticism shows his deeply Hegelian commitments, and how profoundly he diverges from 
Albert. According to Adorno, “while society cannot be abstracted from individual facts, 
nor be grasped as an individual fact itself, there is nonetheless no social fact which is not 
determined by society as a whole” (GS 8:10). Thus Adorno is committed to two 
seemingly antithetical claims: one, societal totality is not at any rate something distinct 
from individual social phenomena; two, nevertheless, no individual social phenomenon 
can exist on its own nor can be made intelligible without considering its relation to the 
totality. Adorno makes this point through an explicitly dialectical formulation:  
Societal totality does not lead a life of its own over and above that which it unites 
and of which it, in its turn, is composed. It produces and reproduces itself through 
its individual moments…. This totality can no more be detached from life, from 
co-operation and the antagonism of its elements than an element can be 
understood merely as its function without insight into the whole which has its 
source in the motion of the individual himself. (PD 107) 
That the totality is not separable from the individual moments shows how Adorno is 
reacting towards certain neo-Platonic readings of Hegel. Adorno emphasizes that for 
Hegel also there is no “pre-formed” totality, but totality is only constituted through its 
constituting moments, and through their inter-relation and motion. In a good Hegelian 
fashion, Adorno maintains that society qua totality is not a thing, whether material or 
immaterial, and “it cannot be ostensively [deiktisch] shown” (GS 8:11), but it is 
essentially a “process”.  This means that through the inter-relation of individuals, a 
dynamic totality gets formed, which nevertheless, is effective in said individuals from the 
beginning, so to speak.  This point, of course, can never be empirically tested. Adorno 
writes,  
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No experiment could convincingly demonstrate the dependence of each social 
phenomenon on the totality, for the whole which pre-forms the tangible 
phenomena can never itself be reduced to particular experimental arrangements. 
Nevertheless, the dependence of that which can be socially observed upon the 
total structure is, in reality, more valid than any findings which can be irrefutably 
verified in the particular, and this dependence is anything but a mere figment of 
the imagination. (GS 8:556, PD 113)  
It is for these reasons that Adorno thinks that the proper method for doing sociology is 
not empiricist, but should be borrowed from Hegel’s speculative logic. Indeed, in contrast 
to the contemporary Critical Theory, Adorno believes that Hegel’s penetrating vision 
about the modern social world is only achieved by virtue of his speculative logic, and 
“loses its substance” as soon as that logic is laid aside (GS 5:252, Three Studies: 3). 
According to Adorno, it is exactly the speculative logic that grasps the primacy of totality, 
and as such it is “indispensable…for social knowledge.”  (PD 113).  
 This Hegelian heritage in Adorno’s conception of society qua totality is evident in 
two other points that I would like to briefly address. Firstly, for Adorno, the relation 
between the individual and society is not a relation of species and genus, conventionally 
understood. It is not the case that if we begin with individuals, and classify them 
according to their similarities and dissimilarities we could climb up the ladder of 
classification, and eventually reach a highest category – society – under which all other 
lower classificatory categories could be subsumed (GS 8:9). Adorno’s is a distinctly 
Hegelian thesis, as Hegel’s totality is not achieved through this process of inductive 
classification. Totality for Hegel is not a kind of Porphyrian tree, which orders categories; 
rather, Hegel’s method is characteristically “developmental”, i.e. how the categories, 
through their very internal insufficiencies must necessarily “develop” into more complex 
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categories, until reaching the maximally complex category, which is totality. Secondly, 
for Adorno, totality is not a mere organizing principle, which brings the parts into a 
harmonious relationship with each other. Referring to Hegel’s conception of totality, 
Adorno writes, “as a critic of romanticism, Hegel knows that the whole realizes itself … 
only through discontinuity, alienation, and reflection” (GS 5:253, Three Studies: 4). This 
means that Hegel’s totality, according to Adorno, does not have any “pantheistic color,” 
and is emphatically not an “unruptured unity” [undurchbrochene Einheit] (NS-V 2:37); 
rather, Hegel’s totality is solely constructed through “antagonistic relations” of parts that 
constitute them126.  
 There is one aspect to Adorno’s conception of totality that needs specific attention. 
According to Adorno, totality is coercive upon the individuals, who nonetheless 
constitute it (Cf. O’Connor 2013: 34ff). Indeed, Adorno talks about society’s 
“omnipotence” in capitalism, and “the powerlessness of the individuals, confronted to the 
totality” (PD 78).  This point is a guidepost in my interpretation of Hegel’s logic of 
essence in this chapter and of Marx’s analysis of capitalism in the next chapter. We have 
learned that the constituting principle of totality for Adorno (following Marx) is the 
exchange of commodities. The best evidence that the totality is coercive upon individuals 
is that whoever does not adjust himself to this logic is doomed to be destroyed. “The 
form of total inter-relation” in capitalism, Adorno writes, “requires everyone to submit 
                                                        
126 Adorno quotes the following passage from the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit to 
support his interpretation: “The life of God and divine cognition might thus be expressed as a 
game love plays with itself. If this Idea, it lacks the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and 
the labor of the negative, then it lowers itself into edification, even into triteness. In itself that life 
is indeed an unalloyed sameness and unity with itself, since in such a life there is neither anything 
serious in this otherness and alienation, nor in overcoming this alienation. However, this in-itself 
is abstract universality, in which its nature, which is to be for itself, and the self-movement of the 
form are both left out of view.” (PhG §19) (Adorno, NS-V 2:66) 
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himself [sich unterwerfen müssen] to the law of exchange, if he does not wish to be 
perished [wenn sie nicht zugrunde gehen wollen], irrespective of profit is his subjective 
motivation or not” (GS 8:14). According to Adorno, this is exactly the point that the 
positivist strands in sociology, through their empirical methodology and their underlying 
nominalist metaphysics, are not able to grasp: namely, what is ultimately effective in 
capitalism is “the blindly dominating totality” (PD 14), not the individuals. Indeed, 
Adorno, following the Hegelian tradition of secularization of philosophical-theological 
concepts designates society as “ens realissimum”, i.e. the most real being (GS 6:309). 
 Adorno associates the power of totality over individuals with the notion of “spell” 
[der Bann], which has replaced Greek fate in capitalism, from which no one can escape. 
The individuals are spellbound, as it were, because they follow the logic of the totality 
compulsively, even without being aware of it. “What they can do nothing about, and 
which negates them,” Adorno emphasizes, “is what they themselves become”. The 
individuals might think that they are autonomous, but in truth, “they behave on their own 
in accordance with what is inescapable” (GS 6: 337-8). The totality constitutes their very 
individuality, and because of its constitutive character, is not necessarily experienced by 
them as something alien. If somebody wants to oppose the power of the spell, he will be 
reduced to a “mutilated” and “insignificant” thing, “lacking any substance”. In Adorno’s 
jargon, “all the non-identical phenomena that are expelled as a result of the domination of 
the identity principle are nevertheless mediated by the power of that principle” (HF: 96). 
 According to Adorno, totality is coercive upon all individuals, without exception, 
not merely workers, or the unemployed. “It is, however, not just the population at large, 
which is subjected to this domination”, Adorno writes, “but also those in control and their 
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entourage”; since, in the capitalist social formation, “the powerful” are also “the 
appendages of their own machinery of production” (Late Capitalism: 217). Adorno 
observes, “even captains of industry spend their time working through mountains of 
documents and shifting them from one side of their desk to the other, instead of ignoring 
office hours, and reflecting on freedom”, simply because “were they to pursue the latter 
course, their business would collapse in chaos” (HF: 6). Indeed, according to Adorno, 
totality qua society is “kollektiver Zwangsmechanismus” (GS 8:13). Even the individual 
capitalist’s domination over his workers is an “epiphenomenon” of power of totality over 
them (HF: 30). The particular employer can exert domination over the particular 
employee, not because he is more powerful in isolation, but because his power is an 
effect of the power of totality. For this reason, the conflict between the particular 
employer and employee is not comprehensible on its own, Adorno asserts, but it is only 
comprehensible through the totality of society, which has the “ultimate reality” (GS 8:10). 
 Although totality has power over all individuals and all individual social facts; 
that does not mean that its effect is undifferentiated. True that the exchange principle is 
the underlying principle for the construction of totality; but that does not mean that it 
manifests itself in all areas of life in the same way and to the same extent. This is one 
point, Adorno thinks, that distinguishes the modern form of domination from the pre-
modern forms. “In the democratically governed countries of industrial societies”, Adorno 
writes, “totality is a category of mediation, not one of immediate domination and 
subjugation” (PD 107, my emphasis).  “In industrial market societies”, Adorno believes, 
“by no means everything pertaining to society can simply be deduced from its principles”. 
Rather “such societies contain within themselves countless non-capitalist enclaves” (ibid). 
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The persistence of the institution of family, for example, in capitalism is not directly 
deducible from the principle of exchange; nevertheless, its nature in capitalism is formed, 
permeated and infected by that principle (the so-called ‘nuclear family’), as many 
feminists have already pointed out. Far from being an institution separable from the 
totality, family is a quasi-enclave, which has its own function within capitalism and helps 
the perpetuation of capitalism. “Even those enclaves, survivals from previous societies”, 
Adorno believes, “become what they are only in relation to the dominant totality from 
which they deviate.” (ibid). Precisely because the mode of domination in the modern 
world is not direct and immediate, the totality of the modern society can tolerate relative 
independence of some of its moments, though this independence remains only relative. 
 Totality, for Adorno, exhibits a rich and differentiated array of causality over the 
individuals. “Society keeps itself and its members alive”, Adorno writes, “but 
simultaneously threatens them with ruin” (PD 108). The capitalist totality, that is, is both 
the cause of life and the cause of death of the individuals, and this at the same time, and 
through the very same mechanism (HF 49). The very class antagonism that oppresses the 
workers and threatens the social fabric to disintegrate, at the very same time and through 
the very same mechanism, reproduces the life of the individuals127.  
 According to Adorno, it is not only the case that the totality has power over 
individuals, but also that the particular and determinate (economic) institutions are 
powerful over individuals. This might seem to be two distinct claims, but in fact they are 
closely inter-related. That is, the particular institutions of capitalist mode of production 
                                                        
127 “Society preserves itself, not in spite of its antagonism but through it; the profit motive, and 
thereby the class relationship, are objectively the motor of the process of production on which 
everyone’s life depends and whose primacy has its vanishing-point in the death of all.” (GS 
6:314)  
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hang together and cohere with each other to form a totality, such that each individual 
institution makes its priority over individuals through recourse to the totality that is itself 
made solely through the relation of the said particular institutions. This means that the 
mark of the coercion of totality over individuals is present in the coercion of each 
particular institution over individuals. This would lead us to understand Adorno’s general 
understanding of the relation of individuals to the institutions of the modern capitalist 
society. For Adorno, “society meets individuals primarily as that which is not-identical, 
as coercion [Zwang]”.  He emphasizes, “the specifically social consists precisely in the 
predominance of institutions over men [Übergewicht von Verhältnissen über die 
Menschen] (GS 8:9). For Adorno, individuals in capitalism are reduced to “mere 
executive organs” [bloβe Ausführungsorgane] (GS 6:336) of the institutions, their mere 
“disempowered products” [entmächtigte Produkte] (GS 8:9)128. 
 
3- What Hegel’s Totality is not 
In this section, I will show (1) that Hegel’s totality is not sum-total of all realities, and (2) 
that Hegel’s totality shall not be understood in terms of a part/whole holism.  
 
                                                        
128 In closing, I should make a brief note on Adorno’s famous dictum in Minima Moralia – “the 
whole is the untrue” [Das Ganze ist das Unwahre] (GS 4:55). According to Adorno, this dictum 
should not be considered as inconsistent with Hegel’s “the true is the whole” [Das Wahre ist das 
Ganze] (PhG §20). According to Adorno, as I take him, the second claim has to be understood in 
a descriptive or structural way. The truth is that the totality in capitalism is the most real being, 
and that the function of individuals is only to contribute to its existence. In contrast, the first 
claim has to be understood in an evaluative way. That individuals are only the “executive organs” 
of the totality makes the totality in capitalism, in a moral sense, “untrue”. The distinction between 
description and evaluation that I ascribe to Adorno corresponds to his ultimately (post-Hegelian) 
Kantianism. In Hegel’s logic of essence, and Marx’s critique of capitalism, there is no place for 
values. (See the Conclusion of the dissertation.) 
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3-1- Totality is not Sum-Total of All Realities. 
One natural way of conceiving  “totality” is to understand it in terms of “allness”, i.e. all 
realities cumulated together. Karl Popper in the Poverty of Historicism ascribes this 
conception of whole to the Hegelian-Marxist tradition, and criticizes it (Popper 2012 
(1957):70ff)129.  According to Popper, the concept of the whole in this tradition is used to 
denote “the totality of all the properties or aspects of a thing, and especially of all the 
relations holding between its constituent parts” (ibid:70), and continues, 
If we wish to study a thing, we are bound to select certain aspects of it. It is not 
possible for us to observe or to describe a whole piece of the world, or a whole 
piece of nature; in fact, not even the smallest whole piece may be so described, 
since all description is necessarily selective. It may even be said that wholes in 
[this] sense...can never be the object of any activity, scientific or otherwise. If we 
take an organism and transport it to another place, then we deal with it as a 
physical body, neglecting many of its other aspects. If we kill it, then we have 
destroyed certain of its properties, but never all of them. In fact, we cannot 
possibly destroy the totality of its properties and of all the interrelations of its 
parts, even if we smash it or burn it. (ibid: 71)  
According to Popper, studying totality in this sense is a “logical impossibility”, since any 
study must “abstract” from a vast array of details, and only take into account those 
aspects that are relevant to the study. Popper’s point about the impossibility of conceiving 
totality in terms of allness is well granted. But Hegel (or Marx or Adorno, for that matter) 
never thought of whole in this way. For Hegel, it is clear that the process of adding things 
or properties or relations one by one such that we eventually reach totality is an instance 
                                                        
129 In this part of the book “the Criticism of Holism”, Popper is actually criticizing Karl 
Mannheim’s Man and Society, but from the context it is completely clear that he means that his 
criticism applies not only to Mannheim (who was neither a Hegelian nor a Marxist), but also to 
Hegel and Marx and their followers. 
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of “bad infinity” and leaves the totality simply “indeterminate”. Hegel indeed emphasizes 
that totality is not omnitudo realitatis; it is not the “sum total of all realities” [Inbegriff 
aller Realitäten]; since, this “lacks all determinate character, and is inherently lifeless and 
empty [in sich tote, leere, Bestimmungslosigkeit] (WdL II:14, SL 390). This means that 
for Hegel, contrary to what Popper would ascribe to him, a true knowledge of a society 
does not involve that we know everything about that society, from its geography, to the 
sexual relationship between people, to food preferences, to details of their way of talking 
and behaving, etc, and Hegel himself in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History when 
he talks about different societies throughout history never proceeds this way. (Or to be a 
good Hegelian historian, one does not need to talk about all the events in their detail, but 
one has to show the “idea” within the historical facts, leaving those unrelated issues 
aside.)130 In his Philosophy of Nature, Hegel makes it absolutely clear that understanding 
everything is not the aim of philosophy: 
Philosophy has to start from the Concept, and even if it does not assert much, we 
must be content with this. The Philosophy of Nature is in error when it wants to 
account for every phenomenon. [Es ist eine Verirrung der Naturphilosophie, daß 
sie allen Erscheinungen will Face machen.] This is what happens in the finite 
sciences, which try to trace everything back to general conceptions, the 
hypotheses. In these sciences, the sole verification of the hypothesis lies in the 
empirical element and consequently everything must be explained. But what is 
known through the Notion is clear by itself and stands firm; and philosophy need 
                                                        
130 In his early work, “Wie der gemeine Menschenverstand die Philosophie nehme – dargestellt an 
den Werken des Herrn Krug”  (1802), Hegel already makes this point. A certain Wilhelm 
Traugott Krug demands idealist philosophy to deduce “every dog and cat, and even Mr. Krug’s 
writing pen”. Hegel points that such demand is simply ludicrous, and asserts: “man hätte sich 
nicht sollen das Ansehen geben, als ob man das ganze System der Vorstellungen deduzieren 
wolle.” (WW 2:194) 
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not feel any embarrassment about this, even if all phenomena are not yet 
explained. (EnzN §270Z) 
Indeed, Hegel’s method of theorizing the totality is much more selective than what 
Popper might think as to be appropriate for doing science. In the quoted passage, Hegel 
even asserts that understanding totality in terms of allness counts more as a desideratum 
of empirical sciences than of speculative philosophy; because the foundation of science 
according to empirical methodology is the empirical fact, and unless all relevant 
empirical facts are understood, we cannot be sure that the corresponding theory is true. In 
contrast, for speculative philosophy, which deals with the essential or conceptual 
structure, much of the empirical details can be simply neglected.  To give an example 
from Hegel, in order to understand what species is, it is “indifferent” whether there are 
“sixty-seven species of parrots” or “a dozen more” and such trivialities do not belong to 
the sphere of philosophy (WdL II:524, SL 804). 
 
3-2- Hegel’s Holism is not a Part/Whole Holism. 
Another natural way of understanding totality is to conceive it as consisting of parts, such 
as a table that consists of four legs and a surface. This has also permeated our way of 
thinking about social wholes. We might think that a state consists of three parts, 
executive, legislative, and judicative, or a society as consisting of the individuals that are 
in it. Hegel is utterly critical of this view, and expresses this criticism in a section entitled 
“the relation of the whole and the parts” [Das Verhältnis des Ganzen und der Teile] in the 
logic of essence (WdL II:166ff, SL 513ff, EnzL. §135 & §136). Hegel does not deny that 
there are some wholes that can be conceived as simply consisting of parts – mostly those 
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wholes that have a “mechanical” nature – but he believes that these wholes are 
themselves “untrue”. The true whole – which has its model in organic life, and the realm 
of the mental and the social – cannot be captured through the relation of parts and whole. 
Yet this is exactly the way, Hegel believes, that the Understanding, with its analytic way 
of thinking, regards the whole. So, for example, in psychology it is usually assumed that 
the mind or the Spirit has different faculties or powers – such as imagination, sensation, 
memory, understanding, etc – and the mind is simply the coming-together of these parts 
(EnzL. §135Z). The problem with this analytic way of thinking is that it does not grasp 
the parts in their internal unity, that it does not conceive that the parts are parts only in 
relation to the whole that constitute them as parts. The language that Hegel uses to 
describe the relation of whole and parts is highly reminiscent of the logic of being:   
The relationship of the whole and the parts is the immediate relationship; hence, 
the thoughtless relationship [gedankenlose Verhältnis] and the turning over 
[Umschlagen] of the identity-with-itself into diversity [Verschiedenheit]. There is 
a passing-over from the whole to the parts and from the parts to the whole, and in 
the one [the whole or the parts] the opposition to the other is forgotten since each 
is taking as a self-standing existence, the one time the whole, the other time the 
parts. Or since the parts are supposed to subsist in the whole and the whole to 
consist of the parts, one time the one, the other time the other is the subsisting and 
the other is each time the unessential. The mechanical relationship, in its 
superficial form, consists generally in the fact that the parts are taken as self-
subsisting against each other and against the whole. (EnzL. §136) 
Here Hegel claims that (1) in the relation of whole and parts, each of the relata is 
considered one time as self-subsisting and independent from the other, and (2) another 
time, as related to the other, but (3) these two different aspects of the relation never get 
explicated, hence (4) the relation remains merely an “external relation” such that the 
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relata only “turn over to each other” and can be only pasted together through a mere 
addition, a mere “too” [auch] (Cf. WdL II:167, SL 514).  
 Hegel also gives some detailed arguments why the relation of parts and whole is 
insufficient to explain the structure of whole properly understood; especially two 
arguments stand out that need to be explained briefly:  
 
3-2-1-The part/whole relationship is tautological. 
(1) “Although the whole is equal to the parts, it is not equal to them as parts”. Rather,  
(2) The whole is equal to the parts as their being “together” [zusammen]. But 
(3) “This their ‘together’ [Zusammen] is nothing else but their unity, the whole as 
such”. Therefore,  
(4) “The whole as whole is equal not to the parts, but to the whole”  
 
And this is obviously a tautology. And a similar argument this time beginning with the 
parts:  
(1) Although the parts are equal to the whole, “they are not equal to it as [their] 
unity”.  
(2) Rather, The parts are “equal to the whole as a manifold; that is to say, they are 
equal to it as a divided whole” [geteiltem Ganzen].  
(3)  But the divided whole is simply the parts.  
(4) Therefore, “the parts as parts are equal, not to the whole as such, but in it to 
themselves, the parts.”  
 
And this is obviously a tautology. (WdL II: 169, SL 56)  
 
3-2-2- The part/whole relationship leads to antinomy.  
(1) The whole is a composite [Zusammengesetztes], consisting of parts. 
(2) “The part insofar as it is a part, it is not a whole; it is not a composite, hence it 
is a simple [Einfaches] ”. 
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(3) But the part is only a part only through the relation of parts and whole. This 
means that, 
(4) The part is not a part by and through itself.  
(5) Everything is either a part or a whole. 
(6) From (4) and (5): The part is a whole.  
(7) “But as a whole, it [the part] is again composite; it consists of parts”  
(8) And “so on to infinity” (WdL II:171, SL 517-8) 
 
Hegel’s point is basically that in the relation of whole and parts, each of the whole and 
part only relates to itself, and not to the other. Rather, there is a “perennial alternation” of 
the relata, such that  “the one moment in freeing itself from the other, immediately 
introduces the other” (WdL II:172, SL: 518). And this according to Hegel is an antinomy: 
Without the whole there could not be parts – the whole is thus self-subsistent. But at the 
same time, without the parts, there could not be any whole – the whole is thus not self-
subsistent.131 From a Hegelian point of view, even such propositions in Gestalt 
psychology as “the whole is more than sum of its parts” is totally indeterminate, and 
already points towards a more determinate conception of totality; since if that which is 
more than the summation of parts is itself a part, the proposition contradicts itself, and if 
it is the whole itself, the proposition is simply tautological.  
 To conclude, the correct way of understanding the relation of individual and 
whole is not to conceive individuals as “parts” of the whole, rather as being “moments” 
of the whole. The point, of course, is not merely verbal. Being a “moment” means that 
the moment is already constituted by the whole, and cannot be conceived at all as self-
subsistent apart from the whole.  The judiciary is not self-standing apart from the totality 
                                                        
131 “The antinomy of this inference when closely examined is really this: because the whole is not 
the self-subsistent, therefore the part is self-subsistent; but because the part is self-subsistent only 
without the whole, it is self-subsistent not as part, but rather as whole” (WdL II:172, SL 518). 
Hegel’s argument here clearly echoes Kant’s second antinomy (KdrV A434, B462ff), which deals 
with the relation of parts and whole. 
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of state, but it is formed through the state. The individuals are not separable from society, 
but they become what they are, only through society. The relation of part/whole can best 
be understood in terms of spatial representation, such as a country on a map of the world, 
which is a part of the world. But the relation of member and whole does not have such 
spatial connotations, and cannot be understood through pictorial thinking. The whole is 
like an invisible ground that constitutes individuals as individuals.132 We get clear about 
the nature of this invisible ground by going into details of the logic of essence133.  
 
 
4- Totality as Actuality 
4-1- The Necessity of Totality 
In the previous chapters, I have argued that in the logic of essence Hegel offers an 
ontology that is absolutely relational. The very idea of absolute relationality commits 
Hegel to develop a concept of totality; since the fact that all individuals are solely 
constituted through relation with each other implies that there is a closed system of 
relationality, which unites all individuals with each other. Hegel calls such a system of 
relationality a “world”, namely, “a world of reciprocal dependency” [eine Welt 
                                                        
132 Cf. Marcuse’s account: “Being always occurs in a totality. It is an occurrence in a world, not, 
however, in the sense that being moves therein as in space, as if it had its “place” there. Rather, 
this totality holds and grounds being such that any entity can constitute itself as unity only in the 
totality.” (1987:86) 
133 In his The Metaphysics of the Social World (1985), David Ruben argues that individuals are 
not “parts” of social wholes, but their “members”(Chapter 2). According to Ruben, the relation of 
“being a part of” is transitive, while the relation of “being a member of” is intransitive, and this 
means that the two sorts of relation have to be different from each other: “If a is an s-part of b, 
and if b is an s-part of c, then it follows that a is an s-part of c. The membership relation is 
intransitive, because I might be a member of a trades union, and the trades union might be a 
member of the Trades Union Congress, but it might be that no individual can be a member of 
TUC” (69).  
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gegenseitiger Abhängigkeit] (EnzL. §123), which he then explicitly identifies with a 
“totality” [Totalität] (EnzL. §132). Importantly, in accordance with the ontology of 
absolute relationality, Hegel conceives of the totality not in terms of a “thing” that 
underlies relations, but itself as a “relation”. More precisely, as we will see later in the 
category of actuality, totality is indeed a “self-relation”. (Hegel emphasizes that “this 
infinite mediation is at once a unity of relation-to-itself” (EnzL. §132))134.  
 From an architectonic point of view, Hegel in the first part of the logic of essence 
(“essence as reflection in itself”) argues for a conception of reality that is solely 
constituted through relation. He shows that the most fundamental form of relation is the 
asymmetrical relation of “opposition” that obtains between what he calls the “positive” 
and the “negative”. While the positive and the negative are interrelated, their definition is 
distinct from each other. Whereas the positive has a privileged status, which 
subordinately relates to the negative to secure its position, the negative is fundamentally 
de-centered, and gets defined through its relation to the positive. (See Chapter Two for a 
detailed discussion.) Having developed the ontology of the absolute relationality through 
the relation of opposition in the first part of the logic of essence, Hegel sets his aim in the 
second part – “appearance” [Erscheinung] – and the third part – “actuality” 
[Wirklichkeit] – to dialectically develop the concept of totality. Importantly, within the 
framework of essence, the relation of opposition never gets annulled, and the 
development of concept of totality is at the same time the development of the relation of 
opposition. In this section, I first discuss Hegel’s conception of totality qua essence and 
                                                        
134 Cf. Marcuse’s account: “The process of essence has already been defined as a relation taking 
place within each individual entity. Now, as an ontological characteristic, relation leads beyond 
individual beings and is ascribed to the totality as a maintaining and grounding occurrence; for 
totality is only a ‘relation-to-self’” (1987:86) 
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qua appearance (4-2) and then discuss totality qua actuality (4-3). This section lays the 
groundwork for Hegel to develop his ultimate conception of totality in essence in the 
category of “substance”, which I discuss in the next section.  
 Before delving into details of Hegel’s logic, I would like to briefly mention the 
necessity of totality for securing the relation of power obtained through the relation of 
opposition. It is obvious that the relation of power between two individuals, say between 
a capitalist and a worker is by and through itself unsustainable. If the asymmetrical 
interdependence of a capitalist and a worker was all there is to their relation, it is 
plausible that the worker could easily change his situation (say, through exiting the said 
relation). The reason that he cannot do so is that such a relation of opposition is grounded 
in an extensive set of economic, social, legal and political institutions that stabilize it. 
From a Hegelian point of view, the interrelation of such institutions constitutes a totality, 
a “system of ethical world” [System der sittlichen Welt] (GPR §270) that in in its very 
totality exerts power over all individuals. This exactly corresponds to Hegel’s conception 
of “substance” in the logic, which he identifies with “absolute power”, as we will see in 
detail later.135 
 
4-2- The Logical Genesis of Actuality: Essence and Appearance 
The dialectic of appearance in the second part of the logic of essence gets articulated in 
different forms: in terms of the relation of “essence” and “appearance” or “existence” 
                                                        
135 Even if we accept that the foundation of the modern world is the symmetrical relation of 
intersubjectivity, as the philosophers of recognition do, one still needs to give an account of the 
“totality” which constitutes such relations. Thus, the logical primacy will always be on 
“substance”, although the philosophers of recognition might want to repress it in their theories.  
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[Existenz], “thing and its properties” [Das Ding und seine Eigenschaften], “the 
phenomenal world and the in-itself world” [Die erscheinende und die an sich seiende 
Welt], “force and its expression” [die Kraft und ihre Äußerung], and finally “the inner 
and the outer” [das Innere und das Äußere]136. We should note that all of these relations 
for Hegel are instances of the relation of opposition. In each case, (1) the two relata are 
constitutively interdependent (there cannot be any essence without appearance, and vice 
versa), such that the negation of each immediately results in the other;  (2) yet at the same 
time the relation is asymmetrical (it is essence that appears, not vice versa. It is force that 
gets externalized, not vice versa). Despite the similarity, however, the above relations are 
distinct from the relation of opposition in the first part of essence. Whereas in the relation 
of opposition, the two relata are individuals (the positive and the negative), in the 
dialectic of appearance the two relata are both totalities.  That is, each of the relata 
mentioned above (essence and appearance, inner and outer, thing and the properties) has 
to be understood in terms of a totality relating to the other relatum as another totality. 
Concerning the relation of “essence” and “appearance”, Hegel writes that the two relata 
are “two worlds, two totalities of the content, one of which is determined as reflected into 
itself, the other as reflected into an other” (WdL II:186, SL 529). He explicates this 
relation in the following way:  
Thus the world of appearance and the essential world are each in themselves the 
totality of self-identical reflection and reflection-into-an-other, or of being-in-and-
for-self and appearance. Both are self-subsistent wholes of existence [Existenz]: 
                                                        
136 Technically the relation of whole and parts (discussed above) belongs to the list. I have not 
included it here, as Hegel introduces the relation of whole and parts only to criticize it. This is of 
course a pattern that Hegel frequently uses in all his works. Namely, he takes up an element of the 
previous stage of dialectic, translates it into to the new stage, and shows its insufficiencies in its 
new format.  
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the one is supposed to be only reflected existence, the other immediate existence; 
but each continues itself in its other and is therefore in its own self the identity of 
these two moments. What is present, therefore, is this totality which repels itself 
from itself into two totalities, one the reflected, the other the immediate totality. 
Both, in the first instance, are self-subsistents, but they are self-subsistent only as 
totalities, and they are this in so far as each essentially contains within it the 
moment of the other. (WdL II:162, SL 510) 
The novelty of Hegel’s conception of essence is clear. As I have argued in Chapter One, 
Hegel denies the distinction between the “essential” and “unessential” properties (in his 
discussion of “the Essential” and “the Unessential” in the beginning of the logic of 
essence). He argues that if we accept such an Aristotelian distinction between essential 
and non-essential properties, or a Lockean one between primary and secondary qualities, 
we end up in an indeterminate situation; since we cannot determinately decide which 
properties are essential, which ones are unessential; which ones are primary, which ones 
are secondary.  That is to say, such conception of the essential in exclusion of the 
inessential inevitably leads to a conceptual block, a conceptual block that indicates that 
the question – what is essential, what is not essential? – is a wrong question to ask. 
Rather, Hegel now suggests that essence must be conceived as a totality, which in its very 
totality, appears into the totality of appearance. (Or similarly, the “thing” must be 
conceived as a totality, which shows itself into the totality of “properties” of the thing; 
and the same for “force” and “expression”; and the “inner” and the “outer”).  
 This talk of essence and appearance might lead to misunderstanding, and it is 
important to get Hegel right on this point. According to Hegel, it is not the case that 
essence is a hidden kernel, as if located behind the appearance, but it is that which 
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appears in the appearance, and has therefore no existence without appearance.  Consider 
these two passages:  
The essence must appear….The essence is thus not behind or beyond the 
appearance; instead by virtue of the fact that it is the essence that exists, existence 
is appearance. (EnzL §131)  
 
The outer is thus, in the first place, the same content as the inner is. What is 
internal is also present externally and vice versa. The appearance shows nothing 
that is not in the essence, and there is nothing in the essence that is not manifested. 
(EnzL. §139) 
A similar mistake has also to be avoided. The fact that there is nothing in essence that 
does not appear does not mean that what there is is only phenomenon, and that essence is 
reducible to its appearance.137 That is, Hegel in expounding the dialectic of essence and 
appearance denies two equally one-sided positions: (a) a kind of “emanistic idealism”138 
according to which essence is a separate and hidden kernel that gets emanated in the 
appearance. (b) a kind of pure phenomenalism which denies the existence of any essence 
or any interiority. Thus, according to Hegel, if we want to understand a phenomenon (say, 
mass unemployment in capitalism) in an adequate way, we have to “bifurcate” it and 
understand it one time, in terms of an appearance of an essence (that a significant 
number of people do not have job, with all material, psychological and social ailments 
that come with it), and another time, in terms of an appearance of an essence (the inner 
                                                        
137 In a footnote in the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel sympathetically quotes Goethe: “For sixty 
years I hear repeated / What I curse, be it in secret /Nature has no kernel no shell /Here comes 
everything all at once.” (EnzL. §140) 
138  The term “emanistic idealism” is from Emil Lask who wrongly attributes it to Hegel. See 
Lask (2002 (1902): 44ff) 
 179 
logic of capital which produces an “industrial reserve army”, or deregulation of labor 
markets by the state, etc.) 
 Hegel uses the term  “translation” [Übersetzen] to describe the relation of essence 
to appearance. (Essence translates itself into appearance.139) The talk of “translation”, as 
Vittorio Hösle has suggested in another context implies (1) that the totality of essence is 
in another language as the totality of appearance, meaning that the two totalities, though 
related, are ultimately distinct from each other; (2) that there should be an underlying 
unity between the two totalities, otherwise the act of translation from one language to the 
other one cannot transpire; (3) that there remains always a mismatch between the two 
languages; that is, there is always the possibility of mistakes or inadequate rendering in 
translation140.  
These are all important points that capture the specificity of the dialectic of 
appearance and also point us towards the conception of “actuality”. The dialectic of 
appearance, as it stands, remains under-determinate, since we do not yet have the 
conceptual resources to adequately grasp the unity between the two interdependent 
                                                        
139 Textually, he uses the term to describe the relation between “force” and “expression”, yet the 
point holds for all instances of the dialectic of essence and appearance: “The movement of force 
is not so much a passing-over [übergehen] as a movement in which it translates itself [sich selbst 
übersetzt] and in this alteration posited by itself remains what it is.” (WdL II:173, SL 519); and: 
“The reflected unity [of force and expression] is essentially a becoming-other as translation of 
itself [i.e. of force] into externality”  (WdL II: 179, SL 524)  
140 Hösle talks about translation in another context, namely, the relation between logic and 
Realphilosophie: “Der Terminus…Übersetzung deutet...doch dreilei an: erstens daß zu 
Vorstellung und Begriff gleichsam zwei verschiedene Sprache gehören; zweitens daß daher eine 
Vermittlung zwischen ihnen erforderlich ist; drittens daß Übersetzungsfehler passieren kann. Die 
Vermittlung zwischen Vorstellung und Begriff, wie sie die Realphilosophie leisten muß, geht in 
zwei Richtungen, einerseits muß der Philosoph zunächst einmal aus der Sphäre der Vorstellung in 
diejenige des Begriffs vordringen, andererseits , muß er aber dann, in der Realphilosophie, seine 
Begriffe wieder in Vorstellung übersetzen, was ein zweiter Schritt ist, der nicht notwendig mit der 
klaren Erfassung begrifflicher Strukturen schon geleistet ist.”  (1987: 84) 
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totalities that ultimately remain distinct from each other. “The [essential] relation”, Hegel 
writes, “is still incomplete union of reflection-into-otherness and reflection-into-itself; the 
complete interpenetration [Durchdringung] of both is actuality” (WdL II 125, SL 480).141 
Moreover, the fact of constitutive discrepancy and mismatch of the totality of appearance 
with the totality of essence cannot be conceptualized within the framework of this 
relation. For this, we need the modal categories – especially necessity and contingency –
that I will discuss in detail in Chapter Five. 
 
4-3- Totality as Actuality 
The separation of the in itself and the for itself, of substance and subject, is 
abstract mysticism. (Marx, MEW 1:265, MECW 3:62) 
  
“Actuality” is the third and the final part of the logic of essence, and as such it is the 
fundamental category of the objective logic. Up to now, I have shown that, for Hegel, the 
dyadic relation between the positive and the negative has to occur in a totality, and that in 
the first step, this totality is bifurcated into two totalities of essence and appearance. It is 
now one single step to actuality, since,  
The actual is the positedness of that unity [of the mediatedness of essence and 
immediacy of appearance], the relationship that has become identical with itself. 
It is thus exempted from the passing over and its externality is its energy; in that 
                                                        
141 Also the following passage: “This is the concept of the [essential] relation. But at first the 
identity it contains is not yet complete; the totality which each related side is within itself is at 
first an inner; the side of the relation is in the first instance posited in one of the determinations of 
the negative unity; the self-subsistence belonging to each of the two sides is that which 
constitutes the form of the relation. Its identity is therefore only a relation, its self-subsistence 
falling outside it, namely in the sides; the reflected unity of this identity and the self-subsistent 
Existences, namely, substance, is not yet before us.” (WdL II:165, SL 513)  
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externality, it is reflected in itself; its existence is only the manifestation of itself, 
not of an other. (EnzL. §142) 
Whereas in the dialectic of essence and appearance, essence appears in appearance 
(which is distinct from essence), actuality is manifestation of itself. That is, the 
dichotomy or chorismos of two totalities has become internalized in one totality that now 
shows itself. Thus, actuality for Hegel is a relation in which the determining and the 
determined are one and the same, and for this precise reason, it is a “self-relation”. 
Actuality, therefore, is the first appearance of the concept of self, though not in its fully 
developed selfhood or subjectivity of the Concept.142 The actual, Hegel writes, “manifests 
itself; that is, in its externality it is itself and is itself in that alone, namely only as a self-
distinguishing and self-determining movement” (WdL II:201, SL 542, my emphases).  
 Recall that for Adorno society qua totality “cannot be ostensively shown”, 
although it shows itself in all social phenomena. Adorno’s undeveloped insight can find 
its adequate philosophical articulation here in Hegel’s logic. Actuality qua one totality 
does not have any other.   It is not, therefore, relative. (It is for this reason that Hegel 
talks about “the absolute” in the chapter of actuality; since the absolute by definition is 
that which does not have any other). Showing something or referring to something 
necessarily presupposes differentiation from other things, and because there is no other 
for actuality, actuality cannot be shown from a standpoint outside it. Rather, actuality 
shows itself; it is immediately and directly manifestation143. According to Hegel, the 
                                                        
142 Cf. Thomas Sören Hoffmann’s account: (1) “Die Wirklichkeit ist das zusammengegangene 
Verhältnis von Bestimmendem und Bestimmtwerdendem, oder die Wirklichkeit ist nunmehr ein 
Selbstverhältnis.” (2012:350), (2) “Die Wirklichkeit ist [...] der erste wenn auch im negative 
Ansich verharrende Begriff des Selbsts, den die Hegelsche Logik enthält. (1991:280) 
143 Cf. Hoffman’s account: “Das Absolute ist, ganz banal genommen, das jenseits aller Relationen 
stehende, das, auf das deshalb nicht „referiert“ werden kann. Man kann auf das Absolute oder auf 
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“demonstration” of the absolute or actuality, “can be neither a determining nor an 
external reflection from which determinations of the absolute would result; on the 
contrary, it is the exposition, and in fact the absolute’s own exposition, and only a 
displaying of what it is.” (WdL II:187, SL 531) [sondern es ist die Auslegung, und zwar 
die eigene Auslegung des Absoluten und nur ein Zeigen dessen, was es ist.]144  
 According to Adorno, Hegel’s philosophy is aimed at overcoming what Adorno 
calls “philosophy of perspective” [Standpunktphilosophie] (GS 5:252). This is a term that 
Adorno coins to designate any kind of philosophy, which looks at the objects from an 
external point of view, instead of letting the objects speak for themselves. Within the 
framework of the logic, actuality is precisely the place that such external perspective is 
fully overcome. The relation of essence and appearance or the inner and outer in an 
object still presupposes an external standpoint to the object, from which such distinction 
is being made145. In contrast, actuality emphatically is “self-subsistent”. [Die 
                                                                                                                                                                     
die Wirklichkeit nicht eigentlich zeigen, weil das Verhältnis des Zeigens schon ein Unterscheiden 
enthält. Das Absolute ist kein gezeigtes, sondern ein Sich-Zeigendes…Die Wirklichkeit im 
strikten Sinne des Wortes ist unmittelbar gerade nicht das, worauf wir zeigen, sondern das, was 
sich uns zeigt. In dieser Hinsicht ist das Absolute oder das Wirkliche nicht verschlossen, nicht nur 
per negationem ansprechbar, es ist vielmehr unmittelbar Manifestation.” (2012:352) 
144 Cf. Hoffmann’s account: “Ist die Wirklichkeit aber so nicht als ein „es gibt“, nicht im Sinne 
des Verstandeskonstrukts der „Gegebenheit“, sondern als ein ursprüngliches Sich-Geben und 
Sich-in-anderes-als-in-sich-Geben verstanden, dann ist auch die positive Einheit (das „Geben“) in 
der Tat schon als Tätigkeit, mithin als negierend oder als negativ verstanden (als „Sich-Geben“). 
(1991:313). Also, Cf. Birgit Sandkaulen’s account: “Über” das Absolute zu sprechen, heißt so, in 
eine Reflexion einzutreten, die in der Form einer Reflexion der Reflexion darauf reflektiert, daß es 
ein Objekt, über das man sprechen könnte, hier nicht mehr gibt. Eben dies nennt Hegel die 
“Auslegung des Absoluten”, aus deren Vollzug absehbar die Form einer internen Selbstreflexion 
des Absoluten werden muß.” (2008: 254) 
145 Cf. with Charles Taylor’s account: “The distinction between inner and outer refers to an 
observer which is still unintegrated in the system….In contrast, Hegel’s is a system in which the 
observer is integrated, and in which ultimately… the duality between observer and reality is 
overcome.” (1977:282) 
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Wirklichkeit ist das selbständige Verhältnis WW4:20]. According to Hegel, actuality is 
the “light” immanent in the object, which shines through it (WdL II:218, SL 554). Thus, 
“to grasp something in its actuality”, in the words of Hoffmann, “is to see it in the light of 
its self-relation instead of throwing light on it from outside.”146 
 In actuality, the relation of inner and outer is superseded, and there is no occult 
interiority to actuality – if the interiority cannot be externalized, it means that the 
interiority is not actual. Hegel writes,  “the absolute is manifestation not of an inner, nor 
over against an other, but it is only as the absolute manifestation of itself for itself. As 
such it is actuality.” (WdL II:194-5, SL 536). Looking at Hegel’s discussion of the 
relation of Aristotle and Plato is helpful to understand this issue.  According to Hegel,  
Aristotle’s polemic against Plato consists then, more precisely, in the fact that the 
Platonic idea is designated as mere dunamis [capacity, potentiality] and that 
Aristotle makes valid the notion, to the contrary, that the idea, recognized by both 
of them likewise as what is alone true, is to be considered essentially as energeia, 
i.e. as the inner that is outright [schlechthin] out there and thus as the unity of 
inner and outer or as the actuality in the emphatic sense of the word discussed 
here [i.e. in Hegel’s logic]. (EnzL. §142Z)  
I do not want to enter to the discussion whether Hegel’s construal of the relation of 
Aristotle and Plato is correct or not. What is important for my discussion is that Hegel 
understands Plato’s Idea as potentiality that may or may not actualize – a potentiality 
which is separate and separable from actuality. Hegel on this point, strongly sides with 
Aristotle who regards actuality as energeia, which is not an interior, but out there 
                                                        
146 “Sie [Wirklichkeit] ist zuerst das Licht, in dem alles, was ist und erscheint, offenbar ist. Etwas 
nach seiner Wirklichkeit auffassen heißt, es in dem Licht seines Selbstverhältnisses zu sehen und 
es nicht von außen zu beleuchten.” (Hoffmann 2012: 353)  
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working in the phenomenon.147 For Aristotle, energeia is directly related to activity 
(ergon)  – energeia means being-at-work – and for Hegel, Wirklichkeit is directly related 
to wirken (being effective, being-at-work): “something manifests its actuality through 
that which it produces” [seine Wirklichkeit gibt etwas kund durch das, was es 
hervorbringt] (WdL II:208, SL 547). Hegel’s actuality is “activity” [Tätigkeit], “self-
moving of form” [Sichbewegen der Form], and “activation of the heart of the matter” 
[Betätigung der Sache] (EnzL. §147). Indeed, in contrast to Spinoza’s substance, Hegel 
thinks actuality is not an “inert identity” [unbewegte Identität] (WdL II:197); it is “not 
that which merely is equal to itself, but is that which posits itself as equal to itself”  [nicht 
das sich Gleichseiende, sondern das sich selbst Gleichsetzende] (WdL II:194, SL 535). 
 Although Hegel does not explicitly conceptualize actuality in terms of power – he 
does so in the highest form of actuality, in substance – one can say, actuality is indeed 
already power. For Hegel, actuality is not to be equated to what is simply present. Such 
mere facticity belongs to the realm of the logic of being, where totality is described as a 
simple aggregate of individuals. Rather, actuality, being the central category of essence, 
is defined as what constitutes the essence of totality. Importantly, Hegel relates his 
conception of actuality to Spinoza’s concept of causa sui, as something which has the 
power to cause itself, i.e. brings its essence into existence. “Actuality is the unity of 
                                                        
147 Cf. Marcuse’s account: “We meet here [i.e. in actuality] the deepest ground of Hegelian 
ontology….In its highest and most proper sense, being is actual being-there, being as manifest. 
To be is to show, to manifest and to reveal oneself. All that is inner, that has not yet emerged and 
become external, is of an inferior value. All being that possesses an inner is not yet “absolute” 
being” [Sein im höchsten, eigentlichsten Sinne ist wirklich da sein, herausgetelltsein: Sein ist 
Sich-zeigen, Sich-manifestieren, Sich-offenbaren. Alles Innerliche, noch nicht Herausgestellte, 
noch nicht Äußerlich-gewordene ist eine Minderwertigkeit. Alles Sein, das noch ein Innerliches 
hat, ist noch nicht das „absolute“ Sein] (1987:91, German 1975:101) 
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essence and existence”, Hegel emphasizes (WdL II:86, SL: 529, also EnzL §279)148. 
However, unlike Spinoza’s substance, which is a totality that categorically does not allow 
any otherness, Hegel’s actuality has its model in organism. An organism is dependent on 
the external environment, but such dependency does not function as a sheer constraint on 
the organism. Rather, the organism is able to produce and reproduce itself through the 
interaction with the environment in which it lives.  Like an organism, which is in a 
dynamic relationship with the external environment, yet has the power to maintain its 
identity through its changing states, Hegel’s actuality, Marcuse explains,  
 can transform itself and yet remain the same. It can be destroyed, but it is the one 
destroyed, and this destruction also “belongs” to it in a certain sense. Even when 
it is completely dependent on it, the actual brings about its being-there. The actual 
is powerful over its being-there in an active way. [Das Wirkliche ist seines 
Daseins in aktiver Weise mächtig.] It does not allow no matter what to happen to 
it, but out of itself resists certain kinds of occurrences, while offering itself to 
others. (Marcuse 1987:93, German 1975:104) 
 
5- Totality as Substance 
We have learned that totality for Hegel is “actuality” which is the generative and 
regenerative process of giving organization to totality. The most determinate form of 
actuality for Hegel is substance. In the dialectical development from actuality to 
substance, Hegel includes extensive discussion of modal categories. The aim of this 
discussion is to show that substance is absolutely necessary, and that individuals are 
                                                        
148 Although Hegel criticizes Spinoza’s substance as being “inert” and “petrified” – as I will 
discuss in detail later – he has a great respect for Spinoza’s concept of causa sui. According to 
Hegel, causa sui is a “totally speculative concept”, and “hätte Spinoza näher entwickelt, was in 
der causa sui liegt, so wäre seine Substanz nicht das Starre.” (WW 20:168) 
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contingent. I will discuss Hegel’s conception of modal categories in detail in Chapter 
Five. In this section, my aim is to elaborate on Hegel’s conception of substance. I begin 
with Hegel’s critique of Spinoza’s substance (5-1), and continue to explicate Hegel’s own 
conception of substance (5-2), and conclude with clarifying what it means that for Hegel 
substance is absolute power (5-3). 
 
5-1- Hegel’s Critique of Spinoza’s Substance 
Hegel’s relation to Spinoza in the logic is complex, and explaining it needs another 
book149. I need to be brief and selective. Hegel is a friendly critic of Spinoza. He both 
highly praises Spinoza and criticizes him for his shortcomings. The “proper refutation” 
[eigentliche Widerlegung] of Spinoza occurs in the beginning of the logic of Concept, 
namely, in the transition from essence to Concept. In the logic of essence, Hegel is very 
close to Spinoza. As I have explained, Hegel’s definition of actuality clearly echoes 
Spinoza’s definition of causa sui.  Moreover, the highest form of actuality for Hegel is 
substance, which he discusses with explicit references to Spinoza150 151(EnzL. §151Z) 152. 
                                                        
149 For good discussions about the relation of Hegel’s logic to Spinoza’s metaphysics, See (1) 
Klaus Düsing (1983:160ff) (2) Birgit Sandkaulen (2007) (3) Eugene J. Fleischmann, (1964). For 
a critical discussion of Hegel’s appropriation of Spinoza and defending Spinoza against Hegel 
See (4) Pierre Macherey (2011). 
150 In the Lectures on the History Philosophy, Hegel is even more explicit about the importance of 
Spinoza’s substance: “It is therefore worthy of note that thought must begin by placing itself at 
the standpoint of Spinozism; to be a follower of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all 
philosophy…When man begins to philosophize, the soul must commence by bathing in this ether 
of one substance; in which all that man has held as true has disappeared.” (WW 20:165, LHP 
III:257)  
151 “We thus come to the vision of Spinoza, which is really what Hegel builds on here to write the 
finale of essence” (Taylor 1975:287) 
152 Precisely speaking, in the logic of essence “substance” develops into the “relation of 
causality”, which ultimately culminates into “reciprocal action” [Wechselwirkung]. The latter is 
 187 
Hegel’s invocation of Spinoza, however, should not blind us to the difference of Hegel’s 
conception of substance from Spinoza’s. Hegel’s logic is not an academic treatise on the 
history of metaphysics. Rather, Hegel appropriates Spinoza’s substance to explicate his 
own philosophy. (What Hegel does, to use a concept from Bertolt Brecht, is an 
“Umfunktionierung” of Spinoza’s substance; that is, a restructuration so that it would 
perform a different function). Hegel’s different conception of substance also is related to 
his critique of Spinoza’s concept of mode and individuality, and I begin with this 
criticism.  
 According to Hegel, Spinoza rightfully and admirably begins with the being of 
substance, but lacking proper dialectics, “such being contains no transition from itself to 
… anything individual”. That is, for Spinoza, “absolute substance is not understood as the 
point of departure for differences, particularization, individuation [Unterschiede, 
Vereinzelung, Individuation] (WW 4:434, Jacobi-Review: 8, Hegel’s emphases). This 
means that for Spinoza, according to Hegel, “everything is merely submerged and 
perishes in a substance which remain motionless within itself and out of which nothing 
ever resurfaces.” [Es geht daher in der Substanz alles nur unter, sie ist unbewegt in sich, 
und kehrt aus ihr nichts zurück] (ibid).  That in Spinoza individuality or mode is not 
properly conceptualized is a core of Hegel’s criticism of Spinoza, and makes his famous 
“acosmism”-charge  [“Akosmismus”-Vorwurf] against Spinoza (EnzL. §151Z, WW 
20:164,177,191). Since my concern here is Hegel, not Spinoza, I do not want to enter to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
clearly a Fichtean/Kantian category. However, the development of the category of “reciprocal 
action” is precisely that which effectuates the transition from essence to Concept, and for this 
reason, it does not properly belong to essence. “Reciprocal action”, Hegel emphasizes, “stands on 
the threshold of the Concept [an der Schwelle des Begriffs]” (EnzL. §155Z). 
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the discussion whether this charge is correct or not.153 I would like only to briefly 
mention that this charge does not mean that for Hegel Spinoza’s modes do not exist. 
Rather, it means that in Spinoza’s philosophy “the principle of difference or finitude does 
not attain the legitimacy befitting it” [das Prinzip der Differenz oder der Endlichkeit nicht 
zu seinem Rechte gelangt] (EnzL. §151Z). According to Hegel, although the modes or the 
individuals for Spinoza do exist, they are merely “transient” [vorübergehend] and 
“vanishing” [verschwindend] (EnzL. §151Z). Against substance, they are merely 
“atrophied” or “vestigial” [verkümmert] beings (WW 20:170). That is, they are a kind of 
being that are “eaten up” and “consumed” [aufgezehrrt] by substance (WW 20:189).154  
 All this language of being “eaten up”, “submerged”, “transient”, etc. is very 
similar to Hegel’s own description of individuality (and the contingency of the 
individuals) in the logic of essence. Indeed, a main driving force of the transition from 
essence to the Concept is the lack of a rich conception of individuality in essence. 
However, although in Hegel’s substance individuals are contingent and transitory, their 
manner of transitoriness is different from that of modes in Spinoza’s substance. That is, 
although in the logic of essence there is only a weak conception of individuality (which 
makes it similar to Spinoza), that individuality is different from Spinoza. According to 
Hegel, insofar as the absolute is Spinoza’s mode, 
it is the self-externality of the absolute, the loss of itself in the mutability and 
contingency of being, its having passed over into its opposite without the return 
into itself; the manifoldness of form and content determinations lacking the 
character of totality. [so ist er das Außersichsein des Absoluten, der Verlust seiner 
                                                        
153 Cf. Yitzhak Melamed (2010) for a helpful discussion. 
154 Hegel even makes a pun that in the same way that in Spinoza’s philosophy, the individuals 
“disappear” [verschwinden] and are “consumed up”, Spinoza himself died of “consumption” 
[Schwindsucht]. (WW 20:185).  
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in die Veränderlichkeit und Zufälligkeit des Seins, sein Übergegangensein ins 
Entgegengesetzte ohne Rückkehr in sich; die totalitätslose Mannigfaltigkeit der 
Form und Inhaltsbestimmungen.] (WdL II 193, SL 535, Hegel’s emphasis) 
According to Hegel, for Spinoza the movement from substance to modes is one of 
“condescendence” [“herabsteigen”, or “herunetersteigen”] (WW 20:170, 185). Once 
substance is condescended to the multiplicity of modes, there is “no return” to the 
substance. Precisely for this reason, this multiplicity remains without unity, hence,  
“totality-less”. Such movement of “condescendence” is conceptually analogous to the 
“oriental conception of emanation”[Emanation], in which 
the absolute is the light which illumines itself. Only it not only illumines itself but 
also emanates [strömt auch aus]. Its emanations are distancing [Entfernungen] 
from its undimmed clarity; the successive productions are less perfect than the 
preceding ones from which they arise. The process of emanation is taken only as a 
happening, the becoming only as a progressive loss. Thus being increasingly 
obscures itself and night, the negative, is the final term of the series, which does 
not first return into the primal light. (WdL II:198, SL 538-9, underline mine) 
That this movement remains “without return” means that substance constitutes modes, 
but it is not constituted by modes. Mode, that is, “is completely reduced to a mere being-
posited [bloßen Gesetztsein]”  (WdL II:195 SL536). We can understand this claim 
through paying attention to Spinoza’s definitions in the beginning of the book. (And 
Hegel’s critique of Spinoza is for the most part based on his reading of the definitions in 
the first page of the Ethics, neglecting the rest of the book.) According to Spinoza, 
substance is “that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; that is, that which 
does not need the concept of another thing, from which concept it must be formed” 
(E1d3). And mode is “that which is in something else, through which it is also conceived” 
(E1d5).  That is, for Spinoza substance is solely defined in terms of internal determination. 
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(Substance is Insichsein.) And mode is solely defined in terms of external determination. 
(Mode is “in etwas Anderes” (WW 20:169)). Now, according to Hegel, it is unclear how 
modes can be internal to substance (since every determination is internal to substance), 
yet at the same time external to substance (since the definition of mode is that of 
exteriority). That is, once there is a gulf between completely internal determination of 
substance, and completely external determination of mode, it is not clear how this gulf 
can be overcome. For this reason, the relation of substance and mode, according to Hegel, 
remains under-determinate in Spinoza, and an example of “external reflection” (WdL 
II:195, SL  537).  
 This argument, I believe, should not be read as necessarily effective against 
Spinoza, but rather as a point through which Hegel can elaborate on his own dialectical 
method. Hegel thinks that the correct way to understand substance and mode is to 
understand them, contrary to Spinoza, as constituting a reflection-logical relationship.  
This means that substance is not only internally determined, but also it is externally 
determined (by modes). Similarly, modes are not only externally determined (by 
substance), but also they are internally determined. This implies that modes must have 
the quality of “reflection-into-self” [Reflexion-in-sich]. through which they reflect the 
totality of substance into themselves. This is a principle that is, of course, absent in 
Spinoza’s philosophy, but can be complemented by a principle of another philosopher of 
the same historical period, the monad of Leibniz. (“The lack of reflection-into-self, from 
which both the Spinozistic exposition of the absolute and the emanation theory suffer is 
complemented in the notion of Leibnizian monad” WdL II:198, SL 539). Through the 
quality of reflection-into-self, the modes become self-relational, therewith, individuals; 
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hence, helping Hegel to get out of the impasse of Spinozist acosmism.155   
 Because Spinoza defines substance in terms of pure internal determination, 
substance remains for him, according to Hegel, an “abstract determination” (WW 20:166) 
and a  “motionless identity” [unbewegte Identität] (WdL II:197, SL 538). If substance 
stops at this stage, Hegel asserts, no “development”, no “activity”, no “Spirituality” 
would result. For this reason, Spinoza’s philosophy is that of “petrified” and “fixed” 
[starr] substantiality (WW 20:166). In contrast to Spinoza’s definition of substance, Hegel 
offers his own conception of substance, which is a movement, from itself to modes, and 
simultaneously, from modes to itself. (Substance is therefore “die zurückkehrende und 
aus sich selbst anfangende Bewegung” WdL II:195). As Hegel’s substance is this 
movement itself – and not a movement upon an unmoved thing – substance is “not that 
which is equal with itself, but that which generates itself as equal” (WdL II:194, SL 535). 
For Hegel, substance is not the “negation” of modes. It is instead the “negation of 
negation”, that is, the negation of modes that are already constituted by substance (WW 
20:164). This obviously makes substance contradictory: although substance is necessarily 
constituted by modes, nevertheless, it retains its independence against modes. 
 That Hegel conceptualizes substance in terms of movement shows how he is 
distant from the traditional conception of substance. The concept of substance was 
introduced in western metaphysics to explain the subsistence of a self-same entity 
underneath change. With this conception of substance, a duality or chorismos was fixed 
                                                        
155  “While Spinoza asserted the universality, the oneness of substance merely…Leibniz, by 
means of his fundamental principle of individuality, brings out the essentiality of the opposite 
aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy, being for self [Fürsichsein], the monad, but the monad regarded 
not as absolute notion, not yet as the I. The opposed principles, which were forced asunder, find 
their completion in each other, since Leibniz’s principle of individuation completed Spinoza’s 
system as far as outward aspect goes.” (WW 20:233, LHP III:325) 
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between the substance, which was posited as inert, and change, which was superimposed 
upon substance. Hegel, in overcoming the duality of change and self-sameness, integrates 
change within the definition of substance. Substance is that which generates and 
regenerates itself as identical with itself through the movement of change. As we will see 
later in more detail, this movement is the absolute power, which, through positing 
individuals and superseding them in the movement, is able to maintain its dynamical self-
sameness156.  
 It is wrong to think that Hegel’s refutation of Spinoza in the logic is purely 
metaphysical. (As recent scholarship has demonstrated, Hegel’s arguments against 
Spinoza, from purely metaphysical point of view, are at times not convincing) 157. Rather, 
Hegel’s logic, as I have endeavored to show throughout the dissertation, is a historically 
specific ontology, which lays bare the fundamental structure of (social) reality in the 
modern world. According to Hegel, Spinoza’s philosophy is an ontology fitting the pre-
modern “oriental” world, where individuals are only regarded as “merely transitory” 
(EnzL. §151Z, my emphasis), without any constitutive role in the formation of the 
structure of the totality of society. In the modern world, where “the western principle of 
individuality” (EnzL. §151Z) has come to fruition, one needs another account of 
substance (i.e. Hegel’s own) to capture this totality. In his discussion of Indian religion in 
particular and oriental religions in general, Hegel tells his students that  
to characterize the East briefly, the Spirit does arise there, but the situation is that 
                                                        
156 Cf. Georg Lukács’ account: “Die neueren Einsichten über das Sein haben die statische, 
unveränderliche Konzeption der Substanz zerstört; daraus folgt jedoch keineswegs die 
Notwendigkeit ihres Leugnen innerhalb der Ontologie, sondern bloß die Erkenntnis ihres 
wesentlich dynamischen Charakters. Substanz ist, was sich im ewigen Wandel der Dinge, sich 
selbst wandelnd, in ihrer Kontinuität zu bewahren imstande ist.” (GLW 14:83)  
157 See especially, Macherey (ibid), Melamed (ibid), and Sandkaulen (ibid)  
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the subject, the individuality, is not a person but has the character of being 
submerged [untergehend] in the objective. There the relation of substantiality is 
the dominating. [Das substantielle Verhältnis ist da das Herrschende]...The 
situation of the individual, the particular, is that of being only something negative 
in face of the substance. The highest achievement of such an individual is eternal 
blessedness which is only absorption in this substance, an extinction of 
consciousness, and so the annihilation of the subject and therefore of the 
difference between substance and subject. The highest state, therefore, is 
unconsciousness. In so far as individuals have not attained this blessedness but 
still exist on the earthly level, they are excluded from this unity of substance and 
individual; their situation and character is one without spirit and without 
substance, and, in relation to political freedom, they have no rights. [Sie sind 
Substanzlose und in Beziehung auf politischen Freiheit Rechtlose.] In this event 
their will is not a substantial will but one determined by caprice and natural 
contingency (e.g. by caste)—a being without inner consciousness.158 
This is an interesting passage in which Hegel blends ontology, religion and politics 
together. I put religion aside. According to Hegel, in the pre-modern world, the individual 
does not have any right, and for that reason, he is directly subsumed by the totality159. 
The mode of domination, therefore, is one of immediate domination. The relation 
between the state and the individual is a one-way relationship, in which the totality of the 
state does not “return back” to the individuals. Because the individual does not have any 
self-subsistence or self-determination properly understood, his position in society is 
                                                        
158 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie.  Hrsg. 
Johannes Hoffmeister, Hamburg: F. Meiner. S.227; Introduction to the Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy, trans. T. M. Knox and A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1987, p167 
159 Cf. also the following passage: “Das christliche Princip ist, jeder einzelne als einzelner ist 
unendlicher Zweck. Bey dem orientalischen Principe verschwindet das Individuum und ist nur 
Accidenz des Monarchen oder der Priester. Es kann kein Staat bestehen ohne die Zwecke der 
Allgemeinheit; aber in unseren neueren Staaten ist gerade der Gesichtpunkt der Subjectivität 
überwiegend, für das Wohl des einzelnen wird sehr gesorgt.” (Vorlesungen über die Philosophie 
des Rechts, Nachschrift Wannenmann 1817/18, GW 26.1:  §90, S.100) 
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merely the result of “natural contingency”, not the result of his own decisions and deeds. 
We can ignore for now Hegel’s philosophical optimism, according to which in the 
modern capitalist world, the individuals are in fact self-determining. (From a logical point 
of view, this occurs in the transition from essence to the Concept. Now, we are still in the 
realm of essence.) Hegel’s own analysis of substance has shown that substance in the 
modern world has to be understood as constituted by the individuals, nevertheless, as 
having an independent status against them. The modern totality is also coercive upon 
individuals, but in contrast to the pre-modern world, the mode of coercion here is a 
mediated one. In the modern liberal capitalist society, the individuals do indeed have 
political and legal rights: they can vote, for example, or they are equal before law. They 
indeed enjoy a certain degree of (formal) freedom. As I have previously explained in 
detail, the mode of domination of totality over individuals is not despite this formal 
equality, formal freedom, and individuality, but precisely through them. The relationship 
of totality and individuals is not one of pre-modern one-way domination, but a two-way 
relationship, in which although the individuals constitute the totality, nevertheless, they 
are thoroughly coerced by the totality. Of course, there can be no talk of substantive 
freedom of self-determination of individuals here. Although the individuals might think 
that their achievement or failure is the result of their own freedom, as I will discuss in 
detail in Chapter Five, this freedom is only due to contingency. But as opposed to the pre-
modern form of contingency, which had the quality of “naturalness” (as in the Indian 




5-2- Hegel’s Conception of Substance 
I have previously argued that Hegel offers the ontology of absolute relationality in the 
logic of essence. The emergence of substance as the highest category of the logic of 
essence does not refute the ontology of absolute relationality, but it is its highest 
actualization.  According to Hegel, absolute necessity or substance is “being simply and 
solely as reflection” [Sein schlechthin als Reflexion] (WdL II:217, SL 554). That is, 
substance is not a being underlying relation; thereby excluding relation, but the relation 
itself.  “Just as the light of nature is neither something nor a thing, but its being is only its 
showing or shining”, substance is simply totality qua relation which manifests itself in all 
individuals (WdL II:218, SL 554). Whereas for Spinoza substance is a thing, for Hegel 
substance is “relation, because it is distinguishing whose moments are themselves its 
whole totality” [Sie ist Verhältnis, weil sie Unterscheiden ist, dessen Momente selbst ihre 
ganze Totalität sind.] (WdL II:217, SL 555) Substance for Hegel is “the relation of 
substantiality” [das Verhältnis der Substantialität, my emphasis], a reflective relation that 
obtains between the totality of substance and the totality of accidents.  Substance, Hegel 
emphasizes, “is the totality of the whole and encompasses accidentality within it, and 
accidentality [Akzidentalität] is the whole substance itself” (WdL II:220, SL 556). 
 According to Kant, “the determinations of a substance, which are nothing but 
particular ways in which it exists, are called accidents. They are always real, because they 
concern the existence of substance.” (KdrV B229 A186) Although Hegel is decisively 
different from Kant, in that he denies any two-world conception of reality (substance-in-
appearance vs. thing-in-itself), his conception of the relation of substance and accidents is 
similar to Kant. Substance is not separable from accidents; accidents are precisely the 
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way that substance exists in actuality. Substance, Hegel emphasizes, is “neither the 
unreflected immediate, nor an abstract being standing behind existence and appearance, 
but it is immediate actuality itself, and this as absolute reflectedness –into-self, as a 
subsisting in-and-for-itself” (WdL II:219, SL 555). Substance is not a potentiality that is 
yet to be actualized; nor an interiority that is to be externalized; but it is “appearing 
totality” [scheinende Totalität], and as such it is identical with accidentality.  
I have previously explained that the ontology of absolute relationality does not 
commit Hegel to a pure processualism of Heraclitean type denying any ontological 
identity; rather, Hegel derives identity from and through relationality. In substance, which 
is the highest ontological category and regressively provides the bedrock for all other 
determinations, identity is equated with relation; and rest is equated with movement. 
According to Hegel, “the movement of accidentality”, as the pure actuality, “is the 
actuosity [Aktuosität] of substance”, and this pure movement is equal with “the tranquil 
coming forth of itself” [ruhiges Hervorgehen ihrer selbst]. (WdL II:220, SL 556). 
Actuosity is the highest form of identity solely achieved through movement. The 
substantiality of a tree, to give an example from Marcuse, is the “effective power” 
[wirkende Macht] of the tree, which “holds together its changing states as belonging to 
the same tree, and which, as a self-moving power, allows them to happen.” The self-
sameness of the tree, that is, is achieved only through the tree continuously positing and 
superseding these states (Marcuse 1987:99).  
 In Aristotle’s conception of substance in the Categories, whereas accidents are 
dependent upon substance, substance is itself independent from accidents. (Substance is 
the object of predication, but it is not itself predicable.) (Categories: 5). For Hegel, as I 
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have been explaining so far, the relation of dependency is two-way: accidents, of course, 
are dependent upon substance, but substance – also – is dependent on, and constituted by, 
accidents. Nevertheless, although substance is constituted by accidents, it retains, 
contradictorily, its independent status, positing accidents as its own presupposition. In a 
typically dialectical formulation Hegel writes, “substance in its determining does not 
begin from accidentality as if this were already an other to start with and only now were 
posited as determinateness, but the two are one actuosity. Substance as power determines 
itself; but this determining is immediately itself the sublating of the determining, and the 
return.” (WdL II:223, SL 558)160 That substance both “posits” the accidents and “returns” 
from the accident makes Hegel’s substance contradictory, a quality which is totally 
foreign to Spinoza’s substance. According to Spinoza, substance cannot contain 
contradiction, because contradiction would lead to the self-destruction of substance. (Cf. 
E3P5: “Things are of a contrary nature, that is, they cannot be in the same subject, insofar 
as one can destroy the other”.) In contrast, for Hegel, substance is achieved through 
contradiction, or more precisely, is contradiction.161  
 
 
                                                        
160 Also: “It [i.e. substance] is the beginning from itself which first is the positing of this self from 
which the beginning is made” [das Anfangen von sich selbst ist erst das Setzen dieses Selbsts, 
von dem das Anfangen ist] (WdL II:220, SL 556).  
161 (1) “What we lack in Spinoza is thus the idea of contradiction, of the unity of opposites, which 
is the source of movement, and which affects the absolute, God himself. Spinoza’s philosophy 
lacks the contradiction of an absolute which is the source and fount of all particular, and yet 
which has particularity in it; which is over and against the particular and which nevertheless 
contains it.” (Taylor, 1977:281) (2) “It is highly unlikely that Spinoza would have much 
sympathy with Hegel’s self-negating dialectic, insofar as the latter strongly conflicts with the 
doctrine of the conatus.” (Melamed, ibid: 83)  
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5-3- Substance as “Absolute Power”  
My aim in this dissertation has been to show how essence has to be understood in terms 
of power. As I have discussed in Chapter Two, the basic form of the relation of power in 
the logic of essence is the relation of opposition, where the positive and the negative are 
constituted through the asymmetrical relation between them. In the present chapter, I 
have argued that power is implicitly present in Hegel’s conception of actuality, although 
he does not explicitly state it. My arguments get their final support in the end of the logic 
of essence, where Hegel profusely uses the concept of power to explain the structure of 
substance.  
 One can recognize two aspects of the power of substance in Hegel: (1) the power 
of substance to sustain and reproduce itself, and (2) the power of substance over 
accidents162. These two aspects are for Hegel united, as it is only through exercising its 
power over accidents that substance is able to maintain itself. To put in differently, 
accidentality is already substantiality, and the power of substance over accidents is in fact 
the power of substance over itself.163 Now, we have to carve out in some detail how 
substance is powerful over accidents. One can recognize two aspects of it: (1) The power 
of substance is constitutive of accidents. Accidents are what they are, through being 
located within the relations of power that make substance what it is. Hegel even uses the 
language of inherence to express how substance is constitutive of accidents. He writes, 
                                                        
162 It is important to emphasize that for Hegel accidents are already individuals, which participate 
in the making of substance (such as a leaf in a tree). This must be contrasted with Aristotelian 
accidents, which are properties of individuals (such as the greenness of a leaf).  
163 Hegel writes, “Substance is power, and power that is reflected into itself and not merely 
transitory [bloß übergehende], but that posits determinations and distinguishes them from itself. 
As self-relating in its determining, it is itself that which it posits as a negative or makes it into a 
positedness.” (WdL II:222, SL 558) 
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substance is “the being in all being” [das Sein in allem Sein] (WdL II:219, SL 555))164. 
(2) The power of substance over accidents is causal. We have learned previously that for 
Hegel something is actual insofar it is effective. Thus, even in actuality the reference to 
causality is present. Now, Hegel explicitly states that, “it is as cause that substance has 
actuality” (WdL II:224, SL 559). According to Hegel, substance exerts a rich array of 
causal powers over accidents. He writes,  
Substance manifests itself through actuality with its content into which it 
translates the possible, as creative [schaffende] power, and through the possibility 
to which it reduces the actual, as destructive [zerstörende] power. But the two are 
identical, the creation is destructive and the destruction is creative; for the 
negative and the positive, possibility and actuality, are absolutely united in 
substantial necessity. (WdL II:220, SL 556) 
Substance both creates and destroys the accidents. From the standpoint of totality of 
substance, any destruction of accidents is at the same time re-creation of substance, and 
any re-creation of substance is accompanied by destruction of accidents. (Think of it as a 
tree, which recreates itself through creating and destroying the individual leaves.)165 
 According to Hegel, the power of substance over accidents is not direct. 
Substance is not a “thing” that directly causes accidents to be or to cease to be. Rather, as 
substance is the process of relationality that obtains between accidents, the power of 
substance over accident is always mediated by the interaction of accidents with each 
                                                        
164 Cf. with Spinoza’s substance: “Whatever exists exists in God, and nothing can exist or be 
conceived without God” (E1p15) 
165 The rich causal power that substance exerts over accidents means that Hegel’s conception of 
substance is far from the Aristotelian one. Not everything that is considered as substance in 
Aristotle’s metaphysics can be counted as substance for Hegel. A chair for Hegel is not a 
substance, or if it is, it is only a very defective form of substance. For Hegel, only human 
societies and living organisms are adequate to the concept of substance, and are thus true 
substances. 
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other. Hegel emphasizes that substance is “as power the mediating” [als Macht das 
Vermittelnde] (WdL II:221, SL 557),  (This point has important consequences for Hegel’s 
social ontology that I will discuss in the next section.) According to Hegel,   
The accidents as such —and there is a plurality of them since plurality is one of 
the determinations of being — have no power over one another. They are the 
simply affirmative something, or the something that is for itself [das seiende oder 
für sich seiende Etwas], existing things of manifold properties, or wholes 
consisting of parts, self-subsistent parts, forces, which require solicitation from 
one another and have one another for condition. Insofar as such an accidental 
seems [scheint] to exercise power over another, it is the power of substance which 
embraces both within itself; as negativity it posits an unequal value [einen 
ungleichen Wert setzt] determining the one as a ceasing-to-be and the other with a 
different content as a coming-to-be, or the former as passing over into its 
possibility, the latter into actuality — ever sundering itself into the differences of 
form and content, and ever purging itself of this one-sidedness, yet in this very 
purging it has fallen back into determination and bifurcation. One accident, then, 
expels another only because its own subsisting is this totality of form and content 
itself in which it and its other equally perish [untergeht]. (WdL II:221, SL 556-7) 
This is an amazing passage that is articulated in a clearly dialectical way. Note that Hegel 
uses the language of illusion [Schein] to describe the power of accidents over one another. 
As we have learned in Chapter One, illusion has a specific ontological status in the logic 
of essence. It is a self-contradictory being. It is a being that at the same time is not. It 
exists, but it does not exist by its own, or for its own sake, but exists only as a moment of 
essence. Accidents do exert power over each other, yet the power of accidents over each 
other is an illusion. In fact, it is the power of substance that works through them, positing 
an “unequal value” between them, making one more powerful than the other. In order to 
understand the ontological status of power of accidents over each other, one has to accept 
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both claims at the same time: that accidents are powerful over each other, yet at the same 
time, they do not have any power, but are embraced by the power of totality of substance, 
which effectuates itself through them.   
 In order to understand how the power of substance over accidents is mediated 
with the power of accidents over each other, one has to look at the dialectical 
development of the category of “causality” for Hegel. First and foremost, one has to 
emphasize that for Hegel, the category of causality does not have any ontological or 
explanatory primacy, as it does in mechanistic sciences. (I will explain this point in more 
detail in Chapter Five.) Causality in mechanistic sciences presupposes an atomistic 
ontology, where things that have causal power over each other are conceived to be self-
subsistent independently of each other. (The paradigmatic examples are Humean: the 
billiard balls that hit each other.) In contrast, Hegel derives causality from substantiality. 
This means that substantiality has primacy over causality, and that causality is always 
embedded in the relation of substantiality which makes cause and effect what they are. 
Indeed, the first form of causality that Hegel develops out of the relation of substantiality 
– the “formal causality” [formelle Kausalität] – is nothing but the causality of substance 
over itself.166 As both cause and effect are substance regarded one time as that which 
causes, and another time, as that which is caused, Hegel concludes, “consequently, effect 
                                                        
166 “It is therefore as cause that substance first has actuality. But this actuality in which its in-
itself, its determinateness in the relation of substantiality, is now posited as determinateness, is 
effect; consequently the actuality which substance has as cause, it has only in its effect. This is the 
necessity which is cause. It is actual substance because substance as power determines itself, but 
is at the same time cause, because it explicates this determinateness or posits it as positedness; 
thus it posits its actuality as positedness or as effect.” (WdL II:244, SL 559) 
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contains nothing whatever that cause does not contain. Conversely, cause contains 
nothing which is not in its effect.” (WdL II: 224, SL 559).167  
 The formal causality of substance over itself is, however, mediated by the second 
form of causality that Hegel calls “determinate relation of causality” [bestimmte 
Kausalitätsverhältnis], which Hegel identifies with “finite causality”. He writes: 
This now is the relation of causality in its reality [Realität] and finitude. As 
formal, it is the infinite relation of absolute power whose content is pure 
manifestation or necessity. As finite causality, on the other hand, it has a given 
content and exhausts itself in an external difference in this identical content which 
in its determinations is one and the same substance. (WdL II:225, SL 560) 
The finite causality is the causality of finite accidents over each other. The finite causality, 
Hegel reminds us, leads to an “infinite regress”, since what is a cause is already an effect 
of something else, ad infinitum. The relation of cause and effect in this relation is 
“external”, and there is no such total overlapping of cause and effect, which was the case 
in the formal causality.168 The infinite regress of cause and effect is the mark of 
“impotence” [Ohnmacht] of accidents to “attain” and “hold fast” to a “unity” (WdL II:231, 
SL 565); such a unity must be bestowed on accidents by substance. 
                                                        
167 Note that Hegel emphasizes it is one and the same substance that determines itself (as cause), 
and is being determined (as effect): “Substance in its determining does not begin from 
accidentality as if this were already an other to start with and only now were posited as 
determinateness, but the two are one actuosity. Substance as power determines itself; but this 
determining is immediately itself the sublating of the determining, and the return. It determines 
itself — it, the determinant, is thus the immediate and that which is itself already determinate; in 
determining itself, it therefore posits this already determinate as determined and thus has sublated 
the positedness and has returned into itself.” (WdL II:223, SL 558)  
168 To be more precise, Hegel thinks that even in the “determinate causality”, there is some unity 
of cause and effect, but this unity is not complete. Rain is the cause of wetness of streets, but the 
same water that constitutes rain is present in the wetness of streets. Thus, there is a unity between 
cause and effect, yet this unity is present, only insofar as the material cause (water) is concerned. 
Insofar as the formal cause is concerned, the two are distinct from each other (the form of water 
in street is distinct from the form of water in rain).  
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 This brings us to third and final form of causality, which is the unity of the first 
two. The real causality now occurs in a systematic fashion, which makes the chain of 
causality self-enclosed. Hegel calls the third form of causality “action and interaction” 
[Wirkung und Gegenwirkung], which occurs between “active” and “passive” substance 
and together constitute a “substantial identity”  (WdL II:233, SL 566).169 We can 
conceive the passive substance as the milieu of externality, where there is a horizontal 
relation of causality between accidents that do not have power over each other. However, 
the passive substance is at the same time determined by the active substance, which 
exerts power over it. That is, the horizontal relation of causality (of passive substance) is 
at the same time determined by the vertical relation of causality (of active substance over 
passive substance.) Hegel talks about “action” and “reaction” of active substance and 
passive substance over each other, since active substance is not a petrified “thing” which 
determines the passive substance in a one-way manner, but is sensitive to the reaction of 
passive substance on it, although in the end it is the active substance that makes substance 
what it is. We can make sense of this dynamic conception of causality of substance – the 
interdependence of passive and active substance, yet ultimately under the terms that 
eventually active substance sets – in the organic life.  The parts of organism are in a 
                                                        
169 Just to emphasize a point that has already been made: in ordinary thought we tend to use the 
categories of action and reaction for individuals that are self-subsistent and independent from 
each other (like two countries that act and react upon each other.) Hegel’s usage is different, since 
action and reaction obtains between substance conceived one time as active, and the same 
substance conceived as passive.  Hegel writes: “Each of these determinations sublates itself in its 
positing, and posits itself in its sublating; what is present here is not an external transition of 
causality from one substrate to another; on the contrary, this becoming-other of causality is at the 
same time its own positing. Causality therefore presupposes its own self or conditions itself. The 
identity, the substrate, which was previously only in itself or implicit, is therefore, now 
determined as presupposition or posited over against the active causality, and the reflection 
which was previously only external to the identity, now stands in a relationship to it.” (WdL 
II:233, SL 566) 
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horizontal relation of causality with each other (it is heart that pumps the blood), but such 
horizontal relation only occurs in the framework of a vertical relation of causality of 
totality of organism over all the parts (over both the heart and the blood)170.  
The vertical relation of causality of totality of substance over accidents is not 
visible. This invisible relation of power, however, becomes manifest, when accidents 
transgress from the boundaries that substance sets for them. The manifestation of power 
in this way is “violence” [Gewalt] which is able to coercively restore the normal status of 
substance as a self-maintaining entity.  (“Violence is the manifestation of power, or 
power as external” [Die Gewalt ist die Erscheinung der Macht oder die Macht als 
Äußerliches.] (WdL II:235, SL 567)). The phenomenon of violence shows that the vertical 
relation of causality of substance over accidents is capable of overriding the horizontal 
relation of causality of accidents with each other. Such overriding, however, always 
occurs through the horizontal causality of accidents over one another. Hegel thus talks 
about the necessity of violence, when there is such a transgression:  
Therefore not only is it possible to do violence to that which suffers it, but also 
violence must be done to it; that which acts violently on the other can do so only 
because it is the power over it, the power in which it manifests both itself and the 
other. Through violence, passive substance is only posited as what it is in truth, 
namely, to be only something posited. (WdL II:235, SL 567)171 
                                                        
170 Although Hegel does not refer to Spinoza in his explication of causality, it is plausible to see 
the development of the category of causality in Hegel’s logic as a dialectical reconstruction of 
Spinoza’s conception of “immanent cause” to “transitive cause”, which are ultimately united in 
the relation between “active nature” (natura naturans) and “passive nature” (natura naturata). (See 
E1p18 and E1p29s). For a helpful discussion of Spinoza’s conception of immanent cause and 
how it relates to transitive cause (without referring to Hegel), See (Melamed 2013: 61-66) 
171 The transition from “action and reaction” to the final category of the logic of essence, 
“reciprocal action” (Wechselwirkung) is the transition that abolishes the relation of power 
constitutive of essence, and instigates the transition to the logic of Concept. Whereas in “action 
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6- Conclusion: Substance and Social Ontology 
A main debate in philosophy of social sciences is the debate between “individualists” and 
“holists”. The debate has “ontological” and “methodological” dimensions. The 
individualist is one who thinks that only individuals are real (ontological dimension), and 
all facts about society must be explained in terms of facts about individuals 
(methodological dimension). By contrast, the holists believe that social wholes are real, 
and have both ontological and explanatory primacy over individuals172. In the Philosophy 
of Right, Hegel recognizes the debate, and strongly sides with holism: 
There are always only two possible viewpoints in the ethical realm: either one 
starts from substantiality, or one proceeds atomistically and moves upward from 
the basis of individuality [Einzelheit]. This latter viewpoint excludes Spirit, 
because it leads only to an aggregation, whereas spirit is not something individual, 
but the unity of the individual and the universal. (GPR §156Z) 
In this section, I explain the implications of the logic of essence for social ontology. (In 
the next chapter, I substantiate these implications through a detailed explanation of 
Marx’s conception of the totality of capital in capitalism.) To emphasize the point that I 
have already made, the social ontology based on the logic of essence is critical, not 
affirmative. I solely focus on the structural issues. The main points of the essence-logical 
social ontology are the following: 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and reaction”, it is the active substance that ultimately determines the passive substance, in 
“reciprocal action”, “each is at the same time active and passive substance in relation to the other; 
[and] any distinction between the two has been sublated” (WdL II:238, SL 569). Explicating this 
transition (and how it translates into social philosophy) requires another book.  
172 For a helpful summary of the debate between individualists and holists and its history, See 
Julie Zahle (2007:311ff), and Julie Zahle & Finn Collin (2014, Chapter 1). For an older and 
strong defense of holism in social sciences especially with reference to Althusser, See Susan 
James (1984)  
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6-1- The totality of society is sui generis. 
According to the logic of essence, the totality of society exists in its own right, and 
independently of individuals. We can distinguish three aspects of the sui generis 
character of the totality of society, (a) according to its composition, (b) according to its 
causal powers, and (related to (b)) (c) according to its capacity to be violent.  
 (a) According to Hegel, totality is not the aggregate of individuals; rather it is the 
structure that constitutes individuals as its moments. However, the fact that the social 
structure (or totality) exists in its own right does not mean that it is a hidden kernel that 
emanates itself in individuals. Social totality is not separable from individuals that form it, 
although it is emphatically not reducible to them.  
 (b) According to Hegel, although social totality is imperceptible, it is causally 
efficacious on individuals. Social totality is able to produce and reproduce itself through 
individuals. (We will learn in the next chapter that capital is a self-maintaining system 
that is able to reproduce itself through individuals.) However, the causal power of social 
totality over individuals is not immediate. It is rather always mediated by the action of 
individuals upon each other. (We will learn in the next chapter that capital is not powerful 
over individuals immediately, but the power of capital is always mediated by the power 
of a particular capitalist over a particular worker.)  
 (c) One other reason that social totality for Hegel is real is that it has the capacity 
to causally override the decision of individuals, and thus turn its power into a manifest 
violence. (To reiterate: this overriding, however, is always mediated through the action of 
individuals upon each other.) In Capital, Marx reports how the economic laws of 
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capitalism destroyed millions of lives of small-scale textile manufacturers in 19th century, 
and we can observe the same dynamics nowadays.  
 We can understand the phenomenon of violence of totality with reference to the 
scope of freedom of individuals. (In Chapter Five, I will discuss the kind of freedom that 
individuals have within the absolute power of totality in detail.) Individuals, to use a 
concept from Georg Lukács, have some “concretely possible space for actions” [konkret 
möglicher Handlungsspielraum] (GLW 14:236), in which they are free to act as they are 
pleased to do; but the contours of such space is determined by the necessity obtained 
through the totality of society.  With the conceptual apparatus of the logic of being, Hegel 
explains this limited space for action in terms of “measure” [Maß].  With reference to the 
Greek conception of fate and “nemesis”, he maintains that individuals are allowed to 
enjoy certain degree of “everything human: wealth, honor, power, and likewise joy, pain, 
etc”; but if this measure is “overstepped”, it directly leads to “ruin” and “demise” (EnzL. 
§107Z). This is indeed the manifestation of power as violence which would reestablish 
the self-maintaining activity of substance. “What is presumptuous, what makes itself too 
great, too high”, Hegel writes, “is reduced to the other extreme of being brought to 
nothing, so that the mean of measure and mediocrity is restored” (WdL I:390, SL 329). 
(We will see in a moment how the Greek conception of fate is still at work in capitalism, 
although in an altered form).173 
                                                        
173 Although Hegelian view is different from Durkheim’s – the former is dialectical, the latter is 
not – it is worth quoting a passage from Durkheim that captures the coercive character of society 
in a way that is quite close to Hegel: “I am not obliged to speak French with my fellow-
countrymen nor to use the legal currency, but I cannot possibly do otherwise. If I tried to escape 
this necessity, my attempt would fail miserably. As an industrialist I am free to apply the 
technical methods of former centuries, but by doing so I should invite certain ruin. Even when I 
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6-2- The totality of society is contradictory. 
According to Hegel, (1) totality of society is solely constituted through the interaction of 
individuals. Therefore, the totality of society is a result. (2) Yet, the totality is present, so 
to speak, from the beginning, forcing individuals to behave according to its logic. This 
makes the totality essentially contradictory. To put it differently, although it is individuals 
that make the society, society is impervious to their action, and has an independent 
existence from them.  
 
6-3- Individuals are dispensable. 
Individuals are only occupying the slots that the social totality provides them. That is, 
individuals are only “bearers” of the social relations (Marx’s term), or “functionaries” of 
the social institutions that they embody (Adorno’s term), or “supports” of the social 
system (Althusser’s term). The power of individuals over each other is by virtue of slots 
that they occupy, and not by virtue of their personal characteristics, which are (from the 
standpoint of totality) contingent. (I will explain in detail the mode of this contingency in 
Chapter Five). It is important to emphasize that these social slots do not exist above or 
beyond individuals, and are always occupied by individuals. Yet, contradictorily, these 
slots are relatively enduring, and therefore exist independently of individuals.  
Moreover, although individuals are necessary for the production and reproduction of 
totality, a particular individual is contingent; he or she can be or not be. (According to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
free myself from these rules and violate them successfully, I am always compelled to struggle 
with them. When finally overcome, they make their constraining power felt by the resistance they 
offer.” (Durkheim 1964:3, quoted by Bhaskar 1998:43) 
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Marx, as we will see later, there must be always some workers who sell their labor power, 
but a particular worker can change his social position and even become a capitalist, and 
this so-called social mobility does not change the structure of society in capitalism.) 
 
6-4- The totality of society is both enabling and restricting. 
We have learned that substance has both creative and destructive power over individuals, 
and that creation and destruction are both moments of the same process of self-
maintenance of substance. In the realm of social ontology, we can say that social 
structure is both limiting and enabling for individuals, or power is both restrictive and 
productive. To give an example, in capitalism all economic relations has to be mediated 
by money. Thus, those activities that do not result in saleable products are doomed to be 
destroyed or devalued. (The care work that typically women do at home tend to be 
conceived as not being a work, or tend to be severely devalued). Yet, although the 
exchange relations impose severe restrictions on human activities, it is at the same time 
enabling. (The traditional hierarchical values in paternalistic societies can potentially – 
but not necessarily – be diminished or abolished through impersonal relations of 
exchange.) 
 
6-5- The power of totality over individuals is non-volitional and impersonal. 
In order to understand Hegel’s conception of the power of totality of society (i.e. 
substance), it is helpful to compare and contrast it with John Searle’s conception of 
power. According to Searle, if something is to be designated as power, it has to satisfy 
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two criteria (2010: 151-2): Firstly, it should be clear who is exactly the agent of power, 
and who is exactly the patient of power (“exactness constraint”). Secondly, it must be 
intentional. For Searle, “the concept of power is logically tied to the concept of 
intentional exercise of power” (ibid: 152) (“intentionality constraint”). Searle’s 
conception of power is a philosophical articulation of common-sense conception of 
power in the tradition of liberalism, and contrasting it with Hegel shows how Hegel is far 
from this tradition.  
 For Hegel, the power of totality of society over individuals does not satisfy 
Searle’s constraints. Firstly, the power of totality of society is not “exact”, since the agent 
of power is not a thing or a person that can be located. It is rather the unobservable 
structure that constitutes individuals. Secondly, the power of totality (substance) is not 
“intentional”. From the logical point of view, there is no intentionality and volition in the 
logic of essence, and such categories can only be developed within the framework of the 
logic of Concept, where freedom is being addressed. 174 
 The non-intentional impersonal power of totality over individuals – Hegel 
associates with the concept of “fate” [Schicksal], which makes the principle of ancient 
Greek religion.  In contrast to modern Christian form of religion, Hegel believes, the gods 
of ancient Greece are not – precisely speaking – “personal” [persönlich]. They are rather 
                                                        
174 One must distinguish between social and political domination of totality over individuals in 
Hegel. Whereas the former is non-intentional and impersonal, the latter is clearly both intentional 
and personal. Hegel’s conception of the political is complicated, and discussing it is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. See especially GPR §279, where Hegel develops the concept of 
political sovereignty. Here Hegel identifies “sovereignty” with the full-blown subjectivity, which 
is both personal and endowed with will. For Hegel, political domination has to be necessarily 
exercised by “one individual”, which he identifies with the “monarch”. From the logical point of 
view, while the locus of discussion of social domination is the logic of essence, the locus of 
political domination is the logic of the Concept.  
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“mere personifications that as such do not know themselves, but are only known” [bloß 
Personifikationen, die als solche sich nicht selbst wissen, sondern nur gewußt warden] 
(EnzL. §147Z). That is, the Greek gods do not have self-consciousness; they do not have 
any intentional state and cannot will anything. Like the individuals, these gods are 
“subjugated” to an alien “fate” which is itself “undisclosed necessity and thus as utterly 
impersonal, devoid of self and blind” [die unenthüllte Notwendigkeit und somit als das 
durchaus Unpersönliche, Selbstlose und Blinde] (ibid)175. In the Science of Logic, Hegel 
associates “fate” with “mechanical process” and writes,  
Power [Macht], as objective universality and as violence [Gewalt] directed 
against the object, is what is called fate — a conception that falls within 
mechanism in so far as it is called blind…The fate of the living being is in general 
the species, which manifests itself through the fleetingness of the living 
individuals, which in their actual individuality do not possess the species as 
species. (WdL II:421, SL 720) 
Although it is the “fate” of individuals that through their life and death perpetuate the 
existence of a species, the species, properly speaking, does not have any volition, which 
purposively makes the individual live and die. An individual living being, according to 
Hegel, is “external” to itself; its being, properly speaking, lies not within itself, but in the 
being of species. The individual living being, therefore, is simply “contingent” whose 
fate is “extinction”. That the individual living being contributes to the continuation of 
species is not the result of any volition on its part, or from the species’ part: the necessity 
involved here is – “blind”. Although the relation of individual living being and species is 
                                                        
175 Cf. also with Hegel’s early Systementwürfe III, where he compares the Greek religion with the 
absolute religion of Christianity.  The Greek religion, Hegel writes, is “die mythische, ein Spiel, 
das des Wesens nicht würdig, ohne Gründlichkeit und Tiefe ist, wo das Tiefe das unbekannte 
Schicksal ist. Die absolute Religion aber ist, das Tiefe, das zu Tage herausgetreten, diß Tiefe ist 
das Ich, es ist der Begriff, die absolute reine Macht”. (GW 8.281) 
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a good illustration of the concept of fate, we should not take this illustration too literally; 
since, Hegel a few lines later reminds us:  
Only self-consciousness has a fate in the proper meaning of the word [Ein 
eigentliches Schicksal hat nur das Selbstbewusstsein]; because it is free, and 
therefore in the individuality of its ego possesses a being that is absolutely in and 
for itself and can oppose itself to its objective universality and estrange itself from 
it. By this very separation, however, it excites [erregt] against itself the 
mechanical relationship of a fate. In order therefore that this fate should be able to 
have power over it, it must have given itself some determinateness or other 
conflicting with the essential universality; it must have committed a deed. (ibid). 
The relation of the individual human being to universality is not a simply “natural” 
relationship of individual/species of other living beings; since the individual has the 
capacity to distance itself from his obligations given to it through his location in the 
totality of society. Yet, if we understand the totality of society in terms of substance, the 
mechanical process of fate still holds. If an individual is so bold that  “resists” the 
absolute power of substance and commits a “deed” against it, by doing so, he initiates a 
mechanical process of revenge of fate, which “overpowers” [Überwältigung] him and 
leads to his demolition. The “relative lack of self-subsistence” of the individual, Hegel 
emphasizes, “manifests itself in the fact that its individuality lacks the capacity for what 
is imparted [to it by the universal] [das Mitgeteilte] and therefore is disrupted [zersprengt 
wird] by it, because it [the individual] cannot constitute itself as subject in this universal, 
or make this latter its predicate” (WdL II:420 , SL 720). With the referral to Greek 
tragedies, Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit develops the dialectic of individual and 
fate, and conceptualizes the action of the individual against fate as a “crime”, which 
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immediately and mechanically, brings about her proper “punishment” by fate176. That is, 
the deed of the individual against society cannot change the society; since “the ethical” 
[das Sittliche], Hegel emphasizes, “as the absolute essence and at the same time the 
absolute power, cannot suffer any inversion of its content” (PhG §466). 
 Hegel obviously thinks that the concept of fate belongs to the ancient world, and 
modernity is a disenchanted world, in which fate does not play any important role. (“The 
ancients, as is well known, construed necessity as fate and the modern standpoint is, by 
contrast, the standpoint of consolation [Trost]” (EnzL. §147Z)). The dissolution of the 
concept of fate in the modern world for Hegel is closely tied up with the development of 
individuality. The individual in modernity has the right to be recognized by the social 
order as individual, and should reciprocally find his reconciliation and consolation in the 
latter. It is exactly for this reason that in the official locus of Hegel’s social and political 
philosophy, the Philosophy of Right, the concept of fate does not have any significant role. 
However, in contrast to Hegel, as Marx has shown us (in the section of the “Fetishism of 
Commodities” in the first chapter of Capital), although capitalist modernity is 
disenchanted in respect to gods and religious thinking, it is at the same time re-enchanted 
through the power of economic sphere that exists independently of individuals, and 
coerces them to follow its logic.177 Indeed, as we will see in the next chapter, Marx 
explicitly calls the power of capital as a “fate” [Verhängnis] that exerts alien power over 
individuals.  For the same reason, Adorno calls the totality of society, which for him is 
                                                        
176 Cf. The section entitled “Ethical action, human and divine knowledge, guilt and fate” [Die 
sittliche Handlung, das menschliche und göttliche Wissen, die Schuld und das Schicksal] (PhG 
§463ff) 
177 In the third volume of Capital, Marx explicitly calls the reification of economic and social 
relations in capitalism as “the religion of everyday life.” (MEW 25:838, C III: 969) 
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primarily formed through economy, as a “spell” [Bann] that nobody can escape from. 
However, despite the similarities, the difference between fate in the ancient world and in 
capitalism must be noted. Whereas in the ancient world, fate is simply given irrespective 
of individuals, in capitalism the economic fate is solely produced by the interaction of 
individuals, although in the end exists independently of them. It is for this reason that 
Hegel’s ontology of substance in the Science of Logic, in which individuals and substance 
are in a reflection-logical relation with each other, precisely captures the specificity of the 
power of economy in capitalism.  
 The reflection-logical relation of individuals and substance drives us to reconsider 
Hegel’s conception of power in relation to the two criteria of power for Searle. We have 
learned that the power of totality over individuals is never immediate, but it is always 
mediated by the action of individuals over each other. Therefore, although the power of 
totality is non-intentional and impersonal, that power has to always be mediated by the 
intentional and personal power of individuals over each other. (Thus, in this second 
aspect, “intentionality constraint” and “exactness constraint” are satisfied.). As we will 
see in the next chapter, although capital exerts a non-intentional and anonymous power 
over individuals, that power nonetheless must always be mediated by the action of the 
living capitalists (endowed with consciousness and will) over the workers. In other words, 
although in capitalism individuals are functionaries of the social position that they occupy, 
nonetheless, there always must be individuals (in their physical and mental existence) 











It is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that 
constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois 
thought, but the point of view of totality. The category of totality, the all-
pervasive domination of the whole over the parts is the essence of the 
method which Marx took over from Hegel and brilliantly transformed into 
the foundations of a wholly new science….Proletarian science is 
revolutionary not just by virtue of its revolutionary content which it 
opposes to bourgeois society, but above all because of its method. The 
domination of the category of totality is the bearer of the principle of 
revolution in science. (Lukács 1971 [1923]:27, original emphasis)178 
 
 
[In capitalism, capital] is a general illumination, which bathes all the other 
colors and modifies their particularity. It is a particular ether which 
determines the specific gravity of every being which has materialized 
within it. (Marx, MEW 42:40, G 107) 
 
                                                        
178 “Nicht die Vorherrschaft der ökonomischen Motive in der Geschichtserklärung unterscheidet 
entscheidend den Marxismus von der bürgerlichen Wissenschaft, sondern der Gesichtspunkt der 
Totalität. Die Kategorie der Totalität, die allseitige, bestimmende Herrschaft des Ganzen über die 
Teile ist das Wesen der Methode, die Marx von Hegel übernommen und originell zur Grundlage 
einer ganz neuen Wissenschaft umgestaltet hat....Das gründlich Revolutionäre der proletarischen 
Wissenschaft besteht nicht bloß darin, daß sie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft revolutionäre Inhalte 
gegenüberstellt, sondern in allererster Reihe in dem revolutionären Wesen der Methode selbst. 
Die Herrschaft der Kategorie der Totalität ist der Träger des revolutionären Prinzips in der 
Wissenschaft.” 
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1- The Critique of Methodological Individualism in Analytical Marxism 
1-1- Two Main Pillars of Analytical Marxism: Methodological Individualism 
and the Primacy of Causal Explanations 
 
The main task of Jon Elster’s magisterial Making Sense of Marx (1985) is to develop and 
defend the thesis that Marx was a methodological individualist. By methodological 
individualism Elster means,  
the doctrine that all social phenomena – their structure and their change – are in 
principle explicable in ways that only involve individuals – their properties, their 
goals, their beliefs and their actions (ibid: 5, emphasis added). 
Elster regards methodological individualism as a form of “reductionism”. In the same 
way that in biology the explanation at the level of organisms and cells must be replaced 
with the explanation at the level of molecules, Elster asserts, in social sciences the 
explanation at the level of social structures and wholes must be replaced with the 
explanation at the level of individuals. Thus, according to Elster, explanation in social 
sciences should follow a three-tiered procedure: 
First, there is causal explanation of mental states, such as desires and 
beliefs…Next, there is intentional explanation of individual action in terms of the 
underlying beliefs and desires… Finally, there is causal explanation of aggregate 
phenomena in terms of the individual actions that go into them (ibid: 4). 
According to Elster, scientific explanation is primarily explanation in terms of cause and 
effect. By going from macro to micro, that is, from more aggregate phenomena to less 
aggregate phenomena, we can approach the ideal of providing a continuous chain of 
cause and effect. In doing so, Elster holds, we can effectively avoid spurious explanations, 
namely, those explanations that invoke merely apparent causes instead of real causes 
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(ibid: 4). One prominent mode of spurious explanation is holistic explanation that 
substitutes causal explanations with a vague reference to totality. Thus, against holism 
Elster emphasizes,  
To explain is to provide a mechanism, to open up the black box and show the nuts 
and bolts, the cogs and wheels, the desires and beliefs that generate the aggregate 
outcome (ibid: 5). 
As Elster considers methodological individualism to be the correct scientific method, 
quite expectedly he attacks the Hegelian origins of Marx’s theory. He regards Hegel’s 
dialectical logic, which has an undeniably holistic character, to be merely a “source of 
confusion” (ibid: 43)179. Correspondingly, he regards those parts of Marx inspired by 
Hegel’s dialectic to be “near-nonsense” (ibid: 4). That is to say, Elster effectively takes 
Marx to be using two quite distinct methods: a holist method that is inspired by Hegel, 
and an individualist method, inspired by Marx’s genuinely scientific interests.180 While 
the former must be discarded, Elster holds, the latter should be further explicated, and 
developed. 
 If Elster is correct that Marx had two completely antithetical methodologies even 
in the same work, we should conclude that Marx had indeed a quite schizophrenic mind. I 
do not think this is an interpretive approach that we should take on. It is true that Marx 
                                                        
179 Cf. the following passage: “Hegel, in the Science of Logic, derived the various ontological 
categories from each other according to certain deductive principles which have resisted analysis 
to this day. The connection is neither that of cause to effect, nor that of axiom to theorem, nor 
finally that of given fact to its condition of possibility. The “self-determination of concept” 
appears to be nothing more than a loose ex post pattern imposed by Hegel on various phenomena 
that he found important” (ibid: 37-8). 
180 It is worth mentioning that individualism here does not have any (explicitly) ethical or 
evaluative connotations; it does not mean egoism. “Methodological individualism is a doctrine 
about how social phenomena are to be explained, not about how they should be evaluated.” 
(ibid:8). See also (Popper: 1945)  
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occasionally explains, say, the behavior of total capital in terms of the aggregate actions 
of individual capitalists – and Elster is admirably good in explaining these parts of 
Marx’s theory – but this does not mean that Marx, even in these parts, has an 
individualistic methodology.  Rather, such individualistic arguments are located within 
Marx’s overall holistic framework of argument, and therefore presuppose holism. As we 
will see, for Marx, the laws and regularities of capital exist independently of individuals, 
but they are activated through individuals. Marx’s dialectical conception of individuals 
and social structure – a conception that regards the social structure to be solely 
constituted through the action of individuals, yet at the very same time to have a life of its 
own  – allows ample room for individualistic explanations. However, as important as 
Marx’s individualistic explanations are, they always have a subordinate significance to 
the holism that frames his entire argument.181 In this point, Marx is greatly influenced by 
Hegel, and it is appropriate to re-examine Hegel in this context182. 
 
1-2- The Primacy of the Totality and the Subordinate Importance of 
Mechanical Causality for Hegel 
For Hegel, Elster’s two methodological principles, i.e. individualism and the primacy of 
causal explanations, are only adequate for explaining mechanical wholes. The 
characteristic feature of mechanical wholes, such as a watch, is that the individuals that 
constitute it are self-standing by themselves. (The various parts of a watch can be 
produced in various places, and then assembled to make the watch in yet another place).  
                                                        
181 For a helpful (and polemical) criticism of Elster, See (Mandel: 1989) 
182 See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of causality in Hegel’s logic, and Chapter 5 for a more 
elaborate discussion of the relation of causality and necessity in Hegel. 
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As the parts of a mechanical whole are self-subsistent, the relation of causality that 
obtains between them is also mechanical; that is to say, cause and effect in mechanical 
wholes are quite distinct from each other.  (A wheel that moves another wheel in the 
watch.)  
 However, for Hegel, mechanical wholes are not true wholes. The true wholes for 
Hegel are organic wholes, which include living organisms and human societies. In 
contrast to mechanical wholes, organic wholes are self-organizing, self-maintaining, and 
self-reproducing. In organic wholes, the individuals that constitute it are so interwoven 
that they cannot exist independently of one another. (A heart and a lung cannot exist 
independently from each other, unless they are dead.) Within the framework of the 
organic wholes, thus, the cause and the effect are not really distinct from each other, but 
they are moments of the whole, which in fact causes itself. As we learned in the previous 
chapter in detail, Hegel considers such a true whole, which has a sui generis character, as 
“substance”. (Note that it is not by accident that Elster’s example, namely the black box 
with its cogs and wheels, is an example of a mechanical whole, which he then applies to 
human society.) 
 Hegel calls mechanical causality “finite” or “real” causality. The defect of finite 
causality, according to Hegel, is that the chain of cause and effect would continue to an 
infinite regress, and thus mechanical causality is not able to produce a self-organizing, 
self-maintaining whole. Mechanical causality, therefore, has to occur within a 
“substance”, that is to say, within a framework that structures it. In Hegel’s words, it is 
the effective “power” of substance that organizes mechanical causality into a unity – 
mechanical causality, on its own, is “impotent” to produce the desired unity. In the same 
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way that Hegel considers mechanical causality as finite, he regards substance as the 
infinite cause. And in the same way that for Hegel the finite and the infinite are not 
separable from each other and the infinite is nothing but the process which bestows unity 
on the finite, substance for Hegel is not a spiritual entity lying beyond or behind the chain 
of cause and effect; rather, substance is the very structure that organizes the chain of 
cause and effect into a living individual.  
 Thus, for Hegel, substance is constituted through two moments: (1) the horizontal 
causality of the finite over each other, (2) the vertical causality of substance, i.e. infinite 
cause, over the horizontal causality. Each individual is determined horizontally by 
another finite cause, yet at the same time, it is determined by the vertical causality of the 




1-3- The Primacy of the Totality and the Subordinate Importance of 
Mechanical Causality for Marx: The Case of Competition   
Hegel’s conception of mechanical causality – the conception, according to which 
mechanical causality between individuals is not self-sufficient, and therefore has to be 
subordinated to the structure of the whole – underpins Marx’s analysis of capitalism. It is 
not my intention here to discuss Marx’s conception of causality in any detail.183 What I 
want to do is to illustrate Marx’s conception of causality through one prominent example, 
namely, in his analysis of competition. 
                                                        
183 For a very helpful discussion, See Zeleny  (1980: 71-88) 
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 Classical political economy is based on an anthropological conception that 
regards human being as a being primarily defined by the pursuit of self-interest.  
In this conception, the principal mode of interaction between individuals is competition. 
Competition is conceived as the organizing principle of the economic order, which 
consequently makes the science of political economy possible. In the words of John 
Stuart Mill,  
Only through the principle of competition has political economy any pretension to 
the character of a science. So far as rents, profits, wages, prices, are determined 
by competition, laws may be assigned for them. Assume competition to be their 
exclusive regulator, and principles of broad generality and scientific precision 
may be laid down, according to which they will be regulated (Principles of 
Political Economy, Book II, Chapter 4, par. 2). 
It is through competition that Adam Smith explains the law of supply and demand, and it 
is equally through competition that David Ricardo explains how the rate of profit of 
various capitals becomes equal across society184. However, although competition plays 
such a pivotal role in classical political economy, it is never theoretically explained. 
Rather, competition is simply presupposed as a brute fact about human nature, which 
therefore does not require any explanation in economy. “The free competition”, Marx 
thus writes,  
has never yet been developed by the economists, no matter how much they prattle 
about it, and [no matter] how much it is the basis of the entirety of bourgeois 
production, production resting on capital. (MEW 42:327, G 414) 
Marx does not deny the role of competition in capitalism. Indeed, as for classical political 
economy, for Marx competition is a necessary requirement for the sphere of economy to 
                                                        
184 For a helpful discussion of the conception of competition in classical political economy, see 
Jessop (2010) 
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be lawful. Indeed, the entirety of Capital is written with the assumption of the perfect 
competition in the market. What Marx denies, however, is the primacy of competition in 
(explanation of) capitalism – and this makes his project not simply a continuation of the 
tradition of political economy, but the critique of political economy. In the context of his 
exposition of the concept of relative surplus value – the surplus value that a certain 
capitalist makes through increasing the productivity of labor relative to other capitalists – 
Marx remarks:  
While it is not our intention here to consider the way in which the immanent laws 
of capitalist production manifest themselves in the external movement of the 
individual capitals, assert themselves as the coercive laws of competition, and 
therefore enter into the consciousness of the individual capitalist as the motives 
which drive him forward, this much is clear: a scientific analysis of competition is 
possible only if we can grasp the inner nature of capital, just as the apparent 
motions of the heavenly bodies are intelligible only to someone who is acquainted 
with their actual motions, which are not perceptible to the senses. (MEW 23:335, 
C I:433) 
As is clear in this passage, for Marx explaining competition is predicated to explaining 
capital as the totality (“the inner nature of capital”), not vice versa.  That is to say, first, 
the totality of capital has to be scientifically developed, and only then it is possible to 
explain competition between individual capitalists. Marx writes, 
Conceptually, competition is nothing other than the inner nature of capital, its 
essential character, appearing in and realized as the reciprocal interaction of many 
capitals with each one another, the inner necessity as external necessity. (Capital 
exists and can only exist as many capitals, and its self-determination therefore 
appears as their reciprocal interaction with one another.) (MEW 42:327, G 414) 
That competition for Marx has to be derived from the totality of capital means that 
competition is not a natural, and therefore, immutable fact about human nature, but is 
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obtained in and through capitalism. In the quoted passage from Capital, the order of 
explanation in Marx is clear: the inner nature of capital requires competition between 
individuals, and this requirement of capital, then, forms the motives and beliefs of 
individuals. (Note that this order of explanation is exactly the opposite of what Elster 
suggests.)  
 Marx quite frequently uses the term “illusion” [Schein] to refer to competition. 
(The title of Chapter 50 of Capital: Volume Three is “The illusion of Competition”.) The 
self-sufficiency and freedom of individuals in competition is an illusion, properly 
speaking, since such freedom only functions as a moment of the totality of capital. The 
free competition between individuals, therefore, solely contributes to the subjugation of 
individuals under the rule of capital. “The domination of capital is the presupposition of 
free competition, just as the despotism of the Roman Caesars was the presupposition of 
the free Roman ‘private law’” (MEW 42:551, G 651), Marx writes. Therefore, “it is not 
individuals who are set free by competition; it is rather capital, which is set free.” (MEW 
42:550, G 650) 
I have explained in the first chapter in detail that for Marx as well as for Hegel 
illusion is not a simple cognitive failure, but it is a necessary illusion, which has an inner 
connection with the totality of essence (of capitalism). The same holds true for 
competition. Although competition is an illusion, namely an illusion that originates from 
the surface appearance of capitalism, it is constitutive of capitalism. In what, then, does 
the necessity of competition in capitalism lie? In classical political economy, competition 
is conceived as the cause of regularities in capitalism, as the cause of, say, the law of 
supply and demand, or as the cause of the law of equalization of profit. Marx does not 
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deny the causal significance of competition; yet he, quite like Hegel, transforms the 
mechanical causality of competition into substantial causality of capital over itself, that is, 
the substantial causality that integrates the said mechanical causality in itself as its own 
moment. Marx writes, 
Competition generally, this essential locomotive force of the bourgeois economy, 
does not establish its laws, but is rather their executor. Unlimited competition is 
therefore not the presupposition for the truth of economic laws, but rather the 
consequence – the form of appearance in which their necessity realizes itself […]. 
Competition, therefore, does not explain these laws; rather it lets them be seen, 
but does not produce them (MEW 42:457, G 552).185 
This is a complex passage, which indicates Marx’s debt to Hegel’s conception of 
causality. We must note, firstly, that competition for Marx on its own is not explanatory; 
it is rather the laws and regularities of capital, which explain competition186. Yet, at the 
same time, secondly, the laws and regularities of capital necessarily require competition; 
since it is only through competition that these laws and regularities can be activated. In 
Marx’s words, competition is the “consequence” [Folge] of capital, yet at the same time, 
competition is the “essential locomotive force” [wesentliche Lokomotor] of capital. To 
refer to Hegel, we must grasp that the horizontal causality of individuals over each other 
in competition is not explanatory on its own; it becomes explanatory only when it is 
                                                        
185 “Die Konkurrenz überhaupt, dieser wesentliche Lokomotor der bürgerlichen Ökonomie, 
etabliert nicht ihre Gesetze, sondern ist deren Exekutor. Illimited competition [sic] ist darum nicht 
die Voraussetzung für die Wahrheit der ökonomischen Gesetze, sondern die Folge — die 
Erscheinungsform, worin sich ihre Notwendigkeit realisiert. Die Konkurrenz erklärt daher nicht 
diese Gesetze; sondern sie läßt sie sehn, produziert sie aber nicht.” 
186 Also: “Competition merely expresses as real; posits as an external necessity, that which lies 
within the nature of capital. [Was in der Natur des Kapitals liegt, wird nur reel herausgesetzt als 
äußere Notwendigkeit durch die Konkurrenz.] Competition is nothing more than the way in 
which the many capitals force the inherent determinants of capital upon one another and upon 
themselves.”(MEW 42:551, G 651) 
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integrated into, and functions as a moment of, the vertical causality of the totality of 
capital over individuals. Marx frequently refers to the vertical causality of totality of 
capital over individuals as “the coercive laws of competition” [Zwangsgesetze der 
Konkurrenz], the laws that coerce individuals, on pain of perishing, to compete with each 
other. 
For Hegel the “finite” or  “real” causality – i.e. the horizontal causality – is what 
can be seen on the surface of the phenomenon, and the “infinite” causality – i.e. the 
vertical causality – is the “ideal” side that organizes the real side. The ideal side is not 
visible, and can only be grasped through conceptual development. Similarly, for Marx, 
the causality of competition is that which appears to the agents in capitalism, but the 
inner nature of capital, through which competition can be grasped, can only be explained 
through scientific analysis.  
Further details of Marx’s theory of competition are not important in the current 
context. What is important is the radical shift that Marx implements in methodology. 
Whereas classical (and neoclassical) political economy begins from individuals and 
analyses the aggregate pattern of the behavior of individuals, for Marx the whole has 
always ontological and explanatory primacy. To put in Hegel’s language, whereas 
classical political economy is based on the logic of being, Marx’s method is based on the 
logic of essence. A main task of the logic of essence is to show that the self-subsistence 
of individuals is merely an illusion. Similarly, Marx’s critique of political economy 
consists in showing that the individualism, with which the classical political economy 
operates, is an illusion. By distorting Marx’s method, I believe, Elster effectively ignores 
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the specific nature of Marx’s critique of political economy, thereby rejecting Marx’s 
revolution in political economy.  
If Marx’s method is holistic, as I have argued, how does Marx, then, explain the 
whole? In mechanical sciences, the usual method of scientific explanation is 
analytic/synthetic. First, a totality is disaggregated into its constitutive parts.  The parts, 
then, are studied independently of each other, and of the whole (analysis). Thereafter, the 
totality is re-aggregated from its constitutive parts to show how the parts interact with 
each other within the totality (synthesis). This method is appropriate for understanding 
mechanical wholes, since in mechanical wholes (such as a watch), the parts are self-
subsistent, independently of the whole. However, this analytic/synthetic method is not 
adequate for explaining the true wholes. One cannot dismember an organism, and wish to 
study the organism in its totality, namely, when it is alive. Similarly, one cannot pluck 
out individuals from social totality to examine their behavior in isolation, and then add up 
the individuals to construct the totality, as individuals are already constituted through 
society.  Marx’s solution, then, to explain the true wholes is radically different from 
analytic/synthetic method that is used in mechanical sciences. His method, to use a term 
from Jindrich Zeleny, is “structural-genetic”. Marx’s method is structural, since it 
analyses the totality or the structure in which individuals stand, rather than analyzing the 
behavior of individuals. Marx’s method is genetic, since it does not attempt to grasp the 
totality in one single stroke – it is not intellectual intuition – rather, it conceptually 
develops the totality from its less concrete to more concrete determinations. In 
mechanical sciences, the phase of analysis is distinct from, and precedes the phase of 
synthesis. By contrast, Marx’s structural-genetic analysis is at the same time analytic and 
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synthetic. Marx’s method is analytic, since the analysis makes manifest what is already 
implicitly contained in the concept of totality. Marx’s method at the same time is 
synthetic, since his exposition does not merely repeat the same data about totality – it is 
not tautological – rather, it explains the totality in an increasingly determinate way. (See 
(Zeleny 1980:111-2.) Marx’s debt to Hegel’s dialectical derivation of the concept of 
totality is obvious.187 In Chapter Three, I have explained in detail Hegel’s dialectical 
derivation and exposition of the concept of totality. The most determinate form of totality 
for Hegel is “actuality” which has a sui generis character. In the current chapter in 
Section 2, I will explain in detail how Marx derives the totality of capitalist mode of 
production through his structural-genetic analysis. The totality of capitalist mode of 
production for Marx is “capital”, which, similar to Hegel, is sui generis. As I will show 
throughout this section, Hegel’s influence on Marx is more profound than just a general 
influence on the methodological conception. I will continue the chapter in Section 3 with 
a discussion of the absolute power of the totality of capital over individuals. For Marx, 
the totality of capital coerces individuals, on pain of perishing, to follow the logic of 
totality. I will also show how for Marx, quite like Hegel, the power of totality is 
impersonal and non-volitional. This chapter presupposes my discussion of Hegel in 
Chapter 3; however, it is understandable on its own.  
 
                                                        
187 In the end of the logic, Hegel discusses his methodology, and writes, “this progression [of the 
concept of totality] is just as much analytic (in that the immanent dialectic only posits what is 
contained in the immediate concept) as synthetic (since in this concept this difference was not yet 
posited.” (EnzL§239) 
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2- The Totality of Capital 
2-1- Exchange as “Objective Mediation” 
As we have learned previously, Hegel in the logic of essence develops an ontology that is 
absolutely relational. In this ontology, objects are not self-standing on their own, but they 
are solely defined in relation to each other. That is, objects are for Hegel what they are in 
and through a system of total mediation that obtains between them. Hegel’s ontology of 
absolute relationality accords to the social structure of capitalism. For Marx, what makes 
capitalism a system of absolute relationality, namely a system of absolute sociality, is the 
relation of “exchange” between the products of labor. Marx designates the relation of 
exchange as “objective mediation” [gegenständliche Vermittlung] (MEW 42:105, G 172). 
“Objective mediation” does not occur through thinking, but is present in the structure of 
commodities in capitalism. 
 However, what makes capitalism, in contradistinction with previous societies, a 
system of absolute relationality is not the mere presence of exchange of commodities. 
Rather, the absolute relationality in capitalism obtains through universalization of the 
relation of exchange. In those pre-capitalist societies, where there was some sort of 
exchange of commodities, exchange remained a marginal phenomenon. The products 
were produced primarily for individual consumption, and only the excess or the surplus 
would get exchanged. By contrast, in capitalism, where the relation of exchange has 
become universal, the products of labor are produced primarily for exchange, and 
consumption always occurs by means of the mediation of exchange. To put it in a 
philosophical language, in pre-capitalist societies, the products of labor are not 
relationally (that is, in relation to other products of labor) defined. They become 
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relational only ex post facto, only if they get exchanged. By contrast, in capitalism, where 
a system of absolute relationality is formed, commodities are ex ante relationally defined; 
they become what they are only through relation with other commodities.  According to 
Marx, the universalization of relations of exchange in capitalism implies, 
(1) that my product is a product only insofar as it is for others [für andre]; hence 
sublated individuality, universality (2) that it is a product for me only insofar as it 
has been alienated [entaüßert], become for others; (3) that it is for the other only 
insofar as he himself alienates his product, which already implies (4) that 
production is not an end in itself for me, but a means. (MEW 42:127, G196) 
When the relations of exchange are universalized, the alienation of my product is 
simultaneously accompanied by the alienation of the other’s product. That is to say, in a 
system of universal exchange any commodity is originally defined not in terms of its own 
(it is not für es); but in terms of its relation to others (it is für andere). In the same way 
that for Hegel relations precede individuals, for Marx, “appropriation through and by 
means of divestiture and alienation is the fundamental pre-condition” of the formation of 
commodities in capitalism (MEW 42:126, G 196). 
 
2-2- Circulation as the “First Totality” 
Marx very clearly distinguishes “circulation” [Zirkulation] from “exchange” [Austausch]. 
When relations of exchange get universalized, a closed system or totality gets constructed, 
in whose construction all commodities participate, and no product of labor remains 
outside it. Marx names this system the sphere of “circulation”. According to Marx,  
To get circulation, two things are required above all: Firstly, the precondition that 
commodities are prices; Secondly, not isolated acts of exchange, but a circle of 
exchange, a totality of the same, in constant flux, proceeding more or less over the 
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entire surface of society; a system of acts of exchange.  [Nicht einzelne 
Austauschakte, sondern ein Umkreis von Austauschen, eine Totalität derselben, in 
beständigem Flusse und mehr oder minder auf der ganzen Oberfläche der 
Gesellschaft vorgehend; ein System von Tauschakten.] (MEW 42:119, G 188, my 
emphases) 
There has been exchange of products of labor and services in the pre-capitalist societies, 
(in the form of, say,  “barter”, “feudal services” etc), but exchange per se does not 
produce circulation (ibid). It is only when exchange gets ubiquitous that all commodities 
become strictly interrelated and produce the sphere of circulation. The universalization of 
relations of exchange, on its part, can only occur through formation of one single 
commodity, i.e. money, that serves as the universal equivalent to all commodities, such 
that the value of each new commodity that is produced gets determined through its 
relation to the universal equivalent. (It is for this reason that Marx in the above passage 
asserts that the precondition of circulation is that all commodities be prices. Price in this 
context is “the expression of the value of a commodity in…money-commodity.” (MEW 
23: 110, C I:189)). In the Contribution to Political Economy Marx writes, 
The continuing processes of the interrelations of commodities [die 
prozessierenden Beziehungen der Waren aufeinander] crystallize into distinct 
determinations of the universal equivalent, and thus the exchange process 
becomes at the same time the process of formation of money. This process as a 
whole, which comprises several processes, constitutes circulation. (MEW 13: 37, 
MECW 29:292)  
The analogy of the sphere of circulation as a totality to Hegel’s “substance” seems 
evident. (We will learn later that the totality of capitalist mode of production is crucially 
more than the sphere of circulation, but for now, let us hold to circulation.)  I would like 
now to emphasize three main points of similarity: (1) For Hegel substance as totality 
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inheres in all individual entities and constitutes them. For Marx, commodities are values, 
only insofar as they are “crystals of the common substance” (MEW 23:52, C I:128). This 
common substance is human-labor, but only insofar as it is mediated by and defined 
through the sphere of circulation188. The value of a commodity for Marx is not 
determined by the time of its individual production, but by virtue of the “socially 
necessary labor time” for its production. This means that the value of a commodity for 
Marx is determined not in isolation, but only in relation to the totality of the sphere of 
circulation. (2) For Hegel, substance is not an inert thing, but sustains itself through its 
constant renewal and reproduction. For Marx, the sphere of circulation is not a pre-given 
inert totality, but is “a process, a fluid whole of purchases and sales” [ein Prozess, ein 
flüssiges  Ganze von Kaüfen und Verkaüfen] (MEW 42:126, G 196). That is, for Marx 
the dynamism of circulation is the prerequisite of its very identity. (3) For Hegel, 
substance obtains by the interaction of individuals; nonetheless, it paradoxically retains 
its independent existence, despite the individuals. For Marx, the interaction of individuals 
produces the sphere of circulation, which is independent from the individuals, and exerts 
absolute power over them. I will elaborately discuss this third point later in the chapter. 
 
2-3- Capital as the True Totality 
True that Marx begins with the sphere of circulation, but it is altogether wrong to 
magnify circulation to the exclusion of the sphere of production. Indeed, Marx asserts 
                                                        
188 Note that, for Marx, the human-labor that is value-constituting is “abstract labor”. Abstract 
labor is that aspect of labor that retroactively obtains through the process of circulation of 
commodities. The determination of abstract labor in Capital is a bone of contention in scholarship 
on Marx. I am following Michael Heinrich on this issue. See (Heinrich: 1999, S.208ff), and 
(Heinrich: 1994) 
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that circulation is only the “first totality [erste Totalität] among economic categories” 
(MEW 42:127, G 197). Reconstructing Marx solely with focus on the sphere of 
circulation would bring Marx too close to the current mainstream economic paradigm 
with its deification of market189. We need, therefore, to re-examine Marx’s conception of 
totality, and see how he develops the totality of capital out of the totality of circulation. 
In the Introduction to the Grundrisse – a text that has been rightfully dubbed as 
“Marx’s Discourse on Method” (Carver: 1975) – Marx analytically separates four major 
spheres within economy: production, distribution, exchange and consumption. According 
to Marx, “production creates the object which correspond to the given needs; distribution 
divides them up according to social laws; exchange further parcels out the already 
divided shares in accord with individual needs; and finally in consumption the product 
steps outside this social movement and becomes a direct object and servant of individual 
need, and satisfies it in being consumed” (MEW 42:24, G 89). Marx then undertakes an 
exposition of these spheres to demonstrate that they are all tightly interconnected, and 
each reacts upon others and determines them. In the end of the analysis, he asserts: 
The conclusion we reach is not that production, distribution, exchange and 
consumption are identical, but that they all form the members of a totality, 
distinctions within a unity. Production predominates not only over itself, in the 
oppositional definition of production, but over the other moments as well […]. A 
definite production thus determines a definite consumption, distribution and 
                                                        
189 This is also a decisive point of difference between Marx and Adorno. Whereas for Marx, as we 
shall see, the dominating element in economy is clearly the sphere of production, for Adorno – 
with his exaggerated emphasis on the “principle of exchange”, and pursuing its ramification in 
culture and in psychology – the sphere of circulation is the determining element. There are some 
passages in Adorno, which suggest that Adorno is aware of the primacy of production for Marx, 
but because of his eclectic and unsystematic style of philosophizing, it is difficult to discern what 
exactly the role of production for him is.   
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exchange as well as definite relations between these different moments. (MEW 
42:34, G 99, Marx’s emphases)190 
According to Marx, production, distribution, exchange and consumption are “moments” 
of an “organic whole” [organischen Ganzen] and “mutual interaction” [Wechselwirkung] 
takes place between them (ibid). This means that distribution, exchange and consumption 
all have an effect on production and determine it. Yet, despite the close inter-connection 
of all the four moments, it is ultimately the sphere of production that is the “dominating 
“ factor [das Übergreifende], and determines the economy as a whole.  
The language that Marx uses is quite unambiguous, and leaves no doubt about the 
primacy of production for him191. The issue is now why production predominates the 
whole economy and determines other moments. In order to understand the primacy of 
production for Marx, let me first simplify Marx’s tetrapartite model of economy: Firstly, 
the sphere of distribution and exchange closely belong to each other, and together 
                                                        
190 “Das Resultat, wozu wir gelangen, ist nicht, daß Produktion, Distribution, Austausch 
Konsumtion identisch sind, sondern daß sie alle Glieder einer Totalität bilden, Unterschiede 
innerhalb einer Einheit. Die Produktion greift über, sowohl über sich in der gegensätzlichen 
Bestimmung der Produktion als über die andren Momente.. Eine bestimmte Produktion bestimmt 
also bestimmte Konsumtion, Distribution, Austausch, die bestimmten Verhältnisse dieser 
verschiedenen Momente zueinander.” 
191 Cf. with other places in the same text: (1) (Regarding the relation of production and 
consumption) “The important thing to emphasize here is only that, whether production and 
consumption are viewed as the activity of one or of many individuals, they appear in any case as 
moments of one process, in which production is the real point of departure and hence also the 
predominant moment.” (MEW 42:29, G 94) (2) (Regarding the relation of production and 
distribution) “The structure of distribution is completely determined by the structure of 
production. Distribution is itself a product of production, not only in its object, in that only the 
results of production can be distributed, but also in its form, in that the specific kind of 
participation in production determines the specific form of distribution.”(MEW 42:30, G 94) (3) 
(Regarding the relation of production and exchange) “In so far as exchange is merely a moment 
mediating between production with its production-determined distribution on one side and 
consumption on the other, but in so far as the latter itself appears as a moment of production, to 
that extent is exchange obviously also included as a moment within the latter.” (MEW 42:33, G, 
99) 
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constitute the moments of the sphere of circulation. So, we can substitute them with 
circulation. Secondly, the sphere of consumption, strictly speaking, does not belong to 
political economy proper, which deals with understanding the economic laws and 
regularities governing the movement of modern society. The act of consumption, for 
Marx, is an individual and isolated act, through which the product “steps outside the 
social movement” and gets consumed. True, consumption is a necessary presupposition 
of economy – without consumption there cannot be any production or circulation – but 
because of the chaotic nature of consumption, there cannot be any scientific law 
explaining it192. All in all, we can assert that for Marx economy, insofar as its structure 
and regularity is concerned, is mainly constructed by the two spheres of production and 
distribution. The task is now to understand why production dominates circulation, and 
how the two interact with each other. Marx gives (at least) two arguments why 
production is the determining sphere, what can be called the materialist or physicalist 
argument (2-3-1), and the economic or theoretical argument (2-3-2). He gives the first 
argument in his 1857/8 unpublished manuscript, the so-called Grundrisse, but he later 
abandons it in his 1867 Capital. The second argument is his pivotal argument, and is 
developed in both works.   
 
                                                        
192 It is exactly for this reason that Marx in the first page of Capital bans the study of various use-
values from the sphere of political economy, and asserts that the “discovery” of the use-values is 
a “work of history” [geschichtliche Tat]. “The use-values of commodities”, Marx emphasizes, 
“provide the material for a special branch of knowledge, namely the commercial knowledge of 
commodities [Warenkunde]”, which is obviously not political economy (MEW 23:50, C I:126-7). 
See also the following passage from his Results of the Immediate Process of Production: “To take 
the use-value first, its particular content, its further determination, was completely irrelevant to 
the determination of the commodity. The article destined to be a commodity, and hence the 
incarnation of exchange-value, had to gratify some social want or other, and had therefore to 
possess some useful qualities. Voila tout [That’s all].” (Results p979, Resultate:56-7) 
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2-3-1- The Materialist or Physicalist Argument 
 According to Marx, in the process of exchange,  
The repetition of the process from either of the points, money or commodity, is 
not posited within the conditions of exchange itself. The act can be repeated only 
until it is completed, i.e. until the amount of the exchange value is exchanged 
away. It cannot ignite itself anew through its own resources. Circulation therefore 
does not carry within itself the principle of self-renewal. The moments of the latter 
are presupposed to it, not posited by it. Commodities constantly have to be 
thrown into it anew from the outside, like fuel into a fire. Otherwise it flickers out 
in indifference. (MEW 42:179-80, G: 254, Marx’s emphases) 
Obviously, circulation cannot produce any products; it can function only insofar as 
products of labor are produced outside it, and then thrown into it to be circulated. Money, 
which mediates between commodities in circulation, can only have economic and social 
significance, Marx asserts, if circulation is related to the sphere of production. Marx 
concludes,  
Circulation, therefore, which appears as that which is immediately present on the 
surface of bourgeois society, exists only in so far as it is constantly mediated. 
Looked at in itself, it is the mediation of presupposed extremes. But it does not 
posit these extremes. Thus, it has to be mediated not only in each of its moments, 
but as a whole of mediation, as a total process itself. Its immediate being is 
therefore pure semblance. It is the phenomenon of a process taking place behind it. 
[Ihr unmittelbares Sein ist daher reiner Schein. Sie ist das Phänomen eines hinter 
ihr vorgehenden Prozesses.] (Marx’s own emphases, ibid)  
Here Marx, using the language of the logic of essence, asserts that circulation 
presupposes production, and this presupposition circulation cannot posit itself. For Marx, 
therefore, circulation is not sufficient on its own, and so, “circulation itself returns back 
into the activity which posits or produces exchange values. It returns into it as its own 
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ground” (MEW 42:180, G 255). We can recapitulate Marx’s argument in the following 
way:  
1- Circulation cannot produce the commodities between which circulation obtains.  
2- Therefore, it needs the sphere of production, within which commodities are 
produced. 
3- Therefore, production determines (or “predominates”) circulation. 
The argument is unconvincing. While Marx is justified in drawing (2) from (1), he is not 
at all justified to draw (3) from (2). True that circulation necessarily requires production 
in order to sustain itself, but this does not mean that production predominates circulation. 
It might well be the case that circulation predominates production, or else neither of the 
two is predominating. Consider that in contemporary capitalism, there are some major 
distributive corporations (such as Walmart or Ikea) that determine the process of 
production (say, in China). The materialist or physicalist reason that circulation requires 
production does not entitle Marx to draw the conclusion that circulation is economically 
predominated by production. 193 Perhaps Marx was aware of the insufficiency of the 
argument that he omitted it in Capital. 
 
2-3-2- The Economic or Theoretical Argument 
According to Marx, a defining feature of capitalism is constant creation of surplus-value 
(or profit). In Capital, Marx begins his analysis with the sphere of circulation, as a 
necessary moment of the totality of economy. His aim is to show how production, 
conceptually, “emerges from the chrysalis” [entpuppt] of circulation (MEW 23:170, C I: 
                                                        
193 See also Harvey (2012:14ff), who offers a similar argument about the inadequacy of the 
physicalist reading. The example of Walmart is also Harvey’s. 
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258).  The argument is simple and straightforward: “Circulation, or the exchange of 
commodities creates no surplus value”, for the simple reason that in the sphere of 
circulation only commodities of the same value get exchanged (MEW 23:178, C I:266).  
The individual seller might be able to cheat the individual buyer, but such act of cheating 
is only able to change the distribution of value. If we take into account, however, the 
totality of economy, it is evident that circulation, with its principle of exchange of 
equivalents, cannot produce any surplus-value. According to Marx,  
Capital cannot therefore arise from circulation, and it is equally impossible for it 
to arise apart from circulation. It must have its origin both in circulation and not in 
circulation. (MEW 23: 180, C I:268) 
Marx calls this state of affair “contradiction in the general formula of capital”. On the one 
hand, the very existence of capital is dependent on circulation of commodities; if there 
were no circulation, the products of labor would remain personal, and would not enter 
into social metabolism. On the other hand, as we have learned, circulation by itself 
cannot produce surplus value, as in circulation only the equivalents get exchanged. It is 
out of the scope of this dissertation to explain in detail Marx’s solution to this so-called 
“contradiction” in the general formula, but the solution briefly is the following: There is 
one specific commodity, which gets exchanged at its full value in the sphere of 
circulation, but has the capacity to produce more value than what it already embodies. 
This specific commodity is “labor-power”, Marx asserts, “whose use-value possesses the 
peculiar property of being a source of value, whose actual consumption is therefore itself 
an objectification of labor, hence a creation of value” (MEW 23:181, C I:270). That is to 
say, labor-power saddles between the sphere of circulation and the sphere of production. 
Insofar as its exchange value is concerned, it gets exchanged within the sphere of 
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circulation and strictly follows the law of exchange of the equivalents. Insofar as its use-
value is concerned, it falls outside the sphere of circulation, and within the sphere of 
production; since use-value of labor-power is production of value itself.  
 Note how Marx dialectically derives production from the conceptual 
insufficiencies unveiled in the exposition of circulation. Circulation cannot, on its own, 
yield surplus value. The inadequacy of the sphere of circulation leads to the derivation of  
the totality of capital, which is the unity of circulation and production. Although both 
moments – circulation and production – are constitutive of capital, it is the production 
that is the pre-dominating moment. For, it is through the sphere of production that surplus 
value is created. We can now make sense of Marx’s enigmatic phrase, cited earlier, that 
production, not only predominates circulation, but also it “predominates […] over itself, 
in the oppositional definition of production” (MEW 42:34, G 99). For Marx, production 
in capitalism is necessarily constituted by two moments: the process of producing use-
values (shoes, computers, food, etc), and the process of producing surplus-value (or 
profit). That production predominates over itself means that in capitalism it is the 
production of surplus-value that determines the production of use-values. To return to the 
case of Walmart and Ikea, we can say that, although it is these distributive corporations 
that might organize the production process, it is the creation of surplus value in the sphere 
of production that is ultimately the defining feature of economy. We should, therefore, 
conclude that the reason that production predominates circulation is economical, and is 
not due to Marx’s so-called materialism. 
 Marx begins his analysis with the exposition of the sphere of circulation to show 
that this “first totality” is only a “pure semblance” [reiner Schein] (See the quoted 
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passage from the Grundrisse above). As I have explained in detail in the first chapter, the 
sphere of circulation, i.e. the market, is that which immediately appears to individuals in 
capitalism. The principle of the sphere of circulation is exchange of equivalents; it is 
through circulation that individuals get the idea that they are equal and free. However, the 
immediate appearance of circulation is a pure semblance, as it hides the sphere of 
production, which is the locus of exploitation, unfreedom and inequality. Although we 
cannot directly translate Marx’s economic theory into Hegel’s logic, it is fair to say that 
the sphere of circulation accords to Hegel’s logic of being, and the transition from 
circulation to production is akin to the transition from the logic of being to the logic of 
essence. For Hegel, we have learned previously, essence does not exclude being, but 
integrates it within its very structure. Similarly for Marx, production does not exclude 
circulation, but integrates circulation into itself. The essence of capitalism is capital, 
which is the unity of production and circulation, in such a way that it is ultimately 
production that is the determining sphere. 
 
2-4- Capital as the Dialectical Unity of Circulation and Production  
Marx’s conception of capital as the dialectical unity of production and circulation is 
greatly influenced by Hegel’s conception of essence as the dialectical unity of essence 
and appearance. The essence of capital, for Marx, is creation of surplus-value which 
occurs in the sphere of production. However, the value created in production is of no 
avail, unless it appears in the market. We can summarize the main points of the 
dialectical conception of essence and appearance in Hegel and in Marx in the following 
way: (1) For Hegel, “essence must appear” (EnzL. §131, my emphasis). If essence does 
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not appear, it ceases to be essence. For Marx, the value created in the sphere of 
production must be “realized” [verwirklicht] in the market. If the product of labor, which 
already contains value, cannot be sold on the market, it loses its entire value. (2) For 
Hegel, essence does not exclude appearance. Essence rather is constituted through the 
relation of essence and appearance. In other words, appearance functions as a necessary 
moment of the totality of essence. For Marx, production does not exclude circulation. 
Rather, capital qua the totality of production is the unity of production and circulation. 
Thus, circulation functions as a necessary moment of the totality of production.194 (3) For 
Hegel, although it is essence that determines appearance, nonetheless, appearance retains 
some degree of independence, such that it can undergo changes on its own accord. The 
changes in appearance can potentially react back on essence, and forces essence to re-
adjust and re-define itself as essence. The same dynamic conception of the relation of 
essence and appearance holds for Marx. Although it is production that defines the market 
or circulation, nonetheless, the market or circulation is not simply, as it were, a slave of 
production. Rather, the market to some extent remains independent, such that the changes 
in the market can potentially force production to adjust itself to the demands of the 
market.195 (4) For Hegel, there is always the possibility of mistranslation between 
essence and appearance. Something which purportedly was essential, upon its appearing, 
                                                        
194 This point – that production is constituted through the relation of production to circulation – 
also explains why Marx uses the term production in two ways, one narrower, the other broader. 
The narrower conception refers to the sphere of production, while the broader refers to “relations 
of production” as the unity of production and circulation.  
195 In the first chapter, I explained how for Marx the market (and correspondingly, equality and 
freedom that obtains through it) is a “semblance” that conceals essence. There is no inconsistency 
involved here. If circulation is regarded as self-standing by itself, or simply as all that there is, it 
indeed functions as “semblance” [Schein]. But if the market is derived from the structure of 
capital, and is accordingly related to the sphere of production in a constitutive way, then 
circulation functions as the true expression of essence, namely as its appearance [Erscheinung].  
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might prove to be unessential. The same holds for Marx. A commodity that is produced 
with a certain value might be sold with a lesser or greater value, or even might lose its 
entire value if it cannot be sold.  The logic of the market, to some degree, reacts back on 
the sphere of production, and retroactively determines what counts as essential in 
production.  
The dialectical conception of capital as the unity of production and circulation 
underpins Marx’s complex architectonic of presentation in Capital. While Marx in the 
entirety of Capital deals with capital as the unity of production and circulation, his 
emphasis changes. In the first volume, called “the process of production of capital”, Marx 
focuses on production, which is the essence of capitalism. Correspondingly, he 
presupposes that circulation works smoothly, and therefore there is no value created in 
production that cannot be realized (sold) in the market. By abstracting from the sphere of 
circulation, Marx thereby manages to elaborate on issues specifically related to 
production such as the length of working day, the influence of struggle of workers on the 
working day, the machinery and technological innovation in production, etc. By contrast, 
in the second volume, called “the process of circulation of capital”, Marx 
methodologically abstracts from production to elaborate on the appearance of capital in 
the market. By doing so, he thereby discusses issues related to the sphere of circulation 
that cannot be discussed in the framework of the first volume, issues such as the effect of 
circulation time on production or the blockages in circulation that could potentially halt 
the process of production.  Finally, it is in the third volume, called “the process of 
capitalist production as a whole” that Marx discusses capital as the dialectical unity of 
production and circulation, and develops the concrete issues, such as the tendency of the 
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general rate of profit to fall, that can only be explained on the basis of addressing capital 
in its totality. 196 
For Hegel, we have learned, the dialectic of essence and appearance is 
insufficient; since the two totalities of essence and appearance, although interrelated, 
remain ultimately distinct from each other, and the relation between them cannot be 
adequately determined. In Hegel’s logic, the category that follows the dialectic of essence 
and appearance is “actuality”. Actuality is a unity of the determining (essence) and the 
determined (appearance). In other words, actuality has the ability to determine itself, and 
by doing so, be determinate. Thus, actuality for Hegel has a self-referential character. 
Hegel writes,   
Actuality is the unity of essence and existence [Existenz], of inner and outer, that 
has immediately come to be. The expression [Äußerung] of the actual is the actual 
itself, so that in the expression it remains something equally essential and is 
something essential only insofar as it is in immediate external existence. (EnzL. 
§142) 
                                                        
196 In the beginning of the third volume, Marx very clearly lays bare the structure of the book as a 
whole: “In Volume 1 we investigated the phenomena exhibited by the process of capitalist 
production, taken by itself, i.e. the immediate production process, in which connection all 
secondary influences external to this process were left out of account. But this immediate 
production process does not exhaust the life cycle of capital. In the world as it actually is, it is 
supplemented by the process of circulation, and this formed our object of investigation in the 
second volume. Here we showed, particularly in Part Three, where we considered the circulation 
process as it mediates the process of social reproduction, that the capitalist production process, 
taken as a whole, is a unity of the production and circulation processes. It cannot be the purpose 
of the present, third volume simply to make general reflections on this unity. Our concern is 
rather to discover and present the concrete forms which grow out of the process of capital’s 
movement considered as a whole. In their actual movement, capitals confront one another in 
certain concrete forms, and, in relation to these, both the shape capital assumes in the immediate 
production process and its shape in the process of circulation appear merely as particular 
moments.” (MEW 25:33, C III:117). 
 243 
As in actuality the determining and the determined are one and the same, actuality is 
effectively the cause of itself. That is, actuality has a sui generis character, it is able to 
reproduce and maintain itself. Although Marx does not explicitly refer to Hegel’s 
actuality, as I will show in the following, his account of capital is greatly influenced by 
Hegel.197 Indeed Marx solves the problem of unity of two distinct totalities of production 
and circulation through his conception of the “circuit” [Kreislauf] of capital. For Marx, it 
is precisely the circuit of capital that gives capital a self-referential character, and makes 
it sui generis. I will discuss the circuit of capital below. 
 
2-5- The Sui Generis Character of Capital: The “Circuit” of Capital 
According to Marx, capital takes on the following circuit [Kreislauf]198: 
M-C (MP, and L)….P…C’-M’ 
Capitalism, to use a phrase from Piero Sraffa, is a system of “production of commodities 
by means of commodities”. In the formula above, M stands for the initial money that is 
advanced. This money is used to purchase two sets of commodities: means of production 
(MP) and labor-power (L). Through the process of production (P), which involves labor 
process, a new kind of commodity (C’) is produced. As surplus-value is created through 
the process of production, the new commodity has more value than the value of MP and 
                                                        
197 See also (Sekine 1984 I:454-5), and (Bell 2009:91), who argue that capital as the unity of 
production and circulation accords to Hegel’s actuality.  
198 The term “circuit” [Kreislauf] has to be distinguished from the term “circulation” 
[Zirkulation]. While the latter refers to the process of buying and selling commodities that are 
already produced, the former describes the circular motion of capital as a whole. (See Bell 
2009:82) 
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L combined. The value of new commodity is realized, when it is sold on the market, and 
results in the return of money (M’), which is more than the initial money advanced.  
 For Marx, capital is this process of “valorization of value” [Verwertung des 
Wertes]; the value that is initially advanced (in the form of M) gets augmented in the end 
of the process (in the form of M’). Classical political economy has a reified conception of 
capital; capital for classical political economy is some “stock” of either money or 
commodities. In contrast, Marx defines capital in a relational way. Capital is not money 
in isolation, or commodities or means of production in isolation, or the activity of 
production in isolation, but the movement that relates all of them together. More precisely, 
for Marx capital is a “value in process” [prozessierender Wert] (MEW 23: 170, C I: 256) 
that successively takes on the form of money, production, and commodity. Marx uses the 
phrase “metamorphoses of capital” [Die Metamorphosen des Kapitals] to explain the 
transformation of capital: A butterfly changes its form from larva, to chrysalis, to moth, 
while remaining the same butterfly through its metamorphosis. Similarly, capital for 
Marx changes its form from money, to production, to commodity, while remaining 
capital throughout the movement.  Importantly, for Marx capital is not a one-time activity 
of investment and making surplus-value (or profit), but the incessant and infinite process 
of re-investing the surplus-value (or profit) already made. Capital, Marx writes, 
is constantly changing from one form into the other, without becoming lost in this 
movement; it thus becomes transformed into an automatic subject. If we pin down 
the specific forms of appearance assumed in turn by self-valorizing value in the 
circuit of its life, we reach the following elucidation: capital is money, capital is 
commodities. In truth, however, value is here the subject of a process in which, 
while constantly assuming the form in turn of money and commodities, it changes 
its own magnitude, throws off surplus value from itself considered as original 
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value, and thus valorizes itself independently. For the movement in the course of 
which it adds surplus-value is its own movement, its valorization is therefore self-
valorization (MEW 23:169, C I:255). 
For Marx, therefore, money, commodities and productive activity are not externally 
related; rather each functions as a moment of capital, which is “the dominant subject” 
[das übergreifendes Subjekt] that relates them all. Thus, while (say) money is 
transformed into commodities, it is in fact capital that transforms itself from one shape to 
another. While clearly having Hegel in mind, Marx emphasize that capital is 
a self-moving substance [sich selbst bewegende Substanz] which passes through a 
process of its own, and for which commodities and money are both mere forms. 
But there is more to come: instead of simply representing the relations of 
commodities, it now enters into a private relationship with itself, as it were. It 
differentiates itself as original value from itself as surplus-value, just as God the 
Father differentiates himself from himself as God the Son, although both are of 
the same age and form, in fact one single person; for only by the surplus-value of 
£10 does the £100 originally advanced become capital, and as soon as this has 
happened, as soon as the son has been created and, through the son, the father, 
their difference vanishes again, and both become one, £110. (MEW 23:16, C 
I:256). 
It is noteworthy that Marx here is distancing himself from his earlier nominalist positions. 
While in his youth, Marx regarded concepts to be mere mental abstractions copied from 
external reality, in his mature period he becomes, in the case of the concept of capital, a 
conceptual realist; the concept of capital, although being abstract, is real and effective in 
the world. Marx writes, 
Those who consider the autonomization [Verselbständigung] of value as a mere 
abstraction forget that the movement of industrial capital is this abstraction in 
action. Here value passes through different forms, different movements in which 
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it is both preserved and increases, is valorized. (MEW 24: 109, C II:185, my 
emphasis) 
We see clearly that Marx’s conception of capital closely echoes Hegel’s conception of 
actuality. While for Hegel, actuality is the “self-moving of form” (EnzL. §147) that has 
the power to organize and reorganize itself, for Marx, capital is a “self-moving totality” 
[sich bewegendes Ganze] (MEW 24:106, C II:182) that has power to repeat and sustain 
itself. While for Hegel actuality is not a petrified thing, and its identity obtains solely 
through its motion, for Marx, capital “can only be grasped as a movement, and not as a 
static thing” (MEW 24: 109, C II:185).  
 For Marx, “continuity is the characteristic feature of capitalist production” (MEW 
24:106, C II:182). Of course, there is some sort of continuity in previous societies 
(insofar as social life is reproduced in those societies), yet the continuity in capitalism is 
more intense, and more importantly, has a qualitatively different character. In subsistence 
economies, the primary goal of production is satisfaction of needs. When the needs are 
met, the production of goods ceases. By contrast, in capitalism the primary goal of 
production is valorization of value (or profit making). Since there is neither an end nor a 
measure to valorization of value, production never stops; it continues ad infinitum. 
Continuity therefore in capitalism acquires an autonomous character, independently of 
the fulfillment of needs. From the ontological point of view, it is exactly the continuity of 
the process of valorization of value that makes capital a unity.  It is only if different forms 
of capital – i.e., money, production, and commodity – continuously succeed each other 
that at any given time the different forms could coexist with each other. “The coexistence 
[of different forms of capital] is itself only the result of the succession.” [Das 
Nebeneinander ist selbst nur Resultat des Nacheinander] (MEW 24: 107, C II:183), Marx 
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writes.199 That identity of capital is solely achieved through the continuity of its different 
moments implies that an interruption in any of the moments disrupts the function of 
capital as a whole. Thus, if commodity that is produced cannot be sold (through, say, lack 
of effective demand), or if the process of production is interrupted (say, through strike of 
the workers), or if money is available but the raw materials or means of production 
cannot be bought (say, through problems in transportation, or through political sanctions), 
the whole process comes to a halt. This point – that any disruption in any part of the 
circuit affects the whole circuit – has important implications for Marx’s theory of crises, 
as well as for anti-capitalist struggles that aim to combat the autonomy of capital. 
Explication of these implications of course lies beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
The incessant continuity of the circuit of capital gives it a further feature. As 
capital for Marx is a self-repeating movement, properly speaking, there is no beginning 
or end to capital.  In Capital Volume II, Marx elaborately discusses three different circuits 
of capital, as they appear to agents involved in production: (1) “Money capital”, which 
begins with money, and ends with more money. The formula is already mentioned above: 
M-C….P…C’-M’. Money capital is thus money that begets more money. (2) “Productive 
capital”, which begins with production and ends with production, and has thus the 
following formula: P…C’—M’—C…P. (3) “Commodity capital” which begins with 
                                                        
199 A very clear statement is the following: “As a whole, then, the capital is simultaneously 
present, and spatially coexistent, in its various phases. But each part is constantly passing from 
one phase or functional form into another, and thus functions in all of them in turn. The forms are 
therefore fluid forms, and their simultaneity is mediated by their succession. [Die Formen sind so 
fließende Formen, deren Gleichzeitigkeit durch ihr Nacheinander vermittelt ist.] Each form both 
follows and precedes the others, so that the return of one part of the capital to one form is 
determined by the return of another part to another form. Each part continuously describes its 
own course, but it is always another part of capital that finds itself in this form, and these 
particular circuits simply constitute simultaneous and successive moments of the overall process. 
(MEW 24:108,CII:184, my emphasis) 
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commodity impregnated with surplus-value and ends with another commodity, and has 
the following formula: C’—M’—C…P…C’. We can understand better the three different 
forms of capital if we consider it from the point of view of the agents involved in the 
economic process. From the point of view of financial capitalist, capital is investing 
money to draw more money (Circuit 1). From the point of view of industrial capitalist, 
capital is the incessant production of commodities that can be sold on the market (Circuit 
2). From the point of view of commercial capitalist, capital consists in continuously 
buying and selling commodities (Circuit 3). Objectively speaking, capital is the constant 
renewal of the whole process that does not have any beginning or end. In fact, Marx 
writes, “the entire circuit [of capital] is the actual unity of its three forms”(MEW 24:105, 
C II:181). But subjectively speaking, capital may appear to the capitalists (depending on 
their position) to be money capital, or commodity capital, or productive capital. Marx 
thus writes,  
In a constantly rotating orbit, every point is simultaneously a starting-point and a 
point of return…. Thus we have seen that not only does every particular circuit 
(implicitly) presuppose the others, but also that the repetition of the circuit in one 
form includes the motions which have to take place in the other forms of the 
circuit. Thus the entire distinction presents itself as merely one of form, a merely 




                                                        
200 Also: “If we take all three forms together, then all the presuppositions of the process appear as 
its result, as presuppositions produced by the process itself. Each moment appears as a point of 
departure, of transit, and of return. The total process presents itself as the unity of the process of 
production and the process of circulation; the production process is the mediator of the circulation 
process, and vice versa.” (MEW 24:104, C II:180) 
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2-6- The Point of View of Totality and the Critique of Ideology [Schein] 
In Chapter One, I argued that one prominent form of ideology is the confusion of 
semblance with essence. Ideological thinking arises from everyday consciousness that 
takes the seeming as self-standing by itself, and in so doing effectively regards the 
seeming to be all there is. I also argued that ideology is the “interfolding of the true and 
the false” (Adorno’s phrase). The ideological judgment is factually true, but it becomes 
one-sided, and therefore, false, when it is considered in relation to the totality of essence. 
In the current context, the development of the concept of capital – as a totality consisting 
of the three circuits of commodity capital, money capital and productive capital – offers 
Marx an opportunity to criticize two prominent instances of ideological thought in 
classical political economy, that of the mercantilists (2-6-1), and that of the physiocrats. 
(2-6-2) Here, I do not intend to discuss the function of these ideologies in their historical 
context, namely, how mercantilism represented the interests of the rising class of 
merchants, and how physiocracy represented the interests of feudal landlords in the 
context of emerging capitalism. What I intend to do is to look at Marx’s scientific critique 
of these ideologies at the theoretical level.  
 
2-6-1- The Critique of the Ideology of Mercantilism 
The mercantilists believed that the real source of wealth is money, and it is money that 
procures more money. Mercantilists, according to Marx, were of three types (in 
increasing order of sophistication). (i) The first group believed that money has the 
capacity to beget more money without any intermediary (M—M’), i.e. through interest. 
(ii) The second group believed that the main source of wealth is trade, that is to say, 
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through buying cheap and selling dear (M-C-M’). (iii) The third group, which historically 
came with burgeoning of industry, accepted the necessity of production, yet still believed 
that it is ultimately money that is the real source of wealth; production is only a means for  
creation of money.201 Marx criticizes the “crude realism” of the first two types, with the 
simple argument already mentioned, namely that circulation can only change the 
distribution of wealth; it cannot produce wealth. For Marx, these two types, which do not 
see the necessity of the sphere of production for creation of wealth, are ideologies of the 
purest sort. About the third form, Marx writes, 
The formula M-C…P…C’–M’, with the result M’= M+m [i.e. surplus value], 
contains in its form a certain deception [Täuschung]; it bears an illusory character 
[illusorischen Charakter] that derives from the existence of the advanced and 
valorized value in its equivalent form, in money. What is emphasized is not the 
valorization of the value, but the money form of this process, the fact that more 
value in the money form is finally withdrawn from the circulation sphere than was 
originally advanced to it, i.e. the increase in the mass of gold and silver belonging 
to the capitalist. (MEW 24:66, C II:140) 
It is true, according to Marx, that in capitalism money can beget money through interest, 
                                                        
201 In the following passage, Marx regards mercantilism to be of two types, the first type that 
corresponds to group (i) and (ii) in my exposition, he calls “Monetary System”. The second type 
which corresponds to the group (iii) in my exposition, he calls “the Mercantile System”: “The 
Monetary System had understood the autonomy of value only in the form in which it arose from 
simple circulation – money; it therefore made this abstract form of wealth into the exclusive 
object of nations which just then entering into the period in which the gaining of wealth as such 
appeared as the aim of society itself. Then came the Mercantile System, an epoch where 
industrial capital and hence wage labor arose in manufactures, and developed in antithesis to and 
at the expense of non-industrial wealth, of feudal landed property. [The Mercantile System] 
already have faint notions of money as capital, but actually again only in the form of money, of 
the circulation of mercantile capital, of capital which transforms itself into money. Industrial 
capital has value for them, even the highest value – as a means, not as wealth itself in its 
productive process – because it creates mercantile capital and the latter, via circulation, becomes 
money. (G:327-8) 
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that trade can procure money, that investment can be profitable, but all these presuppose 
capitalist mode of production in its totality, and that with its specific capital-class relation. 
That is to say, although the fact that the circuit of money-capital can produce more 
money is true, nonetheless if this fact is regarded as self-standing, and in isolation from 
the circuit of capital in its entirety (which includes also productive capital and commodity 
capital), the very same fact becomes false. Thus, the forgetfulness of the point of view of 
totality is exactly the source of the ideology of mercantilism with its deification of money. 
Marx writes, 
The illusory character of M-C…P…C’–M’, and the corresponding illusory 
significance it is given, is there as soon as this form is regarded as the sole form 
[sobald diese Form als einmalige fixiert wird], not as one that flows and is 
constantly repeated; i.e. as soon as it is taken not just as one of the forms of the 
circuit, but rather as its exclusive form. However, [in truth] it [i.e. this form] itself 
refers to other forms. (MEW 24:66-7, C II:141-2, my emphasis) 
 
2-6-2- The Critique of the Ideology of Physiocracy 
According to the physiocrats, the only source of wealth is agriculture. For them, trade and 
industry only transfer the value already created in agriculture. Marx criticizes physiocrats, 
as they did not see that labor in general is the source of value, and restricted productive 
activities only to agriculture. Yet at the same time, he highly praises them; since,  
the physiocrats transferred the inquiry into the origin of surplus value from the 
sphere of circulation into to the sphere of immediate production, and thereby laid 
the foundation for the analysis of capitalist production. (Theories of Surplus Value, 
Vol. 1, MEW 26.1:14, MECW 30:354)  
However, the physiocrats made the mirror image error of the mercantilists. Whereas the 
 252 
mercantilists believed that it is circulation alone that is the source of value, the 
physiocrats believed that it is production alone that is the source of value. (Thus, the 
formula of physiocracy is P…P’). It is no surprise that they considered solely agriculture 
to be the source of value, since agriculture is “that branch of production which can be 
thought of in complete separation from and independently of circulation, of exchange; 
and which presupposes exchange not between man and man, but only between man and 
nature”  (MEW 26.1:19, MECW 30:358). Indeed, the physiocrats ascribed the capacity of 
agriculture to create surplus value to the intrinsic fertility of the soil, and therefore as  “a 
gift of nature” (MECW 30:361, MEW 26.1:22) (See also Roncaglia 2005:97). That is, by 
excluding circulation from their analysis, the physiocrats in effect disregarded the social 
character of production. Their economic theory is therefore a natural economic theory. It 
cannot grasp the historical specificity of capitalist mode of production, which is based on 
the universalization of the relations of exchange. According to Marx, it is true that 
production is the source of wealth, but if this true fact is regarded in isolation from the 
process of circulation, it becomes ideological and false. To conclude, for Marx, both 
mercantilism and physiocracy are ideology, since they fixate or reify the seeming, and do 
not see it as a moment of total social process.202  
 
2-7- The Sui Generis Character of Capital: The “Reproduction” of Capital 
We have learned that capital has the capacity of self-repetition and self-replacement. We 
have learned that this makes capital akin to Hegel’s actuality. On further reflection, 
                                                        
202 For a helpful discussion of Marx’s critique of mercantilism and physiocracy, See Elster 
(1985:494ff). 
 253 
however, we need to qualify these claims. The individual capital, on its own, is not able 
to reproduce itself, as it needs to purchase means of production and consumer goods from 
other capitals. It also needs to sell its products to other capitals. The individual capitals 
are therefore all interlinked with each other, and together constitute “total social capital” 
[das gesellschaftliche Gesamtkapital]. Although the individual capital has some degree of 
autonomy, its autonomy is eventually dependent on the total social capital. Marx thus 
writes,  
But each individual capital forms only a fraction of the total social capital, a 
fraction that has acquired independence and been endowed with individual life, so 
to speak, just as each individual capitalist is no more than an element of the 
capitalist class. The movement of the social capital is made up of the totality of 
movements of these autonomous fractions, the turnovers of the individual capitals. 
Just as the metamorphosis of the individual commodity is but one term in the 
series of metamorphoses of the commodity world as a whole, of commodity 
circulation, so the metamorphosis of the individual capital, its turnover, is a single 
term in the circuit of the social capital. (MEW 24:351-2, C II:437) 
In Part III of Capital Volume II, Marx undertakes a close analysis of the circulation 
process of total social capital, what he calls the “reproduction” [Reproduktion] of capital. 
It is in reproduction of capital that the “actuality” of capital in its full sense obtains. The 
reproduction of capital is therefore the true totality of capital, and regressively provides 
the bedrock for other determinations discussed so far203. It is at the level of the total 
social capital that the sui generis character of capital in its adequate form obtains. We 
                                                        
203 In philosophical works on Marx, the chapter of reproduction of capital is rarely discussed. 
This is unfortunate, as it is ultimately in reproduction of capital that the unity of capital obtains. 
In economic works on Marx, reproduction of capital is discussed at length, but the dialectical 
nature of Marx’s conception is usually ignored. It seems that the excessive disciplinary character 
of the contemporary academia cannot do justice to Marx, who was both a philosopher and an 
economist.  
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should note at the outset, however, that the relation of total social capital and individual 
capitals is by no means harmonious. The laws and regularities of the total social capital 
obtain by virtue of competition of individual capitals, through which the less profitable 
capitals are demolished. While the individual capital, therefore, is perishable, the total 
social capital continues to reproduce itself, so long as capitalism exists.  
In the reproduction of capital, Marx’s basic question is this: How capitalism, 
which is an anarchic mode of production, based on private property and private 
investment of individuals, can reproduce itself in its entirety? In lack of central economic 
planning, what does ensure the continuous growth of capitalist economy as a whole? (Cf. 
Mandel 1978:16). In posing this question, Marx’s source of inspiration was Francois 
Quesnay (1694-1774). Quesnay was an economist as well as a physician in the court of 
Louis XV. As a physician, he took a great interest in William Harvey’s discovery of the 
circulation of blood. Before Harvey, Galen’s theory was predominant for several 
centuries. For Galen (to simplify), blood is produced in the liver, and is transferred to the 
heart. The heart, then, distributes the blood to all the organs, which they consume it away. 
In Galen’s view, thus, there is a one-way street from the heart to the organs; there is no 
return of blood from the organs to the heart. For Harvey, by contrast, the nutrients enter 
to the blood and are taken away from it, but the blood is not consumed away; rather it 
moves in a closed circuit in the body. Harvey provided a detailed anatomical description 
of the heart and the circulatory system as a whole, and showed the precise mechanism of 
circulation204.  In his 1758 Tableau économique, Quesnay, inspired by Harvey’s 
                                                        
204 For a very helpful discussion of William Harvey’s discovery, and how it proved to be 
revolutionary in the history of sciences, See (Butterfield 1957: Chapter 3, 49-67). See also David 
Harvey (2013:329-330). 
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revolutionary discovery, applied the same concept to body politic. He thereby provided 
an elaborate mechanism205 to show how society as the totality of economy is reproduced 
through interconnection of its different sectors.206 Quesnay was a physiocrat, who 
believed that value is created only in agriculture. As we saw, Marx rejected that the 
source of value is in agriculture alone, yet he embraced Quesnay’s holistic way of 
thought.  
 In Marx’s reproduction schema, Marx methodologically presupposes that the 
totality of economy in capitalism is a closed system. This implies that capitalism has 
permeated the economy in its entirety; such that no segment of economy is defined by  
precapitalist (agrarian or otherwise) mode of production. Moreover, Marx presupposes 
that the state does not interfere in economy, and economy is solely regulated by 
competition of individual capitals. These two presuppositions enable Marx to carve out 
the immanent logic of the total social capital, namely, how the total social capital is 
reproduced on its own.  
 The reproduction schemas have been the subject of an intense debate, especially 
in economic books on Marx. In this space, I dare not enter into this discussion, and will 
content myself with an extremely brief sketch. Marx divides the total social capital, 
which consists of individual capitals, into two overarching departments: Department I 
produces means of production (including machinery, raw materials, energy, infrastructure, 
                                                        
205 For a brief and precise description of Quesnay’s model See, (Roncaglia 2006: 97ff.) For 
Marx’s own description and evaluation of Quesnay, See Theories of Surplus Value, Volume One, 
Chapter 6, (MEW 26-1: 282-318, MECW 31:204-240).  
206 “It is of course in Quesnay’s Tableau économique that is found the original picture of the 
system of production and consumption as a circular process, and it stands in striking contrast to 
the view presented by modern theory, of a one-way avenue that leads from ‘Factors of 
Production’ to ‘Consumption goods’.” (Sraffa 1972:93, quoted from Harvey (2013:330)) 
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etc.). Department II produces consumer goods for individual consumption of capitalists 
and workers. Department II, which produces consumer goods, must purchase the means 
of production it requires from Department I. Also, the capitalists and workers involved in 
department I must purchase the consumer goods from Department II. In order for 
economy as a whole to function properly, the two departments should be in balance with 
each other. The required balance has two aspects: (1) material aspect: Department I must 
produce as much as means of production as both departments together require. Similarly, 
Department II must produce as much as consumer goods that both departments together 
require.  (2) value aspect: Since capitalism is not a natural economy in which the products 
are simply divided in society, but the products have to be exchanged with each other, the 
connection between the two departments is maintained solely through the flow of money 
between the two departments. Therefore, there must be some “necessary proportionalities” 
(Marx’s phrase) or “equilibrium”(in contemporary jargon) in terms of value between the 
two departments (as well as within each department).207  
 However, since capitalist economy is based on private investment of individual 
capitals, there is absolutely no guarantee that the necessary proportionalities obtain. On 
the one hand, capitalism is a radically socialized economy in the sense that all individual 
capitals are strictly related to each other. On the other hand, such a socialized economy is 
maintained by private individual capitals, which operate independently of each other. 
Capitalism, therefore, cannot in principle be socially coordinated. Thus, contrary to 
Adam Smith, who without any argument simply presupposed that an “invisible hand” 
regulates the totality of economy for the benefit of all, for Marx the equilibrium can only 
                                                        
207 For a helpful and brief discussions of reproduction schemas, See Harvey (2013:313ff), 
Heinrich (2005:137ff), Mandel (1978:21ff),  Moseley (1998:159ff) 
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occur exceptionally, that is, by chance:  
The fact that the production of commodities is the general form of capitalist 
production already implies that money plays a role, not just as means of 
circulation, but also as money capital within the circulation sphere, and gives rise 
to certain conditions for normal exchange that are peculiar to this mode of 
production, i.e. conditions for the normal course of reproduction, whether simple 
or on an expanded scale, which turn into an equal number of conditions for an 
abnormal course, possibilities of crisis, since, on the basis of the spontaneous 
pattern of this production, this balance is itself an accident. [da das 
Gleichgewicht bei der naturwüchsigen Gestaltung dieser Produktion selbst ein 
Zufall ist.] (MEW 24:490-1, C II:570, my emphasis) 
Throughout the three volumes of Capital, Marx details how capitalist economy 
necessarily produces imbalances that over time grow, and culminate periodically in a 
serious blockage in the process of reproduction of capital, the blockage that he calls crisis. 
The general mechanism of crises is the tension between constant expansion of the scale 
of production of value, and its realization in the market.208 These tensions would, in 
general, result in the crisis of “overproduction” (where commodities produced cannot be 
sold), or the crisis of “overaccumulation” of capital (where capital cannot find adequate 
outlets for investment, which results in devaluation of capital) (Cf. Heinrich 2005:79). 
Classical and neoclassical political economy attribute the emergence of crises to factors 
external to economy, such as the intervention of the government, or natural scarcity. By 
                                                        
208 See the following helpful passage: “Contradiction in the capitalist mode of production. The 
workers are important for the market as buyers of commodities. But as sellers of their commodity 
–labor-power – capitalist society has the tendency to restrict them to their minimum price. Further 
contradiction: the periods in which capitalist production exerts all its forces regularly show 
themselves to be periods of overproduction; because the limit to the application of the productive 
powers is not simply the production of value, but also its realization. However the sale of 
commodities, the realization of commodity capital, and thus of surplus-value as well, is restricted 
not by the consumer needs of society in general, but by the consumer needs of a society in which 
the great majority are always poor and must always remain poor.” (MEW 25:318, C II:391) 
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contrast, Marx shows that crises are endemic to capitalism, and result from the inner logic 
of capital. In the Grundrisse, Marx writes about Ricardo that “he flees from economics to 
seek refuge in organic chemistry” (MEW 42:646, G754); as Ricardo explains the crises 
through decline in the fertility of soil, i.e. naturally.  
 Marx is adamant that crises, while being destructive for capital, are at the very 
same time creative for it.  He emphasizes, “the violent destruction of capital, [which 
happens] not by external circumstances [is] a condition of its self-preservation” 
[Gewaltsame Vernichtung von Kapital, nicht durch ihm äußere Verhältnisse, sondern als 
Bedingung seiner Selbsterhaltung] (MEW 42:642, G 749). The crises, through blocking 
the process of reproduction of capital, disrupt the unity of capital. (For, as we have 
learned, the unity of capital solely obtains through its reproduction.) However, crises 
provide the necessary ambience for substantial reorganization of economy, the 
reorganization that eventually restores the process of valorization of value. (Through 
crises, the less profitable capitals perish and merge with large capitals, thus yield larger 
capitals for investment. Moreover, the massive unemployment results in reduction of 
wages, which in turn increases the rate of profit, and etc.) The unity, however, once 
restored, tend to produce imbalances on its own, which results in a new set of crises. 
Marx thus emphasizes, “crises are never more than momentary, violent solutions for the 
existing contradictions, violent eruptions that re-establish the disturbed balance for the 
time being”(MEW 25:259, C III:357). For Marx, therefore, the sui generis character of 
the totality of capital obtains, not despite crises, but through crises.209210 
                                                        
209 Contrary to the standard readings of Marx, for Marx, the crises of capitalism do not 
automatically result in its collapse. (Therefore, the so-called “Zusammenbruchstheorie” is 
wrong.) (See Heinrich 2016:182). Crises, of course, result in massive impoverishment of people, 
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 The total social capital is sui generis in two aspects: (1) Capital is able to 
reproduce itself economically. It can re-generate the process of valorization of value, and 
derivatively, it can reproduce the means of production and consumption. (2) It is able to 
reproduce itself socially. That is to say, it can reproduce the social relation of capital and 
labor, which is necessary for economic reproduction of capital.211Marx writes, 
Capitalist production therefore reproduces in the course of its own process the 
separation between labor-power and the conditions of labor. It thereby reproduces 
and perpetuates the conditions under which the worker is exploited. It incessantly 
forces him to sell his labor-power in order to live, and enables the capitalist to 
purchase labor-power in order that he may enrich himself. It is no longer a mere 
accident that capitalist and worker confront each other in the market as buyer and 
seller. It is the alternating rhythm [Zwickmühle] of the process itself which 
throws the worker back onto the market again and again as a seller of his labor-
power and continually transforms his own product into a means by which another 
man can purchase him. In reality, the worker belongs to capital before he has sold 
himself to the capitalist. (MEW 23:603, C I: 723, my emphasis) 
In order for capital to be able to sustain itself, there must always be workers who sell 
their labor-power to capital. This cannot be left to subjective preference of workers, i.e. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
but there is no direct link between such impoverishment and revolution. For Marx, as I take him, 
the crises open up the space for political action; whether the politics ensued is progressive or 
reactionary depends on the agency of people involved. 
210 For Hegel, too, the crises are not merely restrictive, but at the same time they can be 
productive. In his Philosophy of Nature, Hegel emphasizes the positive role of defect or lack 
[Mangel] for the life of an organism. Similarly, in the Philosophy of Right, he asserts how 
through lack of crisis, the ethical life can become petrified, and lose its livelihood.  
211 (1) “The capitalist process of production, therefore, seen as a total, connected process, i.e. a 
process of reproduction, produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also 
produces and reproduces the capital-relation itself; on the one hand the capitalist, on the other the 
wage-laborer. (MEW 23:604, C I:724) (2) “Does a worker in a cotton factory produce merely 
cotton textiles? No, he produces capital. He produces values which serve afresh to command his 
labor and by means of it to create new values.” (“Wage Labor and Capital”, MEW 6:410, MECW 
9:214) 
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whether the workers are willing to work for capital, but has to be objectively obtained. 
The process of reproduction of capital ensures that the workers are coerced to work for 
capital, since in the end of each cycle of production, the product of labor is alienated from 
the workers, leaving no choice for them but to continue to work for capital. To use 
Hegel’s language, capital is sui generis, as it is able to posit its own presuppositions. The 
availability of workers who are forced to work for capital is the presupposition of capital, 
and capital posits this very presupposition through its reproduction. As workers exist only 
as the presupposition of capital, Marx emphasizes that they belong to capital, even before 
they have sold themselves to capital.  
 Finally, what secures the sui generis character of the total social capital is the 
“law of relative surplus population” in capitalism. (Cf. Bell 2009:105ff) Contrary to 
Malthus, Marx argues that there is no abstract natural law of population, and capitalism 
has its own historically specific law of population. No matter what the natural rate of 
growth of population is, capital always produces a large number of workers superfluous. 
Marx writes,  
 If a surplus population of workers is a necessary product of accumulation or of 
the development of wealth on a capitalist basis, this surplus population also 
becomes, conversely, the lever of capitalist accumulation, indeed it becomes a 
condition for the existence of the capitalist mode of production. It forms a 
disposable industrial reserve army, which belongs to capital just as absolutely as 
if the latter had bred it at its own cost. (MEW 23:661, C I: 784) 
For Marx, the existence of relative surplus population is (a) a necessary condition for 
capital. Yet, this necessary condition is at the same time (b) the consequence of the 
working of capital. (a) The existence of relative surplus population is a necessary 
condition of capital. On the one hand, the existence of a large number of unemployed 
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people reduces the wages of those employed. This increases the rate of profit of capital, 
and secures the augmentation of the process of valorization of value. On the other hand, 
the imbalance in the total social capital, which results in the cyclical periods of stagnation 
and growth, changes the valorization requirements of capital. The “industrial reserve 
army” ensures that capital, depending on economic situation, be able to expand or 
contract the scale of production. (b) The industrial reserve army, being the presupposition 
of capital, is at the same time the consequence of reproduction of the total social capital; 
since the competition between individual capitals force them to increase the productivity 
of labor through constantly developing labor-saving machinery, which subsequently 
throws workers out of their work.   
In conclusion, let us recapitulate the discussion in this section. I have argued that 
the universalization of relations of exchange makes capitalism a totality that has unity. 
This totality, at first, is conceived as the sphere of circulation. However, on further 
reflection, it turned out that the sphere of circulation requires the sphere of production, 
since it is only through production that surplus-value is created. I have argued that Marx 
has a dialectical conception of the interrelation of the sphere of production and 
circulation; the two co-determine each other, yet, it is ultimately production that is the 
determining sphere. I have argued that for Marx circulation and production become 
united through the “circuit” of capital. For Marx, capital, through its circular motion, 
becomes sui generis, such that it can reproduce and maintain itself. Such a sui generis 
character attains, properly speaking, not at the level of individual capitals, which are 
ultimately perishable, but at the level of the total social capital. Capital is the cause of 
itself, since it produces its own requirements, both economic requirements and social 
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requirements. Particularly, capital establishes its sui generis character through producing 
relative surplus population, which provides the necessary milieu for the thriving of 
capital. 
 
3- The Nature of the Power of the Totality of Capital 
I have argued so far that the totality of capital for Marx has a sui generis character. That 
is, capital has a life of its own, and is able to produce and reproduce itself independently 
of individuals. This implies that capital has an “absolute power” over individuals who 
constitute it. Individuals must necessarily do what capital requires them to do; otherwise 
they perish. In this section, I will discuss the absolute power of the totality capital over 
individuals, and show how this power is impersonal and non-volitional. This section 
serves as an illustration of the absolute power of substance over individuals in Hegel’s 
logic of essence, which I discussed in Chapter Three in detail  
 
3-1- The Absolute Power of the Totality of Capital  
Already in his youth, Marx was aware that the totality of society has an autonomous logic, 
independently of individuals, and that the totality exerts power over individuals. In the 
German Ideology, Marx and Engels write:  
This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce 
into a material power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our 
expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in 
historical development up till now. The social power, i.e., the multiplied 
productive force, which arises through the cooperation of different individuals as 
it is caused by the division of labor, appears to these individuals, since their 
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cooperation is not voluntary but has come about naturally [nicht freiwillig, 
sondern naturwüchsig ist], not as their own united power, but as an alien force 
existing outside them of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant [nicht als 
ihre eigne, vereinte Macht, sondern als eine fremde, außer ihnen stehende Gewalt, 
von der sie nicht wissen woher und wohin], which they thus are no longer able to 
control, which on the contrary passes through a peculiar series of phases and 
stages independent of the will and the actions of man,  nay even being the prime 
governor of these (MEW 3:34, MECW 5:47-8).212 
Note the dialectical language that Marx and Engels use. The totality of society is 
produced solely through interaction of individuals (“what we ourselves produce”), yet at 
the same time it forces individuals to comport themselves according to its logic (“alien 
force existing outside them”). Marx retains this dialectical conception throughout his 
career. The main difference is that while in the German Ideology he regards the division 
of labor as the source of formation of totality that exert power over individuals, in his 
mature writings the division of labor loses its privileged explanatory status. In later 
writing, as I have discussed, the principle of the formation of totality is exchange of 
commodities.213 Thus, in the Grundrisse, in the context of the exposition of exchange of 
                                                        
212 Also in the same work: “How is it that in this process of private interests acquiring 
independent existence as class interests the personal behavior of the individual is bound to be 
objectified [sich versachlichen], estranged [sich entfremden], and at the same time exists as a 
power independent of him and without him, created by intercourse, and is transformed into social 
relations, into a series of powers which determine and subordinate the individual, and which, 
therefore, appear in the imagination as “holy” powers?” (MEW 3:27, MECW 5:245) 
213 This shift of perspective is important. The division of labor is not specific to commodity-
producing societies. There are societies with an intricate network of division of labor in which 
there is only a minimal exchange of the products of labor. (Marx gives the example of an ancient 
Indian village.) In capitalism, according to Marx, the division of labor is guided and determined 
by the logic of exchange of commodities. As division of labor is determined by the logic of the 
market, labor in capitalism, according to Marx, acquires an “abstract” character, a character that 
is absent in pre-capitalist social formations. Thus, in the Grundrisse, Marx writes, “Indifference 
towards any specific kind of labor presupposes a very developed totality of real kinds of labor, of 
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commodities and the totality of circulation, he writes,   
As much, then, as the whole of this movement appears as a social process, and as 
much as the individual moments of this movement arise from the conscious will 
and particular purposes of the individuals, so much does the totality of the process 
appear as an objective interrelation, which arises spontaneously from nature; 
[sosehr erscheint die Totalität des Prozesses als ein objektiver Zusammenhang, 
der naturwüchsig entsteht] arising, it is true, from the mutual influence of 
conscious individuals on one another, but neither located in their consciousness, 
nor subsumed under them as a whole. Their own collisions with one another 
produce an alien social power standing above them, produce their mutual 
interaction as a process and power independent of them. Circulation because a 
totality of the social process is also the first form in which the social relation 
appears as something independent of the individuals, but not only as, say, in a 
coin or in exchange value, but extending to the whole of the social movement 
itself. The social relation of the individuals to one another as a power over the 
individuals which has become autonomous, whether conceived as natural force, as 
chance or in whatever other form, is a necessary result of the fact that the point of 
departure is not the free social individual. Circulation as the first totality among 
the economic categories is well suited to bring this to light.214 (MEW 42:127, G 
196-7). 
                                                                                                                                                                     
which no single one is any longer predominant. As a rule, the most general abstractions arise only 
in the midst of the richest possible concrete development, where one thing appears as common to 
many, to all. Then it ceases to be thinkable in a particular form alone. On the other side, this 
abstraction of labor as such is not merely the mental product of a concrete totality of labors. 
Indifference towards specific labors corresponds to a form of society in which individuals can 
with ease transfer from one labor to another, and where the specific kind is a matter of chance for 
them, hence of indifference. Not only the category, labor, but labor in reality has here become the 
means of creating wealth in general, and has ceased to be organically linked with particular 
individuals in any specific form.” (MEW 42:38, G 105)  
214 “Sosehr nun das Ganze dieser Bewegung als gesellschaftlicher Prozeß erscheint und sosehr die 
einzelnen Momente dieser Bewegung vom bewußten Willen und besondern Zwecken der 
Individuen ausgehn, sosehr erscheint die Totalität des Prozesses als ein objektiver 
Zusammenhang, der naturwüchsig entsteht; zwar aus dem Aufeinanderwirken der bewußten 
Individuen hervorgeht, aber weder in ihrem Bewußtsein liegt noch als Ganzes unter sie 
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This passage is most illuminating, especially if we compare it with the neoclassical 
political economy, which is the foundation of the current mainstream economics. The 
beginning point for the neoclassical theory is the free individual that has certain needs. 
Two individuals enter into the relation of exchange with each other, because before doing 
the exchange, they make an estimate of the utility of the outcome in their mind and intend 
to maximize this utility. That is, it is up to the individuals to enter or not to enter into 
exchange. Marx does not deny that individuals have certain preferences in exchange of 
commodities. But he holds that the individuals’ particular purposes are always already 
formed in a framework, in a totality, and there is no escape from that framework. I might 
be free in deciding what kind of commodities I would like to exchange, but I am 
absolutely unfree with regard to the fact that I have to enter into the relation of exchange 
in a capitalist economy. In the context of the development of the relations of exchange in 
Capital, Marx clearly writes that individuals do what the logic of totality require them to 
do, even if they are completely unaware of it: “they do it, without being aware of it.” [Sie 
wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es.] (MEW 23:88, C I:166). Thus, whereas for neo-classical 
theory, exchange is a contingent phenomenon, dependent upon the calculations of those 
who would get involved in exchange, for Marx exchange is a necessary social 
                                                                                                                                                                     
subsumiert wird. Ihr eignes Aufeinanderstoßen produziert ihnen eine über ihnen stehende, fremde 
gesellschaftliche Macht; ihre Wechselwirkung als von ihnen unabhängigen Prozeß und Gewalt. 
Die Zirkulation, weil eine Totalität des gesellschaftlichen Prozesses, ist auch die erste Form, 
worin nicht nur wie etwa in einem Geldstück oder im Tauschwert das gesellschaftliche Verhältnis 
als etwas von den Individuen Unabhängiges erscheint, sondern das Ganze der gesellschaftlichen 
Bewegung selbst. Die gesellschaftliche Beziehung der Individuen aufeinander als 
verselbständigte Macht über den Individuen, werde sie nun vorgestellt als Naturmacht, Zufall 
oder in sonst beliebiger Form, ist notwendiges Resultat dessen, daß der Ausgangspunkt nicht das 
freie gesellschaftliche Individuum ist. Die Zirkulation als erste Totalität unter den ökonomischen 
Kategorien gut, um dies zur Anschauung zu bringen.” 
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phenomenon, which is independent of individuals and objectively mediates between the 
individuals, who are being coerced to enter into this relation.215 
 It is in this context that we can make sense of Marx’s frequent referrals to the 
economic laws and regularities in capitalism as being “naturwüchsig” (spontaneous or 
natural), laws and regularities which function as a “Naturmacht”  (natural power) over 
individuals. In Capital, Marx even more explicitly states, 
In the midst of the accidental and ever-fluctuating exchange relations, the labor 
time socially necessary to produce them asserts itself like a regulative law of 
nature [als regelndes Naturgesetz gewaltsam durchsetzt] in the same way that the 
law of gravity asserts itself when a person’s house collapses on top of him (MEW 
23:89, C I:168). 
At first sight, Marx’s ascription of naturalness of the social relations in capitalism seems 
to be at odds with the very pivot of his critique of political economy; since, it is the main 
aim of Marx’s critique to show that exactly there is nothing “natural” about capitalism; 
rather, capitalism is a “historical” product, and for this reason it can be abolished for a 
more humane society.216 The apparent inconsistency can be resolved, when we look 
again at Marx’s critique of the physiocrats. Recall that the physiocrats held that the 
source of value is not human sociality, but nature. Marx writes:  
For them the bourgeois forms of production necessarily appeared as natural forms. 
It was their great merit that they conceived these forms as physiological forms of 
                                                        
215 See Michael Heinrich’s critical analysis of neoclassical theory from Marx’s standpoint (ibid, 
1999, S. 62-78, especially, S.77-78). Also, See (Heinrich: 2005, S.43-4)  
216 Among the many places that Marx argues against naturalness of capitalism, See the following 
passage from the Grundrisse. The “aim” of bourgeois political economy, Marx writes, “is to 
present production…as encased in eternal natural laws independent of history, at which 
opportunity bourgeois relations are then quietly smuggled in as the inviolable natural laws on 
which society in the abstract is founded. This is the more or less conscious purpose of the whole 
proceeding.” (MEW 41:22, G 87)  
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society, as forms arising from the natural necessity of production itself, forms that 
are independent of anyone’s will or of politics, etc. They are material laws; the 
error is only that the material law of a definite historical social stage is conceived 
as an abstract law governing equally all forms of society (MEW 26.1: 12, MECW 
30:353). 
In this passage, Marx praises physiocrats, in that they conceived the laws of society –   
contrary to social contract theorists – as independent of individuals; yet at the same time 
he criticizes them, in that they did not see these natural laws as being historical. That is to 
say, when Marx talks of naturalness of capitalist economy, he does not refer to nature 
simpliciter, but quite like Hegel, he refers to “second nature which takes the place of the 
original and purely natural will” (GPR §151). The economic laws of capitalism are 
natural, in the sense that they unavoidable and inescapable. That the individuals have to 
enter into relations of exchange is not something that they can choose. Even if they can 
subjectively distance themselves from the act of exchange and think that they may be 
capable of not exchanging, they nonetheless must objectively engage in exchange, which 
functions as a natural law for them.217  
 The unavoidability and inescapability of the totality of capitalism is also 
expressed in Marx’s allusion that such totality functions as a “fate” from which nobody 
can flee. He writes,  
                                                        
217  Marx’s contradictory ascription of naturalness to capitalism is well discussed by Adorno 
through his concept of “Naturgeschichte”. See Negative Dialektik (GS 6:347-353) especially the 
following passages: (1) “That the assumption of natural laws is not to be taken a la lettre, least of 
all to be ontologized … is confirmed by the strongest motive of Marxist theory of all, that of the 
potential abolition of these laws” (ibid: 348) (2) “That [economic] law is nature-like due to the 
character of its inescapability under the dominating relationships of production” (ibid: 348). (3) 
“The natural lawfulness of society is ideology, to the extent it is hypostatized as an immutable 
given fact of nature. Natural lawfulness is real however as a law of motion of unconscious society, 
as it is pursued in Capital from the analysis of the commodity-form down to the theory of 
economic crisis in a phenomenology of the anti-Spirit” (ibid: 349).  
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Individuals are subsumed under social production; social production exists 
outside them as their fate; but social production is not subsumed under individuals, 
manageable by them as their common wealth. [Die Individuen sind unter die 
gesellschaftliche Produktion subsumiert, die als ein Verhängnis außer ihnen 
existiert; aber die gesellschaftliche Produktion ist nicht unter die Individuen 
subsumiert, die sie als ihr gemeinsames Vermögen handhaben] (MEW 42:91, G 
158).218  
Marx’s conception of the totality of capital as “fate” [Verhängnis] closely resembles 
Hegel’s conception of the totality of substance as “fate” [Schicksal], and Adorno’s 
conception of the totality of society as “spell” [Bann], which I have explained in the 
previous chapter. For Hegel the power of fate is impersonal and non-volitional, and for 
Marx, as we will see, the same holds true.219 
 It is important, to emphasize, that for Marx totality exerts power over all 
individuals, obviously over workers, but also over the capitalists. The capitalist, Marx 
writes,  
shares with the miser an absolute drive towards self-enrichment. But what appears 
in the miser as the mania of an individual is in the capitalist the effect of a social 
mechanism in which he is merely a cog. Moreover, the development of capitalist 
production makes it necessary constantly to increase the amount of capital laid out 
                                                        
218 Also, Compare with the German Ideology: “Or how does it happen that trade, which after all is 
nothing more than the exchange of products of various individuals and countries, rules the whole 
world through the relation of supply and demand — a relation which, as an English economist 
says, hovers over the earth like the fate of the ancients, and with invisible hand allots fortune and 
misfortune to men, sets up empires and wrecks empires, causes nations to rise and to 
disappear?”(MEW 3:35, MECW 5:48) (It is worthwhile to mention that the relation of supply and 
demand loses its explanatory function in Marx’s later writings, but this is besides the point in the 
current context.) 
219 In Capital, Marx emphasizes that “the silent compulsion of economic relations sets the seal on 
the domination of the capitalist over the worker” (MEW 23:765, C I:899). Note that the phrase 
that Marx uses, “the silent compulsion” [der stumme Zwang], clearly echoes Marx’s conception 
of capital as fate.  
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in a given industrial undertaking, and competition subordinates every individual 
capitalist to the immanent laws of capitalist production, as external and coercive 
laws. It compels him to keep extending his capital, so as to preserve it, and he can 
only extend it by means of progressive accumulation. (MEW 23:618, C I:739) 
The capitalist must expand the scale of surplus-value making, Marx asserts, “merely as a 
means of self-preservation, and on pain of going under.” [bloß als Erhaltungsmittel und 
bei Strafe des Untergangs] (MEW 25:255, C III:353). The “coercive laws of competition” 
do not leave any option for the capitalist but extending the exploitation of the workers. As 
the capitalists are also equally dominated by the rule of capital, we must conclude that in 
capitalism the primary mode of domination is not the domination of capitalists over 
workers, but the domination of the totality of capital over all individuals, over both 
capitalists and workers.220 
                                                        
220 It is worthwhile at this point to evaluate Postone’s influential reading of Marx. Postone is quite 
right when he claims that “in Marx’s analysis, social domination in capitalism does not, in its 
most fundamental level, consist in the domination of people by other people, but in the 
domination of people by abstract social structures that people themselves constitute” (Postone 
1990:30). However, Postone is wrong insofar as he thinks that the relation of domination of the 
totality of capital over both capitalists and workers excludes the class domination of capitalists 
over workers. The genetic and dialectical conception of totality in Marx allows him to 
accommodate class domination within the structure of the domination of the totality over all 
individuals, and there is no inconsistency involved here.  Postone writes, “within the framework 
of Marx’s analysis, the form of social domination that characterizes capitalism is not ultimately a 
function of private property, of the ownership by the capitalists of the surplus product and the 
means of production; rather, it is grounded in the value form of wealth itself, a form of social 
wealth that confronts living labor (the workers) as a structurally alien and dominant power” (ibid: 
30). By excluding class domination from Marx’s analysis, I believe, Postone in effect destroys the 
political potential of Marxism. Postone consciously and unabashedly distances himself from the 
history of the class struggle of workers, and from its theoretical expressions in various forms of 
Marxism. Thus, he uncritically lumps together all different forms of Marxism as “traditional 
Marxism”, which he defines as “all theoretical approaches that analyze capitalism from the 
standpoint of labor and characterize that society essentially in terms of class relations, structured 
by private ownership of the means of production and a market-regulated economy” (ibid: 7). 
Contrary to Postone, the private ownership of means of production, as well as the class 
domination that ensues from it, is essential to capitalism. Postone locates himself in the tradition 
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However, that the capitalist and the workers are both dominated by the social 
forces that are independent of them does not mean that there is no difference between the 
domination exerted on the capitalist, and the one exerted on the worker. In the Results of 
the Immediate Process of Production, Marx emphatically avers that “the capitalist is just 
as enslaved by the relationships of capitalism as is his opposite pole, albeit in a quite 
different manner” (Results: 990, Resultate: 70, my emphasis). Obviously, it is the 
capitalists that benefit from the system of total domination, and find “absolute 
satisfaction” in it, whereas the workers in capitalism are systematically deprived of the 
necessary material and intellectual resources for self-development.221  
 
3-2- The Impersonal Character of Power in Capitalism 
Since his youth, Marx clearly understood that domination in capitalism has an essentially 
impersonal character. In the German Ideology (1846), Marx and Engels write that in 
capitalism, the individual is bifurcated into “private individual” [persönlichen 
Individuum] and “class individual” [Klassenindividuum]: 
In the course of historical development, and precisely through the fact that within 
the division of labor social relations inevitably take on an independent existence, 
there appears a cleavage in the life of each individual, insofar as it is personal and 
insofar as it is determined by some branch of labor and the conditions pertaining 
to it …. In the estate [Stand] (and even more in the tribe) this is as yet concealed: 
for instance, a nobleman always remains a nobleman, a commoner always a 
commoner, a quality inseparable from his individuality irrespective of his other 
relations. The difference between the private individual and the class individual, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of Critical Theory, and it is no surprise that he adopts a similar position as Adorno, for whom, as I 
have already indicated, the domination of market is the fundamental form of domination.  
221 For a very helpful discussion about the difference between the “unfreedom” of the worker 
from that of the capitalist See (Cohen: 1983) 
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the contingent nature of the conditions of life for the individual, appears only with 
the emergence of the class, which is itself a product of the bourgeoisie. (MEW 
3:76, MECW 5:78) 
If a capitalist goes bankrupt in capitalism, he ceases to be a capitalist; but a nobleman in 
feudalism remains a nobleman, even if he becomes poor. In capitalism, the private 
individual becomes distinct from the economic category that he embodies. However, 
although the individual in capitalism consists of these two determinations, it is eventually 
the class individual that determines the private individual, such in the end the personality 
in general  “is conditioned and determined by determinate class relations”. The power of 
a certain capitalist over a certain worker is not by virtue of his (private) individuality, but 
only by virtue of him being a capitalist. “The class”, Marx and Engels emphasize, 
“assumes an independent existence as against the individuals” who constitute it, “so that 
the latter find their conditions of life pre-determined and have their position in life and 
hence their personal development assigned to them by their class, thus becoming 
subsumed under it.” (ibid).  
 That individuality is suppressed in capitalism, and individuals primarily become 
the embodiment of social institutions is the basic presupposition of Marx’s later work in 
Capital. In the Preface to the First Edition, he very clearly states that individuals in 
capitalism are mainly “personification of economic categories”, “the bearers of particular 
class relations” and thus, qua individuals they do not even bear responsibility for their 
action: 
To prevent possible misunderstandings, let me say this. I do not by any means 
depict the capitalist and the landowner in rosy colors. But individuals are dealt 
with here only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, 
the bearers of particular class-relations and interests. My standpoint, from which 
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the development of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of 
natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for 
relations whose creature he  remains, socially speaking, however much he may 
subjectively  raise himself above them (MEW 23: 16, C I:92). 
This point – that individuals are only bearers of their social position – gives social 
relations in capitalism an abstract and formal character. While in the German Ideology, 
Marx regards the cause of such abstraction to be the division of labor, in his later work, 
he leaves no doubt that such abstraction is the result of the universalization of the relation 
of exchange. In the second chapter of Capital, he states that in capitalism the individuals 
are primarily appendages to commodities, the “guardians of commodities” [Warenhüter]. 
He writes, 
Here the persons exist for one another merely as representatives and hence 
owners, of commodities…. In general, the characters who appear on the economic 
stage [ökonomische Charaktermaske] are merely personifications of economic 
relations; it is as the bearers of these economic relations that they come into 
contact with each other. (MEW 23:100, C I: 178-9)222 
There is an important distinction between exchange of commodities in pre-capitalist 
societies, and in capitalism. In pre-capitalist societies, when there is exchange – and 
                                                        
222 Also the following illuminating passage from the Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy: “The commodity owners entered the sphere of circulation merely as guardians of 
commodities. Within this sphere they confront one another in the antithetical roles of buyer and 
seller, one personifying a sugar-loaf [i.e. a particular commodity], the other personifying gold 
[i.e. money]. Just as the sugar-loaf becomes gold, so the seller becomes a buyer. These distinctive 
social characters are, therefore, by no means due to human individuality as such, but to the 
exchange relations of persons who produce their goods in the specific form of commodities. So 
little does the relation of buyer and seller represent a purely individual relationship that they enter 
into it only in so far as their individual labor is negated, that is to say, turned into money as non-
individual labor. It is therefore as absurd to regard buyer and seller, these bourgeois economic 
types, as eternal social forms of human individuality, as it is preposterous to weep over them as 
signifying the abolition of individuality. They are an essential expression of individuality arising 
at a particular stage of the social process of production.” (MEW 13:76, MECW 29:331) 
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exchange is a marginal phenomenon in these societies – it is usually in the form of direct 
barter: a commodity is exchanged with another commodity. In capitalism, in contrast, 
exchange is necessarily being made by means of money: first a commodity gets sold, 
thereby is transformed into money; and only then, the money thus obtained can buy 
another commodity. Direct barter is compatible with the social structure, which is based 
on personal relationship. Those who are involved in direct barter do the exchange at the 
same time and in the same geographical location. But once the process is mediated by 
money, the money that is obtained through selling of the first commodity can be used in 
different time and location. (The money obtained, say, in New York City this year can be 
used, say, in a distant village in Iran next year.) Marx writes,  
Circulation bursts through all the temporal, spatial and personal barriers imposed 
by the direct exchange of products, and it does this by splitting up the direct 
identity present here between the exchange of one’s own product and the 
acquisition of someone else’s into the two antithetical segments of sale and 
purchase. (MEW 23:127, C I:209)223 
Because every commodity of whatever sort has to be first transformed into money in 
order to get exchanged, money serves as the universal equivalent, which “extinguishes 
every qualitative difference between commodities.” Money, therefore, serves as a 
“radical leveler”, which makes all commodities qualitatively identical (MEW 23: 146, C 
I:229). In capitalism, therefore, “all relations transform into money-relations: taxes in 
kind into money taxes, rent in kind into money rent, military service into mercenary 
troops, all personal services in general into money services, and patriarchal, slave, serf, 
                                                        
223 Also: “When money enters into exchange, I am forced to exchange my product in exchange 
value in general or for the general capacity to exchange, hence my product becomes dependent on 
the state of general commerce and is torn out of its local, natural and individual boundaries.” 
(MEW 42:84, G 150) 
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and guild labor into pure wage labor” (MEW 42:81, G:146). 
In the pre-capitalist modes of production, the social production and reproduction 
was maintained through personal relationship of domination and dependence: between 
serfs and lords, between slaves and masters, between women and men, between 
apprentices and masters etc. In capitalism, as the social metabolism is essentially 
mediated through money, the personal relation of domination would fade away, or 
become only second rank in terms of importance. The domination in capitalism is 
“objective” in the sense that it is independent of any individual, and therefore, Marx says, 
“abstract”:  
These objective dependency relations also appear, in antithesis to those of 
personal dependence (the objective dependency relation is nothing more than 
social relations which have become independent and now enter into opposition to 
the seemingly independent individuals; i.e. the reciprocal relations of production 
separated from and autonomous of individuals) in such a way that individuals are 
now ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier they depended on one another. (MEW 
42:97, G 164)  
In capitalism, social domination is always mediated by the relations of exchange. In a 
purely capitalist society, for Marx, domination based on nature would fade away (say, the 
domination of men over women would fade away). The relations of exchange are 
sufficient unto themselves to produce dependency, and hence domination. Marx writes, 
“the exchange of commodities in and for itself requires no other relations of dependence 
than those which result from its own nature”. (MEW 23:182, C I:271). In pre-capitalist 
societies, it is the power of community [Gemeinwesen] that pastes people together; in 
capitalism, money, as a universal being [gemeines Wesen] which annihilates all 
distinctions, “is itself the community [Gemeinwesen], and can tolerate none other 
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standing above it.” (MEW 42:149, G 223). Money, that is, is a social substance that 
inheres in all commodities (and through commodities, in their guardians), and determines 
them. The power of people over people in capitalism is not an immediate power, 
originated from some natural relation of dependence, but it is essentially mediated and 
generated through money-relations. In the previous chapter, we learned that for Hegel 
even the power of one individual over another individual is the manifestation of the 
power of the totality of substance. Similarly, according to Marx,  “the power which each 
individual exercises over the activity of others or over social wealth in general exists in 
him as the owner of exchange-values, of money. The individual carries his social power, 
as well as his bond with society, in his pocket” (MEW 42:90, G 157).  Money is the result 
of action of all individuals; so the power that one individual exerts over another 
individual through money is in fact the power of social substance, which is manifested in 
the relation between the two said individuals.  
 
3-3- The Non-Volitional Character of Power of the Totality of Capital 
I have argued that for Marx capital is a self-organizing, self-maintaining, and self-
reproducing social totality. My question is now this: Does the fact that capital has a 
structure of self imply that capital, precisely speaking, is a “subject”? That is to say, is 
capital an “agent”, which has a free will? I have already quoted passages, where Marx 
uses the language of “subject” to describe capital: Capital, Marx writes, is a 
“predominant subject”, or an “automatic subject”, or the “subject of the process” of 
valorization of value.224  
                                                        
224 In other parts of Capital, too, there are passages that seem to indicate that Marx believed that 
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However, I do not think these quotes establish that capital for Marx has agency. 
True that capital has a structure of self, but this does not mean that capital is a subject in 
its full sense. The main interpretive key is when Marx refers to capital as an “automatic 
subject” [automatisches Subjekt]. The hallmark of true subjectivity is freedom. There 
cannot be any talk of freedom for capital, since capital is solely defined in terms of the 
necessity of the activity of the valorization of value. By definition, capital cannot but 
valorize itself, and for this reason capital is an automaton.  (A sewing machine sews. It 
cannot but sew.) To put in Hegelian concepts, capital is determined by a law (i.e. 
valorization of value), which remains external to it. In this precise sense of external 
limitation, capital must be considered as finite (in Hegel’s sense); since a true infinity, 
which is an attribute of subjectivity for Hegel, is not externally limited. The subject for 
Hegel, of course, is law-governed, but the law is not simply given to it; it is rather posited 
and assimilated by the subject as subject’s own law. Moreover, subjectivity for Hegel is 
essentially tied up with purposiveness, which is integral to freedom. Precisely speaking, 
valorization of value is not the purpose of capital, but its “determining motive” 
[bestimmendes Motiv] (MEW 24:351, C II:427) or its “driving motive” [treibendes 
Motiv] (MEW 24: 360, C II:436). We should thus grasp then that the selfhood of capital 
consists in the fact that it is a unity that is able to maintain and reproduce itself, however, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
capital has agency. For example, in the context of the discussion of the working day, Marx writes, 
“capital takes no account of the health and the length of life of the worker, unless society forces it 
to do so. Its answer to the outcry about the physical and mental degradation, the premature death, 
the torture of over-work is this: Should that pain trouble us, since it increases our pleasure 
(profit)?” (MEW 23:285, C I:381), and: “Capital is dead labor, which, vampire-like, lives only by 
sucking living labor, and lives the more, the more labor it sucks.” (MEW 23:247 C I:342). I hold 
that in these passages Marx uses the language of agency not literally, but metaphorically.  
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this selfhood does not amount to subjectivity. Thus, to use Hegel’s words, capital is a 
“substance”, but it is emphatically not Geist or the Concept.225 
In Chapter 3, I argued how for Hegel the power of the totality of substance over 
individuals is non-volitional. I also argued that the non-volitional power of substance is 
always mediated by the volitional power of individuals over each other. That is to say, in 
the social ontology based on the logic of essence, the power of individuals over each 
other is in fact the power of the social slots that they occupy. The social slots are, so to 
speak, inert, and the power that comes from them is thus non-volitional. However, the 
social slots, in order to be effective, must be activated by real individuals who have 
                                                        
225 Therefore Tony Smith’s and Moishe Postone’s interpretations, which regard capital as the 
Concept or Geist are wrong: (1) Tony Smith’s: “When Marx uses the Hegelian terminology of 
‘subject’ and ‘self-moving substance’ to refer to capital he is claiming that the logic of capital 
instantiates Hegel’s logic of the Concept: capital as a universal distinct from its moments, while 
being simultaneously continuous and identical with these moments, which together constitute 
capital’s process of self-valorization […]. The homology between Hegel’s logic of the Concept 
and the logic of capital appears exact and complete. Marx’s claim, in brief, is that capital must be 
comprehended as an absolute ‘Subject’ in the Hegelian sense of the term.” (Smith 2014: 23-4) (2) 
Moishe Postone’s: “Marx describes his concept of capital in terms that clearly relate it to Hegel’s 
concept of Geist…[He] explicitly characterizes capital as the self-moving substance which is 
Subject. In so doing, Marx suggests that a historical Subject in the Hegelian sense does indeed 
exist in capitalism, yet he does not identify it with any social grouping such as the proletariat, or 
the humanity. Rather, Marx analyses it in terms of the structure of social relations constituted by 
forms of objectifying practice and grasped by the category of capital (and, hence, value). His 
analysis suggests that the social relations that characterize capitalism are of a very peculiar sort – 
they possess the attributes that Hegel accorded the Geist. It is in this sense, then, that a historical 
Subject as conceived by Hegel exists in capitalism” (Postone, ibid: 75). However, Postone’s 
account is more nuanced (and obviously contradictory), since two page later he asserts, “as the 
Subject, capital is a remarkable ‘subject’. Whereas Hegel’s Subject is … knowing, in Marx’s 
analysis, it is … blind. Capital, as a structure constituted by determinate forms of practice, may in 
turn be constitutive of forms of social practice and subjectivity; yet, as the Subject, it has no ego. 
It is self-reflexive and, as a social form, may induce self-consciousness, but unlike Hegel’s Geist 
it does not possess self-consciousness” (ibid: 77). Postone’s contradictory formulations can be 
easily resolved, if we take capital to be according to Hegel’s “substance” (which does not have 
self-consciousness) and not to Hegel’s Geist or the Concept (which does have self-
consciousness).  Not only capital does not have any self-consciousness, but also – contrary to 
Postone – it does not have any sort of agency in the full sense of the term.  
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consciousness and will. Exactly the same structure – the structure in which the power is 
primarily non-volitional, but must necessarily be mediated by the volitional power of 
individuals – holds for Marx. In Capital, in the context of the relation of individuals and 
commodity, Marx writes, 
Commodities cannot go themselves to market and perform exchange in their own 
right. We must therefore, have recourse to their guardians, who are the possessors 
of commodities. Commodities are things, and therefore lack the power to resist 
man [widerstandslos gegen den Menschen] […]. In order that these objects may 
enter into relation with each other as commodities, their guardians must place 
themselves into relation to one another as persons whose will reside in those 
objects. (MEW 23:99, C I:178)  
In interpreting this passage, we must first note that for Marx commodity is not a natural 
thing. It is rather a social institution (obtaining through exchange) specific to capitalist 
mode of production. Although the social institution of commodity exerts absolute power 
over individuals – individuals must present their products of labor in commodity-form – 
nonetheless; the power of commodity over individuals is always mediated by the action 
of individuals in exchange. Similarly, later on in the book, in the context of the action of 
the capitalists, Marx defines the capitalists as “personification of capital” [personifiziertes 
Kapital]; as “capital endowed with consciousness and a will” [mit Willen und 
Bewußtsein begabten Kapitals] (MEW 23:618-9 C I:739). He unequivocally writes, when 
surplus-value needs to be divided into capital (for reinvestment) and revenue (for the 
individual consumption of the capitalist), “it is the owner of the surplus-value, the 
capitalist, who makes this division. It is an act of his will” [Wer aber diese Teilung 
vornimmt, das ist der Eigentümer des Mehrwerts, der Kapitalist. Sie ist also sein 
Willensakt] (MEW 23:618, C I:738).  We must conclude, then, that for Marx, the power 
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of the totality of capital over individuals is abstract and non-volitional, yet the same 
power becomes actual and effective only through the action of real individuals who 











Hegel came forward with the hitherto quite unheard-of propositions that 
the contingent has a ground because it is contingent, and just as much also 
has no ground because it is contingent; that the contingent is necessary, 
that necessity determines itself as contingency, and, on the other hand, this 
contingency is rather absolute necessity. [Pre-Darwinian] natural science 
has simply ignored these propositions as paradoxical trifling, as self-
contradictory nonsense, and, as regards theory, has persisted on the one 
hand in the barrenness of thought of Wolffian metaphysics, according to 
which a thing is either contingent or necessary, but not both at once; or, on 
the other hand, in the hardly less thoughtless mechanical determinism 
which in words denies contingency in general only to recognize it in 
practice in each particular case. (Friedrich Engels, Dialectic of Nature, 





1- The Historicity of Hegel’s Conception of Necessity and Contingency  
Hegel’s claim in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right that philosophy is “its own time 
comprehended in thought” [ihre Zeit in Gedanken erfaßt] does not only hold true for 
Hegel’s social and political philosophy, but for all areas of his philosophy. In case of the 
Science of Logic, where the subject matter of the book is “pure thought” as such 
regardless of its empirical manifestation, the claim of historicity of philosophy is more 
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difficult to prove, or even to make sense of. Yet, in this dissertation I have endeavored to 
show that the very categories of Hegel’s logic, specifically those of the logic of essence, 
express the general structure of society in a specific historical period, namely capitalism. 
In this chapter, one of my aims is to show that Hegel’s conception of necessity and 
contingency in the logic of essence is not an ahistorical conception of these modal 
categories, but one, which expresses the specific form that necessity and contingency take 
on in the modern capitalist world.  
A good point of departure is to consider Ian Hacking’s argument in his The 
Taming of Chance (1990, especially Chapter 1). Hacking argues that the gradual erosion 
of deterministic laws of causality in late 19th and 20th century in the natural sciences goes 
hand in hand with the development of statistical thinking in society, and correspondingly, 
the management of society through statistics (in health, insurance, population, etc.) In the 
natural sciences, instead of strict causal laws that exclude chance and contingency 
altogether, a new conception of natural law becomes prominent that is based on 
probability, thereby obtaining through chance and contingency. In a parallel way, in 
society statistical laws are being discovered that, in contrast to causal laws, do not 
determine the behavior of each particular individual, nonetheless express the law-like 
trends and tendencies in society as a whole. The systematic emergence of chance in the 
natural sciences and in society, according to Hacking, does not mean that laws have 
become any less necessary. To the contrary: “The world became not more chancy, but far 
less so” (ibid: 10). Quantum physics accepts that nature is at bottom stochastic, but this 
has paradoxically extensively enhanced human being’s ability in prediction of the 
necessary course of nature (ibid: 2). Similarly, it is only through acceptance of chance in 
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the behavior of individuals that the strict management of society as a whole has become 
possible. Social laws have a statistical character, yet they are equally inexorable (ibid: 2). 
According to Hacking, in the realm of philosophy, it was Charles Sanders Peirce 
that first forcefully argued for the existence of chance in nature (1892). For Peirce, 
Hacking argues, the laws of nature do not obtain despite chance, but they “evolve out of 
random processes.” Therefore, for Peirce, “chance was no longer the essence of 
lawlessness, but at the core of all laws of nature.” (Hacking ibid:xii, Chapter 23)  Perhaps 
because of the impenetrability of Hegel’s logic or perhaps because Hegel had an ill repute 
according to which he is a wildly idealist philosopher that endeavors to derive all 
phenomena without exception from conceptual thought, Hacking does not recognize 
Hegel as an important precursor. Nonetheless, as we will learn in this chapter, there is an 
ineliminable role for contingency in Hegel’s system, and that the necessary for Hegel 
solely obtains through contingency. My aim is not to compare Hegel with Peirce. There 
are important differences between the two, which need to be discussed in a separate essay. 
Rather, I aim to carve out the exact dialectical interrelation between necessity and 
contingency in Hegel’s logic, and to show how for Hegel the “power of necessity” 
[Macht der Notwendigkeit] (EnzL §151) determines the contingent phenomena (Sections 
2, 3, 4). I will also show how Hegel’s conception of necessity and contingency accords to 
Marx’s analysis of the structure of society in capitalism. For Marx, the necessary 
economic laws of capitalism do not occur despite the vagaries of the market, but 
precisely through them (Section 5). Finally, I discuss the shape of freedom of individuals 
in the logic of essence and in capitalism. I will show how this freedom is not a freedom 
of self-determination, but a kind of freedom that solely obtains through contingency and 
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randomness (Section 6). This chapter presupposes my discussion in Chapter 3, where I 
show how the “totality” for Hegel is “substance” that determines – and exerts “absolute 
power” on – individuals as “accidents”. Nonetheless, the discussion in this chapter is self-
standing, and can be understood on its own.    
 
2- The Preliminaries to Hegel’s Modal Ontology 
2-1- The Reality of Contingency 
The first point that needs to be settled is that for Hegel contingency is real. Dieter 
Henrich has already persuasively argued for this point (1971), and I do not want to repeat 
his arguments here. I just want to draw attention to the significance of Hegel’s thought 
through contrasting it with Spinoza. According to Spinoza,   
In nature there exists nothing contingent, but all things have been determined by 
the necessity of divine nature to exist and operate in a certain way. (E1p29) 
Because we are fundamentally finite beings, Spinoza believes, “the order of causes” of a 
thing sometimes “escapes us”, and because of this ignorance, “we” call that thing 
contingent; but the thing in reality is thorougly and necessarily determined (E1p33sch1). 
Contingency therefore for Spinoza results from our epistemic failure. It is not real in the 
world. Quite consistent with Spinoza on this point, Laplace in 1795 writes,  
Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by 
which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose 
it – an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis – it would 
embrace in the same formula the movement of the greatest bodies of the universe 
and those of the lightest atoms; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future 
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as the past, would present to its eyes. (1951:3, Quoted from Hacking ibid:11-
12)226 
In contrast to Spinoza and Laplace227, Hegel is quite clear that contingency is real. It is 
hard to miss the acerbic tone of Hegel in the following passage, where he criticizes those 
who deny the reality of contingency in the world:  
Contingency is to be accorded its due even in the objective [gegenständlich] 
world, since it is a form of the idea in general. This holds first for nature on the 
surface of which contingency has, so to speak, its free sway which should also be 
recognized then as such, without the pretension (at times erroneously ascribed to 
philosophy) of intending to find in it an instance of being able to be only so and 
not otherwise… Even in relation to the spirit and its activity, one has to guard 
against letting the well-intentioned endeavor of rational knowledge mislead one 
into purporting to demonstrate to be necessary or, as one is accustomed to say, to 
construe as a priori, appearances that possess the character of contingency…. It is 
quite right that the task of science and, more precisely of philosophy in general, 
consists in knowing the necessity hidden beneath the semblance of contingency. 
Yet this should not be so understood as if the contingent pertained merely to our 
subjective representation and that, therefore, it must be completely set aside in 
order to arrive at the truth. Scientific endeavors that single-mindedly pursue this 
direction will not escape from the fair-minded reproach of vacuously playing 
around and being obstinately pedantic. (EnzL §145Z) 
                                                        
226 Note that Laplace was one of the first who developed a theory of probabilities and statistics. 
(The passage quoted is from his Philosophical Essay on Probabilities.) Nonetheless, he did not 
believe that probability is something real. Rather it only results from the limitedness of our 
cognitive faculty.  
227 It is also interesting to observe that even a philosopher as skeptic as Hume, who lived in an era 
of predominance of determinism, accepts determinism in the constructive phase of his 
philosophy. So, he writes, “It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its 
existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a mere negative word, and means not any 
real power which has anywhere a being in nature” (2007[1748]:69), quoted from Hacking 
(ibid:13)). 
 285 
This passage contains several important points to which I will return in the rest of the 
chapter. For now, I would like to emphasize the obvious point that Hegel is a philosopher 
of necessity, and regards the task of philosophy to explain the necessary principles 
governing the world. For this reason, although he totally grants that there are contingent 
things and events in the world, nonetheless, he requires philosophy to conceptualize the 
necessity of contingency. True that the specific contingent phenomena are not 
scientifically or philosophically theorizable, but philosophy has to theorize contingency 
as such, and show its necessity in the objective structure of the world. In Henrich’s 
precise formulation, for Hegel, “contingency, but not the contingent is necessary [der 
Zufall, nicht das Zufällige sei notwendig], therefore, the particular contingent is not an 
object of substantial [philosophical] interest.” (1971:168). 
 
2-2- The Centrality of Actuality  
Hegel’s discussion of modal ontology in the Science of Logic, judged even by the 
standards of Hegel’s logic, is most complex. It is easy to lose sight of what he is doing, 
while observing the back and forth dialectical transformation of actuality, necessity, 
possibility, contingency into each other. One pivotal point that helps us to keep our 
orientation is the centrality of “actuality” [Wirklichkeit] to Hegel’s modal ontology. 
Indeed, the discussion of modal categories occurs in the context of Hegel’s discussion of 
“actuality” (the third and final part of the logic of essence), and in the second chapter of 
that part, entitled again as “actuality”. To be more specific, in the logic the modal 
categories emerge as the attempt to adequately conceptualize “actuality” fails. As we 
recall, “actuality” for Hegel is not to be confused with mere facticity, or mere reality. 
 286 
Such mere facticity belongs to the realm of the logic of being, where reality is described 
– uncritically – as it is. In the logic of essence, by contrast, actuality is described in 
relation to what is essential. Now those things or events in actuality that can simply be 
replaced with other things or events, without affecting the actual, are the “contingent”. In 
contrast, those things or events in the actual that cannot be changed – otherwise the actual 
would lose its actuality – are the “necessary”. To give an example, the dress code of the 
workers of Walmart as an economic institution is “contingent”; the dress code can change 
without having any effect on the economic function of Walmart. In contrast, the 
exploitation of the workers, and the drive to maximize profit is “necessary” for Walmart. 
Walmart would not be Walmart – it loses its “actuality” – if it did not exploit the workers.  
Indeed, the centrality of actuality to Hegel’s modal ontology in the logic is in 
accordance with the overall centrality of actuality to his philosophy in general. This is 
one important reason why generations of Marxist thinkers were attracted to Hegel’s 
philosophy. Adorno, who could not hide both his fascination and frustration with Hegel, 
called Hegel’s philosophy “theodicy of actuality” [Theodizee des Wirklichen] (GS 7:116) 
or the “theodicy of this world” [Theodizee des Diesseits] (GS 6:300). Lukács considered 
Hegel’s logic as “the ontology, which is true to the actuality” of modernity (GLW 13:497). 
The Marxists were fascinated with Hegel’s philosophy of actuality; since on the one hand, 
they were opposed to the wishful thinking of liberal philosophy, which is in the business 
of constructing the world as it should be; and on the other hand, they were opposed to the 
positivism of conservative thought, which accepted the status quo, without seeing the 
immanent “possibility” in actuality that would allow actuality to be changed for better. In 
case of modal categories, Hegel’s emphasis on the centrality of actuality testifies how he 
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transforms the transhistorical ontology of early modern period to his own historical 
ontology. Whereas in the early modern period, it is “necessity” that forms the centerpiece 
of ontology – the model of philosophy in this period is mathematics and geometry – for 
Hegel the world as is actually made through history gets the upper hand.228229 
Now, let us look at how Hegel conceives of necessity and contingency in relation 
to actuality. Here is the definition of contingency in the logic:  
The contingent is an actual that at the same time is determined as merely possible, 
whose other or opposite equally is. This actuality is therefore mere being or 
existence, but posited in its truth as having the value of a positedness or of 
possibility. (WdL II:205, SL 545) 
The contingent is “merely possible” (as opposed to the “really possible”) in the sense that 
although it is, it can equally not be; it can be changed without imposing any change on 
actuality. In a similar vein, Hegel defines necessity. First, he provides a usual definition 
of necessity – “what is necessary cannot be otherwise” (WdL II:211, SL 549) – but then 
he develops the concept of necessity in relation to actuality: 
                                                        
228 There is a tension in Hegel’s conception of modal categories: although he regards actuality to 
be the centerpiece of philosophy, nonetheless, he regards philosophy to be primarily related to 
necessity. Hegel resolves this dialectical tension through conceiving necessity in terms of 
actuality, as we will see in a moment.   
229 Cf. Lukács’ account: “Das drückt sich schon darin aus, daß er [i.e. Hegel] die Wirklichkeit als 
Zentrum dieses Gebietes [der Modalitätskategorien] auffaßt. Denn es ist klar, daß sowohl 
erkenntnistheoretisch wie logisch die Notwendigkeit den Gipfelpunkt der modalen 
Betrachtungsweise bilden muss, während für jede echte Ontologie die Wirklichkeit jene Totalität 
ist, welcher alle modale Bestimmungen, die Notwendigkeit mit inbegriffen, untergeordnet werden 
müssen. Natürlich meinen wir dabei eine diesseitige, weltimmanente Ontologie, keine 
theologische oder kryptotheologische. Denn in diesen wird in erster Linie das Universum als von 
einer absoluten Notwendigkeit beherrscht behandelt; das inappellable Geradesosein der 
Wirklichkeit, ihre vielleicht wichtigste immanent ontologische Bestimmung, wird dadurch zu 
einer bloßen Erscheinungsweise, wenn nicht zu einem Schein, hinter welchem dann, in den 
verschiedenen Theologien in verschiedener Weise, die absolute Notwendigkeit, die Absicht, der 
Wille Gottes etc. durch Offenbarung und aus ihr abgeleitete Erkenntnis sichtbar werden soll.” 
(GLW 13:544) 
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The developed actuality as the alternation of the inner and the outer collapsing 
into one, the alternation of its opposite movements that are united into one 
movement, is necessity. [Die entwickelte Wirklichkeit, als der in eins fallende 
Wechsel des Inneren und Äußeren, der Wechsel ihrer entgegengesetzten 
Bewegungen, die zu einer Bewegung vereint sind, ist die Notwendigkeit.] (EnzL. 
§147)  
According to Hegel, actuality indeed has to be conceived as the “activity” [Tätigkeit], as 
the “self-movement of form” [Sichbewegen der Form], as the “activation of what matters” 
[Betätigung der Sache], which “translates itself from the inner into outer, and from outer 
into inner” [Sichübersetzen des Inneren ins Äußere und des Äußeren ins Innere] (EnzL. 
§147). For Hegel, the process of actuality as obtaining through the relation of what is 
necessary in actuality (i.e. the inner) and what is contingent in actuality (i.e. the outer) is 
the necessary itself.  There is no possibility that such a process constituting actuality 
could be otherwise, and for this reason, it is necessary. In the Science of Logic, he writes, 
This actuality, which is itself as such necessary, for it contains necessity as its in-
itself, is absolute actuality – actuality which can no longer be otherwise, for its in-
itself is not possibility, but necessity itself. (WdL II:213, SL 550) 
Thus, Hegel by defining necessity as the process of actuality that is able to maintain itself 
in its changing states, in effect unites “actuality” and “necessity”. As we will see later, 
this is most manifest in the highest form of necessity for Hegel, i.e. the “absolute 
necessity”, which is explicitly defined as “rejoining” [Zusammengehen] of actuality with 
itself. Hegel writes, “that which is simply necessary only is, because it is.” [Das 




2-3- The Broad Conception of Necessity 
It is important to note that Hegel has a much more expansive notion of necessity than our 
usual conception of necessity. We might tend – under the influence of mechanistic 
sciences or perhaps Kantian (but not necessarily Kant’s) philosophy – to restrict necessity 
to causality: what is necessary is that which is causally determined. However, as Lenin in 
his notes on the Science of Logic observes,  
When one reads Hegel on causality, it appears strange at first glance that he 
dwells so relatively lightly on this theme, beloved of the Kantians. Why? Because, 
indeed, for him causality is only one of the determinations of universal connection, 
which he had already covered earlier, in his entire exposition, much more deeply 
and all-sidedly; always and from the very outset emphasizing this connection, the 
reciprocal transitions, etc. (1961 [1916]:162) 
For Hegel, Lenin explains, “cause and effect…are merely moments of universal 
reciprocal dependence, of (universal) connection, of the reciprocal concatenation of 
events, merely links in the chain of the development of matter”. For this reason, “the all-
sidedness and all-embracing character of the interconnection of the world” can be 
expressed by causality, Lenin emphasizes, only “one-sidedly”, “fragmentarily” and 
“incompletely” (ibid). Lenin’s observation is indeed true. If we look only at the logic of 
essence, we readily see that Hegel explains the inter-relation of things and phenomena, in 
addition to cause and effect, in terms of the relation of ground and grounded, condition 
and conditioned, law and appearance, inner and outer, force and expression, interaction, 
etc. Causality for Hegel is important, but only as a relation among other relations, not as 
the overarching category or as the category that strictly excludes other forms of 
relationality. Hegel especially warns to use the category of causality in explanation of 
Spiritual phenomenon and events; the necessity involved in the realm of Spirit is so rich 
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that transcends any strictly causal laws: 
It has become a common jest in history to let great effects arise from small causes 
and to cite as the primary cause  [erste Ursache] of a comprehensive and profound 
event an anecdote. Such a so-called cause is to be regarded as nothing more than 
an occasion [Veranlassung], an external stimulus [aüßere Erregung] of which the 
inner spirit of the event had no need, or could have used a countless host of other 
such in order to begin from them in the sphere of appearance, to disengage itself 
and give itself manifestation. (WdL II:228, SL 562) 
The highest category of the logic of essence is “substance” which Hegel, as we will see 
later, identifies with “absolute necessity”. Absolute necessity is the totality of necessary 
relations that obtain in actuality, and cannot therefore be reduced to mere causality.230 
Thus, from a Hegelian point of view, it is thoroughly insufficient to say that the chain of 
the revolutions in the Arab world in 2011 was caused by the self-immolation of a street-
vendor, Mohammad Bouazizi, in Tunisia; but one has to say that the internal structure or 
the totality – “substance” – of the Arab countries through constellation of factors and 
relations (high unemployment rate, corruption, political dictatorship, etc) became rife 
with instability such that it only needed a trigger to explode. The primacy is not with the 
trigger, but with the totality that posits the contingent trigger as contingent. In Hegel’s 
words, “such a petty and contingent circumstance is the occasion of the event only 
because the latter has determined it to be such.” (WdL II:228, SL 562) To conclude, 
causality does not exhaust necessity for Hegel, but is only a moment of necessity. 
                                                        
230 “To the same degree that the Understanding is accustomed to resisting [the idea of] 
substantiality, it is, by contrast, at home with causality, i.e. the relationship of cause and effect. If 
construing a content in a necessary fashion is what matters, then reflection at the level of the 
Understanding makes it its business to reduce that content to the relationship of causality above 
all. Now this relationship, to be sure, pertains to necessity, but it is only the one side in the 
process of necessity which is just as much this, to sublate the mediation contained in causality 
and demonstrate itself to be a simple relation-to-itself [i.e. substance]” (EnzL. §153Z) 
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3- Hegel’s Materialist Critique of the Cosmological Proof of the 
Existence of God 
In the previous section, I argued (1) that for Hegel contingency is real, (2) that necessity 
and contingency are defined in relation to actuality, and that the necessary is the process 
of actuality constituting itself as actuality, (3) that Hegel’s necessity is broader than one 
that obtains through causality. In this section, I will focus on Hegel’s critique of the 
cosmological proof of the existence of God that precisely deals with the dialectic of 
necessity and contingency, as it pertains to actuality. The shift from the logic to the 
proofs of existence of God might be surprising; yet there is no surprise in case of Hegel, 
as the two are closely interrelated. In the Summer 1829, Hegel offered two courses, one 
on the logic, and the other on the proofs of existence of God (Jaeschke 2003:497). In the 
first meeting of the latter, he announced that his lectures are intended to “supplement” the 
lectures on the logic “not in content, but in form”, and “this doctrine [i.e. the proofs], 
insofar as it is scientific, and the sphere of logic do not fall outside each other” (WW 
17:347, LPEG:37). Indeed, insofar as the “nature of proof” is concerned, the two come 
close to each other; since both involve attending to the transitions from less determinate 
categories to more determinate ones. (In case of the proofs of the existence of God, the 
issue is precisely how to make the transition, say, from contingency to necessity (the 
cosmological proof), or from thought to being (the ontological proof)). (Cf. Hösle 
1998:189ff, Albrecht 1958) However, that Hegel puts much emphasis on the proofs of 
the existence of God does not mean that he simply accepts the traditional theology. 
Rather, as Marx was astutely aware in his dissertation, Hegel by re-interpreting the proofs 
of existence of God in effect dismantles them. Marx writes,  
Hegel has turned this theological demonstration entirely around, that is, he 
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degrades them in order to justify them [umgedreht, d.h. verworfen, um sie zu 
rechtfertigen]. What kind of clients are those whom the defending lawyer can 
only save from conviction by killing them himself? (MEW 40:370, MECW 1:130) 
In order to understand how this “justification by means of degradation” works in the case 
of Hegel’s critique of the cosmological proof, we need first to reconstruct Hegel’s 
argument. We have learned that for Hegel necessity is more expansive than causality. 
Here is the initial definition of necessity in the Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of 
God: 
The necessity of an existing thing requires that it stand in connections 
[Zusammenhänge] with other things such that, in all aspects, it is completely 
determined by other existing things that function as conditions and causes. It 
cannot be separated from them or come into being on its own, nor can there be 
any condition, cause, or circumstance of connection by means of which it could 
be so separated (WW 17: 453, LPEG:105, underline mine). 
That which is necessary, according to Hegel, is completely determined through its 
relation with other things. The necessary things, Hegel emphasizes, are totally embedded 
in a network of “connections of conditions, …dependencies, connections of cause and 
effect, rule-governedness of their inner and outer course of actions, laws” (WW17: 449, 
LPEG: 102). Now, as Hegel defines necessity in terms of relation, expectedly he also 
defines contingency in terms of that which falls out of this network of relationality. A 
thing is “contingent”, Hegel writes, 
in virtue of its isolation [Vereinzelung]; whether it exists or not does not disturb 
or alter other things; the fact that it is so little held by them, and that any hold it 
derives from them is wholly insufficient, gives to them the insufficient illusion of 
independence that precisely constitute their contingency. (WW 17:452-3, 
LPEG:104) 
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According to Hegel, the contingency of the contingent consists in its “lack of a complete 
connection with other things” (ibid), and precisely because of this, the contingent is an 
individual. (Vereinzelung means both isolation and individuation). But the individuality 
of the contingent is not a full-fledged and determinate individuality, but an individuality 
that merely results from lack of determination [beziehunglose Vereinzelung]  (WW 
17:450, LPEG 103). To summarize, the contingent and the necessary are both actual; but 
whereas the necessary should be understood in terms of the totality of inter-relations, the 
contingent is that which shows itself, in Thomas Sören Hoffman’s wording, as “punctual”, 
separated from the totality (2004:353). In Hegelese, necessity should be understood in 
terms of mediation, and contingency in terms of immediacy.  
But this is only one side of the story. Hegel makes another set of arguments to 
show that the reverse is – also – true. That is, the necessary is not relational, and the 
contingent is relational. According to Spinoza, “a thing is called ‘necessary’, either in 
respect of its essence, or in respect of its cause. For the existence of something follows 
necessarily either from its essence or in respect of its cause.” (E1p33sch1, my emphases) 
We do not need to discuss Spinoza’s theory of causation or essence here; what we need to 
know is that Spinoza defines necessity in two ways (translated into Hegelian language): 
(1) External determination: the necessary is that which is determined by relation to other 
things. (2) Internal determination: the necessary is that which is immanent and in-itself. 
Hegel takes this Spinozist insight, and develops it to its logical conclusion. If for Spinoza, 
the necessary is either externally determined or internally determined, for Hegel the 
necessary is both and at the same time externally and internally determined. I have 
discussed the former point; now Hegel tell us:  
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Conversely, however, since an existing thing stands in a condition of complete 
connection, it is in all aspects conditioned and dependent and thus completely 
dependent. In necessity alone, rather, do we find the independence of a thing: 
what is necessary must be. Its having to be expresses its independence in such a 
way that what is necessary is, because it is. [Sein Seinmüssen drückt seine 
Selbständigkeit so aus, daß das Notwendige ist, weil es ist.] (WW 17:453, LPEG 
105) 
If the necessary is something completely dependent upon other things, then it is not 
necessary; since its existence is contingent upon the existence of those things. If the 
necessary is “removed from such a connection”, Hegel emphasizes, “it is isolated” and 
therefore “at once immediately contingent” (ibid). The concept of necessity, according to 
Hegel, requires independence.  
In a similar vein, Hegel argues that the contingent is dependent upon other things. 
The contingent “do not come from themselves, nor do they proceed by themselves” (WW 
17:448, LPEG 101); if they did so, they would be self-sufficient and necessary, not 
contingent. The isolation of a contingent thing is not by virtue of itself, but by virtue of 
other things isolating the contingent thing. That is, the contingent things in their very 
seeming independence are dependent on other things: 
Contingency claims things in virtue of their isolation [Vereinzelung]; therefore, 
they may equally exist or not exist. But they are just as much the opposite, not 
isolated but utterly related to each other as determinate and delimited [beschränkt]. 
But they are no better off as a result of this opposing determination. Isolation 
lends them the illusion [Schein] of independence, but their connection with other 
things, i.e. with each other, expresses the fact that individual things are at the 
same time not independent, shows that they are conditioned and affected by other 
things, that they are necessary by means of other things, not by means of 
themselves. (WW 17:449, LPEG: 102) 
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Hegel’s analysis shows us that necessity and contingency are not to be understood in 
separation from each other. Rather, in the language of the logic of essence, they form a 
reflection-logical relation – more precisely, a relation of “opposition” – with each other. 
That is, the relation of (1) necessity and (2) contingency is in fact the relation of (1) the 
relation of necessity and contingency and (2) the relation of necessity and contingency. In 
Chapter Two, I have discussed in detail how each of the “opposing” categories is 
contradictory; since each category contains the other as its moment, while at the same 
time excludes it from itself. Thus, for Hegel both necessity and contingency are 
contradictory; yet, as we will see later, the mode of their contradiction is decisively 
different from each other. 
We can now understand why Hegel criticizes the cosmological proof of the 
existence of God. A succinct formulation of the cosmological proof is the following: 
“Because the worldly is contingent, therefore an absolutely necessary being exists.” (WW 
17:460, LPEG: 111). According to Hegel, if we think of the contingent and the necessary 
as separate from each other, it is not possible to make the transition from the contingent 
to the necessary. Rather, “a gulf [Kluft] is plainly fixed between them” (WW 17:470, 
LPEG:118). In this way, the transition remains, that is, only an “external necessity” (WW 
17:461, LPEG:111), which does not have any “objective significance”; it does not lie 
immanently in the matter itself; rather, it is merely present in “a wholly subjective sense” 
in us who make this transition from the contingent to the necessary (WW 17:462, LPEG: 
112). In contrast to the proof, Hegel believes, one has to think that the contingent is 
already mediated with the necessary. “The being of the contingent is not its own being, 
but only the being of an other, and indeed it is defined as the being of its other, the 
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absolutely necessary.” (WW 17:468, LPEG: 117) That is, the true transition is not the 
transition from the contingent to the necessary, which is impossible, but it is “the 
transition that is inherently contained in the contingent itself – the transition from one of 
each of the elements that constitute the contingent to its other.” (WW 17:485, LPEG 130) 
According to Hegel, the necessary should not be understood in terms of “negation” (i.e. 
negation of contingency), but in terms of “negation of negation” (i.e. negation of 
contingency, but in such a way that contingency is already understood in terms of 
negation of necessity) (WW 17:518). This is one way to understand the contradictoriness 
of necessity for Hegel. Necessity results solely through the interaction of contingent 
things with each other, i.e. it is the result, but at the very same time it is contradictorily 
present from the beginning, governing the contingent.   
It is now clear why Marx regards Hegel’s proof of the existence of God as a 
justification by means of degradation. In the traditional conception of God, God is a 
necessity, which lies outside the messiness of the contingent world. First, there is a 
necessary God, which then creates the contingent. In Hegel’s conception, however, there 
is no cosmogony involved. For Hegel necessity is already “immanent” in the contingent, 
and only needs to “raise itself up” [sich erheben] from the interaction of the contingent; 
but in such raising up it has already ruled the contingent and determined them as being 
contingent (WW 17:462, LPEG :112). For Hegel, such an immanent necessity, which 
produces and reproduces itself through its relation with contingency, is tantamount with 
“actuality”. Thus, for Hegel, the most essential being is not an external God, but actuality 
itself conceived as necessary. In Hegel’s own words, “being in its own most essentiality 
is actuality, and actuality is inherently the relationship between contingency and necessity 
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as such that finds its complete determination in absolute necessity” (WW 17:420, LPEG 
99). 
In Chapter Two, I have discussed the logical structure of the relata in the relation 
of opposition, which Hegel calls them the “positive” and the “negative”. I have explained 
that there is an asymmetrical relationship between the positive and the negative. The 
positive is primarily defined in terms of self-identity, which is subordinately related to the 
negative to secure its identity. In contrast, the negative is primarily defined in terms of its 
non-identity, which is related to the positive, as its source of identity. The same logical 
structure obtains between “necessity” and “contingency”. According to Hegel, “being is 
simple equality with itself; contingency, however, is being that is absolutely unequal to 
itself and self-contradictory, and it is only in the absolute necessary that is once more 
restored to this condition of self-equality” (WW 17:467, LPEG 116). However, while the 
relation of necessity and contingency at its logical foundation is akin to the relation of the 
positive and the negative, it is nonetheless much more determinate and concrete. In the 
relation of the positive and the negative, the negative is, relatively speaking, self-standing. 
This is emphatically not the case with contingency.  For Hegel, “the contingent by its 
very nature is that which dissolves itself [sich aufzulösen]” (WW 17:485, LPEG 131). In 
the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel makes it clear that it is in the nature of contingent to be 
“eaten up” [verzehrt], to be “consumed” [verbraucht], to “submerge” [untergehen], to be 
“demolished” [zugrunde gehen], to be “sacrificed” [aufopfern] (EnzL. §146, §147Z). 
Indeed, according to Hegel, the very term “contingency” [Zufall] already suggests “a 
kind of existence whose special character is to fall [fallen]” (WW 17:420, LPEG 99). 
When Hegel talks of the “power of necessity” (EnzL. §151), he means that necessity has 
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the power to demolish and annihilate the particular contingent phenomena. To conclude, 
while both necessity and contingency for Hegel are contradictory – since each relates to 
the other as its own constitutive moment, while excluding it from itself – the 
contradiction for contingency is the source of its destruction and annihilation, but for 
necessity it is the source of its self-identity.231  
We can make sense of the nature of contradiction in contingency more when we 
look again at Hegel’s critique of the cosmological proof (Cf. Hösle 1998:191-2). In the 
Thirteenth Lecture (WW 17:460ff, LPEG 111ff), Hegel reconstructs the conventional 
cosmological proof in the following way:  
1- If the contingent exists, then the necessary exists. 
2- The contingent exists. 
C- Therefore, the necessary exists. 
According to Hegel, both premises of this inference are wrong. (1) The first one is wrong, 
since it conceives the contingent as the ground of the necessary, thereby, making the 
necessary dependent on the contingent. Now, if necessary is dependent on contingent, it 
means that its existence is not necessary; rather it is contingent upon the existence of the 
contingent. (2) The second premise is wrong, since it uncritically accepts that the 
contingent exists. This conception is based on representational thought, and is not able to 
grasp the conceptual structure of the contingent. Hegel believes that if we consider 
contingency conceptually, we realize that contingency in fact does not exist. That is, “the 
                                                        
231 Absolute necessity, which Hegel identifies with substance, is the highest category of the logic 
of essence. That the absolute necessity is contradictory shows that it is not possible to supersede 
the contradiction of essence within the framework of essence – essence is inherently 
contradictory. The resolution of the contradiction occurs through the transition from essence to 
Concept, where Hegel discusses how subjectivity (agency) is possible, in spite of – and indeed 
through – contradiction in essence (the social structure). However, an adequate discussion of this 
point – i.e. the logical relation of social structure and agency – needs a separate dissertation.   
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being of the contingent is not its own being, but only the being of…its other, the 
absolutely necessary” (WW 17:468, LPEG 117). In other words, the contingent for Hegel 
is a kind of being, whose mode of existence is non-being. Thus, the true inference 
according to Hegel is the following: Because the contingent is self-contradictory, the 
necessary exists. This way also we will have the true notion of necessity; since necessity 
is not, strictly speaking, dependent on, thereby contingent upon, contingency; but 
dialectically evolves out of the contradiction of contingency232. Hegel makes the same 
argument in a crucial part of the Science of Logic, namely, in the end of the chapter of 
contradiction. As I would like to emphasize the close proximity of the Lectures on the 
Proof of the Existence of God and the logic, I allow myself to quote it at length:  
The true inference from a finite and contingent being to an absolutely necessary 
being does not consist in inferring the latter from the former as from a being 
which is and remains ground; on the contrary, the inference is from a being that, 
as is also implied immediately in contingency, is only in a state of collapse and is 
inherently self-contradictory; or rather, the true inference consists in showing that 
contingent being in its own self withdraws into its ground, in which it is sublated 
— and, further, that by this withdrawal it posits ground in such a manner only that 
it makes itself into the positedness. In an ordinary inference the being of the finite 
appears as the ground of the absolute: because the finite is, therefore the absolute 
is. But the truth is that the absolute is, because the finite is the inherently self-
contradictory opposition, because it is not. In the former meaning an inference 
runs thus: The being of the finite is the being of the absolute; but in the latter: The 
                                                        
232 Hegel’s argument for the transition from “finitude” to “infinity” in the logic of being is similar. 
It is wrong to conceive of finitude as a being that exists alongside the infinite, Hegel argues, since 
it makes the infinite limited by the finite, thus in effect renders it finite. In contrast, Hegel 
believes, the finite has to be understood as a being that is not, a being that “dissolves itself” into 
infinity. Hegel writes, “the finite is thus inwardly self-contradictory; it sublates itself, ceases to 
be.” [Das Endliche ist so der Widerspruch seiner in sich; es hebt sich auf, vergeht.] (WdL I:148, 
SL 136) 
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non-being of the finite is the being of the absolute. (WdL II: 79-80, SL 443) 
 
 
4- The Dialectic of Necessity and Contingency in the Logic 
4-1- Contingency qua Illusion: The Contradiction of Contingency 
One of the main features of Hegel’s dialectic is that the earlier categories that are already 
superseded do not disappear; but they return with the progression of dialectical 
development. This is not due to an arbitrary decision of Hegel, but has to do with the 
conceptual structure of reality, which is a unity, composed of more determinate and less 
determinate categories. Hegel begins the logic of essence with the category of Schein 
(which I translate either as “semblance” or as “illusion”). As I have discussed in detail in 
Chapter One, semblance for Hegel denotes the givenness of being, but at the same time 
denotes that such givenness is already mediated through the structure of essence.  Such 
an “illusion” is not merely subjective, and cannot be dispensed with through enlightened 
reasoning, but it is objective and therefore indispensable to the structure of objects. Now, 
although the category of semblance belongs to the beginning of the logic of essence, it 
returns back – conceptually – as the categories of essence develop. In Chapter Two, I 
have discussed that among “determinations of reflection” the relation of “diversity” 
functions as a semblance: “diversity” captures the givenness of individuals and 
“externality” of relations characteristic of being, yet on further dialectical development, it 
is proved that such “diversity” is a semblance that is already mediated by essence-logical 
relation of “opposition”.  
There is one other prominent return of semblance in the logic of essence, namely, 
in the category of “contingency”. We have learned that for Hegel contingency is that 
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which falls outside the network of relationality of necessity, and for this reason, it is 
immediate and given. Yet such independence and immediacy of contingency is an 
illusion; since, contingency, in effect, is already mediated through, and posited by, 
necessity. Indeed, Hegel talks of the “illusion of contingency” [Schein der Zufälligkeit] 
(EnzL. §145Z), and regards the task of philosophy to “overcome the point of view of 
mere contingency, and recognize it as an illusion, whose essence is necessity” (GPR 
§324). Friedrich Engels, quite consistent with Hegel’s logic of essence, asserts that the 
contingent are “things and events whose inner interconnection is so remote or so 
impossible of proof that we can regard them as non-existent, as negligible”, yet amid 
such contingent things and events “the economic movement finally asserts itself [sich 
durchsetzt] as necessary” (MEW 37:463). Note that for Engels there is an endless number 
of contingencies in history that cannot conceptually be derived from the economic 
structure of society. These contingencies are real. They exist, yet in their very existence, 
they do not exist; since, these contingencies ultimately exist not for themselves, but for 
the necessity of economic laws, which are effective through them. In Chapter One, we 
learned that semblance for Hegel is inherently contradictory and unstable: it is the 
immediacy of being, but at very the same time, it is mediated by the structure of 
essence.233 The same holds for contingency: Contingency is given, yet in its very 
givenness, it is determined by necessity.234 In the Science of Logic, Hegel expresses the 
                                                        
233 “Being is semblance. The being of semblance consists solely in the sublatedness of being, in 
its nothingness; this nothingness it has in essence and apart from its nothingness, apart from 
essence, semblance is not. It is the negative posited as negative.” (WdL II:19, SL 395) I have 
discussed this passage in detail in Chapter One. 
234 Compare with the following: “The contingent itself has only the sort of existence that is of 
absolutely no value beyond being a possibility: it is, but just as much as it is not. In contingency 
being or existence is…dissected [herauspräpariert] to such an extent that it is at the same time 
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contradictory character of contingency in the following way:  
The contingent therefore presents two sides. First, in so far as it has possibility 
immediately in it — or what is the same thing, in so far as possibility is sublated 
in it —  it is neither positedness nor is it mediated, but is immediate actuality; it 
has no ground …. But secondly, the contingent is the actual…as a positedness …. 
Hence neither is in and for itself but has its true reflection-into-self in an other, or 
it has a ground.  
The contingent, then, has no ground because it is contingent; and, equally, it has a 
ground because it is contingent. (WdL II: 205-6, SL 545) 
We need to understand more precisely what it means that the contingent both and at the 
same time does and does not have a ground. Indeed, there is a development in Hegel’s 
conception of contingency and its contradictory nature, which I will reconstruct as 
follows. My exposition does not exactly follow Hegel’s own exposition in the Science of 
Logic, although it reflects its spirit, I believe, adequately235 236. It is noteworthy that the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
determined to be something that is intrinsically a nullity [an sich Nichtige] and consequently the 
transition to its other, to the necessity that is expressed within itself.” (WW 17:456, LPEG 107). 
Note how Hegel’s description of contingency is similar to his description of semblance: 
“Semblance is intrinsically a nullity [an sich Nichtige]; all that has to be shown is that the 
determinations which distinguish it from essence are determinations of essence itself, and further, 
that this determinacy of essence which semblance is, is sublated in essence itself” (WdL II:21, SL 
397) 
235 The chapter of modal categories is among the most obscure – if not the most obscure – part of 
the logic, and a reconstruction that closely follows the text risks re-doubling this obscurity in 
another level. For helpful commentaries that are closely based on the text, See Burbidge (2007: 
Chapter 2, 16-47), Hoffmann (1991: Kapitel 4, S.278ff),  and Houlgate (1995). Yeomans’ 
discussion (2012: Part III, 131-182) is extremely helpful, partly because he reconstructs Hegel’s 
argument not in its purity, but as it pertains to the structure of agency.  
236 The dialectical development that will be presented is similar (but not identical) to the dialectic 
of semblance. I have discussed in detail the dialectical transformation of semblance in the first 
chapter. It mainly consists of three stages. First, in the dialectic of the Essential and the 
Unessential, semblance is regarded as that which touches upon essence, but nonetheless, lies, so 
to speak, outside of essence. Second, semblance is conceived as that which is thoroughly posited 
by, thereby is dependent upon, essence. Third, through the dialectic of “reflection”, essence gets 
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three senses of contingency discussed below cannot strictly be separated from each other; 
rather they form a continuum from less determinate conception of contingency to more 
determinate ones.  
 
4-2- The Three Forms of Contingency in the Logic 
4-2-1 Contingency as the Beyond Necessity 
The first conception of contingency is that which cannot be derived from the conceptual 
structure of reality. Whatever can be reached through conceptual development is 
necessary; whatever lies beyond conceptual determination, i.e. whatever cannot be 
theoretically grasped, is contingent. In this way, the contingent is a brute fact that can be 
empirically known, but cannot be understood, and there is no rational account why it is 
the way it is. In the section of “Administration of Justice” in the Philosophy of Right, 
Hegel emphasizes that there is a “purely positive aspect of law”  [das rein Positive der 
Gesetze] that cannot be dispensed with:  
It is impossible to determine by reason, or to decide by applying a determination 
derived from the Concept, whether the just penalty for an offence is corporal 
punishment of forty lashes or thirty-nine, a fine of five thalers as distinct from 
four talers and twenty-three groschen or less, or imprisonment for a year or for 
364 days or less, or for a year and one, two, or three days. And yet an injustice is 
done if there is even one lash too many, or one taler or groschen, one week or one 
day in prison too many or too few. It is reason itself which recognizes that 
contingency, contradiction, and semblance have their (albeit limited) sphere and 
right, and it does not attempt to reduce such contradictions to a just equivalence. 
(GPR §214) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
its full articulation in that it posits semblance as its (essence’s) own presupposition. The reader 
will notice a similar dialectical path in the case of contingency.  
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According to Hegel, law, which by definition is universal, cannot possibly be complete. 
While applying the universal law to individual cases, thus, the law has to be 
supplemented with contingent decisions that cannot be accounted for through law. The 
existence of contingency in the process of administration of justice is not a defect of law, 
Hegel emphasizes, but it is exactly that which makes it possible that a decision, a 
judgment can be made. Without such contingency, therefore, law loses its effectiveness 
and “actuality”. In other words, the “actuality” of law “necessarily” requires 
“contingency” as its constitutive moment. Now, although the judgment made is 
ultimately contingent (365 or 366 days of imprisonment), it is not a free-floating 
contingency, but it is a contingency whose limits are defined by the necessity of laws (it 
cannot be 3650 days). That is, contingency is both grounded (on the necessity of law), 
and groundless (by virtue of the necessity of law giving it a general limit within which it 
can freely, i.e. without the imposition of law, be materialized.) The contingent is, 
therefore, contradictory; yet its mode of contradiction is under-determinate. It results 
from a qualitative determination (that imprisonment has to be necessarily made) and a 
quantitative determination (that the imprisonment can contingently be 365 or 366 days) 
that remain “indifferent” to each other. The “externality” of relation between necessity 
and contingency – such externality, which is characteristic of the logic of being – has to 
be developed further.237  
                                                        
237 There remains one major worry, namely, if we define contingency as that which lies beyond 
the theoretical grasp, how can we be sure that the boundary between necessity and contingency 
that we draw is a correct one? (Cf. Hösle 1998:91, footnote 79). The example given is about 
ethical issues, but the worry is even more pressing in the theoretical domain. It is too easy a 
solution, so the worry goes, to relegate whatever we cannot currently know to the domain of 
contingency. In this way contingency functions as a shield for our ignorance, as a pretext that 
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4-2-2- Contingency as the Condition: Relative Contingency 
If we look more closely at the concept of contingency, we realize that it is not simply that 
which lies beyond necessity, but it actually functions as a “condition” of necessity, 
thereby as already mediated by necessity. Indeed, in the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel 
explicitly develops the concept of contingency in relation to the category of “condition” 
[Bedingung]:  
The externality of actuality contains more precisely this: that the contingency as 
immediate actuality is essentially what is identical with itself only as being 
posited, but a being posited that is just as much sublated, i.e. an existing 
externality [eine daseiende Äußerlichkeit]. It is thus something presupposed, the 
immediate existence [Dasein] of which is at the same time a possibility and has 
                                                                                                                                                                     
justifies our laziness not to pursue further theoretical determination. It is not difficult to find 
examples in the history of sciences, where what had previously been considered as a matter of 
givenness, now can be theoretically explained. This point – that the boundary between necessity 
and contingency seems to be arbitrary – is in effect the heart of a Spinozist critique of Hegel: 
namely, if we allow brute facts and contingency in our theoretical considerations, then in 
principle everything could be considered as a brute fact, as contingent (hence, Spinoza’s famous 
explanatory principle, “all or nothing”). Hegel, as I take him, is silent to this worry – and for good 
reasons. What is necessary and what is contingent ultimately is not only a matter of logic, but also 
a matter of concrete historical, social, and scientific conjuncture which takes some things and 
events as necessary, and others as contingent. The central category of Hegel’s modal ontology is 
“actuality”, which has both “logical” and “experiential” content. Furthermore, in allowing 
contingency into his system, Hegel’s philosophy is much more congenial to scientific practice 
than Spinoza’s. Any scientific activity necessarily has to be selective. That is, it must simply 
disregard many things and events, and count them as contingent; otherwise, the scientific practice 
would not be able to take off the ground at all. If one does not distinguish necessity and 
contingency, one totally loses one’s sense of orientation about what really matters. In his 
Dialectic of Nature (1883), Engels forcefully argues that in the mechanistic conception of natural 
sciences, which bars contingency altogether, “contingency is not explained by necessity, but 
rather necessity is degraded to the production of what is merely contingent. If the fact that a 
particular pea-pod contains six peas, and not five or seven, is of the same order as the law of 
motion of the solar system, or the law of the transformation of energy, then as a matter of fact 
contingency is not elevated into necessity, but rather necessity degraded into contingency.” 
(MEW 20:488, MECW 25:500) 
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the determination of being sublated – of being the possibility of another – the 
condition. (EnzL. §146) (See also EnzL. §148.) 
According to Hegel, contingency is the condition of necessity. The condition is 
presupposed by necessity; since necessity is not self-standing, and requires the condition 
for its existence. At the same time, the condition is sublated by necessity, since the 
condition does not exist for itself, but only for contributing to the existence of necessity. 
In the Science of Logic Hegel conceives of this kind of necessity as “relative or necessity” 
[relative oder reale Notwendigkeit]. Hegel writes, relative necessity “has a presupposition 
from which it begins; it has its starting point from the contingent” (WdL II:211, SL 549). 
Relative necessity is necessary, but it is necessary only given certain conditions and 
circumstances238. As relative necessity is dependent on its conditions, it is itself 
contingent (upon these conditions.) In Hegel’s own words, “the really necessary is 
therefore limited actuality, which, on account of this limitation, is also only a contingent 
in some other respect.” (WdL II:212, SL 550) Note the similarity of Hegel’s conception of 
“relative necessity” to conventional cosmological proof of the existence of God. In both 
conceptions, contingency is conceived to be the condition of necessity. In both 
conceptions, necessary thus is a limited necessity, not the true “absolute” necessity. 
Hegel’s analysis of the relation of necessity and contingency is particularly 
relevant for his Philosophy of Nature. While explicitly deploying the themes developed 
                                                        
238 There is some analogy between Hegel’s “relative necessity” and Aristotle’s “hypothetical 
necessity” (Physics II: 9). Hypothetical necessity for Aristotle is not unqualifiedly necessary; but 
its necessity is based on some contingent “hypotheses”. The necessity of saw being made out of 
metal is “hypothetically” necessary; since this is only necessary insofar as the saw is to perform 
the operation of sawing. However, the analogy with Aristotle ends here; since the hypothesis to 
which necessity is related for Aristotle is not any contingent condition, but always a “goal” or a 
“purpose” to be achieved. In Hegel’s objective logic any talk of purpose is misguided; the 
concept of purpose only comes in the logic of Concept, where the metaphysics of subjectivity is 
being worked out. 
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so far in the logic of essence, Hegel asserts,  
In this [i.e. nature’s] externality, the determinations of the concept have the 
semblance of an indifferent subsistence and isolation [Vereinzelung] with regard 
to one another; and the concept therefore is present only as something inward. 
Consequently, nature exhibits no freedom in its existence, but only necessity and 
contingency (EnzN. §248). 
And: 
The contradiction of the Idea, arising from the fact that, as nature it is external to 
itself, is more precisely this: that on the one hand there is the necessity of its 
forms which is generated by the Concept, and their rational determination in the 
organic totality; while on the other hand, there is their indifferent contingency and 
indeterminable lawlessness. (EnzN §250) 
According to Hegel, nature is necessary insofar as it is determined by laws, regularities, 
and tendencies that persist through time. Yet, insofar as individuals are concerned nature 
is contingent. It is impossible to know the behavior of one individual bacterium of a 
specific species; it is only possible to know the behavior of the bacteria as a species, or in 
a population, i.e. collectively. Yet, the behavior of one bacterium is not purely random, 
rather it is such that it follows the necessary regularities that the species has. In Hegel’s 
words, “traces of conceptual determination [Spuren der Begriffsbestimmung] are to be 
found even in the most particularized object, although these traces do not exhaust its 
nature” (EnzN. §250). The precise way that individuals are is beyond the conceptual 
determination of the species, yet individuals are at the same time the condition of 
necessity of species existing and persisting through time. From the standpoint of the logic 
of essence, which is the ontology of absolute relationality, there is no Aristotelian 
“substantial form” which constitutes the “nature” of the species, rather, the species is 
solely derived from the interaction of individuals of the species. Necessity, therefore, is 
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not opposed to contingency, but obtains through contingency. “Necessity”, in Vittorio 
Hösle words, “is namely only that, which proves to be unavoidable under contingent, 
arbitrary cases” (1998:89).  
Hegel, thus, shifts the concept of natural law away from Newtonian-type 
conception of natural law. In the latter, there is a strict dichotomy between necessity and 
contingency. The laws are necessary, unalterable, and untouchable. The contingency only 
pertains to the “initial conditions”. Whether a glass dropped breaks or not depends on the 
initial height, from which the glass is dropped, or the makeup of the glass, or the makeup 
of the ground, on which the glass is dropped – and all these are contingent – but the glass 
in any case follows the strict law of gravitation.239 This means that law, in Newtonian 
type of explanation, is a function whose input is contingently given; but the law itself is 
necessary. In contrast, for Hegel, law, which gets its full articulation especially in biology 
and in the social sciences, is such that it does not exclude contingency, but obtains 
through it. Hegel recapitulates his discussion of the interrelation of “law” [Gesetzt] and 
“appearance” [Erscheinung]  in the logic of essence in the following way:   
Accordingly, law is not beyond appearance, but is immediately present 
[gegenwärtig] in it; the realm of law is the tranquil image [ruhige Abbild] of the 
world of existence [Existenz] or appearance. But the fact is rather that both form a 
single totality, and the existent world is itself the realm of laws, which, as that 
which is simply identical, is also identical with itself in positedness or in the self-
dissolving self-subsistence of existence. Existence withdraws into law as into its 
ground; appearance contains these two, the simple ground, and the dissolving 
movement of the appearing universe whose essentiality it is. (WdL II:153-4, SL 
                                                        
239 Hösle (1998:92-3) explains that Hegel can accommodate the conception of “initial condition”, 
but he does not further stress that Hegelian type of explanation is fundamentally different from 
the Newtonian type.  
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503-4) 
The law is “tranquil”, but it is a tranquility that results from “self-dissolving” of the 
appearance. There is no dichotomy between “law” and “appearance”, but the “withdrawal” 
of appearance is that which makes law what it is. While writing down this passage in his 
Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin enthusiastically comments, 
This is remarkably materialistic and remarkably appropriate (with the word 
“ruhige”) determination. Law takes the quiescent—and therefore law, every law, 
is narrow, incomplete, approximate. (1961 [1916]:151) 
Law is “narrow, incomplete, and approximate”, according to Lenin, as it is always 
mediated by “appearance”.  From the architectonic standpoint, Hegel discusses law and 
appearance before his modal categories, and he does not, therefore, use the language of 
necessity and contingency. But the issue is conceptually similar. The necessity of laws is 
approximate, because the necessity is not self-standing, but results from the interaction of 
the contingent. Therefore, within the Hegelian framework, one can talk of the laws of 
contingency, a phrase that is totally incomprehensible within the framework of 
Newtonian-type of explanation. Yet, this comes, of course, with a price. Within the 
Hegelian framework, it is impossible to determine the behavior of one individual through 
law; it is only possible to know the behavior of the essence as a totality. To use a 
sentence that fascinated Goethe, for Hegel, as far as the objective structure of the world is 
concerned “individuum est ineffabile“.240241 
                                                        
240 Cf. Wolfgang Wieland (1995), especially S.7ff. Wieland’s discussion is about contingency in 
general, and he does not refer to Hegel.   
241 The motivation for the transition from the logic of essence to the logic of Concept precisely 
lies in the fact that within the logic of essence, individuals remain under-determinate. That is, 
insofar as the objective logic is concerned, for Hegel, individuation necessarily fails. Proper 
individuation only occurs through “subjectivity”, that is, through understanding of oneself as an 
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4-2-3- Absolute Contingency 
In Hegel’s critique of the cosmological proof of existence of God we learned that it is 
inadequate to conceive contingency and necessity as equally existing side-by-side each 
other; rather one has to understand contingency as non-existent, more precisely, as a 
moment of necessity, namely, as a moment that is simultaneously posited and superseded 
by necessity. The same argument explains the transition from “relative” necessity to 
“absolute” necessity in the Science of Logic. In relative necessity, although the necessity 
of law, and contingency of individuals reciprocally mediate each other; necessity in the 
end remains dependent on contingency, which functions as a “condition” for necessity. In 
relative necessity, Hegel emphasizes, “the presupposing [of conditions] and the self-
returning movement [from conditions] are still separate – or necessity has not yet out of 
itself determined itself into contingency” (WdL II 212, SL 550).  The movement of the 
real necessity is from contingency to necessity; not yet the movement of necessity “from 
itself to itself” [aus sich selbst zu sich] (WdL II:213, SL 550). Whereas in real necessity 
contingent presuppositions fall apart from necessity, the “presupposition” that the 
absolute necessity has is “its own positing” (WdL II:214, SL 551). In other words, 
necessity produces contingency, so to speak, out of itself: 
It is therefore necessity itself which determines itself as contingency – in its being 
repels [abstößt] itself from itself and in this very repulsion has only returned into 
itself, and in this return, as its being, has repelled itself from itself. (WdL II 214, 
SL 551) 
This language is highly reminiscent of the determining reflection, which posits its own 
                                                                                                                                                                     
individual, who can say to himself “I”. The transition from the logic of essence to the logic of 
Concept has an enormous social and political significance – it is concerned with the issue how 
“agency” is possible within a “social structure” that reduces the individuals to contingency. A 
proper discussion of this transition needs a separate book.  
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presupposition. Indeed, the absolute necessity as the pure relation with itself is the 
highest actualization of the determining reflection. The absolute necessity posits things as 
contingent, but only to supersede them, and to integrate them within itself as necessary. It 
is in the figure of “absolute necessity” that we can properly talk of the “power of 
necessity” (EnzL §151); since, in contrast to relative necessity, the contingent things are 
now generated by necessity (qua necessity’s own contingency), and at the same time they 
are destroyed by necessity (since they are contingent). That is, the contingent things are 
simply powerless against the absolute power of necessity.242  
Hegel also explains the transition from relative necessity to absolute necessity in 
terms of the dialectic of form and content. In relative necessity, necessity pertains to the 
“form” of necessity, and the “content” is filled from outside, from contingency, which 
remains external to necessity. The form of necessity is therefore “constrained” by the 
content (WdL II:212, SL 550). In the figure of relative necessity, the dualism of form and 
content, or the dualism of necessity and contingency is still preserved. But in absolute 
necessity, the content is produced, so to speak, out of the form of necessity. For this 
reason, Hegel names absolute necessity “absolute form” (EnzL. §149). This does not 
however mean – I emphasize – that a cosmogonic process or a creation ex nihilo is 
involved here; rather it means that “the form in its realization has penetrated 
[durchdrungen] all its difference [from content] and made itself transparent” such that 
one can say that now “the distinction between form and content is vanished.” (WdL 
                                                        
242 Cf. Charles Taylor’s account: “The two [i.e. necessity and contingency] do not just coexist. 
Necessity has the higher place. Real necessity shows us necessary consequences of contingent 
conditions. Necessity is an island in a sea of contingency. But in the category of absolute 
necessity the position is reversed. Contingency is rather the ornament borne by the necessary 
structure of things.” (1975:285) 
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II:214, SL 551). This means that, in Gerhart Schmidt’s formulation “the absolute 
necessity is not any formalism; although the side of form has become even more stronger 
in it” 243. In other words, whereas in relative necessity, the form is “indifferent” or 
“external” to the content, in absolute necessity the form has absolute power over the 
content, and relates to it as the sovereign. The contingent content, which is initially 
external to and different from the form, is completely taken up by the absolute form, and 
functions as a moment of the form.  
Whereas relative necessity is a kind of “law”, which obtains through contingency 
of individuals, absolute necessity for Hegel is a “totality”, which posits and supersedes 
individuals.  Hegel identifies “absolute necessity” with “actuality” itself and indeed with 
the highest form of actuality – “substance”. In other words, for Hegel, “actuality”, once 
conceived through modal categories of necessity and contingency, is “substance” which 
is able to generate and destroy “accidents”244. Hegel writes, 
It [i.e. absolute necessity] is as much simple immediacy or pure being as simple 
reflection-into-self or pure essence; it is this, that these two are one and the same. 
That which is simply necessary only is because it is; it has neither condition nor 
ground. But equally it is pure essence; its being is simple reflection-into-self; it is, 
because it is. As reflection, it has a ground and condition, but it has only itself for 
ground and condition. (WdL II:215, SL 552) 
                                                        
243 “Die absolute Notwendigkeit verleugnet nicht den Inhalt, sondern bezieht sich auf ihn, auf das 
Zufällige. Aber sie bezieht sich darauf souverän, als das übergegensätzliche Unendliche auf das 
Endliche...Sie ist daher nicht mehr die bloße abstrakte Umkehrung der Zufälligkeit. Die 
Notwendigkeit ist überhaupt die Gegenspielerin der Zufälligkeit; sie muß also mit dem Inhalt 
(dem Zufälligen) fertig werden.  Als absolute Notwendigkeit hat sie den Inhalt gemeistert...Die 
absolute Notwendigkeit ist kein Formalismus mehr, wenngleich die Seite der Form wieder 
gestärkt ist. Der Inhalt oder das Zufällige ist in diesem Absoluten selbst verankert, damit ist die 
Reflexion nicht mehr aüßerlich, sondern in dieses Absolute einbezogen.“ (Schmidt 1973:199) 
244 See Chapter 3 for a detailed explanation of Hegel’s conception of “substance”, and what it 
means that it has “absolute power” over individuals. 
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According to Hegel, absolute necessity is a being that constitutes all individuals, and for 
this reason, it is independent from them. Yet, in its very independence, it is dependent on 
individuals, since it can only be manifested through individuals. Absolute necessity, 
therefore, is not a pre-mediated Platonic One that then manifests itself in individuals; 
rather, it is a One that solely obtains through the mediation of individuals. That absolute 
necessity is both and at the same time dependent and independent of individuals makes it 
contradictory. Yet, its contradiction gives it cohesion and stability, whereas the 
contradiction of contingency, as we have seen before, is the source of its annihilation and 
destruction.  
In Christopher Yeomans’ language, in contrast to relative necessity in which there 
is a “looseness of fit” between the contingent and the necessary, in absolute necessity a 
“tightness of fit” obtains between the two (2012:157). Such tightness of fit occurs when 
there is a fully developed form of “totality”, such as in organisms, in the works of art, in 
the structure of agency245, and more important for my dissertation, in “capital” which is a 
self-maintaining and self-reproducing social system246. In all these forms of “totality”, 
necessity and contingency are so interwoven that each individual, in its very contingency 
and replaceability, can be conceived as necessary and irreplaceable. I would like now to 
very briefly illustrate this point through (a) George Lukács’ aesthetic theory, and (b) 
Marx’s philosophy of history.  
(a) According to Lukács, in works of art, there is no “fixed antinomy” between 
                                                        
245 From the purely systematic point of view, “agency”, “organism”, and the “work of art” 
(although Hegel does not discuss the last in the logic) belong to the logic of Concept, where the 
categories of “purpose” and “life” are being addressed. Absolute necessity in the logic of essence 
is a “blind” necessity that has not yet superseded in the freedom of the Concept. 
246 See my detailed discussion of “capital” as a “totality” in Chapter 4. 
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necessity and contingency. Rather, in art contingency has a “friendly and fruitful 
coexistence with categories that express higher force, order and necessity” (GLW 11:750). 
Indeed, for Lukács, it is exactly through incorporation of contingency that the works of 
art acquire the quality of “naturalness”, “warmth” and “liveliness”, such qualities that are 
absent in scientific enterprises that try to eliminate contingency. To give an example from 
Lukács, when in War and Peace the severely wounded Andrei Bolkonski is laid on 
operating table, he accidentally sees his old rival and enemy Anatol Kuragin in the same 
room, getting his leg amputated. This meeting in this place and time is a brute accident. 
But the abstractness of this accident is superseded, in that seeing Kuragin initiates an 
existential crisis in Andrei that makes the content of the next part of the book. The 
development of Andrei’s character is continued in the rest of the book through a series of 
accidental events that eventually leads to a thorough portrayal of Andrei and his 
relationship with other characters of the novel (ibid:765-6). This transformation of 
contingency into necessity is only by virtue of the “effective power” [wirkende Macht] of 
the totality of the work of art.247 This “effective power” is absent in bad works of art, 
which can only produce piecemeal gatherings of parts that remain indifferent to each 
other. In contrast to the so-called “aristocratic” Tolstoy, Lukács gives an example of a so-
called “communist” writer, Ernst Ottwalt, in whose work necessity and contingency 
                                                        
247 Also: “Auch darin aüßert sich der spontane Materialismus und die spontane Dialektik der 
künstlerischen Praxis. Denn philosophisch ausgedrückt bedeutet sie eine Bejahung der 
Objektivität der Erscheinung, zugleich mit der der Objektivität des Wesens unter notwendiger 
widerspruchsvoller Verbundenheit beider miteinander. Die strenge Auswahl der Details 
wiederum ist eine der wirksamsten Verkörperungen jener Angemessenheit der Kunst an die 
tiefsten Lebensbedürfnisse der Menschheit...Auch hier zeigt sich deren spezifische 
Beschaffenheit darin, daß das Kunstwerk den Phänomenen des Lebens ihre brutale Faktizität, ihre 
leere Zufälligkeit nimmt und das gestaltete Stück Wirklichkeit nicht nur formal zu einem Ganzen 
abrundet, sondern als Voraussetzung dieser Tendenz die dargestellten Phänomene als organische 
Bestandteile eines sinnvollen Zusammenhangs hinstellt.” (GLW 11:757). 
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“confront one another inflexibly and exclusively”. Accidental events for Ottwalt remain 
mere accidents. They remain mere “examples” that “can be arbitrarily replaced by other 
examples”. That is, they never become necessary (Lukács 1948:50, in translation 
1980:59).   
(b) Contrary to some widespread misconception about Marx’s philosophy of 
history, contingency for him plays an important role in unfolding of events in history. In 
a letter to Kugelmann (1871), Marx while commenting on the Paris Commune 
emphasizes,  
World history would indeed be very easy to make if the struggle were taken up 
only on condition of infallibly favorable chances. It would, on the other hand, be 
of a very mystical nature, if “accidents” (Zufälligkeiten) played no part. These 
accidents themselves fall naturally into the general course of development and are 
compensated again by other accidents. But acceleration and delay are very 
dependent upon such “accidents”, which include the “accident” of the character of 
those who first stand at the head of the movement. (MEW 33:209, MECW 44:136-
7, Marx’s emphases) 
According to Marx, therefore, it is not the case that in history there are simply some laws 
that exist independently from the contingencies. Rather, the necessity obtains through 
taking up the contingent events, and transforming them into its process. Such 
contingencies affect the general process of necessity, inasmuch as they can accelerate or 
delay this process. Therefore, as the contingent events are “effective” in the process of 
necessity, they become in fact necessary for it.248 
                                                        
248 To give another example: Hegel’s doctrine of absolute necessity and absolute contingency, 
once applied to the logic of agency, shows why Hegel is not in favor of abstract Kantian 
cosmopolitanism. For cosmopolitans, because the fact of being born in a specific country, say, 
Iran, is contingent, it should not play any role in one’s moral behavior. From a Hegelian 
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5- The Dialectic of Necessity and Contingency in Capitalism 
5-1- Individuals at the “Mercy of Chance” [Herrschaft des Zufalls] in 
Capitalism 
In this section, my aim is by no means to give an exhaustive account of Marx’s 
conception of the relation of necessity and contingency. This needs another dissertation. 
My aim is rather to show how some of the themes discussed in Hegel’s logic work out in 
Marx’s analysis of capitalism. As the theme of the dialectic of necessity and contingency 
is closely interwoven with the dialectic of totality (substance) and individuals (accidents), 
my discussion of Marx in Chapter 4 is highly relevant, and this section should be read as 
a supplement to it.  
A defining feature of modern capitalist society is the formation of market 
economy. In pre-capitalist social formations, there has always been some sort of market, 
but the market was limited and marginal. It is only in capitalism that market has become 
universalized, such that all economic things and activities have become thoroughly 
interdependent. It is exactly this objective inter-relationality that has made the science of 
political economy possible; since the contingent facts and activities across society are 
now interconnected, such that their interaction would compensate each other and produce 
a necessary order. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel emphasizes that political economy is 
“one of the sciences which have originated in the modern age as their ground [Boden]”, 
and elaborates,  
There are certain universal needs, such as food, drink, clothing, etc., and how 
                                                                                                                                                                     
standpoint, as I take him, the “absolute necessity” of moral action can only obtain, when it 
incorporates the “absolute contingency” of unchosen “given” conditions (being born in Iran.) 
This again testifies the centrality of “actuality” in Hegel’s philosophy, and the necessity that 
obtains through it.  
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these are satisfied depends entirely on contingent circumstances. The soil is more 
or less fertile in different places, the years are more or less productive, one man is 
industrious and the other lazy. But this proliferation of arbitrariness [Willkür] 
generates universal determinations from within itself, and this seemingly scattered 
and thoughtless activity is subject to a necessity, which arises of its own accord. 
To discover the necessity at work here is the object of political economy, a 
science which does credit to thought because it finds the laws underlying a mass 
of contingent occurrences. It is an interesting spectacle to observe here how all the 
interconnections have repercussions on others, how the particular spheres fall into 
groups, influence others, and are helped or hindered by these. This interaction, 
which is at first sight incredible since everything seems to depend on the arbitrary 
will [Willkür] of the individual, is particularly worthy of note; it bears a 
resemblance to the planetary system, which presents only irregular movements to 
the eye, yet whose laws can nevertheless be recognized. (GPR §189Z) 
Quite similar to the laws of nature in biology, for Hegel the laws of market economy do 
not exclude contingency, but result from “interaction” [Ineinandergehen] of the 
contingent phenomena that are only “seemingly scattered” [anscheinend Zerstreute].249  
Contingency is therefore a semblance, since although it seems that the contingent 
phenomena generate necessary determinations “from within themselves”, nevertheless, it 
                                                        
249 Indeed, Hegel’s description of the interrelation of necessity and contingency in the structure of 
the market is very similar to his description of the emergence of necessity out of contingency in 
the Encyclopedia Logic: “The process of necessity begins with the existence of scattered 
circumstances that seem to [scheinen] have nothing to do with one another and to have no 
connection between them. These circumstances are an immediate actuality which collapses into 
itself and a new actuality emerges from this negation. We have here a content that is twofold, as 
far as its form is concerned. First, it is content of the basic matter (Sache) at issue and, second, it 
is content of the scattered circumstances that appear as something positive and initially assert 
themselves in this way. This content, as an inherently nothing, is accordingly inverted into its 
negative and thus becomes content of the basic matter. The immediate circumstances go under 
[zugrunde gehen] as conditions, but at the same time are also preserved as content of the basic 
matter. It is then said that something completely different emerged from such circumstances and 
conditions and, for this reason, the necessity of this process is called blind.”(EnzL. §147Z) 
 318 
is ultimately necessity that arises “of its own accord”250.  
The Hegelian point that necessity and contingency are closely interwoven with 
each other was crucial for the young Marx in developing his own political economy in 
contrast to Ricardo and Mill. In a quite remarkable passage in his posthumously 
published Comments on James Mill (1844), Marx writes,  
Mill commits the mistake — like the school of Ricardo in general — of stating 
the abstract law without the change or continual supersession of this law through 
which alone it comes into being. If it is a constant law that, for example, the cost 
of production in the last instance — or rather when demand and supply are in 
equilibrium which occurs sporadically, contingently — determines the price 
(value), it is just as much a constant law that they are not in equilibrium, and that 
therefore value and cost of production stand in no necessary relationship. Indeed, 
there is always only a momentary equilibrium of demand and supply owing to the 
previous fluctuations of demand and supply, owing to the disproportion between 
cost of production and exchange-value, just as this fluctuation and this 
disproportion likewise again follow the momentary state of equilibrium. This 
actual movement, of which that law is only an abstract, contingent and one-sided 
moment, is made by recent political economy into something accidental and 
inessential. Why? Because in the acute and precise formulas to which they reduce 
political economy, the basic formula [Grundformel], if they wished to express that 
movement abstractly, would have to be: In political economy, law is determined 
by its opposite, absence of law. [Das Gesetz ist in der Nationalökonomie durch 
sein Gegenteil, die Gesetzlosigkeit, bestimmt.] (MEW 40:445, MECW 3:211) 
According to Ricardo’s (and James Mill’s) labor-theory of value it is the labor spent in 
production of commodities (i.e. cost of production) that determine their value (or price). 
                                                        
250 The analogy of market economy to planetary system, although being suggestive and 
interesting, can potentially be misleading. The seeming irregularities in the planetary system are 
only irregularities for us – the phenomenon itself does not have any irregularity. In contrast, in 
market economy, as well as in biology, the irregularities are real, and belong to the phenomenon 
itself.  
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This means that the market does not have any effect on the value of commodities. 
Ricardo could propose this theory, since he simply presupposed that in market supply and 
demand always match, thus rendering the market irrelevant for the value of commodities. 
However, this presupposition is exactly what is problematic about Ricardo, Marx holds, 
as in the “actual” world, supply and demand never match, or only sporadically match. 
Therefore, according to Marx, the Ricardian law, which purports to grasp the “necessity” 
of the movement of prices, in effect, makes the law “contingent” (namely, contingent 
upon matching of supply and demand that only sporadically obtains.) Now, Marx accepts 
the labor theory of value, but he holds that in capitalism there is a constitutive role for 
market in economy. Indeed, as he later explicitly develops, the value produced can only 
get “actualized” [verwirklicht] through the market. That market is essential to Marx’s 
theory of value means that for Marx contingency is indispensable; since market economy, 
which by definition is not a planned economy, is always rampant with “fluctuations” and 
“disproportions” between supply and demand. From a logical point of view, Ricardo, 
quite consistent with the predominant Newtonian rationality then, conceives of law as a 
necessity, which excludes contingency. In contrast, Marx, inspired by Hegelian 
rationality, regards necessity and contingency in a dialectical relationship with each other, 
such that necessity is only actualized through contingency.251 
                                                        
251 In his Karl Marx: The Burden of Reason (Why Marx Rejected Politics and the Market) (2002), 
Allan Megill, while quoting the above passage, argues that the main reason why Marx rejected 
market economy is this: because there is always contingency and chance in the market, “the 
market is not rationally understandable”, therefore, “it is not accessible to scientific 
understanding” (164). Megill concedes that Marx got his demand for rationality mainly from 
Hegel; yet he takes Hegel to be a “necessitarian” thinker who holds that “a truly rational 
knowledge is a necessary knowledge in which nothing is contingent” (162). Megill’s argument is 
simply wrong, since it is based on a wrong conception of Hegel. Even if we grant that Marx 
rejected market economy because market fails to be rational, it is very odd to reduce Marx’s 
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Going into details of Marx’s economic theory would take us far afield of our 
subject. Very briefly, and with an overt simplification: Marx distinguishes between “real 
value” (or simply  “value”) of commodities and their “market value” (i.e. “price”). The 
former is defined through the cost of production, but the latter obtains through the 
contingencies of the supply and demand in the market. Yet, although real value and 
market value are distinct from each other, there is ultimately no strict dichotomy between 
the two. As Marx years later in the Grundrisse (1858) emphasizes,   
The market value is always different, is always below or above the [real] value of 
a commodity. Market value equates itself with real value by means of its constant 
oscillations, never by means of an equation with real value as if the latter were a 
third party, but rather by means of constant non-equation of itself (as Hegel would 
say, not by way of abstract identity, but by constant negation of the negation, i.e. 
of itself as negation of real value. (MEW 42:72, G 137) 
For Marx the real value is not an observable thing; it is rather a necessity that undergirds 
the observable price of commodities. This necessity functions as “the driving force and 
the moving principle [die Triebkraft und das bewegende Prinzip] of the oscillations 
which commodity prices run through”, namely, as “the law of the motion” of the prices 
(ibid). In Capital (1867), Marx further clarifies that “the quantitative incongruity between 
price and magnitude of value” or “the deviation of the former from the latter” is 
emphatically “no defect” of the price-form, 
but, on the contrary, it makes this form the adequate one for a mode of production 
whose laws can only assert themselves as blindly operating averages between 
constant irregularities.  [sondern macht sie umgekehrt zur adäquaten Form einer 
                                                                                                                                                                     
demand for rationality merely to a “scientific understanding” of the world. Quite in accord with 
Hegelian philosophy, Marx’s conception of rationality is broad, one which includes moral and 
ethical dimensions. 
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Produktionsweise, worin sich die Regel nur als blindwirkendes 
Durchschnittsgesetz der Regellosigkeit durchsetzen kann.] (MEW 23: 117, C I: 
196) 252. 
The idea that the necessity of economy occurs through the contingent fluctuations of the 
market – in this abstraction and on its own – does not seem to be an adequate reason why 
Marx rejected market. Indeed, even the archenemy of Marx in the twentieth century, 
Friedrich von Hayek, believes that a “spontaneous order” in economy evolves out of the 
contingent decisions of individuals. However, if we regard this idea in the overall 
structure of Marx’s thought, it becomes clear why it has a significantly critical bent. For 
Marx, commodities in capitalism are not inert objects. Rather, they are social institutions 
that exert power over individuals, coercing individuals to abide by their logic. Individuals 
are purportedly self-determining, but in effect it is their products of labor that determine 
them. As the logic of the commodities is the logic of contingency and a necessity that 
comes through it, individuals in capitalism inevitably become a “plaything of alien 
powers” [Spielball fremder Mächte] (MEW 1:355, MECW 3:155).253 Whereas Hayek 
thinks that market is “the most efficient” way of organizing economy, Marx argues that 
the market economy in capitalism renders masses of people unemployed; tends to reduce 
the wage of workers to a minimum, and is necessarily fraught with economic crises that 
could destroy lives of millions of people. It is in this framework that Marx rejects the 
                                                        
252 Cf. also, Marx’s letter to Kugelmann, July 11, 1868: “The point of civil society is precisely 
that, a priori, no conscious social regulation of production takes place. What is rational and 
necessary by nature asserts itself only as a blindly operating average.”(MEW 32:553, MECW 
43:69) 
253 G.A. Cohen in Why not Socialism argues that the market is a huge casino and the economic 
status of individuals, for the most part, is the result of pure chance. However, in contrast to 
normal casinos, to which one can choose to enter or not to enter, market is a casino that 
encompasses all, and thus leaves no choice for individuals not to enter to (2009:32-33). That is to 
say, individuals in capitalism are necessarily forced to be at the mercy of chance.  
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logic of the market, and argues in favor of a social order that the social production and 
reproduction of life is determined by self-conscious and transparent decisions of 
individuals collectively, and not by the contingencies of the products of their labor254.  
For Hegel, as we recall, the form of necessity that obtains through fluctuations of 
contingency is best exemplified in the realm of nature. (“Nature exhibits no freedom in 
its existence, but only necessity and contingency” (EnzN. §248)). For Marx, capitalist 
economy is exactly problematic, as it reduces human beings to “natural” objects, subject 
to the dialectic of contingency and blind necessity. In his early Outlines of a Critique of 
Political Economy (1844) – a text that had tremendous effect on the young Marx, 
drawing him into political economy – Engels argues that the law in capitalist economy is 
“purely a law of nature, and not a law of the mind [Geist]” (MEW 1:514, MECW 3:433). 
For Engels, capitalist economic laws are not the result of conscious decisions of 
individuals, or society as a whole, but quite like the laws of nature have their own 
independent logic. These so speak “artificial” laws develop into periodic crises that are 
not preventable; they are indeed more harmful than the periodic “natural” epidemics of 
plague that haunted Europe in the Middle Ages. Engels writes,   
What are we to think of a law which can only assert itself through periodic 
upheavals? It is certainly a natural law based on the unconsciousness of the 
participants. If the producers as such knew how much the consumers required, if 
they were to organize production, if they were to share it out amongst themselves, 
then the fluctuations of competition and its tendency to crisis would be impossible. 
Carry on production consciously as human beings — not as dispersed atoms 
without consciousness of your species — and you have overcome all these 
artificial and untenable antitheses. But as long as you continue to produce in the 
                                                        
254 For an introductory but helpful account why Marx rejected market, See Jonathan Wolff 
(1992). 
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present unconscious, thoughtless manner, at the mercy of chance [Herrschaft des 




5-2- “Anarchy” in Society and “Despotism” in Workplace 
In order to illustrate how the dialectic of necessity and contingency in the market actually 
reflects back on individuals and determine their lives, I would like to discuss one instance 
of Marx’s concrete analysis of capitalism, namely, how in capitalism the “anarchy” of the 
market and the “despotism” in workplace mutually condition each other. Marx elaborates 
on this issue in Capital in the course of his analysis of the distinction between  “division 
of labor in manufacture” and the “division of labor in society” (MEW 23:371ff, 
Capital:470ff), where he contrasts his conception with Adam Smith’s. 
According to Smith, Marx reports, the division of labor in society and the division 
                                                        
255 Towards the end of his life, Engels in his Origins of Family, Private Property and the State 
(1884) uncritically accepts the identification of the laws of nature with the laws of society, 
nonetheless, his main point remains true all the same: “But chance [Zufall] is only one pole of an 
interrelation, the other pole of which is called necessity. In nature, where chance, too, seems to 
reign, we have long since demonstrated in each particular field the inherent necessity and 
regularity that asserts itself in this chance. What is true of nature holds good also for society. The 
more a social activity, a series of social processes, becomes too powerful (mächtig) for conscious 
human control, grows beyond human reach, the more it seems to have been left to pure chance, 
the more do its peculiar and innate laws assert themselves in this chance, as if by natural necessity. 
Such laws also control the chances of the production and exchange of commodities; these laws 
confront the individual producer and exchanger as strange and, in the beginning, even as 
unknown powers, the nature of which must first be laboriously investigated and ascertained. 
These economic laws of commodity production are modified at the different stages of 
development of this form of production; on the whole, however, the entire period of civilization 
has been dominated by these laws. To this day, the product is master of the producer; to this day, 
the total production of society is regulated, not by a plan thought out in common, but by blind 
laws, which operate with elemental force (Gewalt), in the last resort in the storms of periodic 
commercial crises.” (MEW 21:169-70, MECW 26:273-4). (I have kept the translation of Zufall to 
chance.) 
 324 
of labor in factory are of the same kind; they are only different in degrees. For Smith, the 
difference between the two is only “subjective”, that is, it “exists merely for the observer”. 
In case of the division of labor in factory it is possible to observe all different operations 
at a glance in one spot, while this is not possible in the division of labor in society. 
Against Smith, Marx argues that the two are qualitatively different. In case of the division 
of labor in factory, it is only the end product that is a commodity. Thus, the 
interconnection of different forms of labor in the factory is maintained by a capital that 
organizes the workplace. In contrast, the division of labor in society is held through 
exchange of commodities. Here, what relates different forms of labor with each other is 
not a conscious plan of the capitalist, but the purchase and sale of the products of 
different branches of industry in the market across society. Marx writes,   
The division of labor within manufacture presupposes a concentration of the 
means of production in the hands of one capitalist; the division of labor within 
society presupposes a dispersal of those means among many independent 
producers of commodities. While, within the workshop, the iron law of 
proportionality subjects definite numbers of workers to definite functions, in the 
society outside the workshop, the play of chance [Zufall] and caprice [Willkür] 
results in a motley pattern of distribution of the producers and their means of 
production among the various branches of social labor. (MEW 23:376, C I:476) 
Therefore, according to Marx, the form of necessity that is at work in the division of 
labor in factory is distinct from the form of necessity in the division of labor in society. 
While the former obtains through “a planned and regulated apriori system”, the latter is 
“an aposteriori necessity imposed by nature, controlling the unregulated caprice of the 
producers, and perceptible in the fluctuations of the barometer of the market prices” 
[stumme, im Barometerwechsel der Marktpreise wahrnehmbare, die regellose Willkür 
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der Warenproduzenten überwältigende Naturnotwendigkeit] (ibid). To explicate, the 
division of labor in society is “aposteriori” since it is derived from the contingencies of 
the market. 
For Marx, the two forms of the division of labor are interrelated. The individual 
capitalist under the “coercive laws of competition” [Zwangsgesetze der Konkurrenz] in 
the market (MEW 23: 335, C I: 433) is forced to exert an “undisputed authority” over the 
workers in factory. The capitalist has no choice apart from organizing the workplace in 
such a way that it maximizes the efficiency. Thus, on the one hand, in order to expedite 
the process of production, the worker must be assigned a tiny and repetitive work, which 
makes him an appendage of machine, thereby divesting him of his humanity; and, on the 
other hand, the worker must put to work as hard as his physiology allows. Thus, Marx 
emphasizes, in capitalist mode of production “anarchy in the social division of labor and 
despotism in the manufacturing division of labor mutually condition each other” (MEW 
23:377, C I: 477).  
The point of Marx’s analysis is to attack the ideology of free market; the ideology 
that holds any planned economy, in restricting choices, hinders the freedom of 
individuals. In fact, however, the unregulated “free” market, by reflecting back into the 
workplace, makes the worker systematically subject to the despotism of the capitalist.256  
Perhaps Marx was too optimistic to think this despotism remains limited to the workplace, 
                                                        
256 In a characteristic vent of anger, Marx concludes: “The same bourgeois consciousness which 
celebrates the division of labor in the workshop, the lifelong annexation of the worker to a partial 
operation, and his complete subjection to capital, as an organization of labor that increases its 
productive power, denounces with equal vigor every conscious attempt to control and regulate the 
process of production socially, as an inroad upon such sacred things as the rights of property, 
freedom and the self-determining ‘genius’ of the individual capitalist. (MEW 23:379, C I: 477) 
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but the current neoliberal constellation, with its ideology of “flexible labor arrangement”, 
has proved that this despotism can indeed be extended beyond the workplace and to home.  
 
6- Freedom qua Contingency qua Illusion 
“Contingency, the shape of freedom under the spell.” [der Zufall, die 
Gestalt von Freiheit unterm Bann.] (Adorno, GS 6:338) 
 
I have discussed so far that for Hegel contingency is real; yet its reality is not for its own 
sake, but for the sake of contributing to the existence of necessity. In other words, 
contingency in its very reality is not real. I have discussed how this means that 
contingency for Hegel is a semblance. That is, contingency seems to be independent of 
necessity, but in fact it is fundamentally dependent on necessity. In this section, I will 
discuss how the shape of freedom that obtains in the logic of essence is a freedom that 
results from contingency and randomness. The freedom qua contingency is an illusion; 
since although it is objective and exists; it does not exist on its own, but solely functions 
as a moment of the necessity of essence. Hegel calls this kind of freedom “formal” 
[formell] – a word that is later taken up by Marx and Marxists to describe the kind of 
freedom that individuals have in capitalism. My aim in this section is to discuss the 
formal freedom in Hegel and in Marx, and to show how it is related to contingency.  
 
6-1- Freedom qua Contingency in Hegel 
A good point of departure is to consider the distinction between “negative” and “positive” 
freedom that Isaiah Berlin (re-)introduced in social and political philosophy. Negative 
freedom is the absence of obstacles on one’s action. It is freedom of non-interference. 
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One is free in the negative sense, insofar as one is left over in a space within which one 
can exercise one’s freedom. In contrast, positive freedom is defined in terms of “self-
actualization”, or “self-determination”. One is free in the positive sense, insofar one is 
able to act in such a way that realizes one’s fundamental purposes and values, and insofar 
as one can take control of one’s own life in a significant way (Berlin: 1969). 
Now, it is clear that the freedom that obtains in the logic of essence is merely a 
negative freedom. Recall that in the logic of essence the individual, qua contingency, 
gains its individuality through lack of determination. The individual in essence is not a 
fully determinate or substantive individual; rather, it becomes individual only through 
escaping from the network of relationality. However, it is not by virtue of itself that the 
individual can escape such total determination; rather, it is the totality which determines 
or “posits” the individual as not-fully-determinate entity and contingent. The totality of 
substance withholding from total determination of individuals gives the individuals some 
leeway for self-determination, and this leeway is conceived as freedom. This leeway 
however is only limited, since the contingent always exists not for itself, but for the sake 
of necessity.257 
Calling Hegel’s “formal freedom” as “negative” freedom is illuminating, in that it 
captures its inherent indeterminacy; yet it can be potentially misleading. In liberal 
political philosophy with its atomistic ontology, negative freedom is real; it is a property 
of individuals and there is nothing illusory about it. In contrast, in the logic of essence, 
where there is always absolute primacy of totality over individuals, negative freedom is 
illusory; it exists – but only as a moment of the totality of essence.  
                                                        
257 From the logical point of view, “positive freedom” only obtains in the logic of Concept, where 
individuals are in fact self-determining. 
 328 
Note that freedom qua randomness and contingency is best exemplified in the 
realm of nature, where individuals are totally subject to the dialectic of necessity and 
contingency.  In the realm of nature, Hegel tells us, contingency has its “free sway” 
[freies Ergehen], since it is not possible for individuals as individuals to be conceptually 
determined (EnzL. §145Z). Each individual in a species in its shape or biological makeup 
is unique, but this does not hinder it to be an individual of that particular species, despite 
its individuality.  The diversity of individuals of a species, precisely speaking, is not a 
genuine diversity, since at bottom all of them are structurally and conceptually the same. 
True that the species does not exist apart from individuals – it is only through individuals 
and their variety that species is constructed – yet this does not change the fact that 
individuals are only individuals of the species, and must contribute to the perpetuation of 
the species.  Hegel uses the spatial metaphor of “surface of nature” to describe the locus 
of contingency (ibid). Individuals are free on the surface of nature to be what they are, 
but this does not change the deeper necessary regularities or laws of nature. The totality 
(of a species, or of nature) is  
absolute power just because it can freely abandon [frei entlassen] its difference to 
the shape of self-subsistent diversity, external necessity, contingency, caprice, 
opinion, which however must not be taken for more than the abstract aspect of 
nothingness [Nichtigkeit]. (WdL II:283, SL 608)  
To emphasize: this diversity for Hegel is simply “without concept” [ohne Begriff] – not 
only because it is impossible for us to determine this diversity in its diversity, but more 
profoundly, because this diversity in its objective structure is chaotic and “arational” [das 
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Vernunftlose] (ibid) 258. 
Within the realm of market economy, Hegel believes, freedom of individuals is 
similar to the realm of nature. In buying a MacBook rather than a desktop, or even in 
what initially seems to be deeper, in choosing my profession as a medical doctor or as a 
civil engineer, I might think that I am free.  Yet this freedom is an illusion; as it solely 
contributes to the perpetuation of the laws of market economy. In the Philosophy of Right, 
Hegel emphasizes that although in civil society it seems to me that I myself determine my 
own particularity, nonetheless,  
this is nothing but a pure mistake [aber ich bin eigentlich darüber nur im Irrtum], 
since, while I suppose that I am adhering to the particular, the universal and the 
necessity of the context remains the primary and essential factor. I am thus 
altogether on the level of semblance, and while my particularity remains my 
determining principle, that is, my end, I am thereby serving the universal which in 
fact retains ultimate power over me. (GPR §181Z) 
To give an example beyond the realm of economy, consider the basic presupposition of 
Durkheim’s work on suicide. Highly conscious of the significance of what he is writing, 
Durkheim in the introduction to the book emphasizes, “each society is pre-disposed to 
                                                        
258 Compare essence’s “frei entlassen” (to freely abandon) of individuals with the Concept’s 
“Gewährenlassen” (to give free reign) to individuals. In order to understand the distinction, the 
following passage from Hegel’s Nürnberg period is helpful. “Gott ist, nach den Momenten seines 
Wesens, 1. absolut heilig, insofern er das schlechthin in sich allgemeine Wesen ist. Er ist 2. 
absolute Macht,  insofern er das Allgemeine  verwirklicht und das Einzelne im Allgemeinen 
erhält, oder ewiger Schöpfer des Universums. Er ist 3. Weisheit, insofern seine Macht nur heilige 
Macht ist, 4. Güte, insofern er das Einzelne in seiner Wirklichkeit gewähren läßt, und 5. 
Gerechtigkeit, insofern er es zum Allgemeinen ewig zurückbringt (WW 4:273-4). In this passage, 
Hegel identifies the absolute power of the totality (God) with its capacity to contain the individual 
within itself, which simultaneously allows the individual to be what it is. The key is that the 
totality is absolutely powerful, yet at the same time, it is both good and holy. The identification of 
the absolute power with goodness distinguishes Hegel’s understanding of God from Spinoza’s as 
Majetschak correctly points out (1992:147). Within the structure of Hegel’s own logic, such 
attributes as goodness and holiness only obtain within the logic of the Concept.   
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contribute to a definite quota of voluntary deaths” (1952 [1897]: l). Although Durkheim 
is far from realizing his debt to Hegel, this is a perfect example of the “formal freedom” 
that obtains in the logic of essence. A particular individual thinks that in voluntarily 
killing himself he is free, but in fact his freedom is only the result of chance. A given 
society in a given time through constellation of factors – the level of social cohesion 
obtained through such collective enterprises as religion, the unemployment rate, the 
social and economic upheavals and the ensuing disorientation and “anomie” of 
individuals, etc. – is necessarily predisposed to have a certain number of suicide. This is a 
“social fact”, in Durkheim’s language, that exists independently of individuals. If it is not 
– contingently, randomly – this particular individual that kills himself, another individual 
well would do it.  
From a more general viewpoint, Hegel regards the freedom of choice  [Willkür] 
as freedom qua contingency. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes, “choice is 
contingency in the shape of will” (GPR §15). (The contingency of choice is also captured 
in the translation, as Willkür is sometimes translated to “caprice”, or “arbitrariness”). In 
choosing something over something else, I am contingently free; whatever I choose, it 
could have been otherwise; such freedom would thus remain external to myself. 
Therefore, in freedom of choice, I am in fact not self-determining, but I am taken to be a 
“natural” object determined from without – from natural instincts, sexual desire, external 
manipulation through advertisement, competition with other people, etc. Hegel conceives 
of contingency, we recall, as contradictory. The contradictory nature of contingency lies 
in the fact that the contingent is both and at the same time grounded and ungrounded; it is 
obviously grounded on necessity, but it is also ungrounded, as necessity does not exhaust 
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its determination, thus leaving some leeway for it to determine itself. The same holds true 
for the freedom of choice. The freedom of choice is contradictory (GPR §15, EnzL.145Z) 
– it is grounded on the external factors, but at the same time, it is ungrounded, since, 
although it is determined externally, there remains a moment of indeterminacy that makes 
freedom of choice what it is.259 
 
6-2- Freedom qua Contingency in Marx’s Analysis of Capitalism 
In Chapter 1, I have discussed how freedom in capitalism for Marx is an illusion. Marx 
totally grants that there is freedom in capitalism; yet he proves that this freedom does not 
exist for its own sake; but solely functions as a moment of the structure of domination. 
Now, having discussed the dialectic of necessity and contingency in essence we are in a 
better position to understand the precise nature of formal freedom in capitalism. In this 
section, I explain Marx’s conception of formal freedom in capitalism through the 
following points: (1) the illusion of freedom of consumption; (2) the illusion of freedom 
in labor-market; (3) the illusion of freedom to exit; and (4) the illusion of economic 
desert.  
 
                                                        
259 In the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel conceives of the inherent contradiction in free choice in 
terms of contradiction between “form” and “content”: “Freedom of choice proves to be 
contradictory insofar as form and content still stand opposite one another here. The content of 
choice is a given content and known to be a content grounded, not in the will itself, but in 
external circumstances.”(EnzL. §145Z). Yeomans’ discussion on the contradiction of choice is 
very helpful (2012:167ff). The free choice is contradictory, in Yeomans’ language, because “it is 
the opposition between the fact that the will takes itself to be the locus of responsibility, and yet 
when the action is given a rationally satisfying ground or explanation the locus of responsibility is 
ascribed to external factors.” (171). 
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6-2-1- The Illusion of Freedom of Consumption 
Perhaps the most salient aspect of freedom in capitalism is freedom of consumption. 
Especially in 20th and 21st century, in which consumerism has reached its peak, the 
freedom of consumption appears to be the main reason that does the justificatory work 
for capitalism. Indeed, Marx regards the freedom of consumption as one major point that 
distinguishes capitalism from pre-capitalist social orders.  In a text that was originally 
intended to be the last part of Capital: Volume One, entitled as “Results of the Immediate 
Process of Production”, Marx writes: 
The slave receives the means of subsistence he requires in the form of naturalia 
which are fixed both in kind and quantity, i.e. he receives use-values, the free 
worker receives them in the shape of money, exchange-value, the abstract social 
form of wealth. Even though his wage is in fact nothing more than the silver or 
gold or copper or paper form of the necessary means of subsistence into which it 
must constantly be dissolved – even though money functions here only as a means 
of circulation, as a vanishing form of exchange-value, that exchange-value, 
abstract wealth, remains in his mind as something more than a particular use-
value hedged round with traditional and local restrictions. It is the worker himself 
who converts the money into whatever use-values he desires; it is he who buys 
commodities as he wishes and, as the owner of money, as the buyer of goods, he 
stands in precisely the same relationship to the sellers of goods as any other 
buyer. Of course, the conditions of his existence – and the limited amount of 
money he can earn – compel him to make his purchases from a fairly restricted 
selection of goods. But some variation is possible as we can see from the fact that 
newspapers, for example, form part of the essential purchases of the urban 
English worker. He can save or hoard a little.  Or else he can squander his money 
on drink. But even so he acts as a free agent; he must pay his own way; he is 
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responsible to himself for the way he spends his wages. (Results: 1033, 
Resultate:115)260  
According to Marx, I have discussed in Chapter 4, the driving force of capitalist economy 
– what constitutes its “actuality” – is valorization of value, that is, maximization of profit. 
Human needs are obviously more or less satisfied in capitalism, but not for their own 
sake; rather only because the satisfaction of needs is essential for profit making. In other 
words, use-values for Marx are the condition of the sphere of economy; but, strictly 
speaking, they do not belong to it. A commodity for Marx is essentially defined in terms 
of its exchange-value. It has to necessarily have some use-value, but what kind of use-
value it has is totally irrelevant, that is, contingent. To invoke Hegel’s language, the use-
value of a commodity, qua contingency, is both grounded and ungrounded. It is grounded 
on exchange-value; insofar as use-value does not exist on its own, but only as the “bearer” 
of exchange-value. It is at the same time ungrounded, insofar as it does not matter what 
kind of need it would satisfy. Corresponding to the contingency of use-value, the freedom 
that obtains through consumption is also the freedom of contingency. The worker must 
necessarily spend his money in consumption, but what he buys, from the standpoint of 
the totality of economy, is irrelevant. To conclude, the freedom of consumption is an 
illusion; since it only functions as a moment of the process of valorization of value, i.e. as 
a moment that is both posited and superseded by this process. True that the worker is 
                                                        
260 In the Poverty of Philosophy (1847), Marx explains that although there is always some leeway 
for the worker to spend his wage, nonetheless this leeway is much more restricted than that which 
seems to be the case: “The consumer is no freer than the producer. His opinion depends on his 
means and his needs. Both of these are determined by his social position, which itself depends on 
the whole social organization. True, the worker who buys potatoes and the kept woman who buys 
lace both follow their respective opinions. But the difference in their opinions is explained by the 
difference in the positions which they occupy in society, and which themselves are the product of 
social organization.” (MEW 4:75 , MECW 6:20) 
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more or less free in the realm of consumption, nonetheless, this freedom does not have 
any effect on the social relations of production, which define him in the first place. 
 
6-2-2- The Illusion of Freedom in the Labor Market  
One central aspect of freedom in capitalism is that the worker, precisely speaking, does 
not sell his own person, but sells his “labor-power”, which he can alienate from himself. 
The worker, namely, “the proprietor of labor-power”, Marx writes, “must always sell it 
[i.e. his labor-power] for a limited period only, for if he were to sell it in a lump, once and 
for all, he would be selling himself, converting himself from a free man into a slave” 
(MEW 23:182, C I: 271). The periodic renewal of the contract gives the worker a sense of 
freedom, because it may seem to him that he can renounce working for capital, if he 
wants to do so. However, as Marx sarcastically observes, this formal freedom to sell the 
labor-power is complemented and mediated by another form of freedom, namely, 
freedom from the means of production. The worker, that is, has “no other commodities 
for sale, i.e. he is rid of them, he is free of all the objects needed for the realization of his 
labor-power” (MEW 23:183, C I:273), such that he is coerced to sell his labor-power. No 
matter what the subjective opinion of the worker is, his freedom remains merely formal, 
since he has no viable alternative other than selling his labor-power.   
Moreover, as I have discussed in Chapter 4, in capitalism due to universalization of 
relations of exchange that occurs through impersonal medium of money, the social 
relations get an impersonal character. The individual is not naturally bound to any 
particular estate, guild or master. This gives the worker a certain degree of freedom. 
However, this freedom is only formal; since although the individual worker – if he is 
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lucky – can change his masters who dominate him, he must always have some master. 
The relation of domination, that is, remains untouched. Marx writes,  
The slave is the property of a particular master, the worker must indeed sell 
himself to capital, but not to a particular capitalist, and so within certain 
limitations, he may choose to sell himself to whomever he wishes; and he may 
also change his master. (Results:1032, Resultate:114) 
Note how the freedom of the worker is tied up with contingency. In contrast to slave or 
feudal societies, where there is a necessary bound between the slave/the serf and the 
master, in capitalism the bound between a particular worker and a particular capitalist is 
contingent. However, the kind of freedom that results through this contingency is merely 
an illusion: it seems to the worker that he is independent from the capitalist, but in fact he 
is totally dependent on the class of capitalists. In the German Ideology Marx and Engels 
explicitly state the relation of freedom to contingency in capitalism, and how this 
freedom in effect hides the deeper relations of domination: 
In imagination [Vorstellung], individuals are freer under the dominance of the 
capitalists than before, because their conditions of life are contingent; in actuality, 
of course, they are less free, because they are to a greater extent governed by 
objective coercion [sachliche Gewalt] (MEW 3:76, MECW 5:78-9). 
 
6-2-3- The Illusion of Freedom to Exit  
Due to the impersonal character of social relations in capitalism, the individual worker 
might be able to climb the social hierarchy, and get into position that allows him to stop 
selling his labor-power, or even to become a capitalist.  This has a strong ideological 
appeal, as it seems to the worker that he can exit from the rank of the proletariat, if he 
works hard, or if he is lucky. This is in contrast to feudalism or slave society, where there 
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is allegedly no feasible way for the serf or slave to cease to be what he is. Marx concedes 
the existence of the so-called freedom in capitalism, yet he stresses that this freedom 
remains an illusion. In the Grundrisse he writes,  
The determinacy of individuals, which in the former case [i.e. feudalism] appears 
as a personal restriction of the individual by another, appears in the latter case [i.e. 
capitalism] as developed into an objective restriction of the individual by relations 
independent of him and sufficient unto themselves. Since the single individual 
cannot strip away his personal determinacy, but may very well overcome and 
master external relations, his freedom seems (scheint) to be greater in case 2. A 
closer examination of these external relations, these conditions, shows, however, 
that it is impossible for the individuals of a class etc. to overcome them en masse 
without destroying them. A particular individual may contingently get on top of 
these relations, but the mass of those under their rule cannot, since their mere 
existence expresses subordination, the necessary subordination of the mass of 
individuals. (MEW 42:97, G 164, underlines are mine) 
The inference from the fact that any worker can cease to be dependent on capital to the 
fact that all workers can achieve such independence is based on a “fallacy of 
composition”, as Jon Elster explains (1978:107-116, 1985:211). This is a fallacy that 
infers a collective case from an individual case, i.e. a fallacy that is based on “local-
global confusion”. Obviously, in order for capital to function, there must necessarily be a 
class of workers who are coerced to sell their labor-power under the conditions dictated 
by capital. The reason that a particular individual can rise up in social hierarchy is only 
because not all individuals can do so. That is, the contingency of so-called freedom of the 
 337 
individual worker is mediated and conditioned, to use G.A. Cohen’s phrase, by the 
necessity of  “collective unfreedom” of the workers (Cohen: 1983).261  
 
6-2-4- The Illusion of Economic Desert 
One of the appealing aspects of capitalism is the hegemony of the idea of economic 
desert. Namely, individuals in capitalism earn what they deserve through their talent, 
effort, responsibility, accomplishment, etc. Marx accepts that there is some variation in 
income in capitalism, such that the individual worker, through hard-working, may earn a 
higher income; yet at the same time he believes that such an idea of desert is an illusion, 
which results from the objective structure of economy. I have briefly discussed the 
distinction between “value” and “price” of commodities for Marx, which is constitutive 
of the capitalist economy.  The idea of desert has its material foundation in the distinction 
between “value” and “price” of the commodity of “labor-power”, which the worker sells. 
According to Marx, the “value” of labor-power in a given country at a given period of 
time is more or less fixed and given. This “value” depends on the level of civilization as 
well as the general level of class struggle at that time and place, which defines the needs 
and expectations of the workers (MEW 23:185, C I: 275). However, there is necessarily 
always some oscillation in the “price” of labor-power. An individual worker might be 
                                                        
261 We can see how Marx’s analysis fits well with Hegel’s logic of essence. For Hegel, as we 
recall, essence as a totality is defined in terms of domination, but the particular individual remains 
ultimately indeterminate. However, in this case, there is a difference between Marx and Hegel. In 
the logic of essence, the properties of an individual could in principle be universalizable. (A 
property in an individual organism may hold true for all individuals in the species. There is no 
logical impossibility involved.) In contrast, as Marx conceives capitalism in terms of class 
antagonism, the universalization of the property of “having the option to exit” is logically 
impossible in capitalism. 
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able to sell his labor-power above or below the given “value” that is defined across the 
society as a whole. The constant oscillation of the “price” of labor-power around its fixed 
“value” gives some leeway for the individuals to exert their freedom. It may seem to the 
individual that he is actually the one who determines his income; yet in fact his actual 
income is a contingency that is strictly based on the general necessary relation between 
the class of capitalists and the class of the workers in society as a whole.262 
 
                                                        
262 “In the eyes of the slave a minimal wage appears to be a constant quantity, independent of his 
work. For the free worker, however, the value of his labor-power and the average wage 
corresponding to it does not appear to him as something predestined, as something independent 
of his own labor and determined by the mere needs of his physical existence. The average for the 
class as a whole remains more or less constant, like the value of all commodities; but this is not 
how it immediately appears to the individual worker whose wages may stand above or below this 
minimum. The price of labor sometimes sinks below and sometimes rises above the value of 
labor-power. Furthermore, there is scope for variation  (within narrow limits) to allow for the 
worker's individuality, so that partly as between different trades, partly in the same one, we find 
that wages vary depending on the diligence, skill or strength of the worker, and to some extent on 
his actual personal achievement. Thus the size of his wage packet appears to vary in keeping with 
the results of his own work and its individual quality… Although, as we have shown, the latter do 
not affect the general relationship between capital and labor, between necessary labor and surplus 
labor, the result differs for the individual worker, and it does so in accordance with his particular 
achievement. In the case of the slave, great physical strength or a special talent may enhance his 
value to a purchaser, but this is of no concern to him. It is otherwise with the free worker who is 










Mere knowledge even if it went much further and deeper than that of 
bourgeois economic science, is not enough to bring social powers under 
the domination of society. What is above all necessary for this is a 
social act. (Engels, Anti-Dühring, MEW 20: 295, MECW 25:301) 
The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking 
is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the 
truth, i.e., the actuality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in 
practice. The dispute over the actuality or non-actuality of thinking which 
is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.263 (Marx, “Theses 
on Feuerbach”, MEW 3:5, MECW 5:3) 
Hegel’s logic is the algebra of the revolution. (Alexander Herzen) 
 
In this conclusion, I first summarize my discussion of Marx about the social necessity of 
illusion in capitalism, and argue how such necessary illusion can only be abolished 
through revolutionary praxis (Section 1). Then, I turn to Hegel’s logic of essence and 
summarize my discussion on the issue of how illusion is constitutive of essence. I explain 
                                                        
263 “Die Frage, ob dem menschlichen Denken gegenständliche Wahrheit zukomme ist keine Frage 
der Theorie, sondern eine praktische Frage. In der Praxis muß der Mensch die Wahrheit, i.e. die 
Wirklichkeit und Macht, Diesseitigkeit seines Denkens beweisen. Der Streit über die Wirklichkeit 
oder Nichtwirklichkeit des Denkens, das von der Praxis isoliert ist, ist eine 
rein scholastische Frage.” 
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how the illusion inherent in essence can only be abolished through the supersession of the 
logic of essence into the logic of the Concept, and argue that this supersession is 
tantamount to revolutionary praxis (Section 2). Finally, I discuss Michael Theunissen’s 
interpretation of the transition from essence to the Concept. Theunissen interprets this 
transition as the transition from relations characterized by power to relations 
characterized by intersubjective, “communicative” freedom. I argue how his 
interpretation, both from logical and political point of view, is wrong. (Section 3) 
 
1- The Persistence of Illusion in Capitalism and Marx’s Derivation of 
the Necessity of Praxis  
According to one prominent conception of ideology, ideology is fabricated by the 
powerful, and is then propagated across society through the media that the powerful own. 
Contrary to this voluntaristic conception of ideology – a conception that reduces ideology 
to intentional manipulation of people by the powerful – I have argued that for Marx 
ideology is generated by the totality of social relations, and independently of individuals. 
For Marx, ideology is not primarily the mental beliefs of individuals; it is rather the 
objective institutional norms that govern the behavior of individuals. Ideology is thus a 
“socially necessary illusion” that is systematically related to the totality of society, and 
helps the totality perpetuate itself.  
 The critique of ideology, according to Marx, consists in showing how our 
intuitive awareness relates to the totality of society in capitalism, and thus functions as a 
moment of totality. In Chapter One, I have argued that in every economic transaction that 
we make on a daily basis, we presuppose that we are equal and free. Although each single 
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economic transaction embodies equality and freedom, once such economic transactions 
are conceived from the point of view of the totality of capital, it turns out that such 
economic transactions are based on radical inequality and domination. In Chapter Two, I 
have argued that in our intuitive awareness, the labor-arrangements seem to be “diverse” 
from each other – some more humane, some less humane – but such diverse labor 
arrangements, seen from the viewpoint of the totality of capital, are in fact all essentially 
based on the relation of “opposition” between capital and labor. In Chapter Three and 
Chapter Four, I have argued that in our intuitive awareness, we tend to believe that it is 
an individual capitalist that exerts power over an individual worker, but once seen from 
the viewpoint of the totality of capital, it becomes clear that such power is in fact the 
power of totality that works through individuals, making the former powerful and the 
latter powerless. Furthermore, I have argued that individuals think that they are – each – 
unique and indispensable, but once we see the individuals from the point of view of the 
totality of capital, it becomes clear that the individuals are in fact easily replaceable and 
dispensable. Finally, in Chapter Five, I have argued that even the most real freedom that 
seems to us to have obtained in capitalism, i.e. the freedom of consumption, once viewed 
from the totality of capital, turns out to be solely at the service of maintaining economic 
laws of capitalism, which subjugate individuals.  
 Thus, Marx’s critique of ideology in capitalism explains how the beliefs of 
individuals (about equality, freedom, diversity, and self-determination) in capitalism are 
illusions. However, since these illusions are objectively materialized (in the institution of 
market), they cannot be discarded away through the critique of ideology. No matter how 
deeply I have read and understood Marx’s theory, I cannot but practically act on the basis 
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of ideology (of equality, of freedom, of diversity) in my everyday life. Marx’s critique of 
ideology is thus at the same time the critique of the critique of ideology. To paraphrase a 
well-known phrase from Hegel, Marx’s economic theory in its entirety is a “self-
culminating critique” [die sich selbst vollbringende Kritik], a critique that by 
meticulously developing critical concepts of political economy from the most abstract to 
the most concrete, ultimately destroys itself as critique. The result of Marx’s critique of 
political economy is to show how theoretical, scientific, contemplative activity is unable 
to eliminate illusions. Rather, in order to eliminate these illusions, the theoretical activity 
must be ultimately superseded into practical activity. Practical activity meant here is not 
an instrumental activity, whose purpose is to realize certain given aims within the context 
of existing social relations. Such instrumental activity is based on the illusions embodied 
in the social relations, and in turn reinforces them. Rather, by practical activity here, 
Marx means a kind of activity, which aims to change the very social relations that 
generate the illusions. Marx calls this kind of practical activity “praxis,” or more 
precisely “revolutionary praxis.” The praxis in question is revolutionary in double sense: 
Firstly, it changes the social relations and the totality thereof, and secondly, because 
individuals are constituted by social relations, the individuals engaged in praxis are also 
at the same time engaged with changing their very own selves. This double sense of 
revolutionary praxis is already addressed in the early Marx. In his Theses on Feuerbach 
he writes,  
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-
change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary praxis. 
[Das Zusammenfallen des Ändern[s] der Umstände und der menschlichen 
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Tätigkeit oder Selbstveränderung kann nur als revolutionäre Praxis gefaßt und 
rationell verstanden werden.] (MEW 3:6, MECW 5:4) 
Through revolutionary praxis, individuals are able to eliminate the illusions embodied in 
the totality of social relations, and, by doing so they are able to simultaneously eliminate 
their own cognitive illusions.264 According to Marx, thus, the revolutionary activity is 
aiming at the transparency of totality, as well as the transparency of individuals’ self-
conception. We can understand the importance of transparency for Marx when we 
consider the fact that in the entire Capital Marx does not write about communist society 
more than two paragraphs, and the fact that in both paragraphs he does not fail to address 
transparency as the hallmark of the communist society. In contrast to capitalism, which is 
constitutively defined by illusions, in the communist society, namely, in “an association 
of free men, working with the means of production held in common”, 
[t]he social relations of the individual producers, both towards their labor and the 
products of their labor, are here transparent in their simplicity, in production as 
well as in distribution. [Die gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen der Menschen zu 
ihren Arbeiten und ihren Arbeitsprodukten bleiben hier durchsichtig einfach in 
der Produktion sowohl als in der Distribution.] (MEW 23:93, C I: 172, my 
emphasis) 
And, he emphasizes that the illusions inherent in capitalism 
can, in any case, vanish only when the practical relations of everyday life between 
man and man, and man and nature, generally present themselves in a transparent 
[durchsichtig] and rational [vernünftig] form. The mystic veil is not removed 
                                                        
264 It is worthwhile to emphasize that for Marx the elimination of illusions can only occur through 
collective revolutionary praxis. The illusions are socially constructed, and can accordingly be 
only socially eliminated. Georg Lukács in his History and Class Consciousness clearly 
emphasizes this point: “The individual can never become the measure of all things. For when the 
individual confronts objective reality, he is faced by a complex of ready-made and unalterable 
objects which allow him only the subjective responses of recognition or rejection. Only the class 
can relate to the whole in a practical revolutionary way.” (1971 [1923]: 193) 
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from the countenance of the social life-process, i.e. the process of material 
production, until it becomes production by freely associated men, and stands 
under their conscious and planned control. (MEW 23:95, C I:173, my emphases)  
To preempt misunderstanding, it is worthwhile to emphasize that by describing 
communism as illusion-free and as transparent, Marx does not, at any rate, indulge in a 
wildly romantic idea. His point is not that in the future communist society, there will not 
be any cognitive failure, or any cognitive dissonance – as human beings are finite, errors 
inevitably remain. Rather, what is distinctive about communism, according to Marx, is 
that there will not be any “socially necessary illusions.” That is to say, there will not be 
any illusions that are systematically generated and regenerated by social relations.  
 Note that Marx does not derive the necessity of praxis on the basis of some 
external moral values. Rather, following Hegel, Marx’s method of critique of theoretical 
reason is entirely immanent. By working through theoretical reason, Marx proves the 
limits of theoretical reason, namely, that there is an inherent illusion in it that cannot be 
cleared out through itself alone.265 He thus proves that, in order for transparency of 
reason to obtain, theoretical reason must be transformed into praxis.266 
                                                        
265 In the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel explains the method of immanent critique as follows: “The 
forms of thought must be considered in and of themselves. They are themselves the object as well 
as the activity of the object. They themselves examine themselves and they must determine for 
themselves their limits and point up their deficiency in themselves. This is the activity of 
thinking…that it is to be regarded not as something brought to bear on thought-determinations 
from outside of them, but instead as immanent in them. (EnzL. § 41Z) Following Hegel’s method, 
Marx lets theoretical reason to examine itself, determine for itself its own limit, and point up its 
deficiency through itself. 
266 One could argue that transparency and elimination of illusion are external moral values, and 
thus Marx uses external values in his scientific analysis. However, the argument is wrong, since 
transparency and elimination of falsity are internal cognitive values. There cannot be any 
knowledge, if there is no commitment to elimination of falsity. See Roy Edgley and Roy Bhaskar 
who make the same argument: (1) This notion of wrongness or mistake…is evaluative, as 
criticism or appraisal in general is evaluative. [But] it is not…morally evaluative. (Edgley 
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By proving the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason, Marx in effect 
culminates what can be arguably shown to be the major drive of development of classical 
German philosophy, from Kant, to Fichte, to Schelling, to Hegel. Marx’s account is 
relatively distinct from his predecessors in two interrelated ways: First, Marx’s derivation 
of the necessity of praxis is primarily not of a philosophical nature, but it is based on his 
economic analysis of the structure of society in capitalism. Second, Marx radicalizes the 
notion of historicity of reason, the notion that has been already present, in a less explicit 
and worked-out way, in his predecessors. Marx’s claim in his mature works is not that 
theoretical reason is essentially bound up with illusions in every society; rather, his claim 
is that the theoretical reason is essentially bound up with illusions in capitalist 
societies.267  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1976:6) (2) “If, then, one is in possession of a theory which explains why false consciousness is 
necessary, one can pass immediately, without the addition of any extraneous value judgments, to 
a negative evaluation of the object (generative structure, system of social relations or whatever) 
that makes that consciousness necessary (and, ceteris paribus, to a positive evaluation of action 
rationally directed at the removal of the sources of false consciousness). Might it not be objected, 
however, that the fact/value distinction only breaks down in this way because one is committed to 
the prior valuation that truth is a good, so that one is not deriving a value judgment from entirely 
factual (natural) premises? But that truth is a good (ceteris paribus) is not only a condition of 
moral discourse, it is a condition of any discourse at all. Commitment to truth and consistency 
apply to factual as much as to value discourse; and so cannot be seized upon as a concealed 
(value) premise to rescue the autonomy of values from factual discourse.” (Bhaskar 2005 [1979]: 
69, my emphasis) 
267 Thus, Jindrich Zeleny talks of the “supersession of traditional ontology” in “ontopraxeology” 
in Marx, and emphasizes that “the beginnings of the ontopraxeological supersession of traditional 
philosophy…. presupposes a critical perspective on political economy and a grasp of the 
connection between bourgeois forms of individual life and social life – and metaphysics.” 
(1980:187) 
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2- The Persistence of Illusion in the Logic of Essence and Hegel’s 
Derivation of the Necessity of Praxis  
The task of objective logic is to grasp the structure of individuals. Hegel begins the 
objective logic with the logic of being. The logic of being defines individuals, as they 
immediately appear, in their brute givenness. In the logic of being, individuals are in the 
relation of Gleichgültigkeit with each other; they are “indifferent” towards one another, 
and their relation with one another remains “external” to what makes them what they are. 
As relations remain external to the structure of individuals, individuals ultimately remain 
indeterminable, unanalyzable atoms. The logic of being, thus, fails to determine the 
structure of individuals. 
 With failure of the logic of being, Hegel offers the logic of essence to explain the 
internal relations between individuals, the internal relations that constitute the essence of 
individuals. The logic of essence shows that the seeming indifference and externality of 
individuals to one another is an “illusion,” and that in truth individuals are all absolutely 
interrelated. However, as I have argued in Chapter One, the illusion of indifference of 
individuals does not disappear in the logic of essence. Such illusion rather constitutes a 
necessary moment of the structure of essence. Although Hegel officially discusses the 
category of illusion in the beginning of the logic of essence, I have argued that illusion 
persists throughout the logic of essence. In Chapter Two, I have argued that the “diversity” 
of individuals, the diversity that obtains by virtue of externality of individuals to one 
another, is an illusion. Individuals rather become what they are through the relation of 
“opposition” with each other. In Chapter Three, I have argued that the seeming self-
subsistence of individuals is an illusion. Individuals are rather essentially “accidents” of 
the “totality” of essence, and as accidents they entirely depend on the totality of essence. 
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In Chapter Five, I have argued that individuals seem to be contingent; it seems that each 
could simply be different from what it actually is. However, such “contingency” is an 
illusion that is governed by the “absolute necessity” of essence. We must grasp, then, that 
the logic of essence, although intends to overcome the externality of being, nonetheless 
“remains fettered by the externality of the immediate being” [mit dem unmittelbaren Sein 
als einem ihm auch Äußeren zugleich behaftet ist] (WdL I: 58, SL 61). 
 Thus, the objective logic – in its entirety – fails to do what is supposed to do. The 
logic of being takes individuals to be external to each other, and fails to recognize that 
such externality is an illusion. The logic of essence does recognize the externality of 
individuals as illusion, yet it cannot eliminate this illusion. The moment of illusion 
remains necessary for it. We must conclude, then, that Hegel’ exposition of the objective 
logic – of both the logic of being and of the logic of essence – is primarily critical. Indeed, 
the main drive for the transition from the logic of essence to the logic of Concept, from 
the objective logic to the subjective logic, is the elimination of the illusion of externality 
of being. Hegel characterizes the Concept as “ungetrübt”, as “untarnished” by the illusion 
of immediacy of being (EnzL §163) – the Concept is defined through “disappearance of 
illusion” [Verschwinden des Scheins] (EnzL §242, Hegel’s emphasis). Hegel describes 
the transition from the logic of essence to the logic of Concept, the transition through 
which the illusion of externality of being finally disappears, as follows:  
In the Concept, the realm of freedom is disclosed. The Concept is free because the 
identity that is in and for itself and constitutes the necessity of substance, is now 
also sublated or is posited being, and this posited being as self-relating is simply 
that identity. The opacity that the causally related substance have for each other 
has vanished and become a self-transparent clarity, for the originality of their self-
subsistence has passed into a posited being; the original substance is original in 
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that it is only the cause of itself, and this is the substance that has been 
emancipated into the Concept. (WdL II:251, SL: 582)268 
According to Hegel, the objective logic in its entirety should be considered as an illusion: 
the objective logic purports to be self-standing by itself, yet it does not recognize – and 
thereby remains “opaque” to – the fact that the objectivity is not something externally 
given, but objectivity is already a “posited being”; that is to say, objectivity is already 
posited by subjectivity. Hegel thus characterizes the transition from the objective logic to 
the subjective logic in terms of the “unveiling” [Enthüllung] of substance, as the 
unveiling of the fact that the totality of substance is not self-standing, but that it is 
produced through subjectivity. Through such transition, subjectivity gains “a self-
transparent clarity” [sich selbst durchsichtige Klarheit], and realizes that what seems to 
be external to it is in fact its own product.  
 The transition from the logic of essence to the logic of concept, from substance to 
subject, is not a transition that simply cancels out substance. It is rather the transition that 
shows, in the famous words of the Phenomenology of Spirit, that truth must be expressed 
“not merely as substance, but equally as subject” (PhG §17, my emphasis). Hegel 
discusses the absolute unity of subjectivity and objectivity in the culminating category of 
the logic – the “idea” [Die Idee].269 The two major forms of idea for Hegel are the 
                                                        
268 “Im Begriffe hat sich daher das Reich der Freiheit eröffnet. Er ist das Freie, weil die an und für 
sich seiende Identität, welche die Notwendigkeit der Substanz ausmacht, zugleich als aufgehoben 
oder als Gesetztsein ist und dies Gesetztsein, als sich auf sich selbst beziehend, eben jene Identität 
ist. Die Dunkelheit der im Kausalverhältnisse stehenden Substanzen füreinander ist 
verschwunden, denn die Ursprünglichkeit ihres Selbstbestehens ist in Gesetztsein übergegangen 
und dadurch zur sich selbst durchsichtigen Klarheit geworden; die ursprüngliche Sache ist dies, 
indem sie nur die Ursache ihrer selbst ist, und dies ist die zum Begriffe befreite Substanz.” 
269 “The idea can be grasped as reason (this is the genuine philosophical meaning of reason), 
further as subject-object, as the unity of the ideal and the real of the finite and the infinite, of the 
soul and the body, as the possibility that has its actuality in itself, as that the nature of which can 
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theoretical idea, and the practical idea, which then finally get united in the absolute 
idea.270 Contrary to what has now become commonplace in readings of Hegel – a reading 
that regards him to be the ultimate “speculative” philosopher – Hegel in the logic 
forcefully argues for the primacy of the practical idea over the theoretical idea, namely, 
for the primacy of praxis over theory. The proof of the primacy of the praxis over theory 
lies, again, in the drive of the Concept to discard its illusion. In theoretical idea, Hegel 
writes, objectivity 
counts just as much as a presupposition that has been merely found, as 
an apprehension of a given; in fact the activity of the Concept here consists 
merely in being negative towards itself, restraining itself and making itself passive 
towards what confronts it in order that the latter  [i.e. objectivity] may be able 
to show itself, not as determined by the subject, but as it is in its own self. [Die 
gesetzte Bestimmung gilt daher ebensosehr als eine nur gefundene Voraussetzung, 
als ein Auffassen eines Gegebenen, worin die Tätigkeit des Begriffs vielmehr nur 
darin bestehe, negativ gegen sich selbst zu sein, sich gegen das Vorhandene 
zurückzuhalten und passiv zu machen, damit dasselbe nicht bestimmt vom 
Subjekte, sondern wie es in sich selbst ist, sich zeigen könne.] (WdL II:501, SL 
786) 
The theoretical knowledge in its attempt to grasp the objectivity without bias should 
repress its own desires and interests. It should thus become “passive,” such that 
objectivity can speak for itself. Thus, the theoretical knowledge, in effect, must 
presuppose the objective world as given; it must presuppose the “illusion” of the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
only be conceived as existing, and so forth, because in it [the idea] all relationships of the 
understanding are contained, but in their infinite return and identity in themselves.” (EnzL §214) 
270 In the Science of Logic Hegel calls the theoretical idea the “idea of the true” [Die Idee des 
Wahren], and the practical idea the “idea of the good” [Die Idee des Guten]. More simply, in the 
Encyclopedia Logic, he calls them, respectively, “knowledge” [Erkennen], and the “will” [Das 
Wollen]. 
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independence of objectivity. There is nothing wrong about this procedure – as long as we 
aim to know the world, we must let the world show itself; we should not apply our own 
ideals and desires to the world – nonetheless, the very fact that we have to presuppose the 
world as given shows, according to Hegel, the very limits of theoretical knowledge.  
 It is exactly for the overcoming of the limits of theoretical knowledge that Hegel 
argues for the primacy of practical idea. In contrast to the theoretical comportment, which 
takes the world as external, the practical comportment “is bent on determining, in terms 
of its purpose, the world that it finds.” [die vorgefundene Welt nach seinem Zwecke zu 
bestimmen] (EnzL. §233).271 Quite like Marx, what Hegel means by practical activity in 
this context is not an instrumental activity, which presupposes the existing world, and 
aims to fulfill certain aims within it. Such instrumental activity in effect accepts, and 
indeed reinforces, the “illusion” of independence of the world. Rather, the practical 
activity meant here is a revolutionary activity, which through transforming the world 
eliminates the illusion of externality of the world, and proves that the world is already the 
product of subjectivity.  
In this limited space, I cannot explain Hegel’s conception the relation of the 
revolutionary praxis to the objective (social) world. I only emphasize that Hegel rejects 
two equally one-sided conceptions: firstly, the voluntarist conception that conceives of 
revolutionary praxis as aiming to coercively superimpose a (moral) ideal on the real 
                                                        
271 The notion that the illusion of externality of world is annihilated through practical activity is 
also emphasized in the following passage: “What happens, however, in the process of realizing 
the purpose in itself is that the one-sided subjectivity and the illusion [Schein] of objective self-
sufficiency on hand opposite it are sublated. In seizing the means, the Concept posits itself as the 
object’s essence as it is in itself. In the mechanical and chemical process, the self-sufficiency of 
the object has already evaporated in itself and in the course it takes under the dominance of the 
purpose [unter der Herrschaft des Zwecks], the illusion of that self-sufficiency, the negative 
dimension opposite the concept, sublates itself.” (EnzL. §212) 
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world, and secondly, the evolutionary, fatalist conception that conceives of the existing 
totality as changing on its own accord, without the necessity of any explicitly subjective 
intervention.272 The two conceptions, according to Hegel, are both inadequate, since they 
both presuppose the objective world as existing on its own, and as external to subjectivity. 
Hegel argues that, in contrast to the “einseitige Subjektivität”, the “one-sided 
subjectivity”, which operates in both conceptions, the true revolutionary praxis must be 
conceived in terms of the “übergreifende Subjektivität”, the “overreaching subjectivity” 
which transforms the totality from within. (EnzL. §215, Hegel’s emphases)273 What 
exactly such “overreaching” of subjectivity over objectivity means in both philosophical 
and political sense needs another, full, dissertation.  
 
3- The Critique of the Transition to the Concept as the Transition to 
Communicative Freedom 
I should like to finish this conclusion with a critique of Michael Theunissen’s conception 
of the transition of the logic of essence to the logic of Concept. In his Sein und Schein: 
die kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik, Theunissen argues  (a) that the logic of 
essence is primarily critical; (b) that the locus of Hegel’s affirmative logic is the logic of 
Concept (1978: 38); (c) that the logic of essence is the logic of the relation of 
                                                        
272 Lukács criticizes exactly these two one-sided conceptions of revolutionary praxis – i.e. 
“economic fatalism” and “ethical utopianism” – in his monumental “Reification and the 
Consciousness of the Proletariat.” (1971 [1923]: 196) 
273 “In the negative unity of the idea the infinite reaches over and beyond the finite, as does 
thinking over being, subjectivity over objectivity. The unity of the idea is subjectivity, thinking, 
infinity, and hence it is essentially distinct from the idea as substance just as this overreaching 
subjectivity (thinking, infinity) is to be distinguished from the one-sided subjectivity (one-sided 
thinking, one-sided infinity) to which it reduces itself in judging and making determinations.”  
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domination.274 Based on these points, Theunissen concludes that (d) the logic of the 
Concept is the logic of the relation of “intersubjective,” “communicative” freedom. By 
communicative freedom, Theunissen means a freedom through which  “the one 
[individual] experiences the other [individual] not as a limit, but as a condition of his own 
self-actualization” (ibid: 46). I find it quite astonishing how Theunissen from his critical 
arguments regarding the logic of essence draws such a reconciliatory, conservative, 
conclusion of (d). In what follows, I offer a political as well as a logical critique of 
Theunissen’s thesis that the logic of Concept is the logic of communicative freedom.  
 From the political point of view, it is unclear how communicative freedom could 
possibly occur in the context of a society, which is essentially defined by the relations of 
power. Communicative freedom presupposes that individuals be on an equal footing, 
such that they could engage in – to use Wilfrid Sellars now famous phrase – the 
symmetrical activity of “giving and asking for reasons.” I have argued in Chapter Two 
that when the very constitution of individuals is the product of the asymmetrical relation 
of power, the equality obtained is merely an illusory equality – it is the equality with 
regard to the terms that the powerful dictates. How could a capitalist and a worker be 
possibly on an equal footing in a communication when the two are structurally defined in 
opposition to each other; when the former sets the rules of the possible communication to 
which the latter must necessarily abide?  
It seems that Theunissen offers a Kantian interpretation of Hegel: although 
individuals are constituted by the asymmetrical relations of power in the phenomenal 
world, they are nonetheless free to engage in the game of giving and asking for reasons in 
                                                        
274 See the Introduction for a more detailed discussion of Theunissen. 
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the noumenal world. If we take Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s two-world conception 
seriously, as we should, we cannot conceive of the transition of essence to Concept to be 
an unmediated transition from the phenomenal world of power to the noumenal world of 
communicative freedom. In order for communicative freedom to obtain, there must be 
first a revolutionary praxis, which transforms the one single world that exists from within, 
thereby making the communicative freedom structurally possible. 
 From the logical point of view, I find Theunissen’s interpretation of the logic of 
Concept as the theory of communicative freedom to be question begging from the very 
beginning. The question is this: Why Hegel, after developing the concept of totality in the 
entire second and third part of the logic of essence, should suddenly abandon it for the 
sake a theory of communicative freedom, which is based on the interrelation of two 
individuals? The logic of essence establishes that the totality is prior to individuals and 
constitutes them. The more plausible view is that, Hegel – rather than abandoning the 
concept of totality in order to begin anew from the interrelation of two individuals – 
shows how the totality of essence is transformed into the totality of the Concept. As I 
have argued, such self-transformation of totality should be understood in terms of the 
“overreaching subjectivity” which transforms objectivity such that objectivity accords to 
subjectivity, and that overreaching subjectivity is in effect nothing but the revolutionary 
praxis. 
 Theunissen’s main argument is based on Hegel’s usage of the concept of “love” 
[Liebe] to explain the freedom of the Concept. According to Theunissen, the freedom that 
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obtains through love is communicative.275 He draws a strong connection between 
Hegel’s conception of freedom as love, and Christian revealed theology. Indeed, he 
believes that Hegel’s conception of freedom and Christian theology are thoroughly 
intertwined, such that they mutually ground each other.276 I do not want to enter into a 
theological dispute here, and I grant Theunissen that the freedom that obtains through 
love between two individuals is communicative. I also grant him that such conception of 
freedom and love is pivotal for the young Hegel in his Frankfurt years. However, all 
these do not mean that Hegel in his much-later-written Science of Logic uses the same 
concept of love, as he did then. Indeed, in the Science of Logic Hegel does not indulge in 
theological thinking, and he allows himself to use the concept of love only in one single 
passage of the logic of Concept. Theunissen, without quoting the entire passage, refers to 
it to support his interpretation. This is the passage in its entirety: 
The universal is therefore free power; it is itself and overreaches over its other, 
but without doing violence to it; on the contrary, the universal is at rest in its other 
as in its own. We have called it free power, but it could also be called free love 
and boundless blessedness, for it bears itself towards its other as towards its own 
self; in it, it has returned to itself. [Das Allgemeine ist daher die freie Macht; es ist 
es selbst und greift über sein Anderes über; aber nicht als ein Gewaltsames, 
sondern das vielmehr in demselben ruhig und bei sich selbst ist. Wie es die freie 
Macht genannt worden, so könnte es auch die freie Liebe und schrankenlose 
Seligkeit genannt werden, denn es ist ein Verhalten seiner zu dem 
                                                        
275 “Als Freiheit definiert Hegel ‘die Verhältnisweise des Begriffs’. Da aber der Begriff selber 
Liebe ist, muß die mit ihm herkommende Freiheit eine bestimmte sein: die kommunikative.” 
(ibid:46, Theunissen’s emphasis) 
276 “Universale Kommunikationstheorie und Theologie hängen so untrennbar zusammen. Wie die 
Kommunikationstheorie der Hegelschen Logik zu verstehen sei, verrät ihre theologische 
Fundierung, und umgekehrt läßt sich der kommunikationstheoretischen Absicht entnehmen, was 
da ‘Theologie’ heißt: Logos des Logos, der, nach dem Lieblingsjünger auch Hegels, Liebe ist (1 
Joh 4,8,16).” (ibid: 50) 
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Unterschiedenen nur als zu sich selbst; in demselben ist es zu sich selbst 
zurückgekehrt.] (WdL II:277, SL 603) 
Hegel here does identify freedom of the Concept with love, but there is no trace of 
mutual, symmetrical, intersubjective, communicative freedom in the conception of love 
that he offers. To the contrary, he defines the freedom of the Concept as the “power” that 
has the ability to “overreach” itself, and, by doing so, to constitute its other such that the 
Concept would find its own self in its other. Such conception of freedom qua power, 
rather than being symmetrical, is emphatically asymmetrical. The relation of freedom 
here is not between two individuals – as is the case in the intersubjective, communicative 
freedom – but between the totality of subjectivity and the totality of objectivity. It is a 
relation through which the totality of subjectivity manages to form the totality of 
objectivity.277  Such “free power” or love in effect is nothing but the revolutionary 
                                                        
277 True that for Hegel the Concept is an individual, but the individuality of Concept is not the 
empirical, common sense individuality. It is rather the individuality of totality, which results from 
the self-transformation of the totality of essence. Hegel thus writes, “The individual is the same as 
the actual, with the difference that the individual has gone forth from the Concept and is 
accordingly posited as universal, as the negative identity with itself…The individuality, however, 
is not to be taken in the sense of only immediate individuality in terms of which we speak of 
individual things, human beings…Rather, individuality, the subject, is the Concept posited as the 
totality.” (EnzL. §163) Indeed, Hegel does not hesitate to insist that the revolutionary praxis is 
always the revolutionary praxis of the totality that obtains by collective action of individuals, and 
that within the revolutionary praxis of the totality the individual is simply perishable: “The 
individual being is some side or other of the Idea, but for this still other actualities are needed, 
actualities that likewise appear as obtaining particularly for themselves; the Concept is realized 
only in them together and in their relation. The individual taken by itself [für sich] does not 
correspond to its concept; this limitation of its existence constitutes its finitude and its demise.” 
(EnzL. §213) 
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praxis278, and it is no accident that Hegel uses the same term “overreaching” 
[Übergreifen] in order to describe the structure of both.279
                                                        
278 That the subjectivity does not “do violence” to objectivity makes it no less revolutionary. The 
phrase is meant here to refute the voluntaristic conception of revolutionary praxis. 
279 To be fair to Theunissen, he recognizes the importance of the totality of Concept, insofar as he 
takes Hegel’s conception of love to consist of two aspects, one, the intersubjective love that 
occurs between individuals, and, two, God’s love towards individuals that obtains through his 
“condescendence” [Herunterlasung] in the religious community. Theunissen writes, “nach 
christlicher Theologie ist vor aller Liebe der Menschen zueinander und zu Gott dieser selbst in 
Liebe zu den Menschen hinabgestiegen. In der Begriffslogik verhält es sich nun nicht etwas so, 
daß Hegel Liebe als anthropologisches Phänomen thematisierte, und die theologischen 
Implikationen unausgesprochen ließe. Im Gegenteil: Unmittelbar thematisch macht er nur die 
göttliche Liebesbewegung, derart, daß erst aus ihr der intersubjektivitätstheoretischen Sinn seiner 
Rede sich erschließt.” (ibid:43). Insofar as Theunissen does recognize the importance of totality 
(or God) for securing the communicative freedom, his conception remains far superior to the 
vague and indeterminate Sellarsian conception of “the space of reasons,” or Rawlsian conception 
of “reflective equilibrium,” both of which assume that the mere activity of giving and asking for 
reasons can abolish the relations of power, and that such activity, on its own, can ground itself. 
Theunissen’s addition of the concept of totality to the picture of love notwithstanding, the very 
basic fact that the logic of Concept is not about intersubjective freedom remains true all the same. 
(In an earlier essay, Theunissen interprets the logic of Concept as the logic of Übergreifen, and 
interprets Hegel’s idealism in terms of Übergreifen of subjectivity over objectivity. In the said 
essay, he again interprets Hegel’s logic in theological terms, but this time he regards Hegel’s 
theology as “theology of domination” [Herrschaftstheologie]: “Größe, aber auch Grenze seiner 
[Hegels] Religionsphilosophie besteht darin, daß sie mit folgerichtiger Ausschließlichkeit 
Herssscaftstheologie ist und sein will.” (1978 [1975]: 355) In the book Sein und Schein, however, 
Theunssien, conceives of Hegel’s theology in the logic of Concept, as mentioned above, to be 
revealed theology of communicative freedom. The very fact that Theunissen oscillates between 
the two theological conceptions would indicate how his interpretation of the logic of Concept in 
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